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ABSTRACT

Feminist Theology and the Fantastic in Jewish Poetics and Children's Literature (1960s—
present)
by
Meira Levinson

Advisor: Carrie Hintz

This dissertation traces the development of Jewish fantasy rhetoric in post-WWII British and
American literature, focusing on three genres: kabbalistic Beat poetry, children’s fantasy, and
graphic novels/comics. Despite increasing scholarly attention to all these areas, little work has
focused on fantasy rhetoric or issues of gender and sexuality within non-canonical Jewish
literature, or on interplays of religion and fantasy in children’s literature. Jewish kabbalistic
poetry and children’s fantasy speak to each other in their mutual engagements with the
otherworldly, mystical and monstrous, interrogations of gender, and complex portrayals of
feminist theological potentialities. I identify and analyze Jewish-hermeneutic themes and
methodologies within chronological, geographic, and generic ranges of primary texts; doing so
opens new ways to conceptualize both “Jewish literature” and Judaism/Jewishness across
interdisciplinary contexts. Jewish children’s literature, particularly, receives significant attention
regarding questions of curricular use and sociological import; yet few conversations incorporate
rigorous literary analysis. Utilizing a range of literary theoretical and methodological lenses, my
project’s literature-disciplinary research aims to address this scholarly lacuna.
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Introduction

In 2010, an unlikely heroine entered the scene of children’s fantasy: Mirka, the hassidic
Jewish female protagonist of Barry Deutsch’s Hereville graphic novels. The book’s byline—
“Yet Another Troll-Fighting 11-Year-Old Orthodox Jewish Girl”—dryly acknowledges Mirka’s
rarity, while simultaneously rendering her hassidic-female-superhero status normative.
Deutsch’s award-winning series amassed both critical acclaim and widespread popularity, among
Jewish and non-Jewish readers alike. Hereville is but one example of a recent explosion of
Jewish speculative literature, including Phoebe North’s Starglass (2013), Ari Goelman’s The
Path of Names (2013), and Shana Mlawski’s Hammer of Witches (2013). These publishing
trends challenge claims such as Michael Weingrad’s that there is “no Jewish Narnia” (“No
Jewish Narnia”). How did such an explosion of Jewish fantasy come to pass? What religious,
feminist, and cultural re-imaginings do these works open?
I explore these questions by tracing the development of the Jewish fantastic in noncanonical, post-World War II British and American literature. To do so, I look at examples of
Jewish mysticism and fantasy from the 1960s onward, across three genres: poetry, children’s
prose fiction, and graphic novels/comics. My research uncovers strands of Jewish mystical
fantasy in both Jewish and non-Jewish literature during the 1960s to 1990s; these strands indicate
an emerging English-language, Jewish fantasy rhetoric. Jewish poets such as David Meltzer and
Rose Drachler combine what Adeena Karasick terms “kabbalastic hermeneutics” with fantastic
tropes to rework traditional, rabbinic-Jewish thematics from postmodern feminist perspectives
(Karasick, “Hijacking Language”). Meanwhile, non-Jewish children’s fantasy of overlapping
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decades, such as Diana Wynne Jones’ Dalemark sequence (1975-93) and Madeleine L’Engle’s
Time novels (1962-86), similarly engage with kabbalistic and midrashic themes to suggest new
feminist epistemologies. My dissertation argues that it is the development of these intertwined
strands—kabbalistic fantasy rhetoric and feminist religious epistemologies—that makes the
emergence of contemporary Jewish genre fantasy, such as Hereville, possible.
I specifically examine non-canonical literature in order to interrogate dominant
conceptualizations of Anglo-Jewish literature; in so doing, I build on current scholarly efforts to
broaden considerations of not only Jewish literature, but of contemporary identifications and
expressions of Judaism/Jewishness as well. As scholars such as Ammiel Alcalay, Diane Matza,
and Dalia Kandiyoti have emphasized, “Jewish-American literature” is often conflated, in both
popular and critical discourse, with “Yiddish-inflected speech” and Eastern-European immigrant
themes—a “tradition” of Cahan to Roth that has become mainstream within both Jewish and
American literary canons (Matza 2). Yet, as these and other scholars point out, “Jewishness”—
in literary and other manifestations—is not a unitary, static term but rather contains “intraethnic
difference” (Oksman 5); it often appears at the literary margins, whether ethnic (e.g. Sephardic
or Mizrahi literature), generic (graphic novels, children’s literature, or fantasy), or political (Beat
poetry). While recent scholarship has begun to expand and diversify notions of “Jewish” and
“Jewish-American” literature, much non-canonical Jewish literature, especially Beat poetry and
Jewish children’s literature, remains unexamined. Furthermore, little scholarship focuses on the
rich strains of the fantastic, or on issues of gender and sexuality, in these non-canonical works.
If, as Jodi Eichler-Levine posits, children’s literature is a “site at and through which we perform
core cultural ideas,” then Jewish children’s literature acts a unique repository of Jewish religious
and cultural engagements (xvii). Fantastic modes offer, as Brian Attebery writes, “new way[s] to
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relate to ancient beliefs” and to “redefin[e] the relationship between contemporary readers and
mythic texts” (Stories 3-4). I build on such concepts to examine what Jewish fantasy contributes
to our understandings of Judaism, poetics, childhood, and literature more broadly.
My project highlights texts that engage with overt feminist concerns by foregrounding
female narrative voices and subverting traditional gender roles. However, I particularly focus on
the primary texts’ common engagements with feminist theologies and religious epistemologies.
Here, I draw on a range of criticism from gender and sexuality studies, including Judith Butler’s
deconstructions of gender and sexual paradigms and Teresa De Lauretis’ discussion of feminist
epistemologies. I build as well on the work of Orthodox Jewish feminist scholars such as Tamar
Ross. Crucially, Ross’ explication of kabbalah’s feminist philosophy underpins her own radical,
Orthodox-Jewish, feminist theology. I connect Ross’ discussions of kabbalah to the kabbalistic
poetry of Meltzer and Drachler, who, like Ross, explore kabbalah’s endemic feminisms.1 I also
connect these discussions to the children’s fantasy of authors such as Goelman, Mlawski,
L’Engle, and Jones. I do not argue causal links; rather, I use feminist theoretical lenses, such as
those of Ross and Butler, to uncover similar lines of thought across these variant genres and
writers. My project explores what such commonalities can teach us regarding these writers and
genres individually, and regarding conceptions of “Jewish literature” cumulatively.

Theoretical Frameworks and Definition of Terms
Jewish Literature and Jewish Children’s Literature
The primary texts discussed in this dissertation do not all easily or necessarily fit within
the category of “Jewish literature,” however delineated, particularly the texts I discuss in
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As do other poets of Meltzer’s and Drachler’s circles, notably Hirschman, especially in works such as Shekinah
(1969), and later poets such as Rachel Tzvia Back.
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chapters two and three. Yet all of the primary texts display themes of feminist religio-spiritual
mysticism that either directly invoke, or else complement, Jewish-kabbalistic and midrashic
concepts. In selecting and analyzing my project’s primary texts, therefore, and with particular
regards to my conceptualization of “Jewish literature,” I employ methodologies similar to those
of Travis, Eichler-Levine, Oksman, Miller, and Morris. Like Travis, I identify overt Jewish
characters, diction, and/or themes within mainstream literature, and include in my study texts by
non-Jewish authors that depict Jewish content, such as Hebrew-biblical references. I diverge
from Travis, however, in considering less overtly Jewish content, particularly in my second and
third chapters. Similarly to Eichler-Levine and Oksman, I consider texts by self-identified
Jewish authors—whether such authors identify as Jewish from religious, secular, cultural, or
ethnic perspectives—in order to examine a wider range of prevalent, if covert, Jewish thematics
in such literature. Eichler-Levine aptly describes this question (of what makes a work “Jewish”)
as an “open question” and points to a number of useful (though not exclusive) barometers, such
as “Jewish authorship and/or themes,” or explicit use of Jewish legends, “history, symbols or
holidays” regardless of authorial identity (“Golems and Goblins”). Thus, scholars such as
Miller, Morris, Eichler-Levine, and Oksman rightly point out the ambiguous boundaries, in the
first place, of the term “Jewish.” I follow their lead, methodologically, in arguing for a more
porous approach to the category “Jewish literature”; juxtaposing different works that employ
similar kabbalistic or midrashic imagery, for instance, is surely useful regardless of the nominal
religious or secular self-identifications of the authors.
Like Eichler-Levine, I define “Jewish children’s literature” “capaciously.” In thinking
about the characteristics and boundaries of this category, I find Eichler-Levine’s delineations
useful: Eichler-Levine includes “work both about or written by Jews, directed at young people
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ages 0-16, and encompassing numerous genres, including picture books, schoolbooks,
nineteenth-century ‘catechisms,’ poetry, biblical adaptations, young adult novels, and more”
(“Golems and Goblins”). Eichler-Levine points to Jewish children’s literature as “emerg[ing] in
the nineteenth century, coinciding with two Christian influences: namely, the developing Sunday
School movement and the growth of children’s literature as a distinct category” (“Golems and
Goblins”). My discussions of explicitly-Jewish children’s speculative literature, therefore, exist
within the wider field of Jewish children’s literature to which Eichler-Levine points. For the
sake of feasibility, I limited the scope of this dissertation’s genre considerations to poetry, prose
novels (including both chapter books and young adult novels), and comics and graphic novels.
This current project thus excludes picture books, primers, and educational materials;2 it also
excludes works published prior to 1960.3 I hope to include these categories in future projects
stemming from this dissertation. The picture books of Maurice Sendak, William Steig, and
Sadie Rose Weilerstein are of particular salience to this conversation, especially those
emphasizing Jewish-speculative content such as Weilerstein’s The Adventures of K’tonton
(1935), Sendak’s Where the Wild Things Are (1963), Steig’s Shrek! (1990), and Kushner and
Sendak’s Brundibar (2003).
Eichler-Levine’s discussion of the definition of “Jewish literature” referenced above
regards, specifically, children’s literature; however, I find Eichler-Levine’s examples salient for
the purposes of this dissertation’s analyses, including analyses of texts outside the realm of
“children’s literature,” such as kabbalistic Beat poetry. While I agree with Miller that “however

2

For more on North American Jewish children’s educational materials and bible editions, see Penny Schine Gold,
Making the Bible Modern (2004).
3
Including, of course, realist children’s fiction, including classics such as Sydney Taylor’s All-of-a-Kind Family
(1951). For work on Taylor, see Cummins, “Becoming an ‘All-of-a Kind’ American”; for work on contemporary
realist Jewish young adult literature, see Cummins, “What Are Jewish Boys and Girls Made Of?: Gender in
Contemporary Jewish Teen and Tween Fiction.”
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one characterizes ‘Jewish poetry,’ you need not be Jewish to write it” (xiv), my project answers
Christine A. Meilicke’s call for Orthodox Jewish perspectives on Jewish poetry engaging with
traditional and rabbinic Judaism.4 My primary focus, therefore, is on writers who identify as
Jewish and grapple, specifically, with rabbinic-Jewish themes from feminist perspectives. In
examining the use of kabbalah across most of my primary texts, I employ Karasick’s definition
of kabbalah as “hermeneutic methodologies”: kabbalah as a mode of critical exegesis
(“Hijacking Language”). While I ground my understanding of kabbalistic texts and histories in
the work of experts such as Gershom Scholem and Moshe Idel, I build primarily on approaches
such as those of Karasick, Meilicke, and Maria Damon. My approach here integrates the
perspectives of poets such as Jerome Rothenberg, Jack Hirschman, Meltzer, and Drachler, many
of whom are also scholars of kabbalah. I therefore look not only at Meltzer’s creative kabbalistic
writings, but also at his translations, anthologies, and analytic writings regarding medieval and
early modern kabbalistic texts. My project breaks new scholarly ground by considering these
non-canonical writers, as well as by examining how such kabbalistic poetics are informed by
contemporary fantasy theory.

Fantasy and Speculative Fiction; Immersive and Portal-Quest Fantasy Rhetoric
Similarly to my approach to conceptualizing “Jewish literature” more porously, I define
“fantasy literature,” for the purposes of this dissertation, broadly as well. I include science
fiction, horror, fantasy, dystopian, and to a certain extent magical realism, within my category of
“fantasy/fantastic literature.” At times in this dissertation I refer to such literature as fantasy; at
other times, I refer to it as speculative literature/fiction. The latter terminology is perhaps more
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See Meilicke, Jerome Rothenberg’s Experimental Poetry and Jewish Tradition (2005).
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accurate and useful; my personal preference would be for this language to become more
generally used by scholars when referencing this broader category so as to allay confusion.
However, many of the fantasy theorists and scholars from whom I most directly draw, such as
Mendlesohn and Attebery, specifically draw distinctions between the genres listed above (e.g.,
between fantasy and science fiction). While such distinctions can be exceedingly useful in some
conversations, for my purposes here I find it more productive to take a step back and view
speculative fiction texts both more broadly (from a bird’s eye view, so to speak) and more
inclusively. This is partly because I often subscribe to Diana Wynne Jones’ poking fun at genre
conventions: that science fiction is “fantasy where you traveled on a spaceship; Fantasy was SF
where you traveled on a flying carpet; and Horror was both of those in the claws of a demon”
(Reflections 110). As Jones and others such as Attebery note, the subdivisions of “fantasy”
versus “science fiction” versus “horror” and so on were in part designed by publishers and book
sellers for marketing purposes.5
More fundamentally, though, all of these subdivisions—fantasy, science fiction, dystopia,
etc.—share one crucial trait: subversions of, and thus implicit critiques of, the ontoepistemelogical status quo of the “real” or our accepted world/reality. This is true regardless of
which aesthetic tropes carry such subversions (i.e. whether the aesthetics are those of “science
fiction,” “dystopia,” “horror,” etc.). This is broken down most usefully by Jackson (Fantasy: the
Literature of Subversion [1981]) but is also a common denominator across various fantasy
theorists. Regardless of whether one thinks fantasy operates via a 180-degree reversal of the real
(Rabkin), or via uncanny hesitation (Todorov), or by other means, the fantastic displays a
“creative and disruptive play with representations of the real world” (Attebery, Stories,

5

See Jones, “A Talk About Rules,” in Reflections, pp. 106-112; Attebery, Stories, “Taxonomic Interlude: A Note on
Genres,” (kindle edition).
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“Taxonomic Interlude”). The result, across most definitions, is the fantastic/speculative queering
of onto-epistemological norms.
Therefore, while much foundational fantasy theory—particularly Jackson’s exploration
of fantastic modes as subversive—forms the bedrock of my approach, my project builds most
directly on recent work focusing on fantasy rhetoric and epistemology, particularly that of Farah
Mendlesohn, Edward James, and Brian Attebery. Mendlesohn highlights the ideological politics
and ramifications of various fantasy rhetorical forms; I apply her discussions of what she terms
“immersive” and “liminal” fantasies—particularly, their dialectical reader-text dynamics and
subversive possibilities—to my project’s primary texts. Attebery bridges fantasy theory with
religious and cultural studies by examining modern fantasy’s reworking of myth; I utilize his
methodology to offer new ways of framing Jewish fantastic literature. Both Mendlesohn and
Attebery emphasize the subversive dynamic of fantastic rhetoric; I integrate their work with
Eichler-Levine’s concept of fantasy’s potential to “unbind” and reimagine communal narratives.
While Eichler-Levine explores how fantasy unbinds Jewish cultural tropes of suffering, I extend
such readings to literary engagements with religious and mystical Jewish traditions. Using
fantasy theory to illumine the “immersive” rhetorics of kabbalah, I hypothesize that Jewish
fantasy offers new ways to imagine feminist, religio-spiritual, Jewish identities.
In immersive speculative fiction (Mendlesohn’s terminology, Rhetorics), the narrative
frequently presents content (vocabulary, locations, references) that is familiar to the protagonist
but unfamiliar, and unexplained, to the reader. As Mendlesohn explains, this is due to immersive
fantasy’s closely mimetic/realist mode of narration: readers see the fantastic world through the
perspective of the native protagonist, to whom everything is normal and mundane. Since
immersive rhetoric is often closely wedded to the protagonist’s viewpoint, readers receive little
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or no explanation. Just as we would not walk around our world thinking explanatory
monologues to ourselves (“this is gravity! I am human”) so too immersive protagonists would
not internally reflect on things they take for granted.6
This specific rhetorical strategy of immersive speculative fiction can have a paradoxical
effect on readers: one of simultaneously drawing readers in and estranging them. It distances
readers because they encounter unfamiliar content with little to no hand-holding or guidance
from the text. Simultaneously, though, this rhetorical move draws in and privileges readers by
giving them the “inside view” so to speak. Meanings do not need to be explained specifically
because the reader is tacitly positioned and accepted as a fellow insider to the secondary-world’s
culture. There is a familiarizing dynamic here, between text and reader, that contrasts with the
boundedness of the reader-text relationship in portal-quest rhetoric.
Portal-quest fantasy rhetoric (Mendlesohn Rhetorics) refers to fantasy in which the
protagonist enters the fantastic world from our world via a portal—for instance, the Pevensie
children in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe (1950) travelling through the wardrobe. The
portal can also be more nebulous: Mendlesohn considers The Lord of the Rings (1954-5) a
portal-quest due to Frodo’s journey from the provincial, insular world of the Shire to the larger,
alien (to him) world of Middle Earth (i.e. the rest of Middle Earth) (Rhetorics 2). Quests do not
necessarily need to follow portals,7 but as Mendlesohn points out, they usually do. This is
because the protagonist—and reader—are essentially tourists in the fantastic/unfamiliar world;
quests serve as a device to take the protagonist/reader on a tour of the secondary world. In

6

For more on immersive fantasy rhetoric, see Mendlesohn, Rhetorics, chapter two.
For an example of a portal fantasy that distinctly does not have a quest, see Jones’ “The True State of Affairs,” a
short story/novella set within the Dalemark worlds, in which the protagonist journeys from another world (possibly
ours) to Dalemark via a portal, and is immediately imprisoned. The story, written in epistolary format, takes place
entirely from within the prison. For Mendlesohn’s discussion of this story and its subversion of the portal-quest
fantasy, see Mendlesohn, Diana Wynne Jones pp.94-100.
7
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portal-quest fantasies, the protagonists are completely unfamiliar with the fantasy world they’re
touring. They rely on other characters (usually guide figures, such as Gandalf in The Lord of the
Rings or Mr. Beaver or Aslan in Narnia) to interpret the world for them. This frequently
translates into a more frontal, explicit, and closed explanation of the fantasy world to readers as
well, often leaving less room for multiple or contrasting interpretations, or for either protagonist
or reader questioning/arguing the onto-epistemologies proffered by the authoritative guide
figures.8
In the portal-quest fantasy, readers may be more comfortable in the secondary world due
to textual guidance, explanation, and interpretation (for both protagonist and reader). However,
protagonists—and thus readers—are inherently held at a distance, seen as an outsider, in order
for such explanations to even occur in the first place. In contrast, immersive rhetoric may be
initially more difficult and discomforting, as readers need to piece together meaning and contexts
for themselves; however, readers by default occupy a much more intimate stance vis a vis the
text/secondary world. Additionally, portal-quest fantasy lends itself to more passive and
obedient reading dynamics, as the strange/fantastic is explicitly explained. In contrast, readers of
the immersive fantasy must construct meaning for themselves by piecing together clues from
narrative contexts. The immersive mode is indirect, interactive, and dialogic—and, within
fantasy, it normalizes the strange.

Children’s Fantasy (intersection of children’s literature and fantasy literature)
In terms of situating and contextualizing the discussions of children’s fantasy in chapters
two through five, I specifically focused on works produced (published and/or written) from the
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For more on the portal-quest fantasy, including its colonialist dynamics, see Mendlesohn, Rhetorics, chapter one.
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1960s onward in order to examine those works published after Lewis’ and Tolkien’s impacts on
the fields of fantasy and children’s fantasy. This dissertation does not address Lewis’ and
Tolkien’s works directly; much has already been written on those topics, and my dissertation
focuses instead on feminist reimaginings of both the fantastic and the religio-spiritual, in works
published after Chronicles of Narnia (1950-6) and The Lord of the Rings. It is important,
however, to understand the impacts of Narnia and The Lord of the Rings, and of Lewis and
Tolkien separately from their novels (e.g. in their lectures and nonfiction writing), on both the
writers I examine and the fields as a whole. Even in cases when Lewis and Tolkien had no direct
influence on a specific writer, they impacted the fantasy publishing fields (for children and adults
alike) in both England and North America (C. Butler, Four British Fantasists, chapter 1, “Oxford
Fantasies”). Butler argues that this very impact—the fact that the tremendous sales of The Lord
of the Rings and Narnia convinced publishers there was a market for more fantasy—is even
more important to consider, as a historical and contextual impact on later writers than any direct
emulation or influence of The Lord of the Rings or Narnia themselves. Butler, along with other
scholars such as Mendlesohn and Attebery, also argues that one big impact on the field were the
hoards of Tolkien imitators/derivatives, which set certain generic expectations for fantasy’s
props, rhetorics, narrative trajectories, and underlying ideologies.
Aside from these material factors (e.g. market/publishers, trends of imitators) The Lord of
the Rings and Narnia are significant in the story of fantasy’s development because, as
Mendlesohn argues, “These novels set the pattern for what Clute describes as the full fantasy: the
novels presume a thinned world, one in which wrongness already exists—a motif absent from
Lilith or Wonderland but already present in Oz—and a consolatory healing or restoration (rather
than transmutation), in which the participants are fulfilling an agon, ‘a context conducted in
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accordance with artistic rules’” (Rhetorics 30). While such factors can undoubtedly be found in
the novels I discuss in chapters two and three, what interest me more (for the purposes of this
dissertation) are the ways in which all of the texts discussed in chapters two through five
specifically react against various ideologies latent in Lewis and Tolkien’s fantasies. This is often
the case regarding gender and sexual politics, especially with the authors discussed in chapters
two and three (Jones, L’Engle, Le Guin, and Pierce). It is also the case regarding ethnic and
colonial/postcolonial politics, especially with the authors discussed in chapters four and five
(Mlawski, Goelman, North, Deutsch, and Wilson/Amanat), although this is a pointed aspect of
the fantasy of Jones, Le Guin, and Pierce as well. Finally, all of the writers discussed in this
dissertation upend the religio-spiritual politics at play in Lewis and Tolkien’s fantasies as well—
and they do so while still depicting affirmative religio-spiritual content. The texts discussed in
this dissertation, however, all engage with religio-spiritual themes that offer feminist
problematizations of (often patriarchal in origin) onto-epistemologies. Speculative literature thus
becomes a space for such critique/questioning and reimagining of religio-spirituality;
simultaneously, such writers offer new possibilities for feminist fantasy.

Religion and Children’s Literature (both general and speculative children’s literature)
Religious thematics are especially weighted in the genres of children’s literature in
general and children’s fantasy literature in particular. As one might expect, examining religiospiritual themes in children’s fantasy illuminates what specific religio-spiritual ideologies are at
work within the text at hand; it also, however, sheds light on broader questions of authority and
onto-epistemology that such thematics and rhetorics open. This is the case for two primary
reasons: first, almost any religio-spiritual content reflects implicit or explicit politics regarding
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onto-epistemology (i.e., regarding ontology and the process of seeking/understanding ontology)
and authority (e.g., how do we form truth-narratives or onto-epistemologies, who/what is reliable
or authoritative in that process). Second, children’s literature is inevitably entangled in issues of
power dynamics, if only because it is a genre/field uniquely positioned as created for one group
(children) by—largely9—outsiders (adult writers, publishers, and access intermediaries such as
parents, librarians, and teachers). This, of course, is in addition to the fact that much children’s
literature—historically and currently—exists within explicit conversations regarding power,
whether those conversations address censorship, pedagogic value/use, or appropriateness, and
whether such conversations occur in scholarly journals, mass periodicals, library or education
publications, or other venues. Hence, examining how religio-spiritual and broader ontoepistemological themes and rhetoric function within children’s fantasy sheds light on the
implications of those themes and rhetorics. This in turn can then inform broader conversations
regarding dynamics of power and authority within and surrounding children’s fantasy. In the
upcoming chapters, I thus examine exactly such religio-spiritual themes in children’s fantasy,
across a range of genres and media.
As mentioned above, religious thematics are particularly weighted in the genres of
children’s literature and children’s fantasy literature in general. Regarding the genres of
children’s literature and children’s fantasy, religious thematics are particularly weighted due to a
number of factors. First, children’s literature as a broader genre/field has historical roots in
religious-pedagogical materials; before the twentieth century, “[m]uch of the material intended
for young readers was either directly religious in origin, or took the form of stories calculated to
motivate them towards behavior regarded as appropriate to young Christians” (Pinsent, “Making
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Of course some children’s literature is written by children (e.g. Gordon Korman’s This Can’t Be Happening at
MacDonald Hall [1978]); the majority of published titles, however, are written, marketed, and accessed via adults.
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disciples of the young”).10 Even in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, didacticism and
submerged religious impulses or agendas remain common in children’s literature, “even in works
by writers who would have disavowed it”; Pinsent also notes an “increasing focus [...] on what
might be termed the spiritual value of respect for the environment” (Pinsent, “Making disciples
of the young”).
Second, both fantasy literature and children’s fantasy, specifically, are marked as well by
religious roots. Attebery convincingly argues that fantasy “employs the mechanisms of the
sacred: prophecy, miracle, revelation, transformation” and examines the many ways “writers use
fantasy to reframe myth: to construct new ways of looking at traditional stories and beliefs”
(Stories 2).11 Mendlesohn identifies the bible, among other sources, as an origin for the “quest
fantasy” (Rhetorics 3);12 Mendlesohn and Levy point to Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress (1678)
as “one of the great taproot texts of the quest fantasy” (Children’s Fantasy Literature 1).13
While pre-eighteenth century texts for children, and especially religious texts for children, may
have privileged non-fiction or realist modes, by the end of the eighteenth century “a change in
the way (middle- and upper-class) children were understood enabled the fantastical to enter the
sphere of children's reading” (Levy and Mendlesohn 1). Levy and Mendlesohn posit that the
emergence of children’s fantasy literature was thus tied to both religion and shifts in
conceptualizing childhood: the prior “perception of the child who is born sinful, who must be
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For more on the connections between religion and children’s literature (i.e. the broader field/genre of children’s
literature, as versus children’s fantasy literature, specifically) see Pinsent, “‘Making disciples of the young’:
Children’s Literature and Religion” in The Bloomsbury Reader in Religion and Childhood (2017); Lerer 2008: 61;
and Miskec, “Religion and Children’s Literature: A Decennial Examination.”
11
“Myth” for Attebery here includes religion and the sacred: “throughout this book, myth is used to designate any
collective story that encapsulates a world view and authorizes belief” (Stories 1, original emphasis).
12
Other origins of the quest fantasy Mendlesohn cites include the epic, Arthurian romances, and fairy tales
(Rhetorics 3).
13
This, albeit the fact that Bunyan himself “explicitly denied that The Pilgrim’s Progress was fantasy” (Children’s
Fantasy Literature 1). See also: Mendlesohn, Rhetorics 4.
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tamed and led away from the fantastical to a realist understanding of his or her Christian
responsibilities, is gradually exchanged for a notion that the child is born innocent, and can be
tempted through the fantastic to the marvellous in Christianity” (1).14 Some of the most
formative (to the field) and prominent works of children’s fantasy, such as those by MacDonald,
Lewis and Tolkien,15 engage overtly and/or deeply with religious content and themes. As noted
previously, the work of Lewis and Tolkien in particular impacted the fields of fantasy and
children’s fantasy not only due to the fictional texts themselves, but due as well to publisher and
audience perceptions of what the categories “fantasy” and “children’s fantasy” look like. This
shift (which Levy and Mendlesohn locate, for children’s fantasy, in the 1950s—1980s) included
an upsurge of fantasy that was epic, mythopoeic, hero-quest oriented, and focused on the
“otherworldly, either physically or spiritually” in contrast to “local, secular fantasy” (Levy and
Mendlesohn 106). Although different types of children’s fantasy besides portal-quest fantasy—
e.g., local, secular, urban, domestic, “intrusive” (Mendlesohn, Rhetorics), and other fantasy—
continued to thrive, Lewis and Tolkien “changed the mood and direction” of both genre and
children’s fantasy (Levy and Mendlesohn 106).16 Scholars such as Kath Filmer see the “struggle
with scepticism and religious plurality which pervades the work of writers such as Garner,
Cooper and Madeleine L’Engle” during the 1960s—1970s as the “spiritual descendant” of Lewis
(Levy and Mendlesohn 106). Indeed, in the case of many writers, such as Jones, L’Engle, and
14

Regarding religion and children’s fantasy literature, see also Eichler-Levine and Wood in The Bloomsbury Reader
in Religion and Childhood (2017); Eichler-Levine, Suffer, chapter 5; Wood, “Paradise Lost and Found: Obedience,
Disobedience, and Storytelling in C. S. Lewis and Philip Pullman”; and Gooderham, “Fantasizing It As It Is:
Religious Language in Philip Pullman’s Trilogy, His Dark Materials.”
15
Here, I refer to the influence of all three writers on the fields of fantasy and children’s fantasy literature; I also
refer to the impact of Tolkien’s and Lewis’ fiction on publishing and marketing trends.
16
In the context of this quote, Levy and Mendlesohn are actually referring specifically to Lewis; I would argue,
though, that this extends equally to Tolkien. Levy and Mendlesohn draw a distinction between Lewis and Tolkien
here due to their consideration of The Hobbit (1937) here (as children’s fantasy) as versus The Lord of the Rings
(adult fantasy); as Mendlesohn mentions elsewhere though (Diana Wynne Jones, Introduction), speculative fiction—
especially mid-twentieth-century—differed from much realist fiction in precisely its crossover (child–adult)
audiences.
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Pierce, the link to Lewis and Tolkien is explicitly acknowledged; for all of these writers it is a
link of both homage to and divergence from Lewis and Tolkien (the latter with regard,
especially, to gender and religious politics, as mentioned above).17
The histories and current historiographies of children’s literature, fantasy literature, and
children’s fantasies, therefore, are deeply entwined with religious history, concerns, content, and
ideologies—be they ideologies that inform the narratives, that undergird conceptualizations of
childhood and fantasy, or that motivate didactic agendas. This alone warrants paying attention to
the ways religious thematics and rhetoric play out in children’s fantasy literature. A third factor
that builds on these is that critical and scholarly approaches have traditionally assumed a didactic
objective of literature written for (or marketed towards) a child audience; such assumptions still
inform much contemporary scholarship and criticism.18

Jewish Fantastic
Howard Schwartz writes that “[t]ales of magic and wonder can be found in every phase
of Jewish literature, both sacred and secular” (1). My proposed terminology of a “Jewish
fantastic” or “Jewish monstrous” seeks to articulate overlays between the fantastic/monstrous
and explicitly-Jewish texts, tropes, or contexts (contexts such as cultural traditions, folk tales,
contemporary or historical Jewish-communal norms). This category includes instances in which
Jewish or non-Jewish cultures adopt traditional/rabbinic Jewish figures or tropes as “fantasy,”19
such as the figure of the golem, dybbuk, ibbur, or kabbalistic-magician rabbi. It can also include
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For discussion of and references regarding this, see chapters two and three.
See, for instance, Clark’s valuable survey of the state of the field within literature more broadly (as versus
specifically within children’s literature scholarship) towards children’s literature (Kiddie Lit: The Cultural
Construction of Children’s Literature in America (2003), chapter one, particularly pp.14-15).
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Fantasy here includes horror, science fiction, supernatural/superhuman beings, etc. as delineated previously.
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monsters displaying Jewish-cultural tropes, such as Sendak’s wild things that evoke (and were
inspired by) Sendak’s Jewish relatives (Eichler-Levine, Suffer, 132) as well as Ashkenazi-Jewish
immigrant stereotypes in twentieth-century United States.
Although fantastic/supernatural beings and powers pervade Jewish texts from biblical
texts onward, many pre-modern instances occur in contexts in which the authors and/or
audiences believed in the literal reality of such beings and powers and considered such beings
natural as versus supernatural (Chajes 8-9). Despite the fact that contemporary scholarship is
able to view biblical, midrashic, and talmudic texts as literature (and thus to fruitfully analyze
those texts as such), the perspectives of those texts’ authors and contemporaneous recipients
would not have been “literary” in the fictional sense. In other words, as Attebery articulates,
what may be “fantastic” to contemporary Western eyes may be “realism” to those coming from
varying religious, ethnic, or other cultural starting points (Stories, chapter 6). Thus, the way a
sixteenth-century Jew may have viewed dybbuks, or how some twentieth-century hassidic Jews
view communication with the dead or the Ba’al Shem Tov’s teleportation powers (k’fitsat
haderekh) might be more aligned with each other than with, say, how the majority of
contemporary North Americans view demons and teleportation (i.e., as fantasy).
This distinction is especially important for me to draw regarding my use of the term
“fantasy” when discussing Jewish folkloric, kabbalistic, and midrashic figures and texts (such as,
for instance, the golem). Attebery very eloquently and respectfully points out that if we use
“fantasy” or “myth” to denote a break from the “consensus reality” (Attebery, quoting Kathryn
Hume, Stories, chapter 6), we must acknowledge that “consensus reality” is less a consensus
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than a specifically Western, “modern,”20 worldview that dichotomizes science versus myth and
the supernatural. As Attebery notes, many cultures operate under different starting premises
regarding the definition of “reality” altogether. Attebery gives the example of his car breaking
down in the mountains, and a stranger who stopped to help and suggested that perhaps the car
was possessed and “[h]ad [Attebery] considered exorcism?” (Stories, chapter 6). “Fantasy,”
Attebery writes, “can serve as a neutral meeting point for differing worldviews and different
understandings of religious myth—but only if we agree that what we are reading is fantasy, an
agreement that breaks down at exactly the same points where consensus reality fails to hold”
(Stories, chapter 6). Attebery thus asks, regarding angels (the topic of his chapter), “how many
people must disbelieve in a thing for its appearance in fiction to count as a violation of consensus
reality?” (Stories, chapter 6).
I mention Attebery’s questions and approach in such depth because I find it exceedingly
salient to the “Jewish fantastic” content discussed in my dissertation. For angels, one need
merely substitute golems—particularly within hassidic Jewish circles. My Lubavitch relatives,
for instance, in conversation with me regarding this dissertation, were surprised at and disagreed
with my categorization of golems as fantasy since, they argued, the golem is a real, factual figure
and the story with Rabbi Loew’s creation of the golem in Prague is not fictional legend but true
history.21 Who am I to say they are wrong? Even putting aside my own religious orientation,
such a stance would be hubristic and would defeat, to my mind, the entire point of speculative
literature. Writers like Diana Wynne Jones, Madeleine L’Engle, Tamora Pierce, and others
present fantasy as a “what if?” thought experiment—what if we had seven league boots, and the
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I place “modern” in quotations here not because I’m directly quoting from Attebery, but rather to problematize the
notion of this Western worldview/culture as somehow “modern” or more modern than those of non-Western or
indigenous cultures—a problematizing that Attebery discusses at length in Stories chapter one.
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Note that I repeat some of this content in a relevant footnote in chapter five.
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ability to instantaneously travel? This does not exclude the possibility of the seven league
boots—or a Star Trek transporter, or the Ba’al Shem Tov’s k’fitsat haderekh—from actually
occurring (whether now or in the future). As the famous Arthur C. Clarke’s Law states, “Any
sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic” (qtd. in Mendlesohn,
Rhetorics 62). The same might be said for culturally-held religio-spiritual truths that differ from
the “consensus reality” of the “cognitive majority” (Attebery, Stories, chapter 6) in this particular
time (twenty-first century) and place (United States).
This is all to say, therefore, that when I use the terms “fantasy” or “speculative,” it is not
to connote the impossibility of said events, figures, or textual depictions (and thus fantastic
theories such as Rabkin’s, for instance, are less useful to me here). Rather, it is a comment on
the textual mode of production and readerly engagement: most of the primary texts discussed in
this dissertation are written as, and read as, literature—poetic, fiction, speculative fiction—given
the time, place, authorship, and readership of their contexts (as distinct from, say, sixteenth
century recountings of ibburic or dybbuk encounters). A potential exception may be the comics
literature of chapter five—especially Mendy and the Golem, which was produced in affiliation
with Lubvatich organizations. However, even these texts are produced for and speaking to a
similar readership as the texts of my prior chapters, and thus operate with similar genre
awarenesses.
I bear such distinctions in mind, as well, when conceptualizing a literary-theoretical
framework of a “Jewish fantastic.” Similarly to the delineations of biblical, midrashic, and
talmudic texts discussed above, most scholarship on the topic of Jewish magic and supernatural
beings falls within historical, religious, or cultural studies disciplines. 22 Few scholars address the
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topic of the Jewish fantastic or monstrous from a literary or theoretical (whether theory of the
fantastic/monstrous, gothic, sexual, literary, or other theoretical) lens.23 Scholarship that does
address the Jewish fantastic/monstrous from this latter lense includes Judith Halberstam’s Skin
Shows (1995), Timothy Beal’s Religion and Its Monsters (2002), Howard Schwartz’s many
Jewish folk and fairy-tale compilations, and Jodi Eichler-Levine’s Suffer the Little Children:
Uses of the Past in Jewish and African-American Children’s Literature (2013). Much of my
analysis builds on, concurs with, or complements the above scholarship. Eichler-Levine’s
insightful explications of Jewish monsters and fantastic content in twentieth-century children’s
literature is of particular relevance to this dissertation for obvious subject-matter reasons.
Additionally, her theoretical approaches (fusing contemporary fantasy theory and scholarship
with religious, ethnic, and cultural-studies) and hypothesis of the power of fantasy to “unbind”
tropes of suffering both parallel and inform my own approaches.

From Beatnik Poetry to Hassidic Dragonslayers: Chapter Summaries
My dissertation begins by addressing the kabbalistic hermeneutics and fantastic rhetoric
of Jewish mystical poetry from the 1960s to 1990s. I analyze how such poetry employs
kabbalistic and fantastic rhetoric to frame rabbinic Jewish content—such as biblical and talmudic
references, or depictions of halakha (Jewish law)—from radical feminist perspectives. I focus
on poets whose work engages with specifically Orthodox or traditional Jewish sensibilities,
namely Meltzer and Drachler. I also, however, draw connections to a wider community of poets
engaging with kabbalah, including Jerome Rothenberg, Jack Hirschman, and Diane di Prima. I
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look as well at cross-genre writings, such as Meltzer’s anthology of kabbalah and his kabbalistic
journal Tree, as well as Drachler’s diary entries. I demonstrate that kabbalistic poetics, like
immersive fantasy, engages readers in radically feminist, dialectical constructions of fluid textual
meanings.
Chapters two and three examine children’s fantasy produced during the 1960s to 1990s
that displays overt feminist religious themes. Situating my discussion within a broader survey of
religious children’s fantasy of the mid-twentieth century, I focus on works exhibiting midrashic
themes and kabbalistic methodologies. Since most children’s genre fantasy from these decades
is neither overtly “Jewish” nor written by Jewish authors, I examine, as well, feminist-religious
fantasy that speaks to, but does not directly invoke, Jewish kabbalah or midrash. Chapter two
analyzes kabbalistic and midrashic themes, as well as Hebrew-biblical references and Hebrew
language usage, within Diana Wynne Jones’ Dalemark Sequence (1975-93), while chapter three
considers the broader feminist, religious-mystical dialects of writers such as Madeleine L’Engle,
Ursula K. Le Guin, and Tamora Pierce. All of these authors, I hypothesize, combine fantastic
rhetoric with religious hermeneutics—hermeneutics that either directly invoke, or subtly resonate
with, midrashic and kabbalistic methodologies—to problematize hegemonic epistemologies, and
to destabilize narrative truths regarding morality and divine authority. By doing so, they posit
feminist skepticisms that simultaneously critique and affirm religio-spiritual traditions.
My dissertation next moves to consider how such feminist epistemologies and mysticalfantastic dynamics play out in twenty-first century Jewish children’s speculative fiction. In
chapter four I explore four prose children’s and young adult novels: Phoebe North’s Starglass
(2013) and Starbreak (2015), Ari Goelman’s The Path of Names (2013), and Shana Mlawski’s
Hammer of Witches (2013). Chapter five examines three series of graphic novels and comics
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that feature orthodox religious superheroes/protagonists: G. Willow Wilson (author) and Sana
Amanat’s (creator) Ms. Marvel series (2014-2015), featuring Kamala Khan, a practicing Muslim,
Pakistani-American female teen superhero; Barry Deutsch’s Hereville series (How Mirka Got
Her Sword [2010], How Mirka Met a Meteorite [2012], How Mirka Caught a Fish [2015]); and
the Lubavitch-affiliated Mendy and the Golem series (1981-6; 2003-4), the latter two (Hereville
and Mendy) featuring ultra-Orthodox Jewish protagonists. All of these primary texts speak to
each other in their complex portrayals of Jewish culture, identity, and religion, and in their
engagements with the otherworldly and monstrous. All employ common rhetorical strategies
that render the “Jewish fantastic” immersive: all incorporate Jewish texts, themes, and diction in
ways that simultaneously familiarize and defamiliarize such Jewish content to and from readers.
Their immersive and kabbalistic methodologies encourage dialectical reader-text interactions
that jointly construct meaning. Most of these texts—particularly those by North, Goelman,
Mlawski, and Deutsch—thus foreground feminist concerns in two ways: through surface
privileging of female characters and narrative voices, and through more embedded feminist
critiques of the constructedness of language, identity, and ontology. Juxtaposed with the
children’s fantasy and kabbalistic, Beat poetry of my prior chapters, these twenty-first century
texts present ways to rethink our definitions of, and approaches to, the category “Jewish
literature.”
Overall, this dissertation seeks to highlight connections between the ways the poets in
chapter one use kabbalistic themes and methodologies—i.e. how kabbalistic and midrashic
themes are deployed in texts, the rhetorics/dynamics at play, and the political implications of
such—and the ways authors in chapters two through five employ similar methodologies of
religio-spiritual affirmation via critique. There is an explicit connection between the Abulafian
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kabbalah of the poets discussed in chapter one and that of twenty-first century, Jewish children’s
fantasists such as Goelman and Mlawski. There is an implicit connection between the poets’
uses of feminist, mystical religio-spirituality and magic and that occurring in contemporaneous
children’s fantasy by authors such as Jones, Le Guin, Pierce and L’Engle. Although the poets
and contemporaneous children’s authors, as far as I am aware, did not know each other (i.e.
across the children’s fantasy–poetics divide), they were clearly engaged with similar ideas,
politics, and potentially source materials.24 Fascinatingly, we see the twenty-first century
children’s speculative authors, such as Goelman and Mlawski, picking up a similar conversation
with their comparable uses of kabbalistic themes, methodologies, and politics.
These lines of connection raise numerous fascinating questions: causal questions of why
and how, of whether there was there “something in the air” of the post-World War II decades in
which Meltzer, Drachler, Jones, Le Guin, L’Engle, and Pierce wrote that explains similar
preoccupations (likely yes, many factors); questions of direct overlap in source material (e.g.
how many authors accessed Scholem’s lectures, Buber, or Buddhist texts); and of course
questions of reception (e.g. who read and reads the poetry and fiction discussed in this
dissertation; what impact does it have on readers and on conversations regarding feminist religiospiritualities). Such questions, compelling as they are (these are some of the first questions I am
often asked when presenting my research in interdisciplinary contexts, for example, especially
from historians and sociologists), exceed the scope of this current project. However, they would
be fruitful pursuits in projects that could stem from and build on this dissertation.
Given such explicit and implicit connections between these writers and texts, and with
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such fascinating and productive questions that arise from elucidating these cross-connections,
one might expect that prior scholarship might already have engaged in cross-comparison.
However, this is largely not the case. One likely explanation is of course the disparate “genre”
categories (poetic, children’s literature, and speculative-fiction of prose and graphic novels).
Another factor, however, is that all of the texts I address here are largely considered noncanonical within English academia.25 Despite the growth of children’s literature as a field, it is
still often viewed as marginal—and works that discuss both “adult” and “children’s” literature in
intertwined, equal manners are few and far between. Notably, some of the strongest scholarship
that does so stems from speculative-theoretic (e.g. fantasy, science fiction) positions, which is
itself still largely marginalized. The marginalization of Jewish Beat poetry—especially within
now-established categories such as Jewish literature—is simply astounding. My point is:
perhaps these authors and texts have not been put together in prior scholarly conversation
because not only do they stem from disparate genres, but they stem from genres that are all
marginalized (within academia) in different ways.
My goal in this dissertation, therefore, is to take that first step in cross-comparison, and to
urge for the use and value in specifically aligning these variant texts. Doing so is useful—
whether one is asking questions regarding “Jewish literature,” “children’s literature,”
“speculative fiction,” religio-spirituality, or other potential arenas (e.g. gender/sexuality), putting
these texts, and others like them, in conversation with each other broadens and provides more
accurate pictures of what is happening from literary, historical, and cultural perspectives. The
same way that Matza and Aizenberg call for “Jewish literature” to be stretched beyond the
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current Ashkenazi-oriented domain to include Sephardic and Mizrahi literature, so too I argue
that “Jewish literature” should include children’s/young-adult novels, graphic novels, picture
books, and Beat/kabbalistic poetry. In a similar vein, discussions of fantasy literature would be
broadened by including poetry, especially mystical poetry such as that discussed here.
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Chapter 1: Feminist Kabbalah in the Jewish Mystical Poetry of Meltzer and Drachler

This chapter explores ways that Jewish, Beat-era poetry engages with feminist religiospiritual critiques through mystical tropes, kabbalistic themes, and fantastic rhetoric. By doing
so, such poetry interrogates Jewish traditions and communal narratives; simultaneously, it offers
a specifically-Jewish rendering of “fantastic” or “speculative” tropes. These moves open new
ways for readers to reimagine both Judaism and the fantastic. In this chapter I discuss this
dynamic with regard to two poets: David Meltzer and Rose Drachler. While I position Meltzer
and Drachler within their broader poetics and kabbalistic poetics temporal contexts, I focus on
Meltzer and Drachler’s poetry as a case study of a distinct religio-spiritual dialectic made
possible in such kabbalistic poetics. Meltzer’s and Drachler’s poetry interweaves a specificallyJewish, and often kabbalistic, fantastic with both broader speculative-genre and rabbinic-Jewish
traditions. I posit that this interweaving opens the aforementioned religio-spiritual dialectics via
two main ways: immersive-fantastic rhetoric and feminist theological/spiritual inquiry.
The same way that, as we will see in chapter five, Deutsch’s and Wilson’s comics
specifically render religio-culture immersive—rather than rendering the fantastic immersive—so
too does the poetry discussed in this chapter. That is to say, readers are presented with textual
elements—images, vocabulary, themes—of Jewish culture, religion, and texts in an unguided
fashion. Such textual elements are not superficial; rather, they emerge from a fully-immersed,
fully-realized positioning within Jewish kabbalah, mysticism, midrash, and hermeneutics. Yet
that background context is never laid out for the reader: rather, the reader must piece together
meaning(s) from context—and/or must research information outside the poem. This rhetorical
methodology bears certain similarities to immersive fantastic rhetoric in prose fiction, the subject
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of chapters two through four. An integral feature of immersive fantastic rhetoric is that
information familiar or obvious to the protagonist is specifically, and paradoxically, presented as
normal—and thus unexplained, because un-extraordinary—to the reader. Such information (i.e.
narrative content or context) is often of a fantastic nature, and thus is information that readers
would not necessarily intuit or interpret accurately at the outset. Immersive rhetoric, whether in
fantasy prose or kabbalistic fiction, allows for an interpretive dissonance between protagonist
and reader that is dialectical and dialogic, encouraging reader participation in constructing
meanings, especially as meanings fluctuate throughout the text (and the reading experience).
Additionally, meaning in kabbalistic poetry—particularly that of Meltzer and Drachler—is often
open-ended, ambiguous, and destabilized, in manners that resonate with the rhetoric and
thematics of writers such as Jones, as discussed in chapter two.
What is of interest to me—for the purposes of this chapter—regarding Meltzer’s and
Drachler’s poetry is not so much the immersive aspects described above—i.e. the complex,
defamiliarizing, layered aspects, or the open-ended, ambiguous, or destabilized meanings. While
that dynamic definitely exists in Meltzer’s and Drachler’s work, similar work occurs in the
poetry of many contemporaries (i.e. other postmodern, post-World War II poets)—and, arguably,
in much poetry as a whole. Even the fact that religio-cultural textual elements in Meltzer’s and
Drachler’s poems are frequently unexplained and unnegotiated for readers—even this, while
fascinating, is far from unique, especially regarding other kabbalistic poets contemporary to and
colleagues with Meltzer and Drachler.
Rather, I focus on another critical factor of immersive-fantastic rhetoric at play in
Meltzer’s and Drachler’s poetry, alongside those listed above: that is, the evocative and
emotional work these poems perform for and demand from readers. In some poetry, the
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unmediated presentation or use of religio-cultural and/or kabbalistic content results in more
esoteric dynamics. In contrast, Meltzer’s and Drachler’s kabbalistic poems—those discussed in
this chapter as well as much of their poetic corpuses—operate under an ideological premise: that
even if readers do not understand everything going on in the poem—all the layers, contexts,
references, etc.—readers can still jump right in, tune in, and experience the poems holistically—
which, in and of itself, is part of the poems’ work or point. Such a premise fosters different
reader dynamics, in two key ways. First, the surface aesthetics of the poems discussed here are
accessible to most readers. By surface aesthetics, I mean textual aspects such as: the presence of
a poetic speaker; sequential meaning (one word or line connecting, in terms of its meaning, to the
words or lines around it); and quasi-narrative instances or elements, e.g. the poem walking you
through a narrative—even a fragmented one—of variable length, whether a line, stanza, section,
or longer.
Second, the poems discussed in this chapter make use of tone and emotional resonance,
whether through imagery, rhythm, word choice, musicality, speakers/figures, or other devices.
These two categories—accessible surface aesthetics and tonal/emotional resonance—serve as
strategies for negotiating otherwise inaccessible content (e.g. Jewish-kabbalistic specifics) to
readers.26 By doing so, they foster a rhetoric that I argue fits comfortably within Mendlesohn’s
conceptualization of immersive fantasy rhetoric. The result, with the accessible aesthetics of
Meltzer’s and Drachler’s poetry, is that even if readers have no prior knowledge, and do not
inquire outside the poetic text for explanation, simply reading the poem itself allows for an
opening of the dialectical/dialogic dynamic described above. The poem itself conveys tonal and
aesthetic information and context that help readers engage with, or unpack, the poems’ other
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layers of meaning—or at least allows for and encourages readers to experience such information.
These poems are about experience—about the poet’s experience writing such words and the
reader’s experience reading such words—just as much as they are about the layers of underlying
content or context.
Not coincidentally, many of the kabbalistic texts and themes on which these poets draw
are about exactly this: experiential knowledge and experiential communication of information
through a poem’s individual letters, layout or ordering of those letters, and the rhythm,
skipping,27 or juxtapositions of letters or words. Kabbalistic poems “have moved generations of
readers who may have understood only a small part of that literature’s esoteric import. Working
like verbal spirit traps, the poems of the Jewish mystical tradition precipitate a sense of
transcendence, which becomes palpable long before it is fathomable” (Cole, kindle location
106). Kabbalistic Beat poetry—like the medieval and early modern kabbalistic poetry Cole
references—engages with the concept that such modes of experiencing the surface-level letters
and words hint toward, or tap into, deeper thematic concepts.
In addition to the experiential politics of Meltzer’s and Drachler’s poetry and kabbalistic
methodologies, their poetry stands out—and relates to this dissertation’s focus—in its
engagement with the fantastic and the religio-spiritual, in conjunction with (or, via) immersive
rhetoric. The theological inquiry occurring in these poems is distinct in some ways from that
happening in other contemporaneous poetry, and yet parallels, complements, and speaks to the
other, multi-genre texts discussed in this dissertation, which engage in similar inquiries through
similar immersive rhetoric.
The first section of this chapter sets up a historical-contextual frame, giving a brief
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overview of the wider, surrounding poetics and Jewish-countercultural scenes contemporary to
Drachler and Meltzer (i.e. focusing on 1950s—1980s). Within these larger contexts, I draw
connections to a wider community of poets engaging specifically with kabbalah, including
Jerome Rothenberg, Jack Hirschman, and Diane di Prima. An exhaustive study of these poets’
engagements with kabbalah exceeds the scope of this dissertation; it is critical, however, to
contextualize Meltzer and Drachler in part via their relationships to these and other poets.
Meltzer and Drachler stand out as poets whose work depicts a strong religio-spiritual dynamic,
and whose poetic interactions with kabbalah bulwark said dynamic. Viewed from this angle,
Meltzer and Drachler’s kabbalistic poetics perform different work than do the kabbalistic
ethnopoetics of Rothenberg or of Hirschman—complementary work, but distinct.
The chapter then moves to consider exactly this distinct dynamic: ways in which Beatera, counterculture Jewish-American poetry employs kabbalistic and fantastic rhetoric to frame
rabbinic Jewish content—such as biblical and talmudic references, or depictions of halakha
(Jewish law)—from radically feminist, yet deeply religio-spiritual, perspectives. I thus examine
poetry of Meltzer and Drachler that engages with specifically Orthodox or traditional Jewish
tropes, texts, and sensibilities. Jewish-kabbalistic themes permeate much of both poets’ bodies
of work; to cover such themes extensively exceeds the scope of this chapter. I focus instead on
two specific kabbalistic themes: that of letters and numbers, and the golem. These two themes
are core and iconic aspects of kabbalistic and Jewish-fantastic literature more broadly, especially
English-language, late-twentieth and early-twenty-first century literature. Additionally, these
themes recur in the literature discussed throughout the rest of the dissertation: letters featuring
heavily in the prose fantasy discussed in chapters two through four; golems and the Jewish
monstrous operating in the contemporary-Jewish prose and graphic fantasy discussed in chapters
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four and five. While my analysis focuses on the poems as primary texts, I reference cross-genre
writings of these poets in order to contextualize the poetry analysis. Such cross-genre writings
include Meltzer’s anthology of kabbalah (e.g. his editorial comments and compilations) and his
kabbalistic journal Tree, Drachler’s diary entries, and correspondence between Drachler and
Meltzer.
What emerges from the kabbalistic poetics of Meltzer and Drachler is a particular religiospiritual theological inquiry that speaks to similar inquiries present in the varying, multi-genre
literatures examined in chapters two through five. Kabbalistic poetics, like immersive fantasy,
can engage readers in radically feminist,28 dialectical constructions of fluid textual meanings; the
kabbalistic poetry of Meltzer and Drachler does this in ways that problematize, yet
simultaneously affirm, Jewish religio-spiritual traditions. This dynamic of Meltzer’s and
Drachler’s poetry opens possible (feminist) reimaginings of Jewish religio-spirituality and
contributes to a developing voice of the Jewish fantastic in postmodern North American
literature and culture.

Historical Context: Wider Poetics, Jewish Counterculture, and Kabbalistic Poetry
The category of post-World War II North American Jewish literature, or even of
specifically Jewish poetry, does not usually (i.e. in most scholarly conversations) yield
discussion of kabbalistic poets. Within poetics circles, Meltzer is perhaps best known as a
“Beat” poet; Drachler’s name, as Meilicke writes, does not usually ring a bell (Meilicke
28

I want to acknowledge here that Drachler writes in her journal, “I am womanly, not a feminist” (Collected p.54,
entry dated March 15, 1980). Nevertheless, I read Drachler’s poetry as containing feminist implications, especially
regarding female and feminist approaches to Judaism. Interestingly, Drachler’s statement (that she is not a feminist)
comes in the midst of a discussion regarding the feminist critique of the Orthodox-Jewish prayer (in the morning
daily prayer) thanking god for not making one a woman (the prayer is recited by men; women say a version that
thanks god for creating them according to god’s will); Drachler disagrees with feminists who find the blessing
problematic and offers her own (dare I say feminist?) reading of the prayer.
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“Digging Out”).29 However, an enormous amount of both poets’ oeuvres—both poetic and, for
Meltzer, scholarly—deals with kabbalistic, midrashic, and other Jewish texts and themes. Aside
from his numerous poems with overt kabbalistic themes, Meltzer edited anthologies of
kabbalistic texts (e.g. The Secret Garden [1976]); he also founded and edited the kabbalistic
journal Tree, which ran from 1970-75. Jewish, and specifically kabbalistic, strands are thus
prevalent in Meltzer’s work but have yet to be emphasized in scholarship on Meltzer, Drachler,
or many of their contemporary Jewish-Beatnik poets, with the important exception of Meilicke’s
notable and crucial work in this area.
The decades in which Drachler and Meltzer wrote—particularly the 1960s through
1980s—saw not only a broader poetic and artistic avant-garde in the United States, but also a
Jewish artistic/literary avant-garde and Jewish countercultural movements. Meltzer and Drachler
were aware of and engaged with, albeit not delimited by, such Jewish avant-garde contexts. In
her article on the history of David Meltzer’s kabbalistic journal Tree, Meilicke gives a useful
summary of the Jewish countercultural movement out of which (or parallel to which) kabbalistic
poetics arose:
The Jewish counterculture evolved out of the broader protest movement of the 1960s and was
characterized by an overtly Jewish stance. In the history the 1960s, it was a relatively late
development and only gathered force at end of the decade. Many of its major ideas were
closely related to existing countercultural attitudes towards politics, drugs, ritual,
institutionalized religion and spirituality. Scholars, sociologists, and members of the
movement agree that the emergence of a Jewish counterculture was politically, religiously,
and socially motivated. It began as a reaction to the Black Power movement, which told
white civil rights activists, many of whom were Jewish, to go home and found their own
institutions. [...] The Jewish counterculture was also motivated by the longing for a renewed
and authentic spiritual and communal Jewish life, which the young generation could not find
in their parents' synagogues. (Meilicke, “Forgotten History” 52-3)
Meilicke goes on to divide this countercultural movement into two strands: “one revolutionary
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and political,” e.g. Jews for Urban Justice, Tikkun magazine; the other “psychedelic and
spiritual” e.g. the havurah movement, the journal Response, and community activities of figures
like Rabbis Zalman Schachter and Shlomo Carlebach (“Forgotten History” 53). She then asks
where Tree fits in and concludes that it “does not exactly fit anywhere” in that it both partakes in
and exceeds beyond both strands, defying simple categorization (“Forgotten History” 53).
Crucially, Meilicke notes that this fact—the fact that Tree doesn’t really fit in with any of these
categories—“also explains its relative neglect” (“Forgotten History” 53). Like Tree, Meltzer and
Drachler defy categorization—their poetry, journal writing, letters, and broader lives stretch
across, dip into, stem from, and exceed many of the above-mentioned communities and
categories. Drachler, for instance, writes in her journal of her cousin Hillel Halkin, writing in
Commentary magazine (Collected 83); Meltzer corresponded with Rabbi Zalman Schachter and
other non-literary figures among Jewish countercultural movements.
Within the cultural spheres one might delineate of these decades—Jewish literary, Jewish
poetic, Jewish avant garde/countercultural—we also have a slightly smaller circle: that of
kabbalistic poets—poets engaging with overt kabbalistic texts and themes. Meilicke places this
community in 1960s-70s California (“Abulafianism” 71); I’d argue that it extends through the
1980s as well. Meilicke refers to this phenomenon as “Abulafianism” because of these artists’
strong interest in Abraham Abulafia’s kabbalistic teachings specifically, as versus other branches
of kabbalah.30 Meilicke notes that this phenomenon “marks a shift in American-Jewish poetry,
which in the earlier postwar period had hardly ever dealt with religious or mystical issues”
(“Abulafianism” 71). The community of artists engaging with Jewish kabbalah and mysticism
included poets Jack Hirschman, Jerome Rothenberg, “Jackson Mac Low, Hannah Weiner, Stuart
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Perkoff and the artists Wallace Berman and Bruria Finkel” (Meilicke, “Abulafianism” 71).
Many of these poets and artists, as Meilicke states, identified as secular Jews; their interest in
kabbalah stemmed from a number of influences: “hippie culture” more broadly, including noninstitutional religio-spiritual possibilities; countercultural Jewish movements in the religious and
political spheres (as mentioned above); and “a new interest in mysticism among a few Jewish
academics,” presumably figures like Gershom Scholem (“Abulafianism” 71-2).
Even in the era of the Jewish avant-garde, Drachler was unusual: “On the one hand,
Drachler was an orthodox woman steeped in tradition (her father was a rabbi), on the other, she
was an innovative poet open to new thoughts,” a poet who “read philosophical and historical
literature as well as literary criticism,” was interested in anthropology and archeology, and who
displayed, overall, an “unconventional and original thinking” in her correspondence and diaries
(Meilicke, “Digging Out Rose Drachler”). Meilicke writes that “Drachler regularly went to
synagogue, but she did not really belong to any local literary scene and often felt isolated. Out of
this loneliness, Drachler created poems and shared them with young poets who admired her
poetry and her wisdom” (“Digging Out Rose Drachler”).
These young poets included David Meltzer—they composed a “small group of avantgarde poets and writers in the ’70s and ’80s, such as, Charles Doria, Jackson Mac Low, David
Meltzer, Charlie Morrow, Rochelle Ratner, Armand Schwerner, Diane and Jerome Rothenberg
as well as John Yau and John Ashbery,” who “encouraged [Drachler’s] writing and published it
wherever they could” (Meilicke, “Digging Out Rose Drachler”). Drachler was older than
Meltzer, but Meltzer was one of the first people to publish Drachler’s poetry in Tree; Meltzer
also published Drachler’s first two poetry books, Burrowing In, Digging Out (1974) and The
Choice (1977), through Tree Books. Their correspondence depicts an affectionate, generous
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relationship that intermingles editor-writer dynamics with those of friendship as fellow writers,
intellectuals, and teachers, as well as humorous, motherly tones from Drachler (Drachler, Letter
to David Meltzer, 1976).
Both Meltzer and Drachler are notable not only for being “kabbalistic poets,” as Jerome
Rothenberg has written of them,31 but also for exploring themes of Jewish mysticism and
magic—especially those themes and texts dealing with kabbalistic, midrashic, halakhic, and
spiritual aspects of Jewish tradition. Both also do so via, partly, fantastic imagery and themes.
In his introduction to David’s Copy: The Selected Poems of David Meltzer (2005), Jerome
Rothenberg notes that Meltzer moved in a poetic direction that few others (even other Jewish
poets of his time) moved in: a poetic “idiom & setting [that] remained beautifully vernacular but
the frame of reference opened [...] into new or untried worlds.” “The most striking of these
worlds,” Rothenberg writes:
was that of Jewish lore & mysticism, starting with the Prague-based legend of Rabbi Judah
Loew & his Frankensteinian creation (the “golem” as such), incorporating a panoply of
specific Hebrew words & names along with kabbalistic & talmudic references & their
counterparts in a variety of popular contexts (Frankenstein, the Mummy, Harry Bauer in the
1930s Golem movie, language here & there from comic strips, etc.). It was clear too that the
judaizing here—to call it that—was something that went well beyond any kind of ethnic
nostalgia, that he was in fact tapping into an ancient & sometimes occulted stream of poetry,
while moving backward & forward between “then” & “now.” (David’s Copy p. xv-xvi)
Particularly useful, here, is Rothenberg’s astute perception that Meltzer’s poetry is very “Jewish”
(or, “judaizing,” in Rothenberg’s terms above)—yet in a deeper, more interesting and
meaningful way than “ethnic nostalgia.” This is true of Drachler’s poetry as well, and it is one
way that Drachler’s and Meltzer’s poetry stands out from much of their contemporaneous Jewish
literature (poetic or otherwise). Drachler’s poetry, as well, displays recurring strands of Jewish
mystical, kabbalistic, and spiritual themes. Meilicke writes that “Drachler’s poems fuse the
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spiritual and the sensuous” (“Digging Out”).
Both Meltzer and Drachler mingle Jewish mystical and kabbalistic themes with those of
the fantastic and mythic more broadly. Rothenberg writes that one can see in Meltzer’s poetry:
a demythologizing & a remythologizing, to use his words for it. In this sense what is imagined
or fabulous is brought into the mundane present, while what is mundane is shown to possess
that portion of the marvelous that many of us have been seeking from Blake’s time to our
own. (David’s Copy p. xviii, original emphasis)
Both Meltzer and Drachler’s poems, as well, display what I would term an “immersive” quality:
that of simultaneously being accessible to readers yet esoteric. Meilicke writes that Drachler’s
poems are “lucid on the surface, but complex and opaque if one really tries to comprehend them”
(“Digging Out”). One way that Drachler achieves this surface lucidity is by utilizing an
“excruciatingly precise language” and paying “a lot of attention to detail [...] Whether she writes
about ritual prescriptions or about her garden, she never becomes vague. Yet she is always
mysterious” (Meilicke, “Digging Out”). Similarly, Meltzer “cast[s] an esoteric content in a
nonacademic format & language” (Rothenberg, introduction to David’s Copy, p. xvi). While
Meltzer and Drachler do so throughout their poetry, and in numerous ways, the following
sections examine two specific instances of this: thematics of letters and numbers, and of the
golem.

Letters and Numbers
A major kabbalistic theme, throughout traditional kabbalistic texts as well as kabbalistic
poetry, is that of letters and words—particularly Hebrew letters and names of god—as impacting
reality and/or creating reality. Scholem explains that, “The letters of the alphabet—and how
much more so those of the divine name or of the entire Torah, which was God’s instrument of
Creation—have secret, magical power. The initiate knows how to make use of them” (On the
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Kabbalah and Its Symbolism 166; quoted in Sonheim 384). Thus, too, the act of writing,
speaking, or singing is aligned with creation—not just artistic creation, but divine and physicalworld creation as well. As Peter Cole writes:
In this Kabbalistic context, poems not only depict a mystical process, they produce it.
Seeking a return to the primordial harmony destroyed with the catastrophe of creation and
Adam’s transgression in Eden, those who compose and utter the lines of mystical hymns take
part in the continual reconfiguration of the cosmos. For the letters of the alphabet, or
alephbet, are, a medieval Iberian Hebrew work tells us, nothing less than “the powers of God
. . . engraved on the throne. . . . They are called the angels of the living God.” And according
to late-phase Hasidic Kabbalah, the letters of the Torah are each “a palace or chamber
inhabited by the divine presence”: combined in the proper manner, they lead to the revelation
of the Infinite’s radiance. (Cole, Introduction, kindle loc. 91-8)
Cole draws the connection between kabbalah and poetry, specifically (as versus writing or letters
more generally). This is a point echoed by other scholars and poets, such as Adeena Karasick.32
Much of Meltzer’s poetry engages with this theme, including poems such as “Pardes” (Arrows
1994), “Kabbalistic Tree Poem for R. Skratz” (Arrows 1994), “Shema (1982)” (The Name 1984),
and many others. Two poems that center on this theme, however, are “Letters & Numbers”
(1969, referenced here from David’s Copy [2005]) and “Abulafia” (in YESOD [1969]).
“Letters & Numbers” is, as its title implies, overtly concerned with the kabbalistic play of
numbers and letters in all its various permutations: gematria (numerology), hohkma hatseruf
(“science of the combination of letters”33), and dillug and k’fitsa (“‘jumping’ or ‘skipping’ viz.,
from one conception to another34). Through all these methods, “Letters & Numbers” engages
explicitly with this Abulafian methodology of the powers of number and letter permutations and
combinations. “Abulafia” similarly engages with its eponymous subject’s methodology, but it
also engages more with a personal, spiritual encounter: an encounter with Jewish tradition,

32

See Karasick, “Hijacking Language: Kabbalistic Trajectories” in Radical Poetics and Secular Jewish Culture,
Stephen Paul Miller and Daniel Morris, editors. U. of Alabama Press, 2010 (Kindle edition).
33
Scholem, Major Trends, Fourth Lecture, section 4 (Kindle edition)
34
Scholem, Major Trends, Fourth Lecture, section 5 (Kindle edition)

37

kabbalah, god, or sacred other. The specifics are left open, but the nature of this poetic
encounter is one of spiritual and visceral critique, questioning, seeking, joking, and possibly even
a sort of prayer of or towards the magical and numinous.
The kabbalistic idea that each of the Hebrew letters represents specific creative power
(i.e. with regards to the divine creative power that formed/forms the world) comes through in
numerous instances in “Letters & Numbers.” For instance, Meltzer writes:
In my 32nd year
counting numbers watching
22 letters dance on a wall chart.
Energy goes to & out of 10
ineffable sefira. (David’s Copy p. 77)
The number thirty-two here is significant: it alludes to the thirty-two paths of wisdom described
in the Sefer Yetsirah, the book of creation, which Scholem dates between the third and sixth
century (Major Trends, First Lecture, section 10, [Kindle edition]).35 The number thirty-two is
reached by adding the twenty-two Hebrew letters—referenced directly in the third line above—
of the alephbet, the Hebrew alphabet, to the ten sefirot, “the ten elementary and primordial
numbers” (Scholem, Major Trends, First Lecture, section 10, [Kindle edition]).36 The number
ten here can also be understood as referencing the ten fingers/digits of Adam Kadmon, the first
human (biblical Adam). The letters “dance on a wall chart”—perhaps referencing kabbalistic
charts of the alephbet and/or of the sefirot—and the energy from this dance “goes to & out of 10
/ ineffable sefira.” The sefirot (plural of sefira) are a kabbalistic concept of levels of divine
interaction with the material world. These sefirot account for the nature of creation; they are
understood as part of the process of divine creation of the world, as well as different ways of
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approaching, viewing, or interacting with the material world.
Interestingly, the word “sefira” stems from the Hebrew root letters samech-peh-reish,
which can mean “count” (lispor means “to count”; mispar means “number”) and book (sefer) as
well as to tell a story (lesaper)—a veritable fusion of letters and numbers. Thus, in the lines
above, energy from the dancing letters both infuses and stems from the sefirot—i.e. creation,
reality. Ten refers both to the sefirot as well as to the first ten letters of the alephbet.
In the next stanza, Meltzer makes this connection even more explicit:
22 ways to speak,
tell you
God crowns spine’s tree,
unwinds vertebral knots.
Light spreads thru flesh I
carry to our bed,
your loins spread
to accept the alphabet
I stutter into your womb (David’s Copy 77)
The “22 ways to speak” references different spoken connections to god, to reality, to creation—
power in letters that can emerge in writing as well as in speech and language. The images here
of spine and tree allude back to the sefirot, which are sometimes described, in kabbalistic
literature such as the Zohar, as a “Tree of God” or “skeleton of the universe” (Scholem, Major
Trends, Sixth Lecture, section 3). Common kabbalistic schemas or charts depict the sefirot as a
schematic/diagram, tree, Adam Kadmon (primordial man), or as combinations of these images.37
For example, Tree’s first issue depicts an illustration that includes an image of the sefirot. The
sefirot are depicted in their classic schematic/diagram formation (ten interconnected circles in a
specific geometric layout, each circle containing the Hebrew name of its sefira). The rendering
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of the sefirot, however, also evokes tree imagery: in both the diagram’s shape and the way that
the man holds the bottom link (the one connecting the “Yesod” and “Malkhut” sefirot) as if it
were a sapling trunk, and seems to be about to plant it in the floor/ground (Tree: 1, ed. Meltzer,
p. 16). Di Prima, in another instance, works off of the classic depiction of the sefirot as a
schematic/diagram in her contribution titled, simply, “A TREE” for Tree no. 5 (p.213). In the
above lines we see, again, the idea of letters and language as creation—creation of the world, of
humanity—and the human capacity for imitating god via creative power. Hence, letters—
alphabet, speech—are also procreation, sex, semen, fertility.
Meltzer plays with these connections over the next stanzas, describing how “22 seeds
take hold in your dark earth. / Shake apart into life. / 22 seeds take hold, arise” (77) and “More
than mere / utterance of 32 ways. / It must also be / 22 seeds to germinate 22 new / Edens,
Edom” (78). Creation here is language (moments of spoken language within the poem, e.g.,
“utterance”); writing (e.g., stanza 8: “32 light beams break into rays on the page I / spread black
ink over” [79]); life, creation, and procreation. The creation alluded to here is that of art, of
language, of communication and knowledge (e.g., see stanza 8), but also the creation of people
(e.g., imagery of sex and human procreation), Eden, and the world. As mentioned earlier,
kabbalistic philosophies view the Hebrew letters as the means by which god created the world,
and sexual imagery is often deployed in describing such creative processes. Such sexual
imagery describes god’s creation or birth of the world, for example the concept of tsimtsum: god
drawing inwards in order to make a space that was not-god, and this occurring as a form of
birthing process (labor is a commonly used metaphor) to create life out of nothingness.38 The
kabbalistic significances of individual Hebrew letters themselves, too, often includes sexual
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meanings. And, of course, the act of writing—whether writing Hebrew letters in kabbalistic or
sacred ways, or whether writing poetry in more ostensibly sacred contexts—is also, here,
redolent with sexual and reproductive imagery (e.g., ink and semen; the act of writing as
rupture/penetration).
Meltzer alludes to this divine creative/birthing process throughout the poem but
especially in stanza 9:
This is the news brought back.
No mystery but in silence of numbers & letters.
I tell my bride
there is no mystery but the moment,
penetration,
when emanations merge & bind together.
Sun halves flaming,
stars inside-out,
the hills tremble
& the green glory of woods
turns desert.
No mystery but in the silence of
numbers & letters waiting our touch.
Infinite breath between each letter
sucked into the heart, each number,
each blacked-out star. (David’s Copy 79-80)
The images above evoke the creation of the universe, whether from a kabbalistic perspective
(described above), a biblical perspective (e.g. Genesis chapter 1) or scientific one (e.g., the Big
Bang theory). However, Meltzer’s lines can also be read as referring to nuclear holocausts,
especially lines such as “Sun halves flaming, / stars inside-out, / the hills tremble / & the green
glory of woods / turns desert” and “This is the news brought back.” These lines might evoke (or
allude to) the experience of living in North America during World War II and hearing or reading
the news of Hiroshima, an event that Meltzer notes had forceful impact on him,39 and which
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appears in much of his poetry.40
In this way, Meltzer positions such human creative power as simultaneously—or
potentially—both constructive and destructive, a theme he addresses rigorously in “From Eden
Book,” which I discuss below in the golem section of this chapter. In the stanza quoted above,
“penetration” is both violence and creation: “emanations” (sefirot/divine emanations; semen
ejaculations) “merge & bind together” in creative acts, yet this creation is also violent and even
divisive in its very moment of merging: the sun is “flaming” but it is doing so in “halves.” The
imagery here draws to mind nuclear explosions (especially if one reads the “sun” as also
invoking the image of a split nucleus); thematically, though, Meltzer destabilizes the line we
might otherwise instinctively draw between destruction and creation. Tsimtsum is, similarly, an
act of loving-creation, of god procreating the world, but it is also an act of violence and
division—god contracting and separating itself from an other, the soon-to-be other of the
material universe. Meltzer’s “silence of numbers & letters” is a silence of, among other things,
the primordial chaos that bears potentiality for being formed, created, molded—the “silence of /
numbers & letters waiting our touch,” whether that touch is for violent birth or violent death.
Here, Meltzer’s poem plays with the kabbalistic concept of letters’ and numbers’ creative
powers and applies such an idea more broadly to human creations and activity in a general sense.
Letters and numbers might then be understood as the broader, underlying building blocks
enabling such human creative activity, such as language, communication, or mathematics, that
enable societal and technological development. In this way, our every action can be broken
down to its component letters, numbers, and creative or destructive potential: “each letter /
sucked into the heart” of a burning sun or molecule, “each number, / each blacked-out star.”
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Simultaneously, “Letters & Numbers” depicts how such kabbalistic conceptualizations of
creative/destructive power can also, in the more literal sense, refer to the power of writing—e.g.
poetry.
Meltzer picks up this theme in “Abulafia”; much of the poem addresses the connection
between letters and words—and thus creative acts such as writing, speaking, singing (e.g. poetry,
language, song)—and god. Here, as elsewhere in his work, Meltzer taps into a kabbalistic
concept that the act of creating art (poetry, song, speech/language) is an act of ontological
creation as well, as in midrashim depicting god creating the world through letters and speech.
Poetry (and language and song) thus in some ways positions the poet (or more broadly, humans)
as divine partners with god in acts of creation. Such divine partnership sounds like a lofty
ideal—and is treated as an ideal, albeit an extremely “risk[y]” one by rabbinic kabbalists (Cole,
Introduction).
Meltzer engages deeply with this concept; he does so, however, with a humorous and
questioning voice that simultaneously embraces and critiques the theological and humanistic
ramifications of this idea. In Meltzer’s poetry, the existential question of what it means to be a
poet coincides with the question of what it means to be a human, to live and create more broadly.
Thus, for example, the poem’s opening lines: “Abulafia, you cant kid me with all this / poetry
business” (YESOD 22). Already, in just these few words, Meltzer sets up a dynamic in which,
by questioning Abulafia (both as a figure and the theories he represents), the poem’s speaker
implies that Abulafia and his linguistic concepts are ones with which the speaker has an a priori
affiliation. To say “you cant kid me” implies that there was a previous engagement,
interrogation of said “poetry business”; such a prior engagement must exist for the speaker to
then realize, or determine, “you cant kid me.” And what is such “poetry business”? The poem
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continues: “Alright / a blood thread pulls our hearts together. / We’re men, we suffer, we dream,
we love, / we sing, we suffer, we’re men. / Bloody thread skewers packed with our souls. / But
this poetry business, / what about it?” (YESOD 22) At this point, the poetic speaker seems to
query exactly this existential relationship described above between poetry/art and life. Even if
one conceives of (or buys into) a mystic or pantheistic union of souls, the speaker seems to say,
how does or why should poetry (and broader art and human creativity) connect to that? Why
poetry specifically—or why poetry at all? The question’s inflection—“But this poetry business, /
what about it?”—and its specific grammatical structure (object before verb, question format)
resonate with Jewish, non-native English speech styles; one can picture this question emerging
from the paradigmatic Brooklyn or Lower East Side, Eastern-European Jewish immigrant. The
question’s tone is multivalent: it could be read as bluntly cutting to the meat of the issue (“okay,
what is this poetry business”), wryly flippant or dismissive, or something else entirely.
Regardless of which tone readers prefer, the addressee and direct subject are left purposely open:
is the speaker asking about poetry in general, this newfangled Beat poetry, Abulafia specifically,
or something else entirely? The option of Abulafia himself as a locus for this
question/critique/response is particularly fruitful because the fact that Abulafia centered poetry at
the core of his metaphysical philosophy and methodology is, at a surface glance, somewhat
startling (or may seem so to twentieth century eyes).41
Meltzer’s very next stanza responds by evoking specifically Jewish-kabbalistic creation
myths, and by blurring the lines between speaker and god as grammatical subjects/objects within
the poem. It is unclear, in the next stanza, whether the lines refer at any given moment to god or
to the speaker. Each line is fragmented, both through the visual division of dashes and through
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the grammatically isolated words; the form thus mirrors and echoes the fragmentation being
discussed on a thematic level (e.g. shvirat hakeilim, breaking of the divine vessels that occurred
when the world was created).42 Additionally, the stanza’s fragmentation renders the grammatical
subjects and objects ambiguous: it is unclear whether individual words and lines refer to the
speaker (man, presumably) or to god. The following stanza—“let’s go then / let’s go kiss God
on the mouth”—signifies a turn to, and embrace of god (YESOD p.22). This embrace, however,
is ambiguous in tone. Is the exhortation to “kiss God on the mouth” sensual? Sexual? A sort of
filial love? Cheeky? Or perhaps even semi-pornographic, apropos to Meltzer’s “agit-smut”
style?
Meltzer’s poetic dialectic of simultaneous, and seemingly paradoxical, critique-throughembrace (of this notion, of this divine or spiritual partnership) differs from the approaches of
many contemporary Jewish poets, even those engaged with kabbalistic themes such as Jerome
Rothenberg and Jack Hirschman. One specific area of distinction of relevance here is the
spiritual engagement and investment present in Meltzer’s poems. While a number of Meltzer’s
contemporaries also draw on similar kabbalistic themes and traditional Jewish texts, their use of
such material in their poetry focuses more on poetic, ethnic (and ethnopoetic), cultural, and
political implications and applications of such Jewish texts/themes within, and as, poetry.
Rothenberg, for instance, in his book Gematria, “employs gematria—essentially an exegetical
method—as an aleatory device, not unlike the ‘non-intentional’ methods used by Cage or Mac
Low” (Meilicke, Jerome Rothenberg, 153). Meilicke points out that in his Gematria poems,
Rothenberg “undermines traditional notions of what constitutes a poem” (Jerome Rothenberg
152). Rothenberg also engages with gematria and other kabbalistic themes from an ethnopoetics
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perspective. Owens, similarly, engages primarily with ethnopoetic queries and projects in her
poetry. One could even argue an intense engagement with spiritual themes, questions, critiques,
and re-imaginings, as in Owens’ Joe Chronicles. Yet even here, such spiritual engagement is
explored broadly, beyond a more localized question of “traditional Jewish” spaces for
spirituality.
What stands out with Meltzer’s poetry is its engagement in precisely that: interrogating
rabbinic-Jewish themes of spirituality, authority, and epistemological narratives on their own
terms, yet from postmodern, skeptical, and humorous perspectives. Meltzer’s poems employ
traditional Jewish texts, themes, and methodologies as hermeneutical methods, in and of
themselves, for grappling with questions of spirituality regarding, specifically, rabbinic Jewish
traditions. When Meltzer’s speaker flippantly questions/challenges Abulafia, he does so within a
longstanding Jewish—and rabbinic-Jewish—hermeneutical tradition of questioning, critiquing,
and insulting (at times even irreverently insulting) each other’s commentaries and interpretations.
There is a paradoxical spirituality at play in “Abulafia”—one that revels in the very acts of
questioning and critiquing as religio-spiritual processes themselves. This dynamic speaks to
other poems of Meltzer, such as “Mahshav, Mitva, Miktav” (David’s Copy 30); additionally, it
promotes an imagining of religio-spirituality that both critiques and affirms, and finds
affirmation in that very critique.
In a similar vein, Drachler’s poems engage consistently with the dialectic of embracethrough-critique described above with regards to Meltzer’s poetry. For instance, in Drachler’s
poem “The Letters of the Book,” Drachler uses the same kabbalistic themes of alphabetic
significance to explore similar dynamics of embrace-through-critique:
In the crook
Of the Lammed leaning forward
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I put my neck when I pray
My shepherd makes me meek
He makes my knees bend
He guides me I follow
With the loop of the Lammed
On my throat
I go (Collected Poems, 92)
Drachler here depicts this dialectic as it specifically relates to the believer, to the poetic speaker
engaged in prayer. The letter lammed resembles, in its physical/calligraphic shape, a shepherd’s
crook. The metaphor of god as shepherd and Israel as flock is pervasive in the Hebrew bible as
well as in liturgical texts such as contemporary Orthodox prayer books (such as those Drachler
presumably used in synagogue). Psalm twenty-three is one well-known example; the Rosh
Hashana liturgy in Ashkenazi Orthodox prayer books is another. The Rosh Hashana service
repeatedly invokes the image of god as the shepherd who leads his flock: “As a shepherd’s
searching gaze meets his flock, / as he passes every sheep beneath his rod, / so You too pass
Yours, count and number, / and regard the soul of every living thing; / and you rule off the limit
of each creation’s life, / and write down the verdict for each” (Koren Rosh Hashana Mahzor,
568). Given that the immediate next liturgical verse lists a roster of all the possible fates these
“verdicts” might be—e.g. “who will live and who will die” and so forth in meticulous detail—
this image of the god as shepherd passing his flock under his staff is simultaneously loving and
ominous. So too, Drachler’s “crook / Of the Lammed”—i.e. the shepherd’s staff or crook—
therefore emphasizes both god’s love and custodial relationship towards his people and god’s
judgment and potential execution of his “flock.” It also expresses the profound ambivalence of
the poetic speaker toward individual faith.
Drachler seamlessly segues from a tacit collective identity—and ambivalence—to an
individual perspective: the opening “In the crook / Of the Lammed” leaves unspecified who,
exactly, is in that crook, leaving tacit room for that space to be occupied by a shared collective—
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e.g. the Jewish people—an allusion heightened by the often collective recitation, in
contemporary Ashkenazi Orthodox synagogues, of the Rosh Hashana lines referenced here
(quoted above). Yet in the next line, Drachler transitions to the individual: “I put my neck when
I pray.” Here, Drachler takes this broader ambivalence, this tension between a loving and
vengeful/just god, the anxiety of destinies beyond human control (e.g. those referenced in the
liturgy: life or death, prosperity or poverty, health or sickness, etc.)—and repositions it within a
more local, more nuanced ambivalence of personal struggle with religious engagement. Just as
the metaphoric sheep put their necks onto the proverbial chopping block, so too, those who pray
do so with the awareness of “putting their necks” into the “crook” of the “Lammed”—of divine
letters and law. In other words, accepting the “crook” of the “Lammed” implies accepting the
overarching yoke of religious observance and/or faith; it means adhering to the bible or prayer,
either of which could be the “book” from the poem’s title (“The Letters of the Book”), and both
of which connect to rabbinic interpretations, rituals and laws. Putting one’s neck in the
shepherd’s crook implies, therefore, submitting to a divine yoke—and possibly to a rabbinic one
as well, especially with the prayer-book image, as the prayerbook is part of the rabbinic tradition.
The dynamics of prayer, and specifically the ritualistic requirements of Orthodox Jewish prayer,
are at play in the poem. In the above stanza, Drachler depicts physical motion that specifically
reflects equivalent motions of rabbinic/Orthodox prayer services:43 the speaker “lean[s] forward”
and bends her knees while in prayer, both of which are central and recurring movements of the
holiest and most important prayers, such as the amidah, vidui, and “korim u’mishtachavim”
sections of the Yom Kippur service (sections during which the entire congregation prostrates at
the recitation of the words “korim u’mishtachavim,” literally, “bowing” and
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“bowing/prostrating” [Brown, Driver, and Briggs pp.502, 1005]). The word “lammed,” in
addition to referring to the letter lammed, also connects phonetically to the word
“lammed/lammad,” which means teach or lead.
The grammar and tone of the above stanza is deeply ambiguous. On the one hand, the
speaker actively chooses to “put [her] neck” “in the crook” of divine authority and religious
liturgy and tradition. Some lines are framed with speaker as active subject, lending a tone of
personal choice and power to the verbs and to the poem’s overall motion: “I put my neck when I
pray,” “I follow,” “I go.” Yet in other lines the speaker is rendered passive object, while figures
such as the Lammed or the shepherd are the active subjects. In the lines, “My shepherd makes
me meek / He makes my knees bend / He guides me I follow” the shepherd is active while the
subject is passively responding to the direct actions of the shepherd (hence the repetition of the
verb “makes”). At other times the grammar leaves ambiguous who is the active subject: for
instance, in the lines “In the crook / Of the Lammed leaning forward,” the lammed can be read as
the active subject leaning forward, in parallel to the letter lammed’s forward-leaning shape;
however, one can read those lines as saying that the speaker is “leaning forward” into the
lammed/shepherd’s crook.
At first glance, the spiritually-affirmative elements in Drachler and Meltzer’s poetry
might seem eclipsed, or contradicted, by the deep critique and, especially with Meltzer’s poems,
intensely prosaic, erotic, and seemingly “sacrilegious” rendering of ostensibly “religious”
themes, figures, and texts. In actuality, however, the poems depict precisely these elements—the
unrelenting critique and unapologetic “profaning” of religious themes, figures, texts, and
authority—as integral to the spiritual. Particularly, the poems frame these dialectics of embracethrough-critique and respect-through-“profaning” as continuing a specifically-Jewish traditional
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way of encountering the sacred. From talmudic and midrashic perspectives, such seeminglyparadoxical dialectics are common, perhaps even foundational, hermeneutics of the spiritual.
Meltzer and Drachler’s poetry performs these critiques not only through the overt
kabbalistic thematics discussed above (e.g., letters and numbers), and not only via recognizably
“religious” content such as prayer and rituals (Drachler’s poem above) or Jewish historical
figures such as Abulafia, but through their invocation of magical and fantastic imagery as well.
Both Meltzer and Drachler tap into source-texts of the specifically-Jewish supernatural, such as
the golem legends, and utilize such monstrous and magical topes as spaces within which to
engage in the aforementioned paradoxical religio-spiritual critique-and-affirmation. By doing so,
both poets offer new possibilities of the Jewish fantastic; simultaneously, they reveal—via
postmodern, feminist critiques of golem texts and legends—what “we can learn [...] about a
religious tradition by getting to know its monsters” (Beal, Introduction).

Golems
One illustration of such a Jewish fantastic is Meltzer’s and Drachler’s depictions of the
golem in their respective poetry. Meltzer was interested in golems (he was interested in most
things mystical, magical, and kabbalistic): one of the envisioned future Tree issues (Tree 7) was
to be titled Golem.44 Meltzer’s sense of wonder, play, and critical insight regarding golems and
their manifold resonances, we shall see below, is something that emerges evocatively in his
poetry. In contrast, Drachler is almost silent—almost—on the matter of golems. Drachler’s
correspondence with Meltzer regarding golems, her haunting single poem “Loneliness of the
Golem,” and finally her weighted silence on the issue all reveal a uniquely gendered experience
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of the golem in ways that both complement and counterpart Meltzer’s depictions.

Historical and theoretical contexts
The golem is, as Jodi Eichler-Levine states, “the most prominent monstrous creation” in
Jewish folklore, a monster “who cross[es] lines and raise[s] questions of power and agency”
(Suffer 144). The figure of the golem is also arguably the most recognized figure of Jewish
magic/mysticism that has permeated the non-Jewish world. Despite its origins in Jewish
talmudic and mystical literature, and in particularly Jewish historical contexts such as the Prague
pogroms, the figure of the golem has infiltrated broader (and ostensibly secular) consumer and
popular culture. Eichler-Levine remarks that “a visit to Prague today reveals countless T-shirts,
bookmarks, and figurines for sale that are emblazoned with depictions of the golem” (Suffer
144). The golem has also permeated late-twentieth century and contemporary popular culture:
Eichler-Levine references a number of picture books and graphic novels about the golem, as well
as Michael Chabon’s novel The Amazing Adventures of Kavalier and Clay (2000). To this list
we can add other adult-marketed novels such as Pete Hamill’s Snow in August (1997) and
Helene Wecker’s The Golem and the Jinni (2013)—both New York Times bestsellers; middlegrade novels such as Alette Willis’ How to Make a Golem and Terrify People (2012); television
references such as that in the BBC’s Sherlock series (series 1, episode 3); and a recent theater
production titled Golem by the London company 1927.
In this light, as well as that of the historical development of golem texts, traditions, and
tales pre-twentieth century (on which I elaborate below), one might argue for thinking of the
golem as a palimpsest, an intertextual monster, similar to Ruth Waterhouse’s understanding of
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Grendel (“Beowulf as Palimpsest”).45 The golem’s popular and consumer-culture context also
informs a proposed category of a “Jewish fantastic” through highlighting the extent to which
surrounding cultures adopt traditional/rabbinic, mystical Jewish figures or tropes as “fantasy”
(fantasy here including horror, scifi, supernatural/superhuman beings, etc. as delineated in the
introduction).
In order to understand what this specifically-Jewish fantastic figure embodies, though, we
must first understand the historical development of the golem figure in different Jewish texts,
traditions, and folklore. We can then turn to examining Meltzer and Drachler’s depictions of the
golem, and how they both build on and problematize the palimpsest of golem thematics
accumulated over centuries of Jewish texts/traditions. Eichler-Levine eloquently summarizes the
golem legend’s history:
Jewish traditions and stories about the monstrous clay servant known as the golem often
ascribe its first creation to the sixteenth-century Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague. In fact, ideas
about the creation of artificial life predate Loew and may be traced in some early Kabbalistic
literature such as the Sefer Yezirah, as well as a mention of one such attempted creation in the
Talmud. Since the nineteenth century, however, the best-known versions of the tale have
centered on Loew and the city of Prague (Suffer 144)
According to the Loew-centered version of the golem tale, late sixteenth century Prague
Christians accuse Jews of a blood libel (the false accusation that Jews use the blood of Christian
babies for Passover matzah). The Jews fear a pogrom. Rabbi Loew (also known as the
Maharal), Prague’s leading rabbinic figure at the time, creates (with divine assistance/approval) a
golem out of clay, brought to life by mystical, divine words (Sonheim 378). The golem’s task is
to protect the Jewish people from attempted massacre by their Christian neighbors.
Scholars such as Gershom Scholem, Emily Bilski, Moshe Idel, and Hillel J. Kieval note
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that this theme within the golem legend of protecting Jews from an outside danger, and/or
retaliation towards oppressors, is a relatively late strand in the tale (Sonheim 378). In her article
“Picture Books about the Golem: Acts of Creation Without and Within,” Sonheim cites Bilski
and Idel in tracing the historical development of the golem legend from ancient times through
current:
[Bilski and Idel] find three major developments. First, until the seventeenth century,
discussion of the golem focused on its creation and the creative process. Second, in the
Renaissance and Romantic eras, the discussion shifted that focus from how to create a golem
to how to use one. Finally, at the beginning of the twentieth century (1909), the specific use
of retaliation was added. Yudl Rosenberg, a rabbi from Poland, brought forth the most
intricate story of the Golem of Prague in which Rabbi Loew creates the golem to fight the
false accusation of a blood libel. Rosenberg claimed “he was publishing an original letter of
the Maharal’s and a manuscript written by R. Loew’s son-in-law,” but Bilski and Idel note
that this cannot be proven. (Sonheim 378)
The violence and inter-religious tension in twentieth century portrayals of the Loew golem
legend contrast sharply with the theme of earlier golem legends in the Sefer Yezirah (third-sixth
century) and in the commentary of Rabbi Eleazar of Worms (c. 1176-1238). These earlier golem
tales describe: “a good man (most probably a rabbi) uses clay (because God did) to create a
golem to serve him (as God created man to worship Him)” (Sonheim 380). This version of the
tale, according to Sonheim, “affirms the goodness of man’s imitating God in the act of creating”
(380). This theme of “affirm[ing] the goodness of man’s imitating God in the act of creating”
(Sonheim 380) correlates with broader kabbalistic themes in much of Drachler and Meltzer’s
poetry, specifically the concept that letters, words, and poetry are creative acts in which humans
imitate and/or partner with god in literal acts of creation—whether artistic, metaphysical, or
physical-world creation.
However, around the early seventeenth century, Sonheim explains, the theme of golem
tales shifted from this to “focus on [the golem’s] potential danger” (Sonheim 380). At first,
during the Renaissance, “the golem legend represented a sort of Frankenstein science that is
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dangerous as it attempts to compete with God in creating life” (Sonheim 380). From the first
half of the nineteenth century onward, golem tales predominantly focus on Rabbi Loew as
creator and Prague as setting (Kieval 5, quoted in Sonheim 380). Even these themes, though,
were originally meant as cautionary tales regarding internal potential for violence: “At least as
far back as the 17th-century Polish rendition, the source of danger has always been understood to
reside within—within the confines of the community: in the very process of creation of artificial
life” (Kieval 14-15, quoted in Sonheim 380). It is only in the twentieth century, argues Kieval,
that the golem tale focuses on the “danger posed by the outside world,” a “distortion” in the
communal-imaginative “rememb[rance]” of the tale (Kieval 14-15, quoted in Sonheim 380).
In many of these golem tales, then—and especially in the seventeenth-eighteenth century
versions—the golem represents an ambiguous strength or power: on the one hand, it is a being
(monster or superhero, depending on your perspective) with enormous physical strength,
protector of the innocent. On the other hand, that very strength/power is also a violence—
potentially a vengeance—that can spin out of control.

Lamenting and Lonely: Problematized Golems in Meltzer’s and Drachler’s Poetry
The golem we see in some of Meltzer’s poetry is very much kin to the golems of the
aforementioned tales. If, within the golem narrative, the drive to create a golem can be read in
part as a machismo fantasy, the emasculated and disenfranchised Jewish man’s desire for power
against threats (external or internal) and over his own destiny, then Meltzer’s golem subverts this
narrative in a similar vein as the Renaissance and Romantic versions described by Kieval and
Sonheim. Meltzer’s golem is often a specifically emasculated and marginalized one; his poems
use the golem figure and trope to critique questions of strength and power, especially from
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minority-culture perspectives.
For example, in “Lamentation for Jack Spicer,” Meltzer writes:
The Jew in me is the ghost of me
hiding under a stairway
or returning home to a hovel
to find table & a chair
wrecked by Golem’s fist
bed broken, my black rags
hanging from his teeth. (David’s Copy 41)
The golem here demonstrates physical strength, yet it is raw, brute strength, destructive in nature.
The golem’s fist wrecks the table, chair, and bed; its teeth tear the speaker’s “black rags” (a
reference perhaps to black mourning clothes, or perhaps to the traditional black garb of hareidi
or hassidic Jews?). Yet the golem is in some way the speaker as well, as the speaker identifies
the “Jew in me” as a “ghost” of himself, and it is this ghost that returns home to discover the
golem’s devastation. The golem, here, potentially reflects the suppressed rage and grief bursting
out of the speaker. Overtly, this rage and grief stems directly from mourning a friend’s—Jack
Spicer’s—death. It is significant, though, that in order to demonstrate this rage and grief,
Meltzer turns to the golem, and to the Jewish ghost, as it were, within himself. The pathos of the
golem is not only in the tragic situations that drive its creation (in traditional Jewish folklore, the
pogroms; here, Spicer’s death) but in the ultimately self-destructive ramifications of unbridled
strength or vigilante/vengeful power—or, potentially, any power.
Meltzer explores this theme not only as it relates to specifically Jewish power, but the
power of humanity more broadly. For instance, he writes in “From Eden Book”:
O Jerusalem O Heaven O Eden
genes popping apart in freak collisions
death-dust sprinkled on all our food
stiff fish float topside on oil-slick seas
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the seas retreat into desert
whose sand hardens into highways woven upon each other
& soon piled up like great abstract golems
casting an endless shadow of moon-night
upon the ruined visions of Eden
of Heaven of Jerusalem (David’s Copy p.56)
Here, the golem functions as a symbol of unbridled human progress and technological
innovation, such as nuclear bombs, pollution, and global warming. The golem here evokes
images of Frankenstein’s monster; just as Frankenstein pushed scientific possibility and
creativity too far, resulting in devastation, so too humanity in “From Eden Book” pursues
power—technological power—mindless of environmental harm, resulting in a wasteland. “From
Eden Book” is, among other things, a lament about humanity’s destructiveness—a lament for all
the life (plant, human, animal) and environmental death and pollution caused by human science,
innovation, and violence.
Although this critique is ostensibly a secular, environmental one, by aligning wasteland
images with golems and utopian images with Eden, heaven, and Jerusalem, Meltzer invokes a
Judeo-Christian theme of the divinity, and sacredness, of ecological conservation. The biblical
injunction given in the garden of Eden, to work and guard the land, can be read as presenting an
eco-centric, as versus human-centric, world vision. According to such a reading, humanity’s
divine semblance and resulting creative power are specifically meant to serve the natural world
around them. However, “From Eden Book” portrays human creativity, human ingenuity and
power—all qualities that could be used for good, those “visions of Eden / of Heaven of
Jerusalem”—gone amok on a destructive rampage, “ruined.” Golems, then, point towards
humanity’s divine-like creative power (literally so, as humans bring golems to life by inscribing
the Hebrew word “emet” [truth] on the golem’s forehead and invoking a divine name of power)
taken to an unbridled, destructive extreme.
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In addition to using the figure of the golem to critique issues of creative and destructive
power, Meltzer depicts the golem in an arcane, magical, occult light, as in his “Notes for a Poem
to H. P. Lovecraft” (1959). Here, the traditional golem tropes are also subverted: the golem is
“made of dung,” (rather than the traditional clay or mud) and is depicted as somewhat broken
and constrained: “cragged / by heat—a tragic mesa. / Allowed one song / every hundredth year”
(David’s Copy 65). The dung signifies this golem as even lower, more despised, and more
marginalized than typical golems; this golem is physically flawed (“cragged” by heat) and is a
“tragic mesa”—an amalgamation of different parts/stones, straddling different times and places
(and potentially belonging to none). These themes parallel those discussed earlier, regarding the
golem figure in “Lamentation” and “From Eden Book”: the golem is disenfranchised, powerful
yet marginalized and disempowered by the very terms/limits that give it its ostensive power.
Additionally, however, the golem in “Lovecraft” alludes to broader, non-specifically-Jewish
occult contexts:
KRANTZ: the Golem
made of dung, cragged
by heat—a tragic mesa.
Allowed one song
every hundredth year.
His hand, a single finger of his hand,
takes one century to unbend
& point dead-center
between your eyes! (David’s Copy 65)
The tones of the uncanny and a somewhat gothic horror in the above lines positions the golem
within a broader supernatural/occult literary tradition, one emphasized by the poem’s addressee,
Lovecraft. Yet the golem depiction here also incorporates a lighter, almost campy, tone: the
melodrama of that slowly unbending finger, the informal, casual use of “&” and “dead-center,”
as well as the concluding exclamation point, all imbue the horror/occult tones with a sense of
fun. The “Krantz” golem reads more like Karloff’s Frankenstein than the quietly despairing,
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haunting golem of “Lamentation for Jack Spicer.”
Such a reading is bolstered by the next stanza, which depicts the golem’s bride:
THE ROSE: grinds green from the bulb
to mark her mouth & draw
green lines around her eyes.
She is the Golem’s bride
& doth dance with him
at Aleph fests & Shin parades
& she will bear from his stone seed
gargoyles that perch on
iron-haired trees. (David’s Copy 65)
These lines carry that same mix of eerie and light tones. The phrase “Golem’s bride” evokes
“Bride of Frankenstein”; there is something macabre or uncanny about the golem dance and
gargoyles perched on “iron-haired trees.” Yet they dance “at Aleph fests & Shin parades”—an
esoteric, but not frightening, image—and “The Rose” is associated with nature and birth: the
“green from the bulb,” “green lines” accentuating the Rose’s face, and the Rose bearing gargoyle
progeny from the golem’s “stone seed.” Krantz and The Rose can be read as complementary
halves of an ecosystem—the Krantz/golem as the land, the rock, the “mesa” which forms and
alters slowly over centuries; The Rose as the green nature (roses, bulbs) that entwines around—
dances with—the earth (in this reading, “made of dung” is actually a positive attribute: the
golem/earth as fertile). There are numerous ways to read the above lines (are the “iron-haired
trees” an ecological critique of man-made metals, of unnatural materials and technology?).
Altogether, however, in this poem Meltzer situates the golem as not only a religio-cultural figure,
and not only as a science-fiction figure of generalized human critique (such as Frankenstein’s
monster), but as a Jewish-fantastic figure: the golem as both concept and folk tale revealing a
specifically-Jewish take on the fantastic.
In all the above poems, Meltzer queers and problematizes what otherwise may have been
viewed as the “strength/power” of the “monster,” but also explores the monster as other and
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marginalized. Drachler’s use of golem evokes similar themes to Meltzer’s poems (i.e.
cultural/communal “othering” from a Jewish perspective)—yet Drachler does so through a lens
of female experience, leading her golem to query issues of gendered othering.
We only have one poem of Drachler’s concerning golems. In a letter to Meltzer, Drachler
explains that she hasn’t submitted any poems for Meltzer’s upcoming issue of Tree because she
doesn’t have any pieces about golems (Drachler, Letter to David Meltzer, 1975). Drachler writes
that in her own life, she’s wary of being turned into a symbolic golem—that is, a being who
exists to serve others. She acknowledges that she enjoys being of use, and there are those who
take advantage of that. Drachler leaves much unsaid, but heavily tonally implied: the nebulous
line separating healthy and unhealthy give-and-take in relationships; the dehumanizing dynamic
of friends or family taking advantage of the selfless/generous/eager-to-please individual. In just a
few words, Drachler spearheads a modern-day golem dynamic—after all, a golem quite literally
lives to serve—and in her usual pithy style, communicates volumes about how close this topic
hits.
Despite Drachler’s disclaimer, she did send Meltzer a poem, titled “Loneliness of the
Golem.”46 A poem of the same name appears in the posthumous collection of her poems; the
unpublished, typescript version in her correspondence to Meltzer is almost identical but has an
additional concluding stanza. The version appearing in The Collected Poems of Rose Drachler
(1983) reads as follows:
When the hand moves
When it lives for its own need
When it lights on an object
Like a magician’s hand
To make things disappear
46

Drachler’s comments paraphrased above are from Drachler’s letter to Meltzer dated June 26, 1975; the
unpublished, typescript copy of “Loneliness of the Golem” was included in the stack of letters from Drachler to
Meltzer but it is not dated. It is unclear whether Drachler included the poem with this letter or sent the poem later.
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Then the will of the hand
Separated from the head
From the warmth of the person
Is a punishment
A true punishment
When they cut the hand off
In times gone by
It relieved the whole
Of the need to consider
The solitude of the hand
Separated from its person
To be driven to this act
Headlong, alone
Enrages the hand
Turns the being to stone
The face to brass
The hand separated, alone
Light as a dandelion seed
Wandering acquisitive
Needs a family, a community
To return to the whole
A band of murderers
A den of thieves
Return the hand
Light and skillful
To the ordinary (Collected 234)
The typescript version of “Loneliness of the Golem” includes an additional, final stanza
emphasizing the theme begun in the final lines quoted above: the “hand[’s]” change of status
when the “murderers” and “thieves” absorb the hand into their work/community.47 On its own,
the final stanza as printed above is ambiguous in tone—is this “return[ing]” of the hand positive?
Ominous? Do we read “Light and skillful / To the ordinary” as darkly ironic or hopeful? The
additional lines in the typescript version, however, emphasize the hand’s “return” as a hopeful,
47

All direct quotations are from the Collected version of “Loneliness,” not the unpublished typescript version.
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honorable one: the hand returns to a community, to honor, and to sustenance—albeit within a
community of crime (Drachler, “Loneliness,” unpublished typescript). While one can still read
the typescript final stanza as ironic, it’s a less compelling read. A more straightforward, but
equally if not more complex, reading seems to highlight the change in self-narrative for the
“hand” when it transitions from “solitude” and exile to serving as one piece within a larger
body/community. Simultaneously, the juxtaposition of positive words and tone with an
unabashed reiteration that this is a criminal body/community problematizes a black-and-white
reading of the “den of thieves” as bad and the initial body/community (which exiled the hand) as
good. Instead, we get a sense of the latter as a morally rigid group—ethical on paper, but
experiencing no qualms at quickly, decisively ostracizing individuals who disrupt the status quo,
whether in criminal or simply in nonconformist ways (depending on how one reads the first
stanza). In contrast, the overt criminals—themselves marginalized people—exhibit an
inclusivity, regardless of whether idealistic or utilitarian, that humanizes the hand once more.
Although one can read the poem’s conclusion in this way using only the Collected text, the final
stanza in the typescript version emphasizes and further develops these themes.
Both Drachler’s letter and poem depict the idea of the golem as feminized in its
objectification, forced servitude, and marginalization; both versions of the poem depict this,
although the typescript version renders the forced servitude more explicit (Drachler,
“Loneliness,” unpublished typescript; Drachler letter to Meltzer 1975). “Loneliness of the
Golem” focuses on the golem as the body’s “hand”—the means of action and/or violence. There
is an interesting gender inversion here—usually violence, action, or strength would be seen as a
male (or machismo) trait. In Drachler’s poem, however, it is marginalized because that very
violence is depicted as illicit (“murderers,” “thieves”)—or, at very least, as something separated
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from the community. The poem describes a body (community, family) that uses the “hand”
(golem? woman?) to do the body’s dirty work, e.g. “mak[ing] things disappear.” This “hand”
can stretch itself out to do distasteful, but necessary deeds—such as violence towards outside
threats. But the hand’s very strength, power, and fulfillment of its master’s dark desires is
exactly that which marginalizes the hand from its body.
Drachler depicts this severing—of the hand from the body, of the golem (or woman)
from the community—as, in and of itself, a “punishment / A true punishment.” This state of
oppression, disenfranchisement, and exile “[e]nrages the hand” and “[t]urns the being”—the
hand? the body?—“to stone / The face to brass.” If “being” is read as the body/community,
turning to stone reflects the desensitization and apathy that “the whole” experiences once it is
“relieved” of the “need to consider / The solitude of the hand / Separated from its person.”
Alternatively, one could read this as the hand/golem turning to stone—that, after its
ostracization/exile from the community, the hand/golem experiences first rage and then a stonelike hardness enabling it to wander alone, looking for a new community (even a disreputable one
of “murderers” or “thieves”).
The additional final stanza in the typescript version points to a key distinction in
Drachler’s overall point: it is not the nature of the acts themselves (e.g. “crime”) that determine
whether such acts and actors have honor or not. Rather, it is the manner in which such acts are
committed—namely, whether the actor in question (the hand/golem/woman) has a choice or not.
The emphasis in the poem on choice, or lack of it, is key: golems have no will of their own; they
must carry out the will of their creator (in the tales, always a male rabbi). In later versions of the
golem tale, this is both the entire reason for the golem’s creation, as well as a magical and natural
condition of the golem’s existence—it literally lives to serve, is an extension of the
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rabbi/creator’s wishes, with no will of its own. In fact, the golem is arguably an extension of the
rabbi/creator himself—a “hand,” to use Drachler’s imagery.
The hand/golem’s tasks may be similar in nature (and equally as distasteful) in the
beginning of the poem as in the conclusion. The difference, however, lies in committing such
deeds without choice, while marginalized or severed from the head, heart, and
body/community—or as an active choice, as an accepted member of a community. The same
deeds when committed as part of the community/body—or the same monstrous figure when
accepted as part of a community—are “an honorable tool” due simply to the different
positioning.
Although Drachler gives no explicit gendered identifiers in her poem, it is hard not to
read the golem/hand as implicitly feminized, especially in light of Drachler’s comments in her
letter. Drachler’s comments connote the idea of the golem as anyone who is objectified, who is
seen as existing solely to serve others rather than existing with an autonomous, fully human will
and life. Such experiences were arguably more common for women than men in the Orthodox
Jewish community, especially in the mid-twentieth century (i.e. during Drachler’s lifetime).
And, indeed, this positioning of golem as female, as lacking autonomous will or voice,
and as subservient and/or infantilized, has roots in certain traditional Jewish texts and rabbinic
legal categories. As Eichler-Levine writes, “Being a golem can also signify being unfinished,
diminished, less than human, and this state can be gendered in a feminine manner” (145).
Eichler-Levine quotes Simone Yehuda in noting that “one Talmudic texts reads: ‘A woman
[before marriage or childbirth] is a golem’” (145). Eichler-Levine analyzes that:
Golemness is thus an ambiguously gendered state; although many recent incarnations of the
golem, particularly those that read the monster alongside superheroes, emphasize the golem
as a symbol of the reclamation of Jewish power amid the complexities of the twentieth
century, it is important to keep in mind here Yehuda’s reading, the limited and derogatory
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uses of golem imagery in various Jewish contexts. Just as the child is not a full citizen, for a
long time women were not granted this status either, as shown in the infantilizing aspects of
some upper- and middle-class nineteenth century constructions of femininity, suggesting a
disempowered and nonpriviliged reading of the golem. Golems, then, are not always
understood in terms of metaphors of strength. (145-6)
The childlike, feminine, unfinished, and disempowered aspects of the golem that Eichler-Levine
notes above can also be read as stemming from the golem’s inherent nature of being created to
serve its master, and being bound to this service/obedience by the Hebrew-mystical letters on its
forehead. The very letters/magic that bring the golem to life and endow it with power are also
the mechanism of its binding and constraint; it is the golem’s very strength/power that makes it
an object of interest for servitude from the male rabbi-creator’s perspective.
Eichler-Levine’s apt comparison of the golem’s gendered politics (feminized
infantilization and disempowerment) to “some upper- and middle-class nineteenth century
constructions of femininity” touch on a gendered and sexualized reading of the golem that
resonates with Drachler’s portrayals. Implicit within Eichler-Levine’s readings (particularly her
analysis of the father-son relationship between Loew and golem in Wisniewski’s Golem) is the
idea that the golem occupies a liminal, intersectional space within the category/community of
“Jew.” On one hand, within the tales the golem seems to be insider/family to Jews: it is created,
and thus metaphorically fathered, by a rabbi; it is often depicted in a childlike manner; its
purpose (in later versions) is to protect Jews from danger. On the other hand, the golem is
marginalized even within its parent (Jewish) community: it is viewed as existing purely to serve
and thus objectified and servile; it is bound to its creator/master’s will and can be literally
unbound from life at a word from the rabbi; it is feared or despised (as powerful, monster) and
represents the danger of unleashed violence even to the very Jewish community it protects. Even
as it literally lives to serve, its service in performing distasteful or impossible tasks serves to
estrange it from within its familial community.
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Drachler’s discussion of the golem, in both her letters and poetry, makes explicit this
theme of liminality, and implicitly connects it to gendered/sexualized thematics similar to those
outlined by Eichler-Levine. She raises the question of what happens to these thematics/identities
when one is part of a marginalized/minority group (say, Orthodox Judaism in twentieth century
North America) and yet simultaneously marginalized within that first group—a minority within a
minority. As an Orthodox Jewish female poet who is intellectual, and who straddles both
Orthodox Jewish and secular poetic communities, Drachler experiences just such
intersectionality. Drachler also references, in a journal entry, multiple miscarriages, a fact
potentially significant here too (Collected 82). Currently, I do not know whether Drachler was
familiar with the talmudic text comparing a barren woman to a golem; it is entirely possible,
however, that she was. And she would definitely have been familiar with the unfortunate, oftenstigmatized position of fertility-challenged women in Orthodox Jewish literature and
communities.
As Drachler wrote to Meltzer, she did not often write about golems—in fact she seems to
have specifically avoided them (Drachler, letter to Meltzer, 1975). This fact, though, perhaps
stems not from her lack of familiarity or interest in the subject, but rather from her intense
intellectual and emotional struggle with the golem thematics, gendered dynamics, and ethical
implications discussed above. Meltzer is able to write about golems in multivalent ways:
subverting and critiquing the idea of unbridled power or human innovation; lamenting the
marginalized shadow of a tragic othered; as conflicted counterpart to “the Jew in me” who “is the
ghost of me”; as a fun and nuanced riff on the gothic, occult, and fantastic—and as a specifically
Jewish-fantastical figure. Meltzer’s poems depict an acute sensitivity to the manifold themes and
pathos of the golem palimpsest—and he plays with and explores such themes in his use of
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golems in different poetic contexts.
Drachler, though, may have been too close to the golem itself—to what it represented for
Drachler as woman, as poet, as Orthodox Jewish—to write about it (or at least, to write about it
much, or easily). One can read Drachler’s silence (and her subsequent letter and poem) not as a
lack, but rather as a silence stemming from, and stymied by, an intense awareness of the golem’s
very real implications. It is possible that for Drachler, writing the golem, naming the golem (the
word “golem” does not appear in the text of Drachler’s poem itself, just the title) implies or
privileges a male voice, just as the golem of traditional lore is created only (so far as we see) by
the male-rabbinic hand/voice. Writing the golem, from this perspective, may in fact entail a
male voice—or else entail grappling with and breaking through what it means to be a golem, in
both a female and rabbinic-legal way.48 What Drachler has done is to break the silence—of the
golem, of the female—and speak, not from the position of creator/writer/human but from the
position of the othered, monstrous golem.

48

In fact, Drachler is the first female, Orthodox-Jewish, English-language writer I am aware of to write the golem in
poetic/fictional contexts. Even if Drachler is not the first (and it is entirely possible there exist others of whom I am
not yet aware) by the time of Drachler’s writing in the 1960-70s, golem imagery among Jewish women writers (in
English) was still scarce.
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Chapter 2: “Unbound Truth”: Feminist Religio-Spirituality in Jones’ Dalemark Quartet

Chapters two and three examine children’s fantasy published during the 1960s to 1990s
that displays overt feminist religious themes. These decades saw an explosion in children’s
fantasy production,49 much of it feminist50 and a fair amount with religio-spiritual themes or
content (according to this dissertation’s definition of religio-spiritual). To discuss them all—
even those works overlapping the categories of fantasy, children’s/young adult, feminist, and
religio-spiritual literature—would exceed the confines of this project. The aim of these chapters,
therefore, is not to give an exhaustive survey. Rather, I select specific authors and texts as case
studies regarding different ways fantastic rhetorics and feminist onto-epistemologies can coproduce feminist reimaginings of religio-spiritualities. The rhetorical, thematic, and ideological
implications of these works offer us a lens to consider these texts themselves, which have had
impacts on generations of readers and writers; these case studies may also shed light on broader
trends of children’s and young adult fantasy of their time.
While the authors discussed in chapter three reimagine religio-spirituality in ways that
play with existing, real-world frameworks (e.g., L’Engle and Christianity; Le Guin and Taoism),
Jones explores a feminist and pluralistic religio-spirituality beyond institutional frameworks
altogether. As she does so, Jones brings an atheist sensibility to such explorations: one that
intertwines with, problematizes, and simultaneously amplifies the feminist and pluralistic religiospiritual thematics present in Jones’ novels. In her fusions of these perspectives (affirmative
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See Levy and Mendlesohn, chapter 5.
Feminist authors of children’s fantasy (with “feminist,” “children’s” and “fantasy” all open, multivalent terms)
from this period, in addition to the writers discussed in chapters two and three, include Virginia Hamilton, Susan
Cooper, Penelope Lively, Patricia C. Wrede, Robin McKinley, Ellen Kushner, Diane Duane, Bruce Coville, and
David Almond, among others.
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religio-spiritual and atheistic/skeptical), Jones sounds a distinct note from other feminist religiospiritual children’s fantasy (e.g. L’Engle, Pierce) as well as from atheistic children’s fantasy such
as Pullman’s His Dark Materials (1995-2000). While Pullman’s work is that of a skeptic, Jones’
immersive rhetoric actively engages readers in a process that makes them skeptics, or skeptical
readers—skeptics of the truths and power structures presented to readers over the course of the
novels, whether secular or sacred.
This is particularly true in Jones’ Dalemark sequence,51 which is the focus of this
chapter; the Dalemark sequence includes: Cart and Cwidder (1975) (henceforth Cart); Drowned
Ammet (1977) (henceforth Drowned); The Spellcoats (1979) (henceforth Spellcoats); The Crown
of Dalemark (1993) (henceforth Crown); and the short story “The True State of Affairs” (1995)
(henceforth “Affairs”). In this chapter, I focus primarily on Drowned, Spellcoats, and Crown.
The Dalemark novels resemble secondary-world, portal-quest fantasies, but are in fact
written in an immersive rhetoric that specifically critiques ideologies embedded in the portalquest form. The Dalemark sequence, as Mendlesohn notes, “forms probably Jones’s most
sustained fictional attack” on the “cod medievalism or early modernism” of much genre fantasy
(particularly portal-quest fantasy), and on the “orientalist, static view of the past” that such
fantasy perpetuates (Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5, “A World Lived in”).52 Such orientalist,
static views of history, Mendlesohn argues, permeate portal-quest and genre fantasy when
51

I refer to the Dalemark novels as the Dalemark sequence, rather than quartet, because as Mendlesohn notes, “there
are actually more than four texts that form the Dalemark sequence,” (e.g. the short story “The True State of Affairs”
[Jones, Minor Arcana, 1995] also takes place within Dalemark); yet the four novels referenced here “form a
coherent sequence that ‘speak to each other.’” (Mendlesohn, Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5, “A World Lived in”)
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By “cod medievalism,” Mendlesohn refers to the de facto, pseudo-medievalist settings of many genre fantasy
novels; Mendlesohn (and others such as Butler) argues convincingly that such settings are done less thoughtfully,
accurately, or purposely in nature and rather, stem instead from blind imitation of Tolkien and Lewis. Mendlesohn
and Jones both consider such moves to be missing Tolkien’s point—i.e., deploying Tolkien’s props as integral
requirements of “high,” “epic” or genre fantasy without actually interrogating such settings viz a viz the story one is
writing, and often without much worldbuilding at all (Jones takes aim at such efforts in her Tough Guide to
Fantasyland, where she critiques such pseudo-medievalist settings for their frequent lack of ecology, economics,
technological progress, or other indications of internal consistency and plausibility).
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secondary worlds “exist in the period of history the author selects for them and in which major
religious and political upheavals do little to change the industrial or economic landscape” (Diana
Wynne Jones, chapter 5, “A World Lived in”). Mendlesohn discusses how Jones “uses the
techniques of immersive fantasy to rework the way a quest can be written” (Diana Wynne Jones,
chapter 5). The Dalemark novels, as Mendlesohn notes, contain some portal-quest elements:
“quests,” medieval settings, and bildungsroman trajectories. Yet the quests are not real quests
(and where they are, the characters are unaware of them),53 and medieval political and socioeconomic systems experience significant stress, and change over the course of the novels.
Additionally, the bildungsroman trope is reversed: rather than the wide-eyed, provincial youth
learning about the wider world through a guide (e.g. Frodo and Gandalf), Jones’ protagonists
“frequently […] presume their competence in a world that is not quite as they think it” (Diana
Wynne Jones, chapter 5). Jones, thus, employs in the Dalemark sequence an immersive rhetoric
that specifically deconstructs these very portal-quest tropes.
This subversive rhetoric—i.e., Jones’ deconstruction of portal-quest tropes—applies
across the Dalemark novels; however, such rhetoric takes on additional significance when
considered regarding religious and spiritual thematics in the Dalemark sequence. Similarly to
how Jones destabilizes traditional portal-quest tropes regarding the quest narrative and
secondary-world politics and socio-economics, so too she destabilizes traditional portal-quest
tropes regarding: guide figures; deities, ritual, and mortal-deity dynamics; and finally, regarding
narrative reliability and truth of the text itself (i.e. the text of the fictional novels). All of these
moves, I argue, display implicit or explicit religio-spiritual and onto-epistemological
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See also Mendlesohn’s discussion of how Dalemark’s “quest” (i.e. the presumed quest of Crown) is actually an
attempt to hide an imposter (Maewen, mistaken for Noreth, who was supposed to lead the quest) and thus subverts
typical quest-fantasy rhetoric (Rhetorics 7).
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implications in that they offer ways of reimagining dialogic engagements between oneself and
the numinous or sacred, between power-hierarchy statuses (e.g., mortals-deities, children-adults),
and between reader and text. I further argue that such reimagined, dialogic engagements parallel
feminist and midrashic/kabbalistic approaches to religio-spirituality and onto-epistemology, with
an emphasis on critique, skepticism, questioning, and a multivalent, fluid conception of
ontology/truth.
Section one of this chapter sketches a brief context of Jones from a religio-spiritual
perspective: I address why Jones’ work, specifically, is important to examine regarding feminist
religio-spiritual content. I do so by positioning Jones within the broader field of twentiethcentury children’s fantasy. Put simply, Jones connects backwards (to Lewis and Tolkien, whose
lectures she attended in Oxford) and forwards in time (to a veritable explosion of cross-Atlantic
fantasy writers, including Neil Gaiman54) across the twentieth century. Jones also brings a rare,
if not unique, sensibility to religio-spiritual themes in her fiction: a self-avowed atheist who
acknowledges the formative impact of her minister grandfather, Jones offers complex and messy
(in the best sense of the word) approaches to religio-spirituality that mingle skepticism with
affirmation in a genuinely open-ended way. The middle three sections of this chapter examine
how Jones offers such complex, messy, and subversive religio-spiritual approaches within the
Dalemark sequence. I focus on three ways Jones subverts religio-spiritual tropes (within genre
and children’s fantasy) and reimagines feminist religio-spiritualities: through her destabilization
of guide figure rhetoric, deities and religious tropes, and narrative truth/reliability, respectively.
The final section of this chapter explores ways in which Jones’ subversive modes regarding the
above tropes offer new (for children’s fantasy at the very least) feminist, religio-spiritual
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See Gaiman’s forward to Reflections, pp.xi-xvi.
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possibilities—including some that parallel Hebrew-biblical, midrashic, and kabbalistic thematics.

Religio-Spirituality and Jones: Biographical and Historical Contexts
Jones’ work, specifically, is important to examine regarding feminist religio-spiritual
content due to Jones’ position within twentieth-century children’s fantasy. Jones is a seminal
figure in children’s fantasy in that she connects to canonical fantasy writers both before her (in
the first half of the twentieth century) and contemporaneous to her in the late-twentieth and
early-twenty-first centuries. In both her fiction and nonfiction writing, Jones has paid tribute at
various points, and in specific ways, to predecessors such as Lewis and Tolkien, whose lectures
she attended while a student in Oxford,55 and Nesbit, whose work Jones read as an adult but with
whom Jones shares an affinity.56 Jones corresponded with contemporaneous feminist fantasy
writers, such as Ellen Kushner and Patricia C. Wrede;57 Jones also mentored and influenced a
generation of younger writers, including those formative to the current fantastic field, such as
Neil Gaiman. Jones’ influence, thus, bridges fantasy writers across the edges of the twentieth
century, as well as bridging cross-Atlantic fantasy writers (Wrede and Kushner live in the United
States; Gaiman has lived in both countries) across the twentieth century field of children’s
fantasy literature.
Jones is not unique in this sense. Other authors similarly bridge fantasy writers across the
field both chronologically and geographically (e.g. Le Guin, L’Engle, and Pierce). Jones also
notably lacks direct connections with some of her notable contemporaries, such as Penelope
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Jones has written and spoken of this experience in “Something About the Author” in Reflections pp.290-292;
interview with C. Butler in Reflections p.332; and interview with C. Butler in Diana Wynne Jones: An Exciting and
Exacting Wisdom (2002), ed. Teya Rosenberg et al, p.170. For Jones’ writings on Lewis, see “Reading C. S. Lewis’s
Narnia” in Reflections pp.47-50; for her writings on Tolkien, see “The Shape of the Narrative in The Lord of the
Rings” in Reflections pp.6-32 (first published in J. R. R. Tolkien: This Far Land, ed. Robert Giddings [1983])
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Jones interview with C. Butler, in Diana Wynne Jones, edited by Teya Rosenberg et al, p.171.
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See Jones’ correspondence with both these authors in the Seven Stories archive.
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Lively, Alan Garner, and Susan Cooper, all of whom overlapped at Oxford and whose work
speaks to one another’s, yet none of whom knew each other at the time.58 This is just to say:
Jones’ lines of connections are significant and informative when conceptualizing the broader
fantasy-literature field. They are not, of course, all-encompassing. Yet Jones also brings a
specific, and fascinating, religio-spiritual dynamic to her fantasy: one of atheist sensibilities and
skeptical critique yet, simultaneously, of affirmation of the numinous and spiritual, and an
embrace of critique as religio-spiritual engagement.
Religious and spiritual themes permeate Jones’ body of work as a whole, yet this aspect
of her writing has not yet been explored in depth, if at all, by scholars writing on her work.
Since scholarship on Jones is recently burgeoning to begin with, this is understandable and
points to one of many fertile realms for further exploration of Jones’ work, and one that
complements trends in currently emerging scholarship on Jones. Much recent scholarship on
Jones focuses on related topics, such as Jones’ treatment of authority/power,59 her destabilization
of ontological or epistemological frameworks,60 and her employment of fantastic and narrative
rhetoric to subvert common tropes and ideologies embedded in both fantasy and children’s
literature genres (Mendlesohn, Diana Wynne Jones, Introduction).
The thematics that these and other scholars explore in Jones’ work deeply resonate with
those present in Jones’ treatment of religio-spiritual narrative content across her fiction. A selfproclaimed atheist,61 Jones brings both atheistic and skeptical sensibilities to her fiction.
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For more on the connections between these four writers and productive comparative literary analysis across their
oeuvres, see C. Butler Four British Fantasists (2006).
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See Hixon, “Power Plays” (2010); Jucovy, “Little Sister is Watching You” (2010).
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See Fischer, “The Structure of Magical Revolutions” (2010); Ang, “Dogmata, Catastrophe, and the Renaissance
of Fantasy in Diana Wynne Jones” (2010); and Steinke, “The Games People Play” (2010), particularly Steinke’s
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61
Jones, “Something About the Author,” in Reflections, p.281.

72

Simultaneously, though, Jones describes formative childhood experiences with her grandfather,
T. F. Jones, who was a well-known moderator of the Welsh Noncomformist chapels. As Jones
described:
[P]reaching, he was like the prophet Isaiah. He spread his arms and [Welsh] rolled from him,
sonorous, magnificent, and rhythmic. I had no idea then that he was a famous preacher, nor
that people came from forty miles away to hear him because he had an almost bardic
tendency to speak a kind of blank verse – hwyl, it is called, much valued in a preacher – but
the splendour and the rigour of it nevertheless went into the core of my being. Though I
never understood one word, I grasped the essence of a dour, exacting, and curiously
magnificent religion. His voice shot me full of terrors. For years after that, I used to dream
regularly that a piece of my bedroom wall slid aside revealing my grandfather declaiming in
Welsh, and I knew he was declaiming about my sins. I still sometimes dream in Welsh,
without understanding a word. And at the bottom of my mind there is always a flow of
spoken language that is not English, rolling in majestic paragraphs and resounding with
splendid polysyllables. I listen to it like music when I write. (Reflections 263-4)
This passage emphasizes not only the formative impact Jones’ grandfather had on her as a child,
but also the enduring resonance of such experiences on Jones’ adult, and writing, life. In her
autobiographical writing, Jones conveys her childhood experience of religion as multifaceted and
complex: experiences such as the one quoted above are recounted alongside negative ones62 and
neutral/agnostic ones.63 Jones thus describes her approaches to religion with a wry humor and
strong skeptical tone. Additionally, Jones mingles descriptions of skepticism and distrust toward
religious authorities with episodes depicting skepticism and distrust toward ostensibly secular
authorities as well.64
Overall, the formative experiences and resulting sensibilities Jones illuminates in her
autobiographical writing correlate with the resonances of much of her fictional work, particularly
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See, for instance, Jones, “Something About the Author” in Reflections, p. 272.
Jones, “Something About the Author” in Reflections, p. 275, 281.
64
As a child, Jones and her family evacuated London during World War II; she, her mother, and sisters lived for a
time with other mother and child evacuees. Jones writes of a fellow border, an “eleven-year-old German-Jewish boy
[refugee staying with a Quaker family] who told horrendous stories of what the police did—they took you away in
the night, he said, to torture you—I had no idea he was talking about the Gestapo. I have been nervous of policemen
ever since” (“Something About the Author,” Reflections, p. 267).
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themes of questioning established truths and sources of authority—be they secular, scientific, or
religious; divine, governmental, parental, or other. Jones’ books display this theme both in terms
of content and, as scholars such as Mendlesohn have noted, in terms of structure as well.65
Literary techniques such as unreliable narration, defamiliarization, intertextuality, and
metafiction permeate Jones’s writing. Part of the process of reading a Jones book is learning to
question and critique the “truth” and “authority” of the very narrative itself. While existing
scholarship has opened discussion of Jones’ use of these themes and rhetorical methodology in a
broad, and secular, sense, little to no scholarship has yet investigated the religio-spiritual
ramification of such themes and approaches within Jones’ oeuvre. To cover this topic
exhaustively regarding Jones’ body of work exceeds the scope of this chapter, although a longer
project doing such would be timely, productive, and fruitful. Such a project might focus,
particularly, on the diverse religious figures and institutions of Jones’ multiverses (e.g. her
Magid books [1997-2003], The Lives of Christopher Chant [1988]); her treatments of Norse and
Greco-Roman pantheons (Eight Days of Luke [1975], The Homeward Bounders [1981], The
Game [2007]); and on her employment of Welsh mythological figures such as Gwyn ap Nud and
Arawn (Dogsbody [1975], The Merlin Conspiracy [2003]). For the purposes of this chapter, I
focus on Jones’ Dalemark sequence; however, my analysis here bears parallels to and
ramifications for Jones’ treatment of religion in the other works listed above, and for future
scholarship on religio-spirituality across Jones’ oeuvre.

Subversive Religio-Spiritual Guide Figures
One way we see Jones subverting traditional children’s fantasy portrayals of authority
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See Mendlesohn’s concluding chapter in Diana Wynne Jones.
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and epistemology in the Dalemark sequence is through her challenge to the guide-protagonist
relationship stereotypical of portal-quest fantasy. In much portal-quest and children’s fantasy,
the guide figure
stories the world for us by dispensing knowledge and moral judgment as and when it is
needed. […] There is almost always a guide in the portal-quest fantasy: the Evangelist in
Pilgrim’s Progress […], the raven in George MacDonald’s Lilith, the beaver and Aslan in
The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, and Gandalf in Lord of the Rings. The journeyman
succeeds or fails to the extent he listens to those wiser or more knowledgeable than him,
whether these are spiritual, fantastical, or human guides. (Mendlesohn, Diana Wynne Jones,
chapter 4)
In children’s fantasy, guide figures often work within a closed, static, and binary framework in
which “good” and “evil” are absolute and easily recognizable. Mendlesohn points out that,
typically, in both genre fantasy and children’s fantasy,
good people give truthful information and bad people lie. Guide figures are often deemed
trustworthy because they have told the protagonist they are or because they appear
mysterious. Neither Harry Potter […], Arthur Penhaligon […], or Taran Wanderer […] ever
question his guides’ common sense. (Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5, “A World Lived in”)
This reductive figuring of the guide makes sense in portal-quest fantasies, where, Mendlesohn
asserts, the narrative rhetoric “posits the reader as someone to whom things are explained
through explanations offered [via trustworthy guides] to the protagonist” (Rhetorics 31). Guides
serve to “download information into the text,” in narratives that are “uninterruptible,
unquestionable, and delivered absolutely in the mode of the club discourse: the travelers group
around the narrator and listen to his […] description of great events or political structures”
(Rhetorics, 13-14). The guide thus “usurps the narrator-focalizer role” of the protagonist and
presents both protagonists and readers with a static, closed (unquestionable) version of history
and morality (Rhetorics, 14). Such a protagonist-guide power dynamic is, as Mendlesohn points
out, inherently problematic in its “dependency-syndrome” (Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5, “A
World Lived in”).
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The political ideology underpinning this kind of portal-quest guide figure is inherently
conservative; the moral ideology is static, dualistic, and overly simplistic. Rather than allowing
for nuance, or for protagonist/reader building of their own critical interpretations, portal-quest
guides tell protagonists and readers “what evil is, what it is called, and (it is often implied) that it
has always existed: a glossary becomes a substitute for cultural understanding” (Mendlesohn,
Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 4). This is in part due to the “descriptive structure” of the portalquest rhetoric, which is
intensely political: its apparent neutrality discourages questions and encourages belief in a
monosemic understanding of the world […] It does this primarily by allowing the reader to
assume that what is described in the understanding of protagonist [sic] is described correctly.
The portal–quest fantasy by its very nature needs to deny the possibility of a polysemic
discourse to validate the quest. (Mendlesohn, Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 4)
This “monosemic understanding” often extends to the way in which portal-quest-guides present
morality and religion, with the result that “[t]here is no theology in portal–quest fantasy, only
catechism.” (Mendlesohn, Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 4)
It is specifically these politics—this “catechism” and monosemic understanding of
religio-spiritual truth and morality—that Jones contests and subverts. Jones draws attention to
and critiques the guide-protagonist dependency syndrome by problematizing Dalemark’s wouldbe guides, and by emphasizing, instead, protagonists’—and readers’—developments of their own
critical faculties. Jones does this in a few ways.
First, Jones depicts positively-cued guides who are limited in their abilities to “guide”
directly or effectively. Tanamil, one of the guide figures in Spellcoats, provides a useful
example here. Spellcoats stands out from the other Dalemark novels in both its setting—in the
“prehistory of Dalemark” (Mendlesohn, Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5, “A World Lived in”)—
and in its narrative style: Spellcoats is written from the first-person point of view of Tanaqui, the
female protagonist (the other novels are close third-person). Midway through the novel, we
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discover that the text we are reading—Tanaqui’s first-person recounting of her siblings’ flight
from their home during a war—is actually two spellcoats (woven coats with patterns made of
words/spells) that Tanaqui is weaving in the real-time present of the story. Spellcoats is thus the
most rhetorically immersive of the sequence (and the sequence as a whole is already immersive).
Tanamil encounters Tanaqui and her siblings Robin, Gull, Hern, and Duck along their journey.
While the siblings do not know it at first, Tanamil is one of the “Undying,” mostly-immortal
figures whom human characters consider divine, yet the Undying themselves do not.
Tanamil appears, rhetorically, as though he will be the classic portal-quest guide figure.
He seems magical (the siblings are not sure at first, but then decide he is a wizard before they
realize he is an Undying), seems benign, seems knowledgeable and wise in a vague/mysterious
way, and his narrative function seems to be to assist the protagonists. Yet Tanamil offers very
little direct guidance—partially because he is “bound,” and therefore restricted in what he is
allowed to proactively tell the siblings. When the siblings first encounter him, he tells them there
is a question they must all ask him;66 however, since they all ask the wrong questions (minus
Robin, perhaps), Tanamil’s answers, while technically true, are meaningless to the children.67
Hern, Duck, and Tanaqui all seem to be trying to ask Tanamil who he is—but they phrase their
questions the wrong way, which limits the answers that Tanamil, being “bound,” may give.
Tanamil (at this point in the narrative) can only answer questions by giving directly literal
answers; the information he gives in this scene is unhelpful and/or misleading to both
protagonists and readers. Later, with more knowledge, Tanaqui and readers alike can re-read
Tanamil’s answers and understand their fuller meanings and implications.
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Spellcoats 87
Meaningless despite Robin asking the right question because Tanaqui has “no memory of what was said” between
Robin and Tanamil: “I know [Robin] asked, and I think she asked right, and that Tanamil answered, but I have no
memory of what was said” (Spellcoats 88).
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For instance, when Tanaqui asks where Tanamil comes from, he answers, “I suppose you
would say I come from the Black Mountains” (Spellcoats 88). Initially, Tanaqui interprets this
to mean that Tanamil, as a human/magician, “comes from” the Black Mountains in the colloquial
sense of the term—i.e. that Tanamil (or his people) used to live there. It is not until later in the
novel, when we know that Tanamil is an Undying and is also the Red River, that we fully
understand his answer: the Red River originates in—literally “comes from”—the Black
Mountains. Understood correctly, this is a clue to Tanamil’s immortal identity, and does, in fact,
answer what Tanaqui, Hern, and Duck were trying to ask. However, neither Tanaqui nor readers
have the information necessary to understand it correctly at the time of this scene. Interestingly,
there is never a moment of revelation for the reader: while we do eventually discover Tanamil’s
identity, Tanaqui never goes back and explains this episode to us—rather, it is left for readers to
go back and reinterpret on their own.
Tanamil is cued, in some ways, as a typical portal-quest guide: he asks the siblings to
trust him even if what he does “seems strange” because “it is done for the best” (Spellcoats 78).
The siblings do, initially, trust him simply because of surface-level cues: his “gentle, laughing
look” (Spellcoats 74) and the fact that he seems “to know so much” (Spellcoats 78). However,
immediately following these quotes, Tanamil turns Gull into a figurine. Although, as we do find
out later in the novel, this was a good move68 and Tanamil is “good” (i.e. aligned with the
protagonists), at this moment in the narrative—the moment that Tanamil turns Gull into a
figurine—Tanaqui’s first-person narration shifts from depicting Tanamil as trustworthy to
depicting him as an ambiguous figure. Tanaqui, Hern, and Duck fluctuate wildly between
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Turning Gull temporarily into a figurine actually served to free, hide, and protect his soul from Kankredin, who
was fighting Gull for his soul since Gull’s soul could provide Kankredin a hold on the souls of other Undying, such
as their grandfather. Yet Tanamil cannot fully explain this to the siblings in the narrative moment due to being
bound (Spellcoats 80-81).
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thinking Tanamil is a friendly Heathen human, to a nefarious Heathen magician, to a nonHeathen magician, to an ally, to one of Kankredin’s (the antagonist) henchmen. Their trust of
Tanamil oscillates with each new interpretation.
The episode of the time spent in Tanamil’s abode is also unreliable in its very narrative
structure. Tanaqui admits she is unsure exactly what happened or in what order things happened.
She tells us her siblings remember things differently than she does and contest her narration, but
that since she is “weaving this story,” she will tell it as she remembers (Spellcoats 88). This
entire episode is written in liminal rhetoric,69 with Tanaqui remembering contradictory things
that are never fully resolved: Tanamil’s shelter is simultaneously an empty, mud-driftwood shack
built against the cliff face and a luxurious residence inside the cliff, open to a river; they eat
many luxurious meals or they only eat once; Robin is dancing in the room but also, impossibly,
dancing on top of the cliff across the river. Truth is rendered ambiguous and unstable, both due
to the contradictory information Tanaqui relates and the hazy, dream-like tone in which she
relates it. This alone is not necessarily subversive of fantasy traditions. If anything, it strongly
alludes to fairyland tropes. The siblings’ resulting ambiguity regarding Tanamil himself,
however—their uncertainty, for much of the novel, of who he is, what his agenda is, and whether
or not to trust him—is subversive for a children’s fantasy-literature figuring of a guide,
especially for children’s fantasy published in the 1970s.70
Even as Tanamil’s morality is clarified—as the children learn his identity and learn to
trust him—Tanamil is still an unconventional, and often inadequate, guide. He is easily
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See Mendlesohn’s definition of liminal rhetoric (Rhetorics, p.182-183 [and ensuing chapter])
Although contemporary children’s speculative fiction sees increasingly frequent depictions of
unreliable/ambiguous guide figures, such depiction was rarer at the time of Spellcoats’ publication. While prior or
contemporaneous examples do exist (e.g. Nesbit’s psammead [Five Children and It (1902)] arguably can be read as
an ambiguous guide figure), the prevailing trope of guide figure in children’s fantasy was of a straightforward,
unambiguously positive/reliable guide (e.g. Aslan and Mr. Beaver in Narnia; Merriman in The Dark is Rising
sequence [1965-77]).
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distracted by his romance with Robin, seemingly more interested in that than in “guiding” the
protagonists, even when danger is imminent; he has to be recalled to his duties by Anoreth
(Tanaqui’s mother, also a bound Undying). When Anoreth admonishes, “You were trusted to
watch, Tanamil! Take your mind off Robin and attend,” Tanamil jumps guiltily to help
(Spellcoats 218). The tone of this passage implies not that Tanamil is of ambiguous morality (as
we see later with Duck/Wend) but that Tanamil is a human-like, fallible being who does not
really consider himself to be a god or guide, and is somewhat bad at it. This contrasts starkly
with the later language describing his behavior towards Kars Adon’s people, who hail him as a
god: “Tan Adon, as they call him, came in majesty to the Heathens and bore witness that Kars
Adon had named Hern as his heir” (Spellcoats 257). This rhetoric is more what we would
traditionally expect from a portal-quest guide (or god),71 yet here it is partially ironic: Tanamil
and Hern know that Hern’s claim as heir to the throne is mostly a sham, if a necessary one.
Tanamil subverts the typical guide trope because of his limited ability to help the
children. By the time his bonds start to loosen, at the very end of the novel, the children have
already come into their own self-awareness, agencies, and (as typical in a Jones novel) therefore
their powers. It is Tanaqui herself who figures out, via rereading her own spellcoats (i.e. the text
we’ve been reading), what’s going on; through her critical reading of her own narrative
(literally), Tanaqui discerns her identity as a witch, her power of weaving not just words but
spells, and that her mother, grandfather, and Tanamil are of the Undying. By rereading the
words she has already woven, and noticing patterns, gaps, and connecting threads that she had
previously observed uncritically, Tanaqui figures out that her weaving/writing is actually (i.e.
has already been) a spell. Noticing the gaps in her own narrative focal lens—i.e. gaps in the first
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See Mendlesohn’s discussion of Tolkien’s shift in tone from the high-politics, Old Testament/Anglo-Saxon
Chronicle language of the club story to the “low vernacular” of the hobbits (Rhetorics 33-34).
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half of the novel (and of her narrative) that she had not previously questioned—allows Tanaqui
to ask the right questions of those around her, such as asking her siblings for details or
perspectives beyond her own. It is specifically by adding bits of knowledge and perspectives
from her siblings that Tanaqui is able to figure out how she can break the One’s bounds in order
to defeat Kankredin and save the (literal) land that Kankredin is destroying on both
physical/environmental and metaphysical levels. It is only at this point in the novel that guide
figures such as her mother can help Tanaqui—i.e. can answer her questions—because, as
Anoreth puts it, “you are nearly there already” (Spellcoats 196). Anoreth tells Tanaqui, “You’ve
been thinking at last […] I don’t suppose you can understand how it felt, watching you weave
and willing you to stop blaming yourself and start thinking” (Spellcoats 196). It is only after
Tanaqui becomes an active, critical reader of her own life (and literally of her own narrative),
and after her independent action of loosening the One’s and Tanamil’s bounds, that either
Tanamil or Anoreth is able to offer the proactive assistance typical of guides. The key here is
that it only comes at the end of the story, and is only made possible by the empowered
questioning, learning, and decisions/actions of Tanaqui herself. The running theme across the
Dalemark sequence—indeed, Jones’ oeuvre—is that Jones’ protagonists need to question and
figure out answers for themselves; even the guides themselves say so (if anything, this is their
most common “instruction”).
In this way, it is not only Tanamil, but all of the positively-cued guides throughout the
Dalemark quartet—Anoreth, the One, Old Ammet, Libby Beer, Cennoreth (all Undying)—who
are limited (similarly to Tanamil) in their “guide” roles by either human/mage “bounds” or by
their own ethical rules. These rules—the One’s rules—are, as Old Ammet tells Mitt, that the
Undying “do not tell his mortal family what to do. That is to make people into puppets” (Crown,
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545). What the Undying can do, instead, is encourage questioning and empower the protagonists
to develop independent moral compasses and critical thinking skills. The dialogic manner in
which the Undying do so is strongly reminiscent of certain midrashic/kabbalistic traditions, and
has significant feminist-epistemological implications; these will be discussed in depth in the
upcoming sections.
Just as Jones subverts reader expectations regarding positive-cued guides by limiting
these guides’ abilities and desires to authoritatively lead the protagonists, Jones depicts
antagonists who do provide useful guidance. Mendlesohn points out that in Drowned, “[m]ost of
the people Mitt likes have an extremely distorted understanding of the world around them. Only
his resented stepfather—Hobin—and his unpleasant father—Al—present him with anything like
a useful picture of either the South or the North” (Mendlesohn, Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5,
“A World Lived in”). Antagonists such as Al72 provide protagonists with accurate, useful
information; they do so not to assist the protagonists, but for their own goals. Mendlesohn points
out that this is “quite unlike the way genre fantasy—and particularly children’s fantasy—is
usually written. Within the genre good people give truthful information and bad people lie”
(Mendlesohn, Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5, “A World Lived in”).73 Unlike much (or
traditional) portal-quest fantasy and children’s fantasy, wherein readers are cued to distrust
information from “bad” characters,74 here Jones shows readers that antagonists may have

Hobin is not an antagonist; Mitt simply dislikes him initially.
Mendlesohn brings as examples “Harry Potter (J. K. Rowling), Arthur Penhaligon (Garth Nix),” and “Taran
Wanderer (Lloyd Alexander),” none of whom “ever question his guides’ common sense” (Diana Wynne Jones,
chapter 5, “A World Lived in”). Note, however, that Mendlesohn brings examples here of guides, specifically; if
one expands the criteria to all antagonist or positive characters, the picture gets murkier regarding Rowling at least:
e.g., villains such as Quirrell or Barty Crouch Jr., who are not cued as untrustworthy through most of the narrative
(and who, in the case of Barty Crouch Jr., do impart true and useful information) and ambiguously-cued characters
such as Snape.
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In Narnia, for instance, evil characters such as the White Witch/Queen either lie or skew the truth; characters and
readers alike know not to trust her (even Edmund is explicitly apprehensive of her before he drinks and eats from
her food), and she only offers danger and hindrance to the characters. Similarly, villains are clearly marked as such
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accurate perspectives and information, while protagonist and protagonist-friendly characters may
have incorrect, biased, unrealistic or otherwise unhelpful perspectives. Protagonists and readers
alike must use their own critical faculties to determine what information or ideas make sense in
context, and what does not. They must evaluate based on the information or ideas as such, rather
than based on surface “cues” such as a character’s demeanor or moral positioning in the
narrative.
Finally, Jones also subverts the typical guide figure by rendering some positively-cued
guides unreliable, morally ambiguous, and sometimes the surprise antagonists of the novels.
This is true regarding Hestefan in Crown. Despite his unpleasant personality, and despite key
characters (such as Maewen and Navis) saying they irrationally dislike him, both Moril and
reader are cued to assume Hestefan is good simply due to the role he plays. Hestefan is the
traveling bard, the master singer in charge of his (informal) apprentice Moril, the wise old man
living in a covered wagon who regales the company with ancient legends over the campfire as
they journey on their quest. The discovery, at Crown’s denouement, that Hestefan murdered
Noreth75 at the novel’s start shakes us because, like Moril, we trusted Hestefan—we fell for his
performance as the good, bard-like guide. Nor does Hestefan fall easily into a reductive
villainous stance: he murdered Noreth, and has been spying for Earl Henda this whole time,
because Henda holds Hestefan’s daughter hostage. Contrary to reader/protagonist expectations,

(and also lie or skew the truth) in most of Roald Dahl’s children’s books, Brian Jacques’ Redwall (1986), Wrede’s
Dealing with Dragons (1990), and in more contemporary novels such as Gail Carson Levine’s Ella Enchanted
(1997) and Kristin Cashore’s Graceling (2008). Other examples include, interestingly, Pierce’s Song of the Lioness
and Immortals series, L’Engle’s Time sequence, and Le Guin’s Earthsea sequence. It should be noted that in other
of Pierce’s novels, such as the Beka Cooper and Circle series, this is explicitly not the case; although, as Rachael
Kaplan noted in a discussion forum on this topic, these novels also fall within the mystery genre, and hiding the
culprit’s identity—particularly by cuing the culprit as a good, reliable character until the reveal—is crucial for the
plot (Orthodox Ladies United in Fandom (OLUF) Facebook thread, 7/6/17). These examples contrast with Jones’
villains, such as Al, who offer true and useful information mixed with that which is manipulative, false, or harmful.
75
Noreth is a young woman claiming a right to the throne and aiming to unite the land as queen.
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Hestefan is neither guide nor antagonist—he’s simply a regular person living his own (tragic)
narrative, one that does not directly revolve around Mitt or Maewen (the novel’s protagonists).
This subversion of the guide figure is even starker in Crown’s presentation of
Wend/Duck. Maewen assumes Wend is the typical benevolent guide figure of portal-quest
stories, both because he assumes that role—as her chaperone/guard in her own time and as the
Wanderer-guide for the quest in Mitt’s time—and because he is the one who sends her back in
time, and on the quest, in the first place. For much of the novel, Maewen is either assuming
Wend’s leadership by omission (her interpretation that Wend’s silence means Maewen is doing
things correctly) or waiting for him to lead them. Maewen does so because of her flawed logic:
since Wend-of-the-future sent Maewen back in time for this quest, Wend-in-the-past must have a
reason for wanting her there, and must be subtly guiding the entire quest for his own motives that
led him to involve her in the first place. This logic, from a time-travel perspective, is flawed—
Wend-in-the-past has not yet sent Maewen to this time, and thus can have no knowledge of the
future events Maewen assumes he has—but Maewen assumes Wend time-traveled together with
her. She does not realize, for most of the novel, that this is a version of Wend from this actual
time period.
The climactic reveal that Wend has been working for Kankredin this whole time (i.e. the
duration of Crown) is shocking not only because it so drastically reverses the assumptions
readers—and Maewen—made about him as a guide figure, but also because by this point in the
novel we know that Wend is also Duck, a primary “goodie” protagonist from Spellcoats
(Tanaqui’s sister). Wend/Duck’s development from a “good” child character in Spellcoats to a
“bad” adult (and Undying) character in Crown is a development that Jones said surprised her:
when asked if she has “a sense of [her] characters having a life outside the book” Jones
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answered, “I do, absolutely. [...] I had this sense particularly with the Dalemark books,
because—much to my amazement, really—almost everybody who’d been on the side of the good
in the previous books turned around and came out plain nasty. This was worrying, but in a way
reassuring, because these people all had that potential, and they just went and did their thing” (C
Butler “Interview with Diana Wynne Jones” 164). Wend/Duck’s moral pivot—as well as those
of other adult/authority figures in Crown,76 as Jones references—serves as evidence of Jones’
own questioning and exploration process in the almost twenty years between writing Spellcoats
and Crown. It also, though, speaks to the novels’ emphases on the need for critical assessment
of, rather than dogmatic obedience to, religio-spiritual and other (e.g. parental, political) figures
of authority.77
Jones’ protagonists go through this process of becoming skeptical/critical readers of
authoritative figures and narratives around them. The first person and close-third person
narrative vantage points allow readers to engage in this process alongside protagonists. Over the
course of Crown, for example, Maewen has developed her critical thinking skills through her
journey and adventures, and has become more aware of cues in the people and settings around
her. Her critical awareness and interpretive skills are sharpened in numerous ways over the
course of her “quest” in the narrative, first and foremost because she is an imposter on the quest:
everyone mistakes her for Noreth, who is supposed to be leading the characters on a quest to
obtain magical objects that will cement her right to the throne. Maewen does not dare ask too
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Hestefan, as mentioned, and Earl Keril, are two examples.
Contrast Jones’ treatment of obedience versus disobedience to Wood’s discussion of treatments by Lewis and
Pullman. Although Wood argues for Pullman’s novels as radical in their promotion of Lyra’s disobedience, The
Golden Compass (1995), in stark contrast to Dalemark, explicitly shows readers the true natures of unreliable guidefigures such as Mrs. Coulter—fairly early on in the novel, too—in scenes that Wood specifically cites as furthering
such skeptical, disobedient, readerly standpoints toward guide-figures. Dalemark, in contrast, upends not only the
protagonists’ uncritical, dogmatic acceptance of adult and guide-figure authority, but it upends the reader’s similar
stance as well. Wood’s conclusions regarding the potential impact of such messages for child readers thus applies
even more so to Dalemark.
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many questions for fear of revealing her identity as an imposter. Instead, Maewen must pretend
to be the fully-immersed character the others think her, and use her critical thinking skills to
interpret her surroundings.
When Maewen suddenly returns to her own time at the end of the novel, and is greeted by
a startled Wend, the “animal wariness she had acquired in those days of journeying told Maewen
that Wend had not expected to see her again” (Crown 657-8). By this point, Maewen knows that
Wend-in-the-past (the Wend with whom she journeyed during Mitt’s time) was not actually her
guide—when Cennoreth/Tanaqui reveals Maewen’s identity midway through the novel,
Wend/Duck is shocked and horrified, and runs off. Maewen realizes, at that moment, that the
Wend journeying with her actually belongs to the time they are currently in (i.e. is not from her
own time, 200 years later), has not yet sent her to the past, has actually mistaken her for Noreth
(as versus knowing she is an imposter, as future-Wend knows when he sends her back in time),
and is not the guide she had assumed. It is not until she returns to her own time at the novel’s
conclusion, though, that Maewen realizes Wend actually sent her back in time to be murdered
instead of Noreth, his daughter. A disillusioned Maewen thinks:
Tanamoril, Osfameron, Mage Mallard—he was all those heroes of all those stories, and he
could be one of her own ancestors, too—and he had come down to this, a museum attendant
in league with Kankredin. She knew how Moril had felt about Hestefan. It made a bad taste
in your very bones. Playing the good guy on the train so that she would trust him. Yuk.
(Crown 659)
Maewen’s newly honed critical-thinking skills contrast with Wend’s poor ones. Wend set the
novel’s events in motion by allowing Noreth to think the One was her father (rather than Wend)
and encouraging Noreth in her quest to become queen—and he only did so because, as he tells
Maewen, “The One told me [Noreth] would ride the royal road. He lied” (Crown 679). When
Maewen replies “Are you sure that wasn’t Kankredin,” Wend “turned and stared at her, as if this
had never occurred to him” (Crown 679). Wend clearly forgot, or never understood, that the
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One’s very nature is to refrain, as much as possible, from giving instruction or prophecy. As
Mendlesohn notes, critical readers have “learned to distrust the voice [Kankredin’s] that speaks
to Maewen in [Crown], because it is the only voice that speaks of prophecy and grandeur”
(Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5, “A World Lived in”). Ironically, Wend—a divine, guide-like
figure—is not a critical reader of his surroundings, and does not critically evaluate whether the
prophetic voice he hears is indeed the One, or is Kankredin. Rather, it is Maewen—the “time
tourist”78 child protagonist—who, through the “wariness” she acquired trying to survive the
time-travel journey forced upon her, and through her own mistakes, has learned to skeptically
assess information—and, in a power reversal, now guides Wend.
Altogether, what Jones does here is pretty radical, whether in the context of children’s
literature during the 1970s,79 children’s fantasy generally, or adult/genre fantasy. Even
contemporary children’s fantasy writers hailed as radical or subversive—such as Philip
Pullman—rarely, if ever, deconstruct the guide tropes as rigorously as Jones does. As
Mendlesohn points out, although Pullman’s His Dark Materials “provides Lyra with a
multiplicity of guides, and although this could have broken down the monolithic view provided
by the single guide, there is so little disagreement among these individuals that this never occurs”
(Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 4). Although Pullman’s atheistic content seems subversive at the
surface, his rhetoric adheres to conservative portal-quest methods of frontally presenting
protagonists and readers with monosemic, closed meaning. Jones’ work stands in sharp contrast.
While Jones is far from the only author to render guide-figures ambiguous, the thorough methods
with which she does so, taken together, constitute one of the most sustained critical attacks,
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Mendlesohn’s phrasing; Mendlesohn makes this point (that Maewen knows more than Wend, the guide-figure) as
well (Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 4).
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Although Crown was written in the 1990s, the first three novels were written in the 1970s.
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within children’s fantasy, on portal-quest/“guide” notions of authority, epistemology, and
learning processes.

Subversive Deities and Religious Tropes
A common fantasy trope is that of deities as authoritative powers, whether benign or evil.
Dalemark’s gods, called the “Undying,” seem, at first glance, to fit this stereotype. Different
geographic and historical sections of Dalemark, across the sequence, display belief in different
“Undying,” with different modes of worship. However, Dalemark’s Undying do not actually
consider themselves gods. Towards the end of Spellcoats, when a frustrated Tanaqui snaps at
Tanamil: “Oh! And you call yourself a god!” Tanamil replies, “very earnestly, a very strange
thing. ‘I never called myself that […] Neither I nor any of the Undying ever made that claim. It
is a claim men made for us, and that is how we came to be bound’” (Spellcoats 268). Tanamil’s
response shows that the Undying do not see themselves as “gods,” if by “gods” we mean beings
who relate to humans in a hierarchical, or authoritative, way. Rather, Tanamil depicts the
Undying as simply that—Un-dying. When humans ascribe religious and authoritative weight to
the name “Undying” by calling the Undying “gods,” humans actually, physically, “bind”—
constrain, delimit, and potentially control—the Undying themselves.
In the Dalemark books, “binding” usually has a negative connotation. When benign
beings such as the One, Tanamil, or Duck are “bound,” their physical and moral strengths
weaken, lessening their abilities to both detect and resist moral corruption and antagonistic forces
such as Kankredin. Resolutions in the Dalemark sequence hinge precisely on unbinding. For
example, the entire text of Spellcoats is, we discover, woven by Tanaqui in order to unbind
Tanamil and the One so that they can fight Kankredin and restore health and balance to the land.
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The novels note a number of behaviors that “bind” the Undying, all of which connect,
thematically, to religious worship. As mentioned previously, one behavior is humans ascribing
religious/divine authority onto the Undying by calling the Undying “gods.” Another action that
“binds” is creating images or pictures of the Undying, as Hern tells Crown’s protagonists: “I was
always very careful never to let anyone make a picture or an image of me—that’s how the
Undying are bound into godhead, you know” (Crown 622). The pictures and images to which
Hern refers may be religious in nature (e.g. the statues worshipped by “Natives” such as
Tanaqui’s family and the Shelling residents in the pre-historic Dalemark of Spellcoats) or
secular/historical in nature (e.g. the museum pictures Maewen sees in Tannoreth Palace in the
modern-day Dalemark of Crown). However, even ostensibly secular acts, such as painting
historical portraits of the Undying as kings, contain underlying tones of worship and religious
authority; veneration towards a king is not far removed from veneration towards a god,
especially in a medieval-political fantastical setting. Creating pictures or images of Undying,
therefore, parallels the act of calling the Undying “gods”: both are acts of worship that confer
undesired divine status upon the Undying, and by doing so, “bind” the Undying to human will
(whether the humans are aware or unaware of this fact).
“Binding” is therefore intrinsically connected to worship and is often (although not
always) depicted as negative. Undying definitely don’t want to be bound, as we see in Hern’s
statement quoted above; Mitt specifically avoids being painted in order to avoid being bound.
Tanamil loathes being bound so much that he can’t bear the sight of the statue that binds him,
and turns taciturn and unhelpful when the protagonists remind him (even inadvertently) that he is
bound. The Undying definitely dislike being bound or worshipped—but they also seem
ambivalent towards their immortal existences, even when unbound. When Duck/Wend says, “I
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took the job for something to do. There’s so much time, you know,” Maewen notes: “He said it
very drearily. Maewen could see time stretch on and on, before and behind him” (Crown 678).
In a subversive move, Jones depicts gods who vehemently reject their “godly” status, immortals
who are ambivalent towards their immortality, and human worship that not only harms the
“gods” being worshipped but also—albeit indirectly—upsets the balance of nature, leading to a
“sick[ening]” of the river and land (Spellcoats 147).80
Jones’ depiction of the Undying is also subversive in the ambiguity of a given
individual’s divine status. It is often unclear both to surrounding characters and to the individual
in question whether said individual is or is not Undying. For instance, Hern says that he was
careful to never let anyone make a picture or image of him because, “I was afraid all my life that
I was going to turn out to be of the Undying” (Crown 622). The Undying themselves do not
know whether or not they are immortal until, by default, they simply have not aged or died. The
only way to establish an identity as an Undying is post facto; one can live one’s whole life in fear
of “turn[ing] out to be of the Undying” and not know for certain. Sometimes that question of
status (Undying or mortal) remains perpetually unresolved, since the Undying can in fact be
killed—they are only immortal in that they do not age or die natural deaths. The Adon, for
instance—a legendary figure of Dalemark’s history—might have been Undying or mortal; since
he was killed, it is impossible to know.
Altogether, this level of ambiguity regarding divine/immortal status is unconventional in
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It is important to note that not all human worship of Undying, and not all binding of Undying, is depicted as
negative or harmful: the worship of Tanaqui’s family, for instance, helps loosen the bindings rather than strengthen
them; the worship of Kars Adon’s people in Spellcoats and the Holy Islanders in Drowned is depicted as positive
(even for the Undying); and the main force destroying the land is not human worship but Kankredin, who is
Undying himself (although this is only possible due to a human woman, Cenblith, having bound the One already.
All this said, the worship depicted positively (e.g., Kars Adon’s people and the Holy Islanders) is less worship per se
than recognition of and gratitude for the Undying and of the Undyings’ relationships to humans (literal blood
relations as well as relationships arising from mutual service), and it is always expressed in a manner careful to
avoid names, images, or anything else that would bind the Undying.
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genre and children’s fantasy literature. Traditional fantasy tropes present deities/immortals who
are clear regarding their immortal statuses; even if such status is unclear to readers or fellow
characters, the beings themselves usually know. Even characters that start off ignorant of their
immortal identities usually become aware of such identities in climactic, revelatory moments.
Will Stanton, for example, the eleven-year-old protagonist of Susan Cooper’s The Dark is Rising
(1973), does not initially know he is an Old One but that is soon revealed to him in a dramatic
manner. While the Old Ones are not depicted as gods, they are immortal beings whose purpose
is to serve the Light and battle the Dark in an epic, moral, and eternal war for the existence of the
universe. L’Engle’s Mrs. Ws (discussed in chapter three) perform a similar function and are
similarly immortal with deified-tones. It is rare for immortal or divine designations to remain
ambiguous for most, or all, of the novel.81
All of this points to the fact that the “Undying,” the only deities within the Dalemark
novels, are not, at the end of the day, truly deities—they are simply a different form of being.
These different beings never asked to be worshipped, and such worship in fact binds and
restrains them, a situation depicted as uncomfortable, upsetting, and humiliating for them. Not
only do Undying not wish to be worshipped, their laws forbid them from trying to assert such
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Tolkien’s and Lewis’ works are classic examples of texts in which the immortal and/or divine natures of
characters are unambiguous (e.g., Aslan, Galadriel). Instances of clearly-delineated immortal/deity figures abound in
both children’s and genre fantasy; as such it is impractical to attempt to list them all. Some notable examples,
however, of children’s fantasy in this category predating or contemporaneous to Dalemark (i.e. the 1970s Dalemark
titles) include: Cooper’s Dark is Rising sequence (1965-77), in which the Greenwitch and Herne the Hunter are
clearly deities (albeit of local, environmental/elemental qualities) and the Old Ones are clearly immortal; the three
enchantresses of Lloyd Alexander’s Prydain series (1964-1973); Monica Furlong’s Wise Child (1987); and, as
discussed in chapter three, Tamora Pierce’s Song of the Lioness series (1983-88). There is an argument to be made,
as well, that L’Engle’s Mrs. Ws fit in this category, as do the Nameless Ones in Le Guin’s Tombs (1970); regarding
the latter, Tenar/Arha (and her people) worship the Nameless Ones as gods, although Ged tells her they are
immortals but not gods (Tombs 129). Once we broaden the scope to include later titles (i.e. published after the
1970s) and/or “adult/genre” fantasy titles, we see a deluge of fantasy with clearly delineated deities, including:
Marion Zimmer Bradley’s The Firebrand (1987), Neil Gaiman’s American Gods (2001) and Anansi Boys (2005),
Katya Reimann’s Tielmaran Chronicles series (1996-2002), N. K. Jemisin’s Inheritance series (2010-2014), and
more. Thanks to members of the OLUF facebook group for many of the above examples in a thread regarding this
question of ambiguous versus clearly-delineated deities in fantasy (OLUF facebook thread, 7/21/17).
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power, as Ammet explains to Mitt, “His [the One’s] law is that we do not tell his mortal family
what to do. That is to make people into puppets” (Crown 545).
The ideal relationship between humans and Undying is depicted not as hierarchical, but
rather as dialogic. When Mitt, in Crown, asks Old Ammet: “Why do you Undying keep pushing
me about?” Old Ammet answers that it is not the Undying who “pushed” Mitt onto this heroic,
but dangerous path—rather, Mitt chose it. “I know, I know,” Mitt replies. “But I keep having to
choose all the same!” (Crown 544). Mitt’s complaint that he must continuously choose his own
destiny critiques the stereotypical heroic-fantasy plot development in which the hero, once he
chooses to align with the powers of good over those of evil, then receives some form of what
Mendlesohn terms the “download of legend”—i.e. the info-dump, so to speak, of
knowledge/history, quest-directives, or epistemological frameworks, by a trustworthy guide
figure (wizard, god, etc.). Jones, however, does the exact opposite. After Mitt, in Drowned,
makes his choice to engage with the Undying as “friends” rather than “enemies,” he receives
their support—in the form of their names, which wield magical power. Then, however, the
Undying leave him alone to continue making his own moral and practical choices. There is no
downloading of legend or history—no warnings, no instructions. Mitt vents to Old Ammet that,
“every time I choose and try to get right, things turn round on me and try to make me go to the
other way. The One told Noreth to kill me…You tell me what I’m supposed to do about that!”
(Crown 544-5). Mitt is primed to expect interference from the gods, whether in the form of
punishment or instruction. Mitt is also still stuck in his own warped narrative of himself, the
unworthy, uncouth, would-be-murderer narrative imposed on him by his parents, Earl Keril, and
the Duchess. Therefore, when he overhears a voice, claiming to be the One, commanding
Maewen to kill him, Mitt uncritically accepts it, thinking, “This is a laugh! The One was playing
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games with him. Or he had it in for Mitt, which was much more likely” (Crown 540). He is, in
actuality, misreading the situation—the voice claiming to be the One is actually Kankredin,
although readers have not yet been told this.
Old Ammet’s reply to Mitt’s request for instruction is, “I am not here to tell you what to
do” (Crown 545). At first glance this may sound obtuse and flatly unhelpful, which is how Mitt
takes it, as he bitterly complains that the Undying never give straight answers. However, Ammet
replies, “The One’s law is that we do not tell his mortal family what to do. That is to make
people into puppets” (Crown 545). What Mitt interpreted as a simple negative statement, “I am
not here to tell you what to do,” was actually meant in the affirmative—“I am here to not tell you
what to do”—in other words, I am here to step back, and give you independence. Rather than
exerting control, Dalemark’s Undying actively withhold control. Ammet, here, makes overt
what Mendlesohn describes as Jones’s “rather [neat illumination of] the dependency syndrome at
the heart of the guide-protagonist relationship,”82 i.e. that in an imbalanced power relationship,
the line between guidance and manipulation is thin. The guidance Ammet does display,
therefore, is dialogic and open-ended:
Ammet: “The One’s law is that we do not tell his mortal family what to do. That is to
make people into puppets.”
“Then the One just broke his own law,” Mitt said.
“I am here to tell you to think about that,” said Ammet.
There was a silence full of warm wind and the rustling and streaming of Ammet’s whiteblond hair, while Mitt digested this. “I don’t get it,” he said at last. (Crown 545)
This back and forth illustrates teaching that is genuinely “student-centered” and open-ended –
Ammet provides Mitt with an observation/piece of information (the One forbids human
manipulation); Mitt responds with an analysis (then the One just broke his own rule); Ammet
responds, “think about that.” As with any genuinely open discourse, and as some of us may
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Mendlesohn describes this with regards to Tanamil as guide figure in Spellcoats (Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5).
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experience in teaching, there is a real possibility of quagmire—after “digesting” the information,
Mitt “doesn’t get it.” But Ammet doesn’t tell him—Mitt has to do his own critical thinking, and
critical reading, of events around him in order to construct his own “mental map,” as Jones puts
it, “of right and wrong and life as it should be.”83
Ammet guides Mitt in a roundabout way: he proclaims what he is not doing (guiding
Mitt, although this very proclamation serves as guidance) and advises Mitt to “think about it” for
himself. Later, when Hern’s ghost employs a similar tactic in weeding out “who will be Amil
[king],” Mitt is the one who catches Hern at his hermeneutical game, and inadvertently earns the
crown. Mitt has learned to question the questions, to challenge the very premises on which
surface questions are posed, to listen for multiple meanings, and, most significantly, to pay
attention to what’s not being said—such as Hern’s unspoken misery. Mitt’s final step—an
unasked-for freeing, or unbinding, of Hern—displays not only his independent, critical
observation and analysis, but also his ability to carry that into creative initiative—to write his
own narrative. We see a similar dialogic discourse between Tanaqui and Anoreth, and a similar
trajectory of Tanaqui learning to notice absence—to notice what people specifically omit, and to
see, literally, the shadow spaces in her weaving—in order to develop her own critical thinking
skills. Like Mitt, Tanaqui learns to actively interpret her surroundings rather than passively
accepting interpretations provided by authority figures; also like Mitt, Tanaqui moves from
becoming an analytical “reader” of her life to writing her own, empowered, narrative (quite
literally in Tanaqui’s case, via her spellcoats).
All of the above characteristics and themes—the Undying’s repudiation of divine status
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Jones, “Writing for Children: A Matter of Responsibility” in Reflections p.78. Jones is talking here about children
doing this in reaction to reading fantasy (and the values and responsibilities of writing fantasy for children), but I
think the idea applies here just as well, with Mitt being a reader of the world around him (as per Mendlesohn’s
analysis).
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and ambivalence toward their own immortality; the ambiguous/unresolved natures of
establishing Undying identity; the frequent negative consequences of human worship and
religious rituals; and the ideal relationship between human and Undying being dialogic, rather
than hierarchical—all of these subvert conventional expectations of divine beings in fantasy
genres. Although the theme of passivity on the part of gods (in order that mortals maintain
freedom of choice) is a fairly common one, the idea of divine authority being disavowed by the
“god” figures themselves is atypical. Philip Pullman’s His Dark Materials series (1995-2000)
definitely works at undercutting traditional ideas of god and religion on many levels, but at the
end of the day, his “god” figure—a usurping angel who desires control over the other angels and
over humans—is the opposite of the figures depicted in Jones’ texts. Other examples of divine
beings who embrace, rather than disavow, their divine authority include: the deities of Tamora
Pierce’s Song of the Lioness (discussed in chapter three) and other novels set in the Tortall
universe, the Powers of Diane Duane’s Young Wizards series (1983-2017), and “adult” or more
mainstream/genre fantasy, such as Reimann’s Tielmaran Chronicles (1996-2002), and Neil
Gaiman’s American Gods (2001) and Anansi Boys (2005). Pierce’s gods are depicted in
significantly more diverse, pluralistic, and benign tones than that of Pullman; Pierce’s gods,
however, do desire mortal worship and in fact gain or lose strength depending on the strength
both of their worshipers (in socio-political areas of mortal life) and of the worship/fealty
offered.84 The Powers of Duane’s series, while not termed “gods,” function as such: they are
explicitly identified as sentient, “manag[ing] the business of creation” and replete with a “Lone
Power” cast out from the others and associated with entropy and evil, and described in terms that
directly bring to mind Lucifer (So You Want to Be a Wizard, p.14-15). The Powers do not
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require worship, nor do mortals worship them per se. The Powers do, though, have the authority
that comes from their hierarchical relationship between themselves (immortals who created the
universe and oversee the large-scale picture of life) and mortal wizards, who are described as
working for the Powers by overseeing smaller-scale ethical/moral issues and fighting against the
Lone Power. All of these examples starkly contrast with Jones’ Undying, who are appalled at
the idea of humans worshipping them, are in fact harmed or diminished (“bound”) by human
worship, and are thus trying to evade positions of authority as much as possible.85
In addition to depicting unconventional deities and dialogic, rather than hierarchical,
divine-mortal relationships, Jones subverts religious tropes of much genre fantasy through her
diverse and wryly skeptical portrayal of religious ritual in Dalemark. Religious rituals often
feature in secondary-world genre fantasy; Jones, in fact, pokes fun at oft-repeated tropes in her
Tough Guide to Fantasyland (1996). Similarly, throughout the Dalemark sequence, “religious”
customs or beliefs are often portrayed as empty rituals: foolish at best, or dangerous at worst.
While some ritual is revealed to hold meaning and power, the novels critique characters who
blindly follow superstitions or traditions. Instead, Dalemark depicts positively-cued spiritual and
moral/ethical tropes; when characters use religious ritual in order to achieve these moral/ethical
ends, ritual has meaning and value.
Examples of religious customs that are portrayed with a skeptical, even mocking, tone
include Tanaqui’s description, at the start of Spellcoats, of her neighbors’ worship of the river
and ugly Undying idols:
Everyone in Shelling has such awful Undying. Most of them are supposed to be the River.
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A writer who presents gods similar to Jones’ Undying is N. K. Jemisin. In Jemisin’s Inheritance series (20102014), while gods are clearly delineated as such, such categorization merely reflects their nature, not their
relationship viz a viz mortals; furthermore, Jemisin’s gods are frequently indifferent to or scornful of mortal worship
towards themselves (i.e. towards the gods). Both of these facets parallel characteristics of Jones’ Undying; both
remain rare even in contemporary fantasy.
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Uncle Kestrel has a piece of driftwood that his father caught in his net one day. It looks like a
man with one leg and unequal arms – you know how driftwood does – and he never lets it
out of his sight. (Spellcoats 16)
Tanaqui’s scorn for the Shelling idols is paralleled, later, by Kars Adon’s scorn for idols at all:
“Do you believe in the Undying?” I said.
Kars Adon smiled. “We’ve no use for dolls beside our fireplaces, if that’s what you
mean. The Undying are not clay figures. But when I die, I hope to be gathered to them.”
This made me very indignant, but I could see, all the same, that Kars Adon did in some
manner believe in the Undying. (Spellcoats 128)
Kars Adon, a “heathen,” has different religious customs and thus scoffs at the southern custom of
needing figurines to represent the Undying. So too, Tanaqui scoffs at the ridiculous Shelling
idols that cannot compare to her family’s. Although it may seem, at first glance, that Tanaqui is
simply noticing that her family’s statues are nicer than those of others, what underlies her
critique is a semi-conscious awareness that Kars Adon’s fundamental point is true—the statues
themselves, and the false religious meaning attributed to them, do not contain the full truth of the
gods, of the essence behind the traditional practice. Tanaqui’s family figurines are, in fact,
powerful—because they happen to be the actual bound forms of the gods themselves (The One is
Tanaqui’s grandfather, the Lady is her mother, etc). So, too, the custom of putting the idols in
the fire—meaningless for Tanaqui’s Uncle Kestrel—is part of the manifold process that will
eventually set the powers free. Yet, the custom itself, as most people keep it—ignorantly, with
their laughable and ugly lumps of driftwood—is vapid and somewhat foolish, something
Tanaqui knows subconsciously as she scorns her uncle for never letting his Undying out of his
sight. Tanaqui’s skepticism here, however, is belied by the fact that she herself does not let her
Undying out of her own sight, and is frantic to conduct the One’s fire ceremony as custom
dictates.
This sense of skepticism toward and potential foolishness of religious ceremony—
especially as highlighted by one character looking at a foreign, culturally different character as
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Other—reappears in Crown. Mitt, a southerner, and Noreth, or Rith, as she calls herself in this
scene (disguised as a boy), a northerner, companionably tease each other for their various
customs:
Rith…seemed genuinely interested to know what Mitt thought of the North now he was here.
Mitt was a bit wary at first. He had found that most Northerners did not like criticism. “It’s
this porridge they all eat I can’t stand,” he said jokingly. “And the superstition.”
“What superstition?” Rith said innocently. “You mean, like the Holanders throw their
Undying in the sea every year?”
“And you lot put bowls of milk out for yours,” said Mitt. “Believe anything, these
Northerners! Think the One’s a pussycat!” (Crown 312)
Mitt and Noreth/Rith see each other as foreign, and view each other’s customs and beliefs as
unfathomable or, at least, somewhat mockable—yet, the disparate religions remain nothing more
than a slightly bewildering difference between two peoples. As Mitt and his fellow southerner,
Navis, demonstrate later at a religious feast, these foreign customs seem like different cloaks one
can don or discard at will, depending on one’s environment: “The custom seemed to be to tip
your mug and let a few drops of wine splash on the floor. Navis looked at Mitt. Mitt shrugged.
And they both spilled some wine as well, with a private murmur to Libby Beer [a Southern god]”
(Crown 336). Altogether, the attitudes of the southern versus northern characters in Crown
towards each other’s varying religious customs and beliefs is much milder than in Spellcoats or
Drowned. The reactions of light mocking or bewilderment, rather than antagonism, demonstrate
that any religious or superstitious behavior has the potential to appear slightly ridiculous to a
stranger. In the above examples, religious ritual—traditions, ceremonies, and superstitious
beliefs and customs that receive authority either from their longevity or from various power
figures such as the headman, earl, or king—receives negative and skeptical treatment from Jones
in these novels, depicted as at best foolish and vapid, and at worst, dangerous.
However, as mentioned earlier, religious traditions are depicted in positive tones when
the characters engaging in such traditions do so in mindful and ethical ways. One example of
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this is the religion of the Holy Islanders in Drowned; the Holy Islanders are depicted as
indigenous people with a subtle undertext implying that they are colonized indigenous people.
Their religion is depicted as peaceful and life-affirming. Although the Holy Islanders worship
the same Undying that Mitt does—Libby Beer and Old Ammet—the Holy Islanders’ relationship
with said deities is more informed than that of the Holanders of Mitt’s home.86 For instance, the
Holy Islanders call the Undying by much more accurate names: Libby Beer is “She Who Raised
the Islands” (Drowned 497) and Old Ammet is “Earthshaker” (Drowned 506). As we see in the
novel’s climax, these names are apt in the literal sense: the power of Libby Beer’s greater name
raises islands (and it is implied that the power of Old Ammet’s greater name similarly shakes the
earth, which we see in Crown). In contrast, the names Mitt is used to (i.e. the Southerner’s
names for these Undying)—“Libby Beer” and “Old Ammet”—are actually inaccurate: Old
Ammett says that his name “used to be the same as [Mitt’s]”—Alhammit—“But people have
forgotten” (Drowned 514). The implication is that the Holanders at one point called these
Undying by accurate, relevant names but that over time, both those names and the meaning
behind them got lost and garbled, resulting in the current versions “Libby Beer” and “Old
Ammet,” which don’t make sense but which Southerners use because of unthinking adherence to
a tradition gone stale and skewed.
Most of the Holanders’ rituals are depicted in a similar manner: Southerners throw
effigies of Libby Beer and Old Ammet into the sea each year for their Sea Festival, a
“ceremony” that Holanders consider “something of a joke” (223) and as “just an excuse to have a
holiday, eat sweets, and get drunk” (224). At the same time, though, “everyone would have
thought it horribly unlucky not to have held the Sea Festival” (224). The Sea Festival is

86

The country from which Mitt hails is called “Holand”; however, it is very clearly located in the fantastical world
of Dalemark (Holand is in South Dalemark).

99

described as replete with custom and ritual: it takes place annually on a specific day (223); the
Earl of Holand “was required by tradition to dress up in outlandish clothes and walk in a
procession down to the harbor carrying a life-size dummy made of plaited wheat” (223) which
was called “Poor Old Ammet” (224); the earl’s son similarly walks down carrying an effigy of
Libby Beer made of fruit, accompanied by a procession that was “both noisy and peculiar” (224).
When the earls and procession “reached the harbor, they said traditional words and then threw
both dummies into the sea” (224). The emphasis of the word “tradition” here, along with the
words “required” and “ceremony,” provide a sense of seriousness to this religious ritual—a sense
bolstered by the narrative’s explicit declaration that “everyone would have thought it horribly
unlucky not to have held the Sea Festival.” Yet this ritual is just as clearly depicted as, in its
current state at least, a vapid one—its performers go through the motions of the ceremony
without any understanding of the meaning, origin, or purpose of said ceremony. This is
conveyed via the narrative’s self-mocking tone, which reflects that characters feel this tradition is
silly, as well as vague terms used in the narrative’s description, such as “traditional words” (what
words?) and “outlandish clothes” (what kinds of clothes?). The characters clearly do say specific
words and wear specific clothes. The narrative’s vague tone, however, reflects the vagueness
that most Holanders (especially Mitt, our close-third-person protagonist) feel towards their
religious traditions and their lack of understanding what the rituals signify or accomplish.
Despite the moments of sincerely-depicted religious ritual, therefore, Jones more
frequently treats religious and “traditional” behavior with something of a wry voice. The impact
of passages such as the ones aforementioned on the reader is to ingrain the reader with
skepticism within the confines of the novels. In a first reading of Spellcoats, readers may be
unsure whom to trust, Zwitt or Tanaqui. Readers usually share the protagonist’s viewpoint,
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especially in the case of a first person narrative, as is used here. In Spellcoats, however, the
situation is complicated by the fact that, early in the narrative, the sibling-protagonists are
divided as to whether Zwitt is right or not. The reader needs Tanaqui’s final assertion of “we do
not believe in spirits flocking around being angry at everything, the way Zwitt does” to conclude
the novel’s preliminary debate (14). However, by the point that Zwitt is willing to use religion
as an excuse to murder the siblings (and perhaps even earlier in his ostracizing actions), readers
realize firmly that Zwitt is acting wrongly and that his religious claims do not justify his
behavior. Later in the novel, readers are asked to reassess “right” and “wrong” once more when
they learn that even Zwitt knew his religious claims were false, and that they merely masked his
personal agenda against the siblings. Yet Zwitt turns out to be right about some theological
points (such as the River being the Undying) that Tanaqui—and through her, readers—had
thought were wrong. Jones’ treatment of religion engages the reader; through the presentation of
conflicting “religious truths” and varying pictures of contrary religious encounters, from the
lethal to the laughable, readers have to thoughtfully piece together for themselves what they
think “truth” or “good,” as it works in the story, really is.

Destabilizing Narrative Truth
The fact that two of the Undying in the Dalemark series—Tanaqui and Mitt—also
happen to be the child protagonists of the three books under discussion encourages reader
association with the Undying figures on a personal level (especially, presumably, if readers are
young). It also allows for reader ignorance or confusion regarding events in the story, as the
story itself is narrated to us from the protagonists’ perspectives. These perspectives begin
limited in scope and interpretive accuracy, and slowly, through the course of the novel, gain
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wider and more acute understanding. At certain points throughout the texts, Mitt and Tanaqui
realize that they have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of truth and/or reality around
them—they have mistaken enemies for friends, good for bad, power for weakness. Since readers
discover the story’s truths and realities via the perspectives of the protagonists—what Nikolejava
terms “subjective realism”—readers have also mistaken or misunderstood the identities and
scenery before them (“Exit” 228-9). Mitt, Tanaqui, and Maewen thus act as naive and unreliable
narrators.
Jones employs unreliable narrators in many of her novels,87 but what makes the Dalemark
instances particularly interesting is the fact that two of these “unreliable narrators”—Mitt and
Tanaqui—are immortal figures themselves, implying that even the “deities” are fallible regarding
comprehension of the world around them. And, initially, this is the portrait we receive of Mitt
and Tanaqui. Mitt sees his father as a loving, good father who was betrayed and destroyed,
indirectly by the corrupt Southern government and directly by traitors within the freedom
fighters. He believes that the freedom fighters’ cause is the “good” and the Earl is “bad,” and
that he is justified in his attempted murder of the Earl. Tanaqui progresses through a series of
false notions as well: that the River is not a god, that Tanamil is a Heathen enemy, and that she is
not a witch, among others. The reader, following the story from Mitt and Tanaqui’s perspective,
believes these ideas as well, although they are fundamentally false.
Nikolajeva points to the innocence of young, unreliable narrators, as well as the irony
inherent in this mode of narration that “involv[es] a character inferior to his surroundings”
(“Exit” 229). Nikolajeva also mentions that Jones specifically is “particularly outstanding in
using the first-person unreliable narrator” (“Exit” 230). Yet, Jones’ “unreliable narrators,” while
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See Archer’s Goon (1984), The Lives of Christopher Chant (1988), Fire and Hemlock (1985), Power of Three
(1976), The Game (2007), and Dogsbody (1975), among others.
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they may begin as non-ironic and innocent, go through a transformative process of learning the
truth, or, as Tanaqui says, “seeing things as they really [are]” (Spellcoats 224). The point at
which Tanaqui and Mitt discover that they are descended from the Undying and/or that they have
extraordinary powers is the same moment that they become aware of their responsibilities.
These instances coincide with moments of extreme disillusionment on the part of the children.
Mitt is first aided by the Undying on his boat journey, while he is confronted, for the first time,
by questions regarding the morality and justification behind his attempted murder. This
questioning begins a slow process of events that unravel his sense of self and truth:
It was the same with Mitt. He took one look at Lithar, and one look at Hildy, and he knew
that what was happening to Hildy now had happened to him in Holand. But he had not
admitted it. Everything he had thought of as being Mitt – the fearless boy with the free soul,
the right-thinking freedom fighter – had fallen to pieces there…and he had been left with
what was real. And it had frightened him to death. (Drowned 475)
Mitt’s first revelation, or the first “unbinding” of the blinders on his eyes, comes in the form of a
dissolving of his identity, which was built on false notions of the world around him and his place
within it. His next revelation is that the criminal Al, who abused and threatened him, is in fact
his father, and that his father was the one who had betrayed the freedom fighters, rather than the
reverse. This stage leads to misery and self-loathing, in which Mitt feels “as if his whole mind
was falling to pieces…There seemed nothing left of him at all” (Drowned 502). Mitt’s sentiment
that there is “nothing left of him at all” at this stage of his disillusionment is literally that—a
stripping-away of Mitt’s “illusions”—about his father and his own self, until there is “nothing
left…at all” of Mitt’s former ideas and self. It is only after this cathartic purging that the
Undying can give Mitt the chance to begin again.
When the Undying do offer him that chance, Mitt first has to decide whether he will act
as “enemy” or as “friend” to the humans around him. Later, in Crown, while he is not offered a
choice of kingship, he is given a choice of the type of king he is to become—whether he will
103

“take on” the One’s name and with it, the One’s battle against Kankredin, or not. Mitt makes his
formative decisions—to be “friend” rather than “enemy” and to take on the One’s name—based
on his internal sense of morality (Drowned 513-14; Crown 633). Tanaqui goes through a similar
process of disillusionment, identity questioning, and the formation of herself through her
choices. Tanaqui’s choices, as well, are honest moments of her deciding what she thinks is right
based on her gut feelings, rather than external pressures (Spellcoats 234).
Of all the Dalemark characters that learn to both critically read and write their own
narratives, Tanaqui, in her weaving of Spellcoats, is clearly emblematic. As Mendlesohn
demonstrates, the text of Spellcoats is destabilized through a number of literary techniques,
particularly: the immersive rhetoric of Tanaqui’s first-person narrative; unreliable narration in
the text; and metafictive moments such as Tanaqui’s awareness of her own writing,
collaborations of multiple perspectives from different characters woven together in her tapestry,
and the text’s archeological appendix. These destabilizations both overtly and covertly
problematize readers’ assumptions of the narrative voice as authority. Mendlesohn argues that
such devices (here and throughout the Dalemark novels) serve to highlight the ways in which
Jones’ fiction functions, simultaneously, as criticism. Mendlesohn also posits that such
rhetorical moves highlight the importance, for Jones’ characters, of becoming critical readers
themselves; Mendlesohn speculates that not only Jones’ characters but her readers, as well, may
become critical readers through this process.88
The transformative processes that Mitt and Tanaqui undergo as they shed their innocent,
naive, and flawed understandings is significant specifically because the key to their gaining
accurate comprehensions of their worlds and themselves lies within their internal senses of truth
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See Mendlesohn Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5 and conclusion.
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and morality. In other young adult novels, unreliable narrators finally learn truths via frontal
pedagogy from other characters. That mode exists to some degree within the Dalemark texts;
Mitt and Tanaqui are both told truths about themselves and their misunderstandings by other
characters and external forces. Yet, Jones goes one step further: the only way for Mitt and
Tanaqui to rebuild their identities and to grow into their powers and responsibilities is for them
to trust themselves. Even though they are unreliable initially, due to their misinterpretations,
Jones’s protagonists are still more perceptive and honed to truth than are most characters around
them. They simply have one or two major blind spots in their lines of vision—usually regarding
themselves. Disillusionment and subsequent revelation that comes via external and, often, adult
characters is merely a tool with which the protagonists hone their own critical outlooks. At the
end of the day, these child heroes rescue themselves, make their own decisions regarding truth,
and write their own narratives—even when expressly challenged by their adult companions.
In addition to using unreliable child narrators (i.e. first or close-third person narration),
Jones destabilizes narrative truths via metatextual content in Dalemark, such as the “Final Note”
appendix to Spellcoats. In this “Final Note,” a pseudo-scholarly commentary by “Elthorar
Ansdaughter” reveals to readers that the entire novel is actually the literal text and body of two
spellcoats:
Spellcoats, as they are called, are mentioned frequently in folklore and legend, but these
are the only two examples ever discovered. They were found in the marsh above
Hannart…they are both preserved by the marsh to a wonderful degree…The coats were
known to be of immense antiquity, but they were not recognized for what they are straight
away. We are indebted to Earl Keril for first pointing out that the designs bear strong
affinity to letters of the old script. Since then both coats have been carefully studied and
the foregoing translation made. (Spellcoats, 278, original emphasis)
The commentary then analyses, in an academic literary fashion, the character and Undying
references, and tries to place the story within Dalemark’s geography, all of these noted as
“remarks” that “may be of use to students” (279). The metafiction here is both playful (“Earl
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Keril” is a character in the other novels) and revealing. In the same way that fictional scholars
have teased out meaning from Tanaqui’s weavings and translated it to a coherent story, actual
readers of the novels are, by the mere act of reading, enacting the same analytical process. The
layers of metafiction and forced-reader-engagement are interesting in and of themselves, but to
center this critical technique on questions of gods, religion, and worship is especially significant.

Hebrew-Biblical, Kabbalistic, and Feminist Religio-Spirituality
While Jones’ depiction of the Undying references a plethora of religious, spiritual, and
mythological sources, Hebrew-biblical allusions are a recurring theme. Much of Jones’ language
and themes in her descriptions of Dalemark’s Undying parallel the language and themes of
Hebrew-biblical and kabbalistic texts—and both display similar methodologies, and
ramifications, for feminist re-imaginings of religio-spiritual methodologies. This section first
examines linguistic parallels between names of Dalemark’s Undying and Hebrew and Arabic
words. I then demonstrate ways in which Jones uses themes of negative space and of unbinding
or freeing to open theological possibilities that are feminist in their eschewing of finite, singular,
or static conceptualizations of the divine/sacred. Jones conveys this through Dalemark’s
prohibitions of saying the Undying’s true/magical names; through taboos of rendering images of
the Undying; and through actual depictions of negative space, whether in shadow shapes of
Tanaqui’s spellcoats, language that emphasizes silence and shadow, or in characters noticing
specifically what is not said. All of these elements within Dalemark parallel specific Hebrewbiblical and Jewish kabbalistic themes; I elucidate these parallels throughout my analysis. All of
these elements point to negative theologies and spaces (and unbindings/freeings) as openings for
conceptualizations of, and relationships with, the divine/sacred that are fluid, multiple, and
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intrinsically liminal (i.e. that conceptualize divine ontologies as intrinsically liminal, multiple,
and ever-changing) rather than static or objective.
From the linguistic perspective, the head of Dalemark’s pantheon is referred to as “the
One,” a name which evokes the concept of biblical, Judeo-Christian monotheism. Jones’ One
has a few other “secret names” as well, a factor that also reflects Judaic and Hebrew Biblical
traditions in which god has numerous names (Spellcoats 192). These secret names, “Adon, Amil,
[and] Oreth,” can all be linked to Hebrew words (Spellcoats 192, original emphasis).
In Dalemark, “Adon” is a name that passes on to human kings in the novels. When
Tanaqui uses Tanamil’s sign for “River” in her weaving, she realizes the significance of the
letters that make up the One’s names—i.e. she figures out the multiple meanings of the One’s
secret names and of the letters/signs she uses to spell those names in her weaving. She writes
that, “Adon is as much as to say Lord, the difference of a thread” (Spellcoats 192, original
emphasis). Similarly, “adon” means “lord” or “master” in Hebrew,89 and often—although not
exclusively—refers, in the Hebrew Bible, to god (Brown, Driver, and Briggs, 10-11). At points
in the Hebrew Bible it also refers to human kings, lords or masters; so, too, in Dalemark it
becomes the title of the human king of Dalemark in Hern’s day, and of the lord of Hannart in
Mitt’s day.
The One’s name of “Oreth” is, as Tanaqui writes, “a sign for weaving, or knotting, but
not the usual one” (Spellcoats, 192). In the “Guide” at the end of the Dalemark Quartet,90 the
definition for “Oreth” is: “one of the secret names of the One, the least known, meaning ‘he who
is bound’” (“A Guide to Dalemark,” Dalemark Quartet Vol. Two 733). In Aramaic, the word
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Meaning, a transliterative pronunciation of “adon” – i.e. the Hebrew word אדון
As Mendlesohn reminds us, readers must take this “Guide” with a grain of salt, since it was written by a character
within the Dalemark world, as was the “Final Note” after The Spellcoats. Both of these “guides,” then, are actually
immersive, and unreliable, fictional texts themselves (Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5, “A World Lived in”).
90
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“oraita”—from the letters O-R-T (aleph, reish, taf)—means teaching or instruction, usually via
written narration (Brown et al. 434). It also means “law,” and in its biblical and talmudic
contexts, carries a connotation of “binding law.” A different Hebrew word, “oth,” uses some of
the same letters (aleph, taf) but stems from a different root; “oth” means “sign,” “letter” (i.e.
letters used for writing), or sometimes “pledge”—as in a covenant pledge wherein one binds
oneself to certain obligations (e.g. the Noahide or Abrahamic covenants) (Brown et al. 16-17).
These meanings strikingly parallel the Dalemark ones.
“Amil,” as Tanaqui tells us, means “river” (Spellcoats 192); the glossary informs us it
also means “brother” (“A Guide to Dalemark,” Dalemark Quartet Vol. Two 685). However,
“Amil” also seems to connote the idea of “burden” or “task” as well. When the One offers Mitt
the choice of taking the name “Amil” to use during Mitt’s reign as king, the One tells him:
“Before you choose between that name or your own, you must know that I have sworn to root
out Kankredin from my land. If you take my name, that will be your task, too” (Crown 633).
Mitt thinks, “Amil was a name […that] carried the One’s burden with it. Well, Mitt had carried
burdens all his life” (Crown 633). The repeated emphasis of “burden” implies that it is a
meaning intrinsically connected to the name/word “Amil.” In the Hebrew bible, “amal” and
“ameil” stem from the root A-M-L (ayin, mem, lamed) mean labor or toil (both the verb and
noun senses of the words), or sometimes sorrow/suffering (Brown et al. 765).
In addition to the names themselves, the way Mitt uses the Undying’s names for magical
power parallels midrashic tales of heroes using god’s names. Mitt shouts the secret names of
Libby Beer and Old Ammet at his enemy—first the “lesser” names and then the “greater” ones—
and saying these names out loud spurs magical forces correlating with the respective Undying’s
natures: Libby Beer’s names cause the growth of trees and islands (Libby Beer is previously also
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called “She Who Raised the Islands” [Drowned 497]); the lesser name of Old Ammet, the “Earth
Shaker” (Drowned 506), creates a hurricane (Drowned 529-32). Mitt was given these names by
Old Ammet and Libby Beer, once he agreed to pave his future as a “friend” to the Holy Islands
(i.e. “in peace” rather than “as a conqueror” [Drowned 512]), to be used in times of need for this
very purpose (Drowned 516-7). The trope of using magical names, words, or spells is of course
ubiquitous in fantasy. However, the ways Jones deploys this trope echo Jewish midrashic tales.91
For example, Jones ties such magical names to the specific names of gods; the gods’ names can
be eyeballed and kept in one’s mind but when spoken out loud wield power specific to, and only
with the good graces of, their respective gods. The idea of wielding god’s name as magical
power with that god’s approval is one found as well in tales of King Solomon and his adviser
Benaiah using the “Name of God” (engraved on Solomon’s ring) to defeat the demon king
Asmodeus, as well as in numerous talmudic/aggadic stories (Schwartz 3).92
By drawing the above correlations between these words—Adon, Oreth, and Amil—and
Hebrew/Aramaic words, I am not arguing that Dalemark as a whole is written in any sort of
“biblical” or “priestly” language,93 but rather that there is a thematic correlation between these
specific terms. My goal is to highlight parallels between Jones’ terms and their Hebrew
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Most likely, this echoes not only Jewish-midrashic/biblical sources, but rather other religious traditions as well;
scholars on other religions may well be able to shed light on multiple resonances here.
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See, for instance, “The Witches of Ashkelon” in Schwartz, Elijah’s Violin, pp.25-28, taken from the Jerusalem
Talmud, tractate Haggigah 77d-78a. Schwartz notes that this episode is depicted in the talmud as based on a
historical event—“the hanging of eighty witches in the city of Ashkelon”—and that the talmud describes the “fury
of the relatives of the witches following their execution” (4). I mention this to once again point out the porous line
between “fantastic/magical” and “real” in texts stemming from different cultural and religious premises regarding
the nature of reality and what is possible, as Attebery discusses (and as I mention in the dissertation introduction).
93
Jones in fact scoffed at fantasy novels written in what she called a “priestly sort of language, in sort of pseudobiblical language” (“Diana Wynne Jones in her own words (part 2)”). However, this seems to refer to novels that
rely heavily, and artificially, on what Mendlesohn terms the “high formality” and esoteric style of the “club
narrative”—a style Mendlesohn likens to Old Testament or Anglo-Saxon Chronicle languages. Such style is
drastically different from the overall tone and rhetoric of the Dalemark quartet, which, as Mendlesohn notes, is
overwhelmingly immersive. Thus, my argument here is not that Jones uses an Old Testament style, in the clubnarrative esoteric sense; rather, I argue that she embeds within the Dalemark novels themes and names/terms that
parallel certain themes/words present in midrashic contexts.
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transliterated corollaries—parallels that extend to the thematic import of not only these specific
words/terms, but also their wider rhetorical contexts within both the Dalemark novels and
biblical/midrashic texts.
In addition to the linguistic connections above, many themes within Dalemark seem
linked to Hebrew Bible and/or kabbalistic/midrashic concepts. The descriptions of the
Undying’s natures and bindings resonate with descriptions of human souls and the divine in
Abulafian kabbalah. In Dalemark, as mentioned in the prior sections, the Undying are described
as “bound” when they are delimited, constrained, or compartmentalized by others (either mortals
or other Undying). In this bound form, various aspects of their souls, powers, and active
potential are inaccessible to the Undying. For example, Tanamil and Anoreth cannot share much
information with the siblings while bound; the One cannot reshape the land and defeat Kankredin
until he is unbound. Thread features prominently in the descriptions of the Undying being bound
or unbound, especially since Tanaqui is weaving the story of the narrative and weaves spells—
via letters and, at one point, magical thread94 in her spellcoats—that unbind the Undying. This
imagery resonates with the kabbalistic idea, in Abulafian kabbalah, of “unseal[ing] the soul” by
“unt[ying] the knots which bind it” (Scholem, Major Trends, Fourth Lecture, section 4).
Scholem writes of this concept that, “All the inner forces and the hidden souls in man are
distributed and differentiated in the bodies. It is, however, in the nature of all of them that when
their knots are untied they return to their origin, which is one without any duality and which
comprises the multiplicity” (Scholem, Major Trends, Fourth Lecture, section 4).95 As Scholem
notes, similar terminology and conceptualizations exist in the “theosophy of northern Buddhism”
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The One gives Tanaqui special thread that belonged to Cenblith (the One’s wife), which Tanaqui uses to weave
the vision the One gives her of reshaping the land—as Tanaqui weaves it, it also becomes reality (Spellcoats 276-7).
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Scholem is quoting here from Abulafia (see footnote there).
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(Scholem, Major Trends, Fourth Lecture, section 4). The parallel language and themes in
Dalemark might be coincidental; Jones also may have been drawing from or alluding to either
Buddhist writings or kabbalah by way of Jung, whom she references in her nonfiction writing.
Another point of resonance between Jones’ descriptions of the Undying and Abulafian kabbalah
is the comparison of souls and the divine with running water: some of the Undying (e.g., the
One, Tanamil, Anoreth) are described as being rivers (i.e. one of their many forms is a river);
human souls are also described as being the river (Spellcoats 225; discussed more below in this
section). The same language is used in Abulafian kabbalistic conceptualizations of human souls
and the divine, albeit in (presumably) metaphorical terms (Scholem, Major Trends, Fourth
Lecture, section 4).
Additionally, the language describing characters’ encounters with the “One” is strongly
reminiscent of descriptions of god in the Hebrew bible. All the characters we are shown
encountering the One experience him as shadow or light, often “in the shape of a figure with a
bent head and a nose that was neither straight nor hooked, but both at once” (Spellcoats 230).
Tanaqui’s first encounter with the One is in his cave, an “oddly shaped dark hole” in a rock—
again, an association with shadow or negative space/shapes. In the Hebrew bible, god is often
referred to as shadow, light/fire, or as a rock.96 The One’s cave has a “haze of steam”
(Spellcoats 231) and the grass on his hilltop/waterfall (i.e. the origin of the “River” which is also,
partly, the One) “steam[s]” (Spellcoats 233) and “smoke[s]” (Spellcoats 238) after Tanaqui starts
unbinding the One. Smoke and clouds are ongoing descriptors of god in the Hebrew bible,
especially in Exodus;97 specifically, the mountain of Sinai—location of the ten-commandments
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For example, the imagery of god as shadow appears in Isaiah 25.4 and Psalms 121.5, among others. God is
described as appearing as or within fire in Exodus 13.21, 24.17, 19.18; and as rock in Psalms 28.1 and 92.16, among
others (Koren Bible).
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See Exodus 13.21, 19.9, 19.18, 24.16, among others (Koren Bible).
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revelation—is described repeatedly as cloaked in cloud and fire (e.g. Koren Bible, Exodus 24.1518). Mountains and rock—especially in conjunction with smoke or steam/clouds—pervade both
Dalemark and the bible’s descriptions of god/One; just as Tanaqui must enter a “hole” in the
rock in order to converse with the One, god must put Moses “in the hole [in] the rock” in order to
converse with him after the golden calf sin (Koren Bible, Exodus 33.22, my translation;
referenced as well in Brown-Driver-Briggs 669).
Like Moses, Tanaqui only converses with the One behind her back, rather than face-toface. Tanaqui writes: “I wanted to turn round and look at him, but I did not dare. I looked at his
shadow and said […]” (Spellcoats 234). Tanaqui continues her conversation with the One aware
of his presence at her back, but looking only at his shadow as she speaks (unlike Moses, who
does not see a shadow). Throughout their conversation, Tanaqui’s urge to turn around and see
the One face to face grows stronger: “Then I did nearly turn round to look at him, but again I did
not dare. [...] By this time I was shaken with the urge to look round and see my grandfather, but I
could not do it” (Spellcoats 236). The urge to turn around is identified, for Tanaqui, both with
love for the One—“I had not thought it was possible to love him until then. I wanted to turn
round and look at him, but I did not dare” (Spellcoats 234)—and with fear:
I could not resist turning round. I was so frightened of looking that I slithered down on to
my knees […] I think I gave a whimper of panic. But I turned round.
Kars Adon was standing there, casting a long shadow on the turf beside the blob of mine.
[…] There was nobody else there. (Spellcoats 236)
The fact that Tanaqui can only see her grandfather’s shadow, and converse with him behind her
back, rather than face to face, is strongly reminiscent of Moses’ encounters with the Israelite god
in Exodus, after the sin of the golden calf. Before the golden calf incident, Moses conversed
with god face to face. After the sin, however, God tells Moses:
[Y]ou cannot see My face, for man may not see Me and live [...] See, there is a place near
Me. Station yourself on the rock and, as My presence passes by, I will put you in a cleft of
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the rock and shield you with My hand until I have passed by. Then I will take My hand away
and you will see My back; but My face must not be seen. (JPS Tanakh [1985], Sefaria.org,
Exodus 33:20-23, my emphasis)
Tanaqui describes an increasingly building urge to turn around and face him, but each time she
“does not dare,” until finally, at the end, she does—only to find her grandfather gone, and Kars
Adon casting the shadow. Jones uses similar language in Crown:
[…] there was a presence standing behind them, casting this shadow, but it was beyond any
of them to turn round and look […] When the One spoke, the voice came from behind them
[…]
“It is not easy,” said the One, “for my mortal children to speak with me face-to-face.”
This was true. All of them were aching to turn round and see the One, and all of them
knew it was quite impossible. (Crown 632)
Mitt and Maewen describe similar sensations to Tanaqui, and these are far from the only
instances. The language here that alludes to biblical passages thus pervades the Dalemark series
to become a prevalent theme.
Another biblical parallel is the prohibition/taboo of writing or speaking divine names.
Within the Dalemark novels, true names of the great Undying (e.g. the One, Old Ammet, Libby
Beer) are not spoken out loud without great cause; doing so either broaches taboo or results
directly in unleashing cataclysmic forces connected with the Undying’s natures. When Mitt
meets Old Ammet and Libby Beer on Holy Island, he is told:
“The names of the Earth Shaker and She Who Raised the Islands are strong things [...] even
the least of them. Spoken aloud by the voice, they are too strong, unless the speaker has right
in the heart of him. And I must tell you that the names of the Earth Shaker are cruel even
then, as they are strongest. He who learns these names must never say them aloud, even
sleeping, unless he wishes something perilous to follow.” (Drowned 516)
When Mitt is shown the names, he is warned again to read them silently, and not to speak them
“until [he has] true need” (Drowned 517). The names are not even technically written; rather, the
letters are formed from the sun lighting up certain cracks in the hollow of a stone wall (an
interesting reversal of the concept of the “heavenly Tora [bible]” as “written with ‘black fire on a
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white fire’” [Faur 116]98). Tanaqui, too, describes the One’s names as “secret” and she is
“horrified” and “ashamed” to speak them out loud; Tanaqui’s family and their king know the
secret names of the One because those names were passed down orally and secretly within their
families from generation to generation (Spellcoats 164). When Tanaqui starts to speak them
aloud to Kars Adon, he stops her (it is taboo for his people as well) and is awed (Spellcoats 238).
And for good reason—as with the names Mitt receives, the One’s names, woven/written in the
right way within Tanaqui’s spellcoat, are what unbind the One and literally reshape/rebirth the
land. Similarly, in rabbinic and Jewish mystical texts, secret names of god are often spelled out
and meant to be eyeballed or read mentally without verbal recitation.99
Yet another parallel theme between biblical/rabbinic texts and Dalemark is that of the
prohibition/taboo of making divine images (Koren Bible, Exodus 20.3). In the Dalemark books,
it is precisely through the creation of their likenesses—whether two or three-dimensional—that
the Undying are bound. The One and Tanamil are bound through small statues made in their
images. Hern tells Mitt, Maewen, Ynen, and Kialan that he was always careful not to have any
images made of him, in case he ended up being of the Undying (Crown 622). Later, when
Maewen returns to Tannoreth Palace and revisits the portrait of Amil the Great, she realizes that
Mitt purposely directed the painter to misrepresent him, in order to avoid the same bindings to
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For more about this concept, including the negative/empty space between letters as space for unending,
continuously progressing truth, including the contributions of man in co-writing (so to speak) with god, see Faur,
Golden Doves with Silver Dots (1986), chapter five, especially pp.114-118. Faur’s descriptions resonate with Jones’
passages discussed here. See also Idel, Old Worlds, New Mirrors (2010) chapter 13 for a discussion of the same
concept from a slightly different angle.
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For instance, in the Rosh Hashana morning service (of contemporary Ashkenazi, Orthodox Jewry in North
America), in the midst of the “Avinu Malkeinu” prayer the Artscroll mahzor (prayerbook) lists a “Kabbalistic prayer
for sustenance” that “some recite” (i.e. some people have the custom to recite) while the chazzan recites a specific
line. In reciting this kabbalistic prayer, the Artscroll instructions say: “The Divine Names that appear in brackets
should be scanned with the eyes and concentrated upon, but should not be spoken” (Scherman, The Complete
Artscroll Machzor, Rosh Hashanah [1985] 386). Similar kabbalistic prayers and instructions to silently eyeball
divine names appear in other instances of Artscroll prayerbooks, including birkat kohanim (the priestly blessing),
tashlich (the ritual of casting one’s sins into water during the High Holiday season), and more.

114

which Hern referred (Crown 664).
Another example of such a thematic is that of empty or negative space. As mentioned
earlier, a significant part of Tanaqui’s critical reading and writing process is learning to pay
attention to what’s not being said, to read between the lines and to see the literal shapes and
shadows—specifically, that of her grandfather—underlying the words in her textual
narratives/spellcoats.
After Tanaqui brings the One her first spellcoat, but “nothing happen[s]” and she is sent
from his cave, she thinks she has failed to unbind him, failed to stop Kankredin (Spellcoats 231).
She asks, “What did I do wrong?” (Spellcoats 233). Her grandfather, however, thanks her, and
tells her she “took Kankredin’s hands from my throat”—implying that if she did not fully
succeed, she definitely did not “fail,” either (Spellcoats 234). The conversation could have
ended here, but by this point in the novel’s trajectory, Tanaqui has already learned to ask further
questions. She persists:
“Then what didn’t I do?” I said.
His answer came after a pause. He sounded sad. “Nobody asked you to do anything –
beyond what your family has always done. And I was not very kind to your mother, after
all.”
“I know,” I said. “But Closti – my father – wasn’t in the least like Cenblith, you know.
You might have forgiven her.”
He paused again before answering sadly and hesitatingly, “I am very devious,
Granddaughter. You – you would not be here now if I had.”
It came to me that my grandfather was not only bound and sad, and weighted with
shame and loneliness, but even uncertain how to talk to an ordinary person like me. I had not
thought it was possible to love him until then. I wanted to turn round and look at him, but I
did not dare. I looked at his shadow and said, “Grandfather, tell me what I have to do to
unbind you. I want to. It’s got nothing to do with Kankredin or Mother or even Gull. It’s for
you.” (Spellcoats 234)
It is specifically the One’s inarticulateness—his pauses, his “uncertainty” regarding how to talk
to “an ordinary person” like Tanaqui that draws Tanaqui towards him emotionally. Tanaqui
reads the One’s inarticulateness here as connected not only to his bounds, but to his sadness,
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shame, and loneliness. His very lack of speech connotes more to her, in this scene, than do his
specific words. The void of his speech, like the voids of his cave and shadow, may be read as
spaces for potential meaning and creativity—chasms of inchoate, infinite, and fluid meaning
before it gets bound (literally by Tanaqui) into words and their limited abilities to
communicate.100
This scene is redolent of Hebrew-biblical encounters between Moses and god: like Moses
post sin-of-the-golden-calf, Tanaqui can only see her grandfather’s shadow, and converse with
him at her back, rather than face to face. She describes an increasingly building urge to turn
around and face him, but each time she “does not dare,” until finally, at the end, she does—only
to find her grandfather gone, and Kars Adon casting the shadow. Tanaqui concludes the episode
by writing: “I do not know if it had been the shadow of Kars Adon all along, but I think not”
(Spellcoats 237). She leaves us on an ambiguous note—was her conversation with the One real?
Hallucinatory? Something else? This episode is a moment of liminal fantasy, in which
hesitation and ambiguity are key, and, ideally, never fully resolved. Negative space, then, refers
not only to the critical process of noting what is not said or written, but to a lack of clearly
defined meaning, reality, or truth—or, in other words, a multiplicity of simultaneous meanings, a
view of truth as multifaceted and fluid.101
This ambiguity and refusal to pin down meaning to one single form characterizes
Tanaqui’s, and thus readers’, understandings of the Undying’s ontology as well. “I can’t get
used to the way things are the same and not the same,” Tanaqui tells Gull in the River of Souls:
“The One is not the River. Is he this golden statue?”
“He was before the River, and he made it,” Gull said. He paced seriously and frowned as
100

Similarly, Faur writes that “[i]t is the peculiar trait of the Hebrew God not only to speak, but also to be ‘silent.’
[...] It is precisely this speechlessness which—like blank spacing in writing—contains and gives expression to
speech” (116-117).
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See Faur, chapter five.

116

he tried to explain. Gull is not a thinker like Hern or Duck. “Making the River, he was bound
as the One. He is the River, in a way, or its source at least.”
“But the River is people’s souls,” I said. “And it’s water, too.”
“It’s all of those things,” said Gull. “But…well, if anyone’s really the River, I think
Mother is.”
“Mother!” I exclaimed.
“I can’t explain,” said Gull. (Spellcoats 228-229)
Significantly, at this point in the novel, Tanaqui thinks she has finally—after misreading upon
misreading—figured out the “truth,” only to have Gull upend it yet again by destabilizing her
preconceived framework of only one, single truth. From what we as readers can piece together
between Gull’s and Kankredin’s explanations, the One holds the following identities
simultaneously: he is the River; he is not the River; he predated and made the River (i.e. is its
source); he is in some ways the golden statue, in that he was bound to and by the statue; he is the
entire land, as is implied by Tanaqui’s weaving/magical vision of the One and the land
upheaving and resettling geological features, and by the change in Dalemark’s topographical
map (in the beginning of the novel) between the times of Spellcoats and the later novels. The
River, too, bears simultaneous identities: it is the One in some ways; it is not the One; it is the
One’s offspring (literally and genealogically), Tanaqui and Gull’s mother; it is people’s souls; it
is “the soul & substance of the land”; it is water. Truth here defies being pinned down—or
bound—to a single identity, in a similar manner to Kialan and Moril’s depictions of “unbound
truth.” “Unbounded truth,” as Kialan sings, is “not a thing” “cramped to time and bound in
place”—in other words, if truth is not a thing, it is nothing. However, if it is nothing, it is
something as well (the very absence, or negation, of a finite “thing”).
Jones’ use of negative space as space redolent with multiple, potential meanings in
flux—in contrast to singular, static meanings—speaks to negative theologies within Jewish

117

philosophy. Maimonides, for example, is one foundational articulator of this view.102 Similar
views of negative theology permeate kabbalah and other forms of Jewish mysticism. For
example, Rabbi A. I. Kook, in discussing god, writes, “We do not speak of nor do we even
contemplate the Source of all Sources, but from the very fact that we do not deny him,
everything lives and exists forever. [...] Nothingness and I (Ain and Ani) are composed of the
same letters” (quoted in Ross, Expanding Palace, 130, original emphases). In this passage, R.
Kook goes on to differentiate such “nothingness” and infiniteness from the “comprehensible
infinity” of monotheism (which he identifies as a “gentile” idea) and from “Buddhism’s negation
(of earthly life)”; god can be “comprehended and spoken of only through the nuances of colors,
through (his) many deeds and abundant peace, his profusion of love and courage” and is
“revealed through the subjective revelation of all hearts who seek and comprehend him” (quoted
in Ross, Expanding Palace, 130). R. Kook’s words here can be read as positing an inherently
pluralistic, subjective, multifold, and dynamic understanding of god—and doing so specifically
via the concept of nothingness and lack of categories/boundaries—in contrast to theologies
depicting god as static, bounded (delimited) finiteness or infiniteness (e.g., “comprehensible
infinity”) and in contrast to what R. Kook describes as “Buddhism’s negation,” which might
mean (for him) simple absence (nothingness as lack or absence, rather than as a lack merely of
singularity or boundaries (“no thing” or “no end”).
My point here is twofold: first, that Jones’ depictions of “nothingness” bear similarities to
Jewish negative theology; second, that both such depictions (within Dalemark and kabbalistic
texts) offer potentialities for feminist imaginings of the divine—and thus, for feminist religiospiritualities more broadly. Tamar Ross, for instance, an Orthodox-Jewish scholar and
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See Scholem’s discussion of this (Major Trends, First Lecture, section 4)
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theologian, quotes the above passages of R. Kook in a context of highlighting compatible strands
between traditional Jewish texts (e.g. aggadot, kabbalistic and other Jewish mystical texts) and
twentieth century feminist sensibilities and agendas.103 Ross identifies a number of fascinating
factors, such as kabbalistic texts’ female metaphors, images, and language for god (e.g. the
Shekhinah, images of “birthing, nursing, and nurturing the world”), aggadic emphases on
“human relationships, feelings, and the meaning of life as it is lived” over “law and formal
abstractions,” and other points (Expanding Palace 129). Of particular salience here, however, is
Ross’ analysis of kabbalistic conceptions of god:
In Kabbalah, God is not a being outside us, over and against us, who manipulates and
controls, and raises some people over others. God is the source and wellspring of life in its
infinite diversity and its present in all its aspects. God is present not just as father and
protector but as the force that empowers us to act creatively ourselves. [...] The pinnacle of
the Godhead—Ein-Sof,104 the Infinite One—embraces the inexhaustible particularities of all
communities and is named fully by none. (Expanding Palace 129, original emphasis)
What Ross points to here, as well as in her analysis of R. Kook’s theology, is a conception of god
that is inherently pluralistic, manifold, and inclusive. Ross reads R. Kook’s theology as
endorsing “a pantheistic picture of the relationship between the world and God, with the two as
part of one continuum, rather than a theistic one, that entails a clearly demarcated hierarchy with
God above and His creatures down below and on an utterly different plane” (Expanding Palace
130). Ross connects such “pantheistic or panentheistic vision” with the process theology of
some Christian feminist theologians,105 in which “[a]ll of reality is interrelated” and god and the
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Importantly, Ross differentiates between feminist potentialities within R. Kook’s theology and R. Kook’s views
and practices regarding women in day-to-day matters, which, as Ross writes, “can be characterized [...] as benign
paternalism at best” (Expanding Palace, 131)
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“Ein-Sof” translates, literally, as “No end[ing]”—an interesting connection to the negative theology discussed
above.
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Ross cites Sheila Davaney, ed., Feminism and Process Thought: The Harvard Divinity School/Claremont Center
for Process Studies Symposium Papers (New York and Toronto: Edwin Mellen, 1981); Catherine Keller, From a
Broken Web: Separation, Sexism and Self (Boston: Beacon, 1988); as well as noting that “[t]wo prominent versions
of this theology have been formulated by the French Catholic theologian Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and by the
British-born mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead” (Expanding Palace, 286).
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world (comprised of individuals) respond to and change each other in ongoing dynamics:
individual humans change the makeup of the world, which is simultaneously contained within
god and something to which god “respond[s]” by “bringing new possibilities into being” which
then, in turn, impact humans “inasmuch as we construct each actual moment from the
possibilities God presents” (Expanding Palace 131).
Whether or not Jones intended these references is currently impossible to say, barring
further examination of the Dalemark manuscripts and Jones archive. None of the abovementioned references are overt, and other scholars are already pointing out traces of other
languages and mythologies within Dalemark.106 The idea that true names and images of
individuals are magically potent, that they can grant the speaker/creator control over (can “bind”)
the named/represented subject, and that names/images should therefore be hidden and not shared
casually—these are all ideas common enough in fantasy and fairy tales. However, as scholars
such as Ang107 and as Jones herself have pointed out, Jones, if anything, was a master of multiple
allusions/references simultaneously. Jones was familiar with the bible; it is likely that she
consciously or subconsciously referenced biblical themes and images, among other reference
points. More importantly, however, is the fact that Jones’ language and themes described above
parallel those of Hebrew-biblical/kabbalistic texts—and both display similar methodologies, and
ramifications, for feminist re-imaginings of religio-spiritual methodologies.
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Peronal conversation with Victoria Symons and Elizabeth K. Adams regarding Old English references in
Dalemark (at Diana Wynne Jones Memorial Conference, 2014)
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See Ang, “Dogmata, Catastrophe, and the Renaissance of Fantasy in Diana Wynne Jones.” The Lion and the
Unicorn (34:3) September 2010, pp. 284-302.
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Chapter 3: Feminist Religio-Spiritual Fantasy in Le Guin, L’Engle, and Pierce

Like chapter two, chapter three examines children’s fantasy produced during the 1960s to
1990s that displays overt feminist religious themes. All of the authors discussed in this chapter
(L’Engle, Le Guin, and Pierce) acknowledge the impact of Lewis and Tolkien on their writing
(even Le Guin, who wrote Wizard before reading The Lord of the Rings, acknowledges this). All
three, however, significantly deviate from Lewis and Tolkien in their perspectives (as women),
feminist rewritings of heroic/quest fantasies, and feminist religio-spiritual politics (personally
and in the novels). Additionally, the feminist-religious—and specifically, mystical—fantasy of
these texts speaks to, but does not directly invoke, Jewish kabbalah or midrash. All of these
authors, I hypothesize, combine fantastic rhetoric with religious hermeneutics—hermeneutics
that either directly invoke, or subtly resonate with, midrashic and kabbalistic methodologies—to
problematize hegemonic epistemologies, and to destabilize narrative truths regarding morality
and divine authority. By doing so, they posit feminist skepticisms that simultaneously critique
and affirm religio-spiritual traditions.
This chapter thus focuses on the following: Madeleine L’Engle’s Time sequence (1962—
1989) including A Wrinkle in Time (1962) (henceforth Wrinkle), A Wind in the Door (1973)
(henceforth Wind), Many Waters (1986) (henceforth Waters), A Swiftly Tilting Planet (1978)
(henceforth Planet) and An Acceptable Time (1989) (henceforth Acceptable); Ursula K. Le
Guin’s Earthsea series (1968—1990) including A Wizard of Earthsea (1968) (henceforth
Wizard), The Tombs of Atuan (1970) (henceforth Tombs), The Farthest Shore (1972) (henceforth
Shore), and Tehanu (1990); and Tamora Pierce’s Song of the Lioness quartet (1983—1988)
including Alanna: The First Adventure (1983) (henceforth Alanna), In the Hand of the Goddess
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(1984) (henceforth Hand), The Woman Who Rides Like a Man (1986) (henceforth Woman), and
Lioness Rampant (1988) (henceforth Lioness). I do not discuss Le Guin’s fifth Earthsea novel,
The Other Wind (2001), simply because its publication date places it beyond the temporal scope
of this chapter’s focus. However, where relevant I do consider contextual information from both
The Other Wind and Tales From Earthsea (2001), in the same way that I do regarding L’Engle’s
and Pierce’s later works. While evidence from these later works cannot be applied
anachronistically to the period under discussion, it is useful to keep them in mind when
analyzing their earlier companion texts.
There are several reasons for choosing these specific authors and texts. First, these
authors/works all emerged from a particular milieu—that of the post-Tolkien and Lewis
children’s fantasy industry. Levy and Mendlesohn write that:
[...] the influence of C. S. Lewis changed the shape of British children's fantasy, pushing it
towards portals, myth-magic and destinarianism, and perhaps most important, towards what
Marek Oziewicz has argued is the dominance of the mythopoeic; that is, the making of
myths. As children's and teen fantasy developed in the 1960s, this element came sufficiently
to the fore that it began to dominate the public perception of what fantasy was. (Levy and
Mendlesohn, Children’s Fantasy Literature, chapter 7)
This applies, as well, to the religious themes prevalent in Lewis’ and Tolkien’s work:
Under [Lewis’] influence, the local, secular fantasy took a back seat, yielding to an
understanding that much children's fantasy would be otherworldly, either physically or
spiritually. Kath Filmer has argued that in the 1960s and 1970s, while religion per se may
have remained in the background, the struggle with scepticism and religious plurality which
pervades the work of writers such as Garner, Cooper and Madeleine L'Engle is its spiritual
descendant. (Levy and Mendlesohn, Children’s Fantasy Literature, chapter 5, “Narnia and
the salvation of the world”)
Levy and Mendlesohn quote Oziewicz, from his book One Earth, One People (2008), in
describing Le Guin and L’Engle (along with Lloyd Alexander and Orson Scott Card) as having
“strong convictions about fantasy as fulfilling vital human needs, as concerned with human
values, and spiritual yearnings, and as grounded in archetypal patterns and poetic mode[s] of
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expression” (Levy and Mendlesohn, Children’s Fantasy Literature, chapter 7).
While Jones and Pierce have acknowledged Lewis and Tolkien as influences,108 Jones
and Pierce diverge from Lewis and Tolkien in many ways—particularly with regard to religious
and gender politics. Jones, as we have seen in chapter two, explores a feminist and pluralistic
religio-spirituality beyond institutional frameworks altogether (whether Christian or other
institutions). Pierce, as I discuss later in this chapter, imagines religio-spiritual institutions that
are inherently feminist and that disrupt Judeo-Christian paradigms, proposing instead
polytheistic, pluralistic pantheons that incorporate an amalgam of non-fictional and fictional
religious references. Le Guin is the most liminal writer of this group, in terms of religio-spiritual
dynamics, in that one could easily read Earthsea as atheist and/or secular; however, those
scholars who do read religio-spiritual politics in Earthsea repeatedly term them as Taoist and/or
eco-feminist.109 While some scholars do read Judeo-Christian dynamics in Earthsea,110 the
examples used in such arguments easily lend themselves to different readings, and touch on
broad themes whose valences extend significantly beyond Judeo-Christian sources (e.g. themes
of sacrifice).

L’Engle
L’Engle’s Time novels (1962—1989) can and have been characterized differently: as
science fiction,111 fantasy, “mystical fantasy” (Fisher 49), and “science fantasies” (Attebery,
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Pierce, “Margaret A. Edwards Award Speech” (2013); for Jones, see discussion in chapter two.
See, for instance: Jobling, Fantastic Spiritualities (2010); Oziewicz, One Earth (2008); Wytenbroek, “Taoism”
(1990); and Comoletti and Drout, “How They Do Things with Words: Language, Power, Gender, and the Priestly
Wizards of Ursula K. Le Guin’s Earthsea Books” (2001). Comoletti and Drout’s reading is particularly astute in its
acknowledgment of Taoism in Earthsea while highlighting Christian tropes within the earlier Earthsea novels (e.g.,
correlations between wizardly depictions and Christian priests).
110
See Comoletti and Drout, ibid.
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See Fisher, “Mystical Fantasy for Children” (1990), p.49.
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123

Stories, chapter 6, “Archeological Angels in Fiction”). Regardless of how one categorizes them
genre-wise, and despite what protestations (and bannings) from groups on the Christian right112
might lead one to believe, religious and spiritual themes—both Christian and universalist—run
through the novels in explicit and implicit ways. Religio-spirituality in L’Engle’s works has
been discussed by numerous scholars, including Brian Attebery, Farah Mendlesohn and Michael
Levy, Marek Oziewicz, Nancy-Lou Patterson, and more.113 From a broader religio-spiritual
perspective, Patterson terms the Time sequence “ethical fantasy;”114 while this may sound
secular, Patterson understands “ethical fantasy” as specifically including spiritual, and arguably
religious, frameworks. Patterson quotes and adopts Molson’s definition of ethical fantasy as “the
Psychomachia, the bellum intestinum, the Holy War,”115 explaining that the “major action” of
L’Engle’s works “occurs in a place beneath the level of the consciousness, to which the ego must
travel with the aid of a spiritual guide” (Patterson 195). Although L’Engle’s works lend
themselves to numerous and different interpretations than that offered by Patterson, Patterson
aptly summarizes central and recurring thrusts of L’Engle’s narratives: the climactic battle
between Light and Dark, and travel (in a portal-quest manner) aided by spiritual guides.
The Time sequence can also be read as specifically “Christian mythopoeia—a modern
reimagining of a Christian myth,” as Oziewicz terms the novels (Oziewicz 182). Oziewicz’s
delineation that the Time sequence “is not an overemphasis of any elements of Christian
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‘Wind’ Trilogy” (1983). See also: Fisher, “Mystical Fantasy” (1990); Steem “Listening as Heroic Action” (2013);
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doctrine” (Oziewicz 182) but rather a “spiritual rendering of Christ’s message in the
contemporary language of science and in the ‘mere Christianity,’ nonsectarian paradigm”
(Oziewicz 183) is a useful one for our purposes here. In many ways, L’Engle’s Time novels thus
continue in the tradition of much prior children’s fantasy, particularly the works of MacDonald
and Lewis (the former of which L’Engle has referenced directly116) and the mythopoeic tone cast
by Lewis’ and Tolkien’s works that impacted genre and children’s fantasy in the 1960s through
1980s.117
In this L’Engle differs slightly from authors such as Jones, Le Guin, and Pierce. While
Jones and Pierce have acknowledged Lewis and Tolkien as influences, Jones and Pierce diverge
from Lewis and Tolkien in many ways—particularly with regard to religious and gender politics.
Jones, as we have seen in chapter two, explores a feminist and pluralistic religio-spirituality
beyond institutional frameworks altogether (whether Christian or other institutions). In contrast
to Jones, Le Guin, and Pierce, L’Engle works within similar religio-spiritual paradigms as
MacDonald, Lewis, and Tolkien: the Time novels can convincingly be read as Christian
mythopoeia (albeit a nonsectarian one); good (“Light” in the novels) and evil (“Dark”) are
portrayed as static, often-reductive binaries; and much of L’Engle’s gender and religious politics
can be read as conservative rather than progressive, especially compared to the works of Jones,
Le Guin, and Pierce. It is therefore possible to read the Time novels as more conservative in
their religious and epistemological politics overall, especially compared with the other novels
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discussed in this dissertation.118
However, while L’Engle does operate largely within a Manichean, Christian framework
similar to those employed by Lewis and Tolkien, within this paradigm L’Engle departs from and
subverts prior tropes in three crucial areas: a) gender politics (in general and specifically
regarding religious figures), b) universalist concepts of redemption, and c) space for
dialectical/dialogic critique and questioning (of mortals toward deities). In these three areas,
L’Engle’s Time novels depict feminist and dialectical, skeptical themes and rhetorics that
problematize the very boundaries and pillars of her otherwise binary, Manichean and Christian
religio-ethical paradigm. L’Engle also draws on and depicts Christian mystical themes (as
versus mystical themes from non-Christian traditions) and directly invokes Hebrew-biblical and
midrashic concepts and hermeneutics (i.e. as both content and methodology). In these ways, I
argue that L’Engle portrays an onto-epistemology that simultaneously critiques and affirms
religio-spiritual traditions of prior children’s fantasy.119
In this section of the chapter, I’ll examine the above-mentioned themes (i.e. gender
politics, b) Christian universalism and c) dialectical/dialogic critique across L’Engle’s Time
sequence. My main goal is to examine these themes at play in L’Engle’s works. At points
where L’Engle uses techniques or content that either stems from or runs parallel to Christianmystical, Hebrew-biblical, or midrashic/kabbalistic tropes or texts, I will discuss those as well.
118

I specify the Time novels here, as L’Engle displays significantly different religio-ethical paradigms in many of
her other works, including some written earlier or contemporaneously to various Time novels (e.g. The Small Rain
[1945]; Camilla [1965]; A House Like a Lotus [1984]). The religio-spiritual, ethical, and epistemological
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instead is a much messier, dynamic, and open form of ongoing questioning (of protagonists within the narrative, but
also between the narrative rhetoric and the reader). It is possible that one explanation lies in different intended
audiences (on the part of the publishers and/or L’Engle), with the Time novels geared more for middle-grade readers
and these latter works aimed at young adult or adult readers; further research is required to test this hypothesis.
Regardless, it’s notable that these latter books are realist as versus speculative—for this reason, they are excluded
from this chapter.
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fantasy, arguably going as far back as Pilgrim’s Progress (1678), as Mendlesohn argues (Rhetorics, p.4).
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However, the purpose of this discussion is not simply to identify and categorize source texts or
influences within L’Engle’s work, but rather to explore the ideological implications of these
themes and rhetorical strategies.

Female-Centered Religio-Spiritual Thematics and Guide Figures
The question of gender and sexual politics in the Time series is a complex one. While a
rich conversation may be had regarding the gender and sexual politics of many different facets of
the Time novels—e.g., female characters, portrayals of motherhood and womanhood—I focus on
L’Engle’s depictions of feminist and female-centered religio-spirituality. I first discuss
L’Engle’s depictions of Meg, the female hero-protagonist of Wrinkle, and her treatment of Meg’s
anger, love, and spiritual growth. I then point to L’Engle’s feminist guide figures: both those
mundane (e.g., Meg’s mother and Beezie’s grandmother) and supernatural (e.g., the Mrs. Ws,120
Progo). I posit that such guide figures disrupt heteronormative and binary gender frameworks,
while simultaneously queering static and exclusive conceptions of religio-spirituality and
epistemology. The guide figures on which I focus in this section perform a politics I read as
feminist in its insistence on multiple, multifaceted, and fluid ontology (this, despite the very real
textual tension with L’Engle’s Manichean depiction of morality), and which concurs with
L’Engle’s universalist thematics discussed in the following section.
One of the notable ways that L’Engle breaks gender conventions is with Wrinkle’s
protagonist, Meg. Meg is a math-loving, smart, nerdy, socially-awkward, female protagonist in a
science-fantasy adventure. Wrinkle defies easy genre alignment: it can be read as science fiction,
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fantasy, religious fiction, and/or through other lenses.121 However one categorizes Wrinkle
genre-wise, though, Meg is one of the first female, young adult science fiction protagonists. This
fact alone makes Meg groundbreaking; Meg’s love for and strengths in math and science makes
her even more atypical for female characters in young adult and children’s fiction at the time.
Interestingly, despite Meg’s brilliance, she is initially terrible in school. Wrinkle opens with Meg
having been “dropped down to the lowest section in her grade” and with her teachers
admonishing her for doing so poorly academically when she has such brilliant parents (Wrinkle
7-8). If a brainy, math-oriented, female young adult protagonist is unusual for children’s books
in the early 1960s, even more unusual is a protagonist who is all of those things plus a
“delinquent” (Meg’s thought, Wrinkle 8). Meg is also specifically ordinary-looking - rather than
beautiful - and is going through awkward teenage physical stages, such as braces (and, the text
implies, glasses and “mouse-brown hair” (Wrinkle 10), although it is unclear to me what is so
terrible with glasses and brown hair). Meg calls herself a “monster” (Wrinkle 10), “oddball”
(Wrinkle 17), and “repulsive-looking” (Wrinkle 18). Although Meg’s self-loathing (and
particularly her focus on outward beauty standards) can definitely be critiqued from a feminist
point of view, L’Engle’s depiction of a “delinquent”, “oddball”, and tomboy female protagonist
who “rough-house[s]”, tears her clothes, and blackens her eyes fighting bullies (Wrinkle 8) is
unusual for children’s books of this time.122
And Meg’s “delinquent” characteristics extend beyond her academic troubles in school;
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in Wrinkle and Wind Meg is depicted as often angry, impetuous, and impatient. Notably, the
positively-cued guide figures in Wrinkle do not usually tell Meg to control or suppress her anger,
nor does Meg usually self-censure these feelings (in Wind she is told to, or tells herself to, more
often). Rather, as Meg herself notes during the meeting with the Happy Medium, “It really
helped ever so much because it made me mad, and when I’m mad I don’t have room to be
scared” (Wrinkle 109). This is a recurring theme throughout Wrinkle: Meg’s anger helps her
overcome her fear; it strengthens and empowers her, and the narrative explicitly references this
numerous times. In addition to fortifying her emotionally, Meg’s “faults” serve as valuable tools
in her quests, and this is validated by the guide-figures. For instance, when the children prepare
to face the Dark on Camazotz in order to rescue Meg’s father, Mrs. Whatsit, Who, and Which
give each of them a talisman to help the children on their quest. Mrs. Whatsit gives Meg “your
faults” (Wrinkle 112). Meg protests, “But I’m always trying to get rid of my faults!” Mrs.
Whatsit, however, says “I think you’ll find they’ll come in handy on Camazotz” (Wrinkle 112).
It is exactly Meg’s faults—her impatience, anger, rudeness—that help her defy the pressure to
conform, and submit, to IT. Meg’s scream for her father “jerked her mind back out of darkness”
(Wrinkle 136) when IT, acting via the man with the red eyes, tries hypnotizing her; tackling
Charles Wallace (causing him to bang his head on the floor) helps him break free of IT’s spell
(Wrinkle 140); and Meg finds it useful to respond to the red-eyed man “as she sometimes reacted
to Mr. Jenkins at school. She scowled down at the ground in sullen fury” and complains rudely
of hunger (Wrinkle 140). It is the negatively-cued authority figures—the red-eyed man/IT, Mr.
Jenkins, Meg’s teachers at school—who consistently urge Meg to be patient, calm, and polite,
and they do so in attempts to suppress Meg’s individuality and force conformity (explicitly and
maliciously in the case of IT; implicitly and more ambiguously in the case of Meg’s school).
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This is not to say that L’Engle’s texts always validate Meg’s anger; in Wrinkle there are a
few times when Meg’s anger is depicted as tinted by confusion, hate, blame or guilt, and
identified as “spiritual damage” from the “Black Thing” (Wrinkle 209, 215). One implication is
that Meg’s anger is “good” (or deemed good by the guide-figures and narrative) when directed at
evil, or when used to overcome fear—in other words, when used for good purposes, but that it
can become “bad” if used in negative ways, such as to hurt her father or Calvin, or if it stems
from fear, blame, guilt, or despair. One may, arguably, read this as simply affirming a reductive
moral binary (regarding what the narrative promotes as “good” or “bad” exhibitions of anger) or
a reductive, conservative portrayal of authority (the Mrs. Ws and Aunt Beast determine where
and how Meg’s anger is appropriate or inappropriate). It is also possible, however, to read
L’Engle’s treatment of anger (and, indeed, of all emotional outbursts—e.g. Meg’s crying tantrum
on Aunt Beast) as neutral tools that can be either useful or not, but must first be accepted (rather
than suppressed or loathed) in order to be useful at all. I would argue that this reading bears out
most consistently, for while we see Meg’s emotional “faults” aid her in some instances, there are
other instances, as mentioned above, when they derail her; at other moments they are neither
helpful nor hindrances, but simply not the tool at hand she needs, such as when she rescues
Charles Wallace from IT. Here, Meg tries using her anger, but while it does help her
momentarily, it is her love that ultimately saves her and Charles Wallace. Crucially, the reason
anger fails Meg here is not that anger is “bad” or “wrong;” it is simply that love is something IT
lacks, as versus anger, which it knows and understands (and therefore is not the “weapon” Mrs.
Which gifts to Meg, the “something that IT has not” [Wrinkle 223]).
In Wrinkle, therefore, L’Engle’s message seems to be primarily one of self-acceptance:
Meg must accept her anger, fear, impatience, and other “faults” simply because they are “facts,”

130

as Meg might phrase it—they are undeniable parts of her, or inevitable and reasonable reactions
to dangerous situations (such as journeying alone to Camazotz to rescue Charles). Rather than
suppressing her unruly emotions, Meg learns to trust and accept them, empowering her to use her
anger and impatience to her advantage when possible, and to accept but move past them when
not.
Meg is not the only strong female character in the series: Meg’s mother, the three Mrs.
Ws, Polly, Aunt Beast, the Happy Medium, Beezie and [Beezie’s] Grandma. These characters
are interesting in their own rights; it is particularly fascinating to examine portrayals of
motherhood and womanhood in Meg’s and Calvin’s mothers.123 There is, however, another
interesting facet to the gendered dynamics of these characters, one that connects to the novels’
themes regarding religion and authority: the fact that many of these female-cued side characters
function both as guide figures and as figures of religio-spiritual authority, both mortal and
immortal. This is true, especially, in Wrinkle. Meg’s mother, the Happy Medium, and Aunt
Beast all act as minor guide figures in the narrative, helping the child protagonists along while
providing moral and spiritual guidance (albeit to varying degrees, and in different ways). The
three Mrs Ws are the main guides for the child protagonists on their quest; the Mrs. Ws are also
the closest figures we see, in Wrinkle, to benign deities (and/or divine authority). Within the
narrative, they function as guide-figures (or mouthpieces) for the powers of Light; they are
immortal, magical, powerful beings who are wise and who guide the children on their quest—a
quest which is framed as part of the cosmic battle of Light against Dark. Within the text they are
explicitly identified as angelic beings: Calvin calls them “Guardian angels” and “Messengers of
God” (Wrinkle 210); Mrs. Whatsit used to be a star; they can metamorphose into majestic flying-
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centaurs that radiate a beauty and “perfection of dignity and virtue, and exaltation of joy, such as
Meg had never before seen” (Wrinkle 73).
The Mrs. Ws—and, arguably, the more side or minor guide figures such as Dr. Murry,
Aunt Beast, and the Happy Medium—operate within the narrative as unquestionably good and
right, the epitome of the portal-quest guide figures Mendlesohn discusses in Rhetorics. In this,
L’Engle’s guide figures seem to function similarly to those of Lewis or Tolkien in the Narnia
Chronicles and Lord of the Rings. However, the fact that L’Engle cues many of these guide
figures as female and/or ambiguously gendered/sexed (e.g. the Mrs. Ws, Happy Medium, Aunt
Beast, Progo, Blajeny), does something to the authoritative voices here that is very much not
happening in Narnia. Specifically, L’Engle’s depictions of female guides allow her to explore
religio-spiritual authoritative perspectives that are feminist and universalist, yet are also
compatible with L’Engle’s Christian sensibilities. In this, L’Engle breaks with the dominant
religious themes in much of twentieth century children’s fantasy (e.g. Lewis and Tolkien) and
depicts, instead, something that looks very similar to MacDonald’s approach (in both his adult
and children’s fantasy). To fully understand the ramifications of this, we must briefly examine
key differences in Lewis and MacDonald’s approaches and these differences’ implications
religiously, and then see where and how L’Engle fits into this tradition.
Most of Lewis’ guide/authority figures in Narnia—i.e. the characters who give practical,
moral, and religio-spiritual guidance to the child protagonists—are cued as male: Aslan, Mr.
Beaver, Mr. Tumnus. Attebery convincingly argues that “For Lewis [...], adult female power
was evil: the White Witch of Narnia or the brutal lesbian Fairy Hardcastle of That Hideous
Strength” (Stories About Stories, chapter 3). In contrast, George MacDonald’s “versions of the
goddess are nearly always both good and wise. Even in Phantastes and Lilith, in which the good
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aspect of the goddess is paired with an evil twin, the good is ultimately more potent” (Attebery,
Stories, chapter 3). Attebery views MacDonald’s depictions of female wisdom, power, and
religio-spiritual authority as stemming from sources outside canonical Christian texts and
doctrine:
There is nothing in Christian scripture and very little in doctrine to support MacDonald’s
vision of the female savior or mentor. Tolkien, strongly Catholic, could look to the Virgin
Mary, the Queen of Heaven, as a precedent for Galadriel and Middle-earth’s mother goddess
Varda, but MacDonald, coming from a Protestant background, had no such backing. Yet
MacDonald trusted the truthfulness of fairy tales—both traditional Märchen and his own
invented stories—and the symbols they cast up, including women rulers and adventurers.
Where those stories and their inner logic diverged from biblical authority, he followed the
former. (Stories, chapter 3)
Attebery’s comparison of MacDonald to Tolkien here is key, because it elucidates why
MacDonald’s cuing of religio-spiritual, moral authority as female matters here. As Attebery
argues in the above excerpt, Tolkien had direct religious-canonical precedent for his female
power/authority figures; Lewis, who had none, portrays only negative female power/authority
(within Narnia at least). MacDonald, however, looked to “fairy tales—both traditional Märchen
and his own invented stories,” to the extent of following these “stories and their inner logic”
rather than “biblical authority” when the two diverged. MacDonald’s protagonists,
Though they occasionally go astray, all are led ultimately toward self-knowledge—and hence
the chance of salvation—by some mentor figure, nearly always a woman. These mentors
indicate which strand of myth Mac-Donald found most useful for exploring moral and
spiritual issues. His values are derived from Christianity, but his model is not Old or New
Testament narrative but the fairy tale tradition that he, like feminist commentators such as
Marina Warner and Angela Carter, associates with female storytellers and feminine power.
(Stories About Stories, chapter 3)
MacDonald thus depicts strong, active female characters (protagonists as well as guides), and
Attebery convincingly argues that such portrayals align with (and perhaps stem from) the
depiction of females in the Scottish fairy tales MacDonald likely grew up hearing:
Though the passive heroines of the Grimms’ published versions might lead us to think, with
Roderick McGillis, that “the female [in fairy tales] is passive and in need of protection and
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rescue; the male is active and skilled in the manly arts of war” (86), that is not necessarily
true of the stories MacDonald would have heard in his youth. [...] What McGillis sees as a
departure from tradition might actually be a reflection of MacDonald’s own heritage:
“MacDonald allows his female characters agency, and he invests his male characters with
characteristics we might think of as ‘feminine’” (McGillis 86). All of MacDonald’s fantasies
are “old wives’ tales” in that they look to older women for wisdom. (Stories About Stories,
chapter 3)
According to this reading of MacDonald, the fact that MacDonald bases his religio-spiritual
understanding on a heterogenous, and relatively open, mixture of source materials—including
“old-wives’ tales”—directly opens the door for him to depict both characters and religious truth
in feminist ways. These ways, while perhaps traditional for MacDonald, were distinctly different
from dominant religious and gender messages in most other children’s fantasy before and after
MacDonald (or, at least, fantasy stemming from Protestant or Anglican Christian contexts).
L’Engle’s construction of wise female power and religio-spiritual moral authority seems
to continue in MacDonald’s vein. And, as with MacDonald’s fantasy (and in contrast to Narnia),
L’Engle’s female guide figures can be read in more than one way. Perhaps the most obvious
way to read L’Engle’s female guide figures are as manifestations of exactly those fairy-tale
female figures of power to which MacDonald hearkened: old, wise women; witches; magical
grandmothers or great-grandmothers who double as guardian angels. Beezie’s Grandma seems a
flesh-and-blood version of MacDonald’s wise woman of Märchen/fairy/folk tales.
Simultaneously, Grandma functions within Planet’s narrative as the wise old
woman/grandmother who tells these folk tales and legends—ostensibly Welsh and Irish ones—
passing the stories and their accompanying traditions/beliefs down generations of females.
Similarly, the Mrs. Ws recall aesthetically MacDonald’s wise women, in various guises.
The Mrs. Ws appear old (in their human forms) and have grandmotherly mannerisms, such as
verbal phrases (e.g. “Now, don’t worry, my pet” [Wrinkle 93]) and behaviors (e.g. sewing in
rocking chairs) thus conjuring “reassuring images of benign old age” in general (Patterson 195)
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and the elderly, sage women of Märchen and MacDonald tales in particular.124 Mrs. Which’s
name and “black robe and a black peaked hat, beady eyes, a beaked nose, and long gray hair; one
bony claw clutched a broomstick” (Wrinkle 68) recall the classic fairy-tale witch, as does their
bubbling cauldron (Wrinkle 41) and Mrs. Who’s quoting “When shall we three meet again, / In
thunder, lightning, or in rain” (Wrinkle 68). Mrs. Whatsit and Who are often dressed in ways
that recall the wandering beggar women of fairy tales as well, beggar women who usually turn
out to have power and/or wisdom belying their appearance. Granted that, while MacDonald
deployed such imagery sincerely, L’Engle does so in a tongue-in-cheek manner. The old,
grandmotherly-figure (Mrs. Who) rocking and sewing is actually making ghost costumes for
their haunted house charade, and all three Mrs. Ws self-consciously and humorously remark
upon their various human materializations (witch, beggar-woman)—bringing a campy,
metafictional and intertextual aspect to the narrative—and the Mrs. Ws make it clear that from
their perspectives such appearances are simply fun props and disguises. Regardless, the Mrs. Ws
most overtly evoke amalgamations of various fairy-tale wise women tropes, similar to those of
MacDonald (e.g. Irene’s Great Grandmother).
The Mrs. Ws may also be read as alluding to the Fates and/or other tri-fold goddess
concepts. As Patterson argues, “the threefold female figures are derived from the triple
goddesses who abound in mythology, whether as the three Fates, the three-faced Hecate, the
triple fertility goddesses of the ancient Near East, the trifold Morrigan, or in a late incarnation as
the three witches in Macbeth” (Patterson 197).125 Patterson then immediately qualifies, “These
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figures are not goddesses for L’Engle, however, but angels, beings who come as messengers and
supernatural aids” (Patterson 197). I would actually argue that Patterson’s initial statement,
before her qualification—her claim that L’Engle’s threefold female figures allude to various
versions of and sources regarding triple goddesses—points to exactly the various ways the Mrs.
Ws might be read within Wrinkle. L’Engle has Mrs. Which overtly reference Macbeth; L’Engle
was certainly familiar with the classical figures of the three Fates and Hecate, and may have been
familiar, as well, with tri-fold goddess figures of other ancient cultures, especially via popular
texts for mid-century fantasy writers, such as Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890) and Graves’
The White Goddess (1948).126
As with MacDonald’s female religio-spiritual figures, therefore, L’Engle’s female guide
figures can be read in multiple ways, defying simple or allegorical mappings. This allows for a
level of openness regarding potential religious, spiritual, ethical, or literary meaning—and it
conveys thematically the idea that religious “truth” is, itself (i.e. even outside of literary
contexts) multifaceted, fluid, or pluralistic. This is true, as well, for some of L’Engle’s guides
who are loosely cued as male, such as Blajeny and Progo in Wind. Both these figures explicitly
refer to themselves as non-singular. They refer, in part, to their abilities of materializing in
different forms, like the Mrs Ws. However, their expressions also connote non-static,
nonsingular, and fundamentally ambiguous (rather than clearly delineated) identities, presumably
including their gendered/sexed identities. Indeed it does seem convincing to add “gender/sex” to
the corpus of amorphous/ambiguous identities of Blajeny and Progo given that they are never
strongly cued as gendered/sexed in human terms. In small ways they are—Blajeny looks like a

126

Although it is currently unclear to me whether L’Engle’s depiction of the Mrs. Ws was directly inspired by or
connected to either of these texts, both were very much in the milieu of mid-century fantasy writers: Jones, for
instance, overtly references Frazer in Fire and Hemlock; Alan Garner and Susan Cooper directly reference Graves as
an influence (C. Butler, Four British Fantasists, 186), as does Pierce (Lo, “Interview with Tamora Pierce”).

136

man, and the narrative uses masculine pronouns to refer to each of them. Yet Blajeny’s
appearance as a man is not nearly emphasized as much in the narrative as is, say, the Mrs. Ws
appearances as women. It is de-emphasized quantitatively—we see Blajeny’s description in this
way very few times—additionally, though, Blajeny’s mannerisms seem much more genderneutral than do the Mrs Ws or other female-cued guides. In some ways, the Mrs. Ws display
fluid gender as well: they metamorphose into centaurs, are at times disembodied, and used to be
(literal) stars.127 The Mrs. Ws make clear to the child protagonists that they (the Mrs. Ws) are
not restricted to one material form, and that any particular physical manifestation the children see
(e.g. that of elderly ladies) is merely a costume chosen for the moment, rather than an indication
of underlying identity (or gender/sex). That said, most of Mrs. Ws’ appearances in Wrinkle are
those of elderly (human) women. In Wind, the narrative emphasizes that Blajeny’s appearance is
simply one possible manifestation, and is not necessarily “real.” Blajeny’s and Progo’s fluidity
in physical manifestation and gender ambiguity parallels those of the Mrs. Ws in essence (the
Mrs. Ws, Blajeny, and Progo are all fluid and/or ambiguous regarding material form and
gender); however, Wind stresses this ambiguity and fluidity more emphatically and repeatedly
than does Wrinkle. In fact, the recurring refrain throughout Wind is “what is real?”; just as
Blajeny and Progo explain their multiple/fluid natures, they explicitly state that “truth” or
“reality” (as well as measurements by which humans conceive of truth/reality, such as size or
space) is ambiguous and fluid.
L’Engle’s ambiguous, multifaceted guide figures (e.g. the Mrs. Ws, Grandma, Beezie,
Blajeny, Progo) strike noticeably different religio-spiritual tones than those who seem more
rigidly categorized, such as the seraphim in Waters. Interestingly, the seraphim are all male; the
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narrative implies that the maleness of the seraphim and nephilim extends beyond surface cues,
such as those of Blajeny and Progo, due to the textual focus on sexual (nephilim) and
ambiguously-romantic (seraphim) lust or love between these beings and human women. The
seraphim come across as much more rigidly moralistic guide figures and Waters, overall, reads
much more didactically and simplistically binary in its religio-spiritual messages than do the
other Time novels. Morality in Waters, for instance, is often black and white: characters (be they
human or immortal) are either fully good or fully bad—a step further than the genetic inclination
towards good or evil we saw in Planet, since here there seems to be no choice, change, or
possibility of change at all. Bad characters (i.e. the entire world except Noah’s family) deserve
and receive death by flood; the only good characters (Noah’s family) are either saved or die
neatly before the flood (i.e. Lamech, Yalith). All characters get their just rewards.
Whether or not Water’s moral reductiveness and rigidity is connected with the
seraphim’s—i.e. the only guide figures in the novel—portrayals as males is hard to say. Such
moral reductiveness and rigidity do, however, seem connected with the overall depiction of
gender in the novel, which is a much more reductive and conservative one than in the other
novels. Even Planet, which also has many moments of reductive, binary religio-spiritual
messages (e.g. characters neatly aligning into “good” or “evil” categories, predictable via genetic
ancestry and/or eye color), still has equally-weighted moments of non-conformist/traditional
religio-spiritual authority. Examples in Planet include the People of the Wind (however
problematic their depiction is from racial and cultural perspectives), heroes of ostensible Celtic
legends (part real and part L’Engle’s invention), and Beezie’s Grandma. These figures convey
religio-spiritual truths and authority that stem from non-Christian and non-institutionalized
sources. Such sources are portrayed as more indigenous and ground-roots sources of authority
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(i.e. stemming from the common folk, not from elites). They include more mythical forms such
as legends, myths, fairy tales, and runes as versus scripture. Additionally, L’Engle depicts such
religio-spiritual authoritative sources as passed down via maternal versus paternal lines: not lines
as in genetics—because that seems to all stem back to the two male Welsh princes—but lines as
in mother orally passing these tales, histories, traditions and values to daughter. In Wrinkle,
Wind, and Planet, L’Engle renders explicit MacDonald’s implicit Christian themes and views:
that of a heterogenous, unorthodox, non-exclusive Christianity whose foundations are universal
love, and whose authority/power lie with female and feminine figures.
The question of whether, for L’Engle’s, this perspective on Christianity is intrinsically
connected to gender, sexuality, and/or feminist thought is still open. L’Engle writes, “I come
from a long line of women who were universe disturbers,” and describes how “her maternal
great-grandmother and her grandmother disturbed the universe by their courage, integrity,
education, and open-mindedness” (Oziewicz 171, quoting from L’Engle, “Do I Dare Disturb the
Universe?” 673). In this address (a talk L’Engle gave at the Simmons College Center for the
Study of Children’s Literature in July 1983) L’Engle explicitly connects women and (her own
matrilineal, intergenerational connectedness) with “disturb[ing] the universe” by “asking
questions,” and opposing “the rigidity of [any] profession or the church establishment or the
legal or any other establishment” (Oziewicz 171, quoting from L’Engle, “Do I Dare Disturb the
Universe?” 673-8).
Additionally, L’Engle’s depictions of a more fluid, heterogenous, unorthodox, nonexclusive Christianity correlate with her more female-centered and/or feminist (again, feminist as
understood by L’Engle) narrative strands. Conversely, L’Engle’s depictions of more rigid,
orthodox Christian undertones (e.g. seraphim versus nephilim) correlate with more traditional,
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conservative (again, conservative for L’Engle) gender/sexual thematics and narrative depictions.
Regardless of L’Engle’s messages regarding gender/sex, however, her depictions of a more fluid,
heterogenous, unorthodox, non-exclusive Christianity are subversive in and of themselves—
especially given L’Engle’s simultaneous disposition to Manichean, reductive depictions of good
and evil. The following section traces how L’Engle depicts these differing themes, and navigates
the tension between them.

“A struggling Christian”: L’Engle’s Open Christianity and Universalist Concepts of
Redemption
When discussing L’Engle’s unorthodox yet simultaneously traditional Christianity, one
clearly crucial area to address is L’Engle’s arguments, throughout her non-fiction and fiction
writing, that science and faith are compatible and complementary, rather than contradictory or
mutually exclusive. At times L’Engle even “reinterprets Christianity in the light of the
discoveries of modern holistic sciences” (Oziewicz 172). In many regards here, L’Engle echoes
MacDonald, albeit in a postmodern, mid-twentieth century, North American context. L’Engle’s
interweaving of science and Christianity is extensive and carries ramifications beyond a limited
project of theological apologetics and toward, instead, a feminist and postmodern reimagining of
religio-spirituality, one Oziewicz terms a “Christian mythopoeia” (Oziewicz 196). As Oziewicz
argues, L’Engle is “aware of the tremendous challenge facing Christianity in the increasingly
unifying and technology-permeated world”; L’Engle thus:
struggles through story toward a viable theology for the third millennium, a theology which
integrates science and spirituality and may thus become an element of a new mythology of
humanity that the world desperately needs. This theology is a dialogic one in which science
and spirituality co-exist to illumine rather than prove (or disprove) each other, and scientific
terms provide a contemporary language for articulating spiritual experience. [...]
Characterized by a kind of joyful, intuitive and expansive appeal of a mystic, L’Engle’s
vision of reality is partly subversive of and partly a source of vitality to the religious tradition
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she represents. (Oziewicz 196, original emphasis).
For the purposes of this dissertation, the salient aspects of Oziewicz’s above assessment are
those describing L’Engle’s methodology, rather than the Christian-specific implication. These
salient aspects are, first, L’Engle’s efforts to reconcile her traditional faith and changing
contemporary realities, beliefs, discoveries, and perspectives (Oziewicz focuses here on science,
but this can extend to encompass issues of gender/sexuality and multiculturalism as well).
Second, the fact that L’Engle pursues such efforts and struggles via imagining (or reimagining) a
dialogic theology/mythology and an “expansive,” “mystic[al]” religio-spiritual approach
characterized by dialectical interactions between seemingly-contradictory stances (interactions
that are at times integrative and at times in unresolved discourse). Third, that such a reimagining
is simultaneously “subversive of” and “a source of vitality to the religious tradition [L’Engle]
represents.” All these conclusions correlate with both my analysis of L’Engle and (when applied
beyond Christian-specific religious traditions) with this dissertation’s broader argument
regarding all the writers under discussion.
L’Engle’s interweaving of science and faith has already been extensively addressed by
scholars such as Oziewicz. 128 Yet the methodology Oziewicz describes above applies just as
much to L’Engle’s interweaving of orthodox Christian philosophy/theology with less traditional,
more subversive views—namely, an openness toward divine truths within non-doctrinal source
materials and integration of such with doctrinal sources, and the concept of universal love
(divine and human) and redemption. This chapter section focuses on these two strands within
the Time novels. A third and related strand—that of the importance of questions, critique, and
debate in the divine-mortal discourse—is where we see some of L’Engle’s strongest, and at
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times explicit, integration of Jewish midrashic and mystical concepts; this will be addressed in
the third and final L’Engle section of this chapter.
The first strand, L’Engle’s openness to divine truths within non-doctrinal source
materials and integration of such with doctrinal sources, permeates most of the Time novels. As
Oziewicz notes, Wrinkle’s list of “fighters” for the Powers of Light and against the Powers of
Darkness juxtaposes Jesus with spiritual leaders of other faiths, including Ghandi and Buddha,
and with Earth’s “great artists” and scientists, including names such as “Euclid, Copernicus,
Pasteur, Madame Curie, [and] Einstein” (184). In addition to presenting art and scientific
discovery as forms of spirituality on par with Christianity, L’Engle often depicts both the
universe and religion in eco-feminist, mystical terms. Oziewicz points to L’Engle’s portrayal of
the universe as “not mechanical and entropic but orderly, alive and teleologically unfolding,”
characterized by an “all-pervading, purposeful energy which permeates, energizes, links and
organizes the entire cosmos” (191). L’Engle refers (in both the Time novels and her nonfiction)
to such energy as “dance [...] ‘music’ [...] ‘joy,’ ‘bliss’ [...] ‘the cosmic rhythm’ [...] ‘the song’
[...] ‘the ancient harmony’ [...] ‘the Old Music’ [...] ‘love song’” and other similar terms that
depict the cosmos as a living, fluid, and ultimately singular being/telos whose components
(beings, matter) are interconnected, moving (ideally) in harmony (Oziewicz 191). Oziewicz
aligns such conceptualizations and descriptors of the universe with, among other theories, James
Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, “according to which Earth is a living organism with its flora, fauna
and human species adding up to form, though not to exhaust, an individualized planetary
consciousness” (192). While Oziewicz focuses on the scientific aspect of this (Gaia theory as
science, and the congruence with L’Engle’s cosmic conception as evidence of her fusion of
science and spirituality), there are clear eco-feminist and neo-paganist, feminist-
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mystical/spiritual implications as well. For instance, L’Engle’s depictions of the cosmos as a
sentient being, and of all matter—animals, plants, rocks, stars—as alive and interconnected—
promotes a conceptualization of human-environmental interactions as an interactive, twodirectional relationship rather than an anthrocentric, unidirectional one. Such interactive and
interdependent relationships (between humans and nature), as well as the viewpoint that
positions humans as simply one piece of a greater cosmic whole, parallel perspectives of writers
such as Robin Wall Kimmerer (Braiding Sweetgrass, [2013]) and Mary Siisip Geniusz (Plants
Have So Much to Give Us, All We Have to do is Ask: Anishninaabe Botanical Teachings [2015]).
Kimmerer’s descriptions of trees communicating with each other across distances, for example,
resonate with Calvin’s discussion of similar phenomenon with Meg and Mr. Jenkins in Wind
(Wind 172-174). Both Kimmerer’s and L’Engle’s texts discuss this phenomenon not only from a
scientific perspective, but connect it as well to a deeper spiritual connectedness of all things, and
to the “butterfly effect” that positions humans as impacting and impacted by seemingly disparate
objects/beings (e.g., other people, plants, stars, etc).
L’Engle’s heterodoxical approach to source materials carrying divine and/or religiospiritual weight extends, within the Time novels, beyond her portrayal of the broader universe or
battle between Light and Dark; it informs L’Engle’s depictions of Christianity, specifically, as
well (i.e. Christian faith, practice, scripture, etc). As L’Engle writes in her nonfiction:
Of course, because I am a struggling Christian, it’s inevitable that I superimpose my
awareness of all that happened in the life of Jesus upon what I’m reading, upon Buber, upon
Plato, upon the book of Daniel. But I’m not sure that’s a bad thing. To be truly Christian
means to see Christ everywhere, to know him as all in all. I don’t mean to water down my
Christianity into a vague kind of universalism, with Buddha and Mohammed all being more
or less equal to Jesus—not at all! But neither do I want to tell God (or my friends) where he
can and cannot be seen. We human beings far too often tend to codify God, to feel that we
know where he is and where he is not, and this arrogance leads to such things as the Spanish
Inquisition and the Salem witch burnings and has the result of further fragmenting an already
broken Christendom. (Walking on Water, chapter 2)
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We see here one example of the tension pervasive in L’Engle: on the one hand, she decries the
label “universalist;” here she seems to conflate universalism with a “water[ed] down” form of
Christianity. On the other hand, however, L’Engle clearly views non-canonical (i.e. nondoctrinal texts for orthodox Christianity) sources as compatible with canonical/doctrinal ones.
L’Engle “superimpose[s]” her Christianity onto non-Christian works (those of Buber, Plato); yet
she’s reading, and drawing inspiration from, those texts in the first place. She assures that she
does not view “Buddha and Mohammed [as] all being more or less equal to Jesus—not at all!”
yet, in the very next sentence, L’Engle qualifies that position with, “But neither do I want to tell
God (or my friends) where he can and cannot be seen.” What emerges in L’Engle’s (nonfiction,
religious) writing here is a view of (or relationship with) Christianity that is constantly
navigating between these two poles: asserting the supremacy and uniqueness of Christian
doctrine, yet also open to pluralistic, non-Christian sources of truth and spirituality—especially
as a means of epistemological humility.129
That is L’Engle in her religious nonfiction (or, in Walking on Water at least). Yet
L’Engle pursues and develops this theme even more strongly—and perhaps more
adventurously—in her fiction. One of L’Engle’s clearest depictions of this open/struggling view
of Christianity within the Time novels is Planet’s episode set during the colonial period
(presumably, near the Salem witch trials years), in the chapter “The lightning with its rapid
wrath.” One of the primary characters in this episode is Zylle, a Native American130 woman who
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L’Engle also wrote: “If we fall into Satan’s trap of assuming that other people are not Christians because they do
not belong to our own particular brand of Christianity, no wonder we become incapable of understanding the works
of art produced by so-called non-Christians, whether they be atheists, Jews, Buddhists, or anything else outside a
frame of reference we have made into a closed rather than an open door. If I cannot see evidence of incarnation in a
painting of a bridge in the rain by Hokusai, a book by Chaim Potok or Isaac Bashevis Singer, music by Bloch or
Bernstein, then I will miss its significance in an Annunciation by Franciabigio, the final chorus of the St. Matthew
Passion, the words of a sermon by John Donne.” (Walking on Water, chapter 2)
130
Within the novel’s narrative, Zylle refers to herself as “Indian” (as do others).
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shares distant Welsh ancestry with the caucasian protagonist Brandon Llawcae (the ancestry is
that of Madoc who married into the “People of the Wind” in earlier chapters). Zylle is notable in
her blend of religio-spiritual and ethno-cultural implications: a character who stems from a
mixture of Welsh and Native American backgrounds; a “blue-eyed Indian” as she describes
herself (chapter 6); who is still enmeshed in and faithful to her family and the People of the
Wind; yet who is married to Christian colonist Ritchie Llawcae. Zylle considers herself
Christian as well: “When I married Ritchie I accepted his beliefs” (p.142, kindle location 1442).
When challenged that Christianity is contrary to “the beliefs of [her] people,” because “The
Indians are pagans,” Zylle replies: “But they are not contrary. [...] I do not know what pagan
means. I only know that Jesus of Nazareth sings the true song. He knows the ancient harmonies”
(chapter 6). Pastor Mortmain reacts in horror, “You say that our Lord and Saviour sings! What
more do we need to hear?” Zylle replies:
But why should he not sing? The very stars sing as they turn in their heavenly dance, sing
praise of the One who created them. In the meeting house do we not sing hymns? [...]
Scripture says that God loves every man. That is in the Psalms. He loves my people as he
loves you, or he is not God. (chapter 6)
There are two salient points here: first, that L’Engle expresses here (via Zylle as mouthpiece) a
heterogenous, non-orthodox and potentially universalist concept of Christianity, a view of
Christianity as compatible and arguably intertwining with other faiths, traditions, and
worldviews. Second, L’Engle distinguishes here (and throughout the episode) between a
“good/correct” Christianity versus a “bad/false” Christianity: Pastor Mortmain’s brand of
Christianity demonstrates the latter; Zylle’s and the Llawcae’s demonstrate the former.
Mortmain is of the fire and brimstone persuasion: he bans singing and stories; builds an
imposing church, a “belfry erected more to the glory of Pastor Mortmain than to the glory of
God” (chapter 6); and tries to hang Zylle as a witch. Overall, Pastor Mortmain represents a
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Christianity that is harshly dogmatic, rigidly orthodox, and xenophobic (not to mention sexist
and racist, although that seems more Mortmain than his branch of Christianity per se). Although
Mortmain’s stance, within the narrative, is depicted as an “Echthroic perversion of Christianity”
(Oziewicz p. 240 note 35) rather than as representing any legitimate branch of Christianity,
Mortmain’s portrayal carries tones of a hyperbolic/extreme Puritanism (or perhaps stereotypes
regarding Puritanism) fused with strands of seemingly Catholic tones—in Mortmain’s emphasis
on pomp, prestige, and hierarchy, and his opposition to individuals reading or expounding upon
scripture outside of formal Church settings.131 Zylle and the Llawcae’s brand of Christianity,
however, emphasizes love, tolerance, and openness to all—and the concept that such love, and
basic interpersonal ethics, be the radar by which ideas and actions are judged as “Christian” or
“godly” in the first place. Their brand of Christianity also emphasizes individual connections
and access to god, spirituality, truth, and to scriptural ownership (i.e. validity of personal access
to and understanding/interpretation of scripture).
The episode culminates with lightning striking the Church as the accompanying rain ends
the drought, and Zylle’s people dismantling the erected gallows and throwing the wooden pieces
on the smoldering remains of the Church. This denouement applies and reverses biblical tropes
of the miraculous and prophetic: Heaven-sent fire outs the evil/falsehood (Mortimer’s and his
church’s hubris, xenophobia, misogyny) that had masqueraded as good/truth; the long-desired
rain comes immediately after Zylle is freed and the colonists repent, connoting (in biblical terms)
a clear reward and validation of not just the act of freeing her, but of all she stands for. The
resulting message, in all these instances, is that sources outside traditional Christian scripture and
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As Becky Fullan noted in conversation, L’Engle’s portrayal of the O’Keefe family in Wrinkle also bears antiCatholic stereotypes, e.g., of large, poor, families; the other O’Keefes besides Calvin are depicted as dumb and
thuggish.
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institutions carry just as much—if not more—religious truth as do orthodox sources.
Concurrently, L’Engle points to the dangers of blindly following institutional Christian authority
if and when it contradicts foundational Christian values such as love, empathy, humility, and
kindness. Implicit here is the need for protagonists and readers alike to employ their autonomous
critical lenses in order to discern true “good” (including true “Christian”) ideas, behaviors, or
choices from “bad” ideas, behaviors, or choices masquerading as good ones—even when the
latter comes with the weight of institutional authority. L’Engle renders this message more
explicit when Meg and Charles Wallace need to do the same thing in Wind and Planet: Meg and
Charles Wallace need to employ their critical faculties to discern/name the true Mr. Jenkins and
Gaudior (in Wind and Planet, respectively) from the false, Echthroi impersonations.
The second strand of this section’s focus, L’Engle’s concept of universal love (divine and
human) and redemption, similarly permeates most of the Time novels. L’Engle continuously
emphasizes love as a means to, and tool for, redemption. For instance, she writes in Walking on
Water: “Following Christ has nothing to do with success as the world sees success. It has to do
with love. — So does the Bible. God’s love for his people. All of us. As the psalmist sings, “God
loves every man….He calls all the stars by name” (chapter 3). Oziewicz points out that L’Engle
occasionally denied the label of “universalist” (as she did in the paragraph quoted above from
Walking on Water, chapter 2)—universalist meaning, in Oziewicz’s words, “a Christian who
believes that all people, not just Christians, will be saved”; Oziewicz nevertheless argues, “To
my mind L’Engle is a universalist [...] for despite her occasional denials, much of her fiction and
non-fiction reveals her as such” (Oziewicz p. 239 note 21). This concept alludes to a number of
religio-spiritual traditions: most obviously, the Episcopalian Church of L’Engle’s own affiliation
for most of her adult life (and at the time of writing Wrinkle) and the universalist school of
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MacDonald; although one can easily draw connections to Buddhism as well. To see these
different influences at play, we can examine a few key examples.
In Wrinkle’s climax, love is something IT lacks, and thus represents the one way Meg
and Charles can differentiate themselves from IT and evil. The message here definitely carries
Christian weight—redemption through love—yet, notably, there is just as strong a message of
self-acceptance, and of acceptance of one’s failings:
If she could give love to IT perhaps it would shrivel up and die, for she was sure that IT
could not withstand love. But she, in all her weakness and foolishness and baseness and
nothingness, was incapable of loving IT. Perhaps it was not too much to ask of her, but she
could not do it. But she could love Charles Wallace. (Wrinkle 229)
The implication here is that Meg, in her human frailty, cannot bring herself to love evil itself—
that only God/Jesus can, as per Mrs. Who’s quoted talisman for Meg. And, as per Mrs. Who’s
quote, this perceived weakness of humanity is actually a strength.
These messages thus far (i.e. the emphasis on love as the ultimate force of redemption,
and God/Jesus as divine aspect/performer of this, on a level beyond human capability) tally with
numerous Christian ideologies. Yet Meg’s acceptance of this—that despite this being “not too
much to ask of her,” she acknowledges and accepts that she cannot love IT—diverges from the
message of authors such as MacDonald (whom L’Engle otherwise mostly echoes, regarding
religious and moral views), for whom even evil/Satan itself can be loved and redeemed (Stories
About Stories, chapter 3). Meg’s acceptance here, as well as L’Engle’s emphasis throughout
many of the books on knowing and accepting the limits of one’s personal tasks, burdens, and
power (as versus taking upon oneself expectations or burdens that are not actually one’s own, but
driven by ego) parallel certain strands of Buddhist thought.132
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For further connections between L’Engle’s Time sequence and Buddhist thought and healing practices, see
Trudelle Thomas, “Spiritual practices” (2008).
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Space for Dialectical/Dialogic Critique and Questioning
Many of L’Engle’s quotes above (from both her fiction and nonfiction) emphasize the
importance of questioning—of asking questions of god, of scripture, of oneself—and of not
assuming that one has or knows the answers. L’Engle links this to a sense of humility:
We live by revelation, as Christians, as artists, which means that we must be careful never to
get set into rigid molds. The minute we begin to think we know all the answers, we forget the
questions, and we become smug like the Pharisee who listed all his considerable virtues and
thanked God that he was not like other men. (Walking on Water, chapter 2)
This plays out, in L’Engle’s fiction, in ongoing tropes of child, mortal protagonists questioning
their immortal and/or deity-esque guide figures. Earlier, we touched on L’Engle’s guide figures
as subversive, thematically, regarding gender and non-Christian sources of truth and spirituality.
L’Engle’s guide figures are also significant, however, in their frequent endorsement of the child
protagonists’ questioning, critical thinking, and autonomous decision-making (rather than blind
obedience and passivity). Although L’Engle’s narratives oscillate between affirming and
rebuking such questioning, the moments when she affirms it—or leaves it ambiguous—subverts
prior trends within children’s fantasy that emphasized hierarchical and obedience-centered
guide-protagonist relationships. Unlike writers such as Diana Wynne Jones, L’Engle upholds
much of the hierarchical guide-protagonist paradigm; for instance, L’Engle’s guides are always
good, right, older than and wiser than the mortal, child protagonists. Yet, within this paradigm,
L’Engle carves space for questioning and critique as permissible (and sometimes integral)
components of said hierarchical relationship. In doing so, she posits a theology that speaks to
(whether or not directly referencing) prevalent Jewish philosophies and methodologies including
midrashic, talmudic, and kabbalistic strands.
Throughout the Time novels, we see examples of protagonists questioning guide figures,
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and of guide figures encouraging or empowering protagonists to employ their (protagonists’)
critical thinking skills in deciding what to do. Meg and Calvin challenge the Mrs. Ws in
Wrinkle; the Mrs. Ws also explain, crucially, that they cannot make decisions or act for humans,
as that would deny humans free will (213-219). When Meg first meets Progo in Wind, she
expects Progo to know their upcoming “ordeal,” and is surprised when Progo does not. “Why
would I know?” Progo asks her; Meg replies, “You’re a cherubim.”133 Progo replies, “Even a
cherubim has limits. When three ordeals are planned, then nobody knows ahead of time what
they are; even the Teacher may not know” (77). Although Progo is not precisely a guide in the
traditional sense—Progo is a “student” along with Meg, while Blajeny is their “Teacher”—Progo
is a magical being significantly older and more experienced than Meg (as Progo itself notes).
The role Progo plays within the narrative is something between a guide figure and a helpful
magical sidekick, similar perhaps to Mr. Beaver in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe.
However, while Mr. Beaver serves to instructs the child protagonists and provide them with
“infodumps” of legend and history (Mendlesohn, Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5, “The
Technique of Immersion”), Progo asks questions—and engages Meg in an open-ended
questioning process.
In the scene quoted above, for instance, L’Engle plays with the “three task” trope—
readers (and Meg) expect the guide figures (Progo, Blajeny) to guide the protagonist/hero in the
three tasks—or at the very least to know the nature of the tasks. Yet Progo does not know, and
thinks the very assumption absurd. When Meg asks frantically, “Then what do we do? How do
we find out?” Progo, rather than supplying Meg with easy answers (of which Progo has none),
instead engages in a joint brainstorming process, opening a dialogue with Meg that explores
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For more on Progo as a “cherubim,” on L’Engle’s depictions of angels (e.g., Progo), and on broader fantastic
traditions and depictions of angelic figures, see Attebery, Stories, chapter 6.
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possible directions (77). A bit further in the discussion, when Meg asks “Then what am I
supposed to do?” (78, emphasis in original), the response is ambiguous and unhelpful:
“Proginoskes waved several wings, which, Meg was learning, was more or less his way of
expressing ‘I haven’t the faintest idea.’” (78) Meg has to keep asking Progo questions just to
figure out the right questions to be asking in the first place, and the same is true in reverse (i.e.
Progo needs to keep asking Meg questions).
In fact, at times Progo asks Meg what to do:
“What do we do now?” [Progo] said.
The cherubim was asking her? “I am only a human being, not quite full-grown,” she
replied. “How would I know?”
“Megling, I’ve never been on your planet before. This is your home. Charles Wallace is
your brother. You are the one who knows Mr. Jenkins. You must tell me what we are to do
now.”
Meg stamped, loudly and angrily, against the hard, cold surface of the rock. “This is too
much responsibility! I’m still only a child! I didn’t ask for any of this!” (89-90, emphasis in
original)
As Progo continues to question Meg, though (“Are you refusing to take the test?” “Are you
going to enter into the ordeal?” “Then what do we do now?” [90]), Meg eventually answers her
own questions: “She shoved at her glasses as though that would help her think. ‘I’d better go
home now and have breakfast. Then I’ll get on my school bus—it stops at the bottom of the hill
and maybe you’d better wait for me there.’ [...] ‘Whatever you think best,’ Proginoskes said
meekly” (90). The typical guide-protagonist relationship is reversed here: Meg gives the orders
and makes decisions, while Progo agrees “meekly.”
This reversal is made possible via Progo’s insistence not only on his lack of any
knowledge, authority, or decision-making power greater than Meg’s, but also via Progo’s
insistence on the need for Meg to think and act critically and independently—and on the strategy
of asking questions in order to enable such critical thinking and action in the first place. It is
only through Progo and Meg’s mutual, back-and-forth questioning that they learn information
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about each other and their tasks—by questioning, and exploring the new directions/avenues these
questions open for them (e.g. Wind 78-81). Similarly, when Meg struggles during the tasks
themselves—when she struggles with trying to name the true Mr. Jenkins, for example—Progo
aids her not by giving explicit directions, but by asking Meg questions that help her to think and
decide more clearly (104-5, 113-115). L’Engle’s protagonists have to choose, for themselves,
what to do—and at times they make the wrong choices, such as when Meg and Calvin join the
farandolae’s wild dance (Wind 193) or when Charles Wallace tries to control where he and
Gaudior are sent (Planet 115, 165).
Although this reversal of the protagonist-guide relationship is prevalent throughout
L’Engle’s Time novels, L’Engle renders both it and its theological implications explicit in
Waters. Throughout most of the novel, the human characters (the twins, Noah’s family) mostly
accept the seraphim’s guidance without question; those who speak with El (god), such as Noah
and Lamech, do the same.134 Overall, this pattern contrasts with those prevalent in Wrinkle,
Wind, and Planet, as described above. At two key points, though, the twins do question the
seraphim (question in the critique/debate sense, as versus the “questioning for factual answers”
sense, which happens throughout the novel).
First, when Admael, in his camel form, carries Dennys to Lamech’s tent and a manticore
tries to eat Dennys, Dennys cries to Admael to help. Admael makes it clear that he does not plan
on interfering, which is consistent with the seraphim’s passive/neutral stance throughout the
novel: as beings outside of time (angels who chose to stay on earth to help humans, but can leave
at will) and who therefore know how events will unfold, they frequently caution against
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Despite Piehl’s claims that in Waters L’Engle “adds other dimensions - and weaknesses - to Noah’s character”
beyond the “unquestioning obedience” that characterizes traditional depictions of Noah in both biblical texts and
children’s literature (which Piehl surveys), these “other dimensions” and “weaknesses” Piehl references seem to be
merely Noah’s proud and stubborn estrangement from his father, Lamech (Piehl 48).
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interfering with the natural course of events. This caution is directed at the twins (who have
time-traveled back to the story of Noah and the flood), but is also a frequent explanation of the
seraphim’s own passive behavior. In the episode in question, Dennys sees that Admael intends
to not interfere—i.e. let Dennys get eaten by the manticore (or so Dennys fears at least). Dennys
asks Admael for help a number of times, to no avail, and “Dennys remembered that seraphim did
not like to interfere or change things. ‘Hey!’ he shouted. ‘If [the manticore] eats me, won’t that
change the course of things?’” (Waters 164) It is only then that Admael changes back into
angelic form and saves Dennys’ life (although Admael demurs that the manticore was not a real
threat in the first place). Admael is not a guide who is unquestioningly invested in protecting the
protagonists’ lives; rather, Dennys has to make a logical argument to Admael to persuade him to
interfere.
Second, the twins argue with the seraphim for saving Yalith. The twins urge the
seraphim to “rewrite the story” and argue with the seraphim regarding theodicy and rigidity of
biblical scripture—a debate that opens space for dialectical, midrashic reading, questioning, and
rewriting of scripture. In this episode, Sandy and Dennys are concerned about the fact that
Yalith, Noah’s daughter, with whom they have each fallen in love, is not included in El’s
(God’s) instructions to Noah regarding whom Noah should take on the ark. Because El did not
list Yalith, it seems Noah won’t be able to take her; Sandy and Dennys do not want Yalith to die
in the flood. Dennys confronts one of the seraphim, Alarid, asking what will become of Yalith
and demanding that the seraphim intervene and protect Yalith. In general, the seraphim have a
non-interference philosophy regarding human fate; Alarid tells Dennys that “it is dangerous to
change things. We do not meddle with the pattern.” (Waters 278) Dennys, however, responds:
“But Yalith isn’t in the pattern […] There’s no Yalith in the story. Only Noah and
his wife and his sons and their wives.”
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Alarid’s wings quivered slightly.
“So, since she isn’t in the story, it won’t change anything if you prevent her from
being drowned in the flood.” (Waters 278, emphasis in original)
Dennys’ argument here parallels certain midrashic and kabbalistic concepts and methodologies,
that give individual readers of the bible some amount of creative license regarding the silences of
the biblical text. For instance, there is a kabbalistic/midrashic idea of white space vs. black ink –
of looking at the white spaces between the written letters/words (i.e. “ink”) of biblical text on the
page, and of these spaces as being poetic, pre-linguistic/verbal, non-static potential for
individuals to add parts of the story, add new stories, and provide different interpretations or
exegesis for what is written in black/static ink. This idea can represent a way of entering into
personal dialogue with both the text and the divine, and of rewriting/reinterpreting the story
itself.
This episode demonstrates the protagonist-critiquing/questioning-guide motif;
additionally, though, the episode serves as a venue for L’Engle to engage in overt biblical
criticism (light criticism, or arguably apologetics) and light theodicy as well. Even aside from
the topic at hand (which is the possibility of rewriting or reinterpreting the bible and god’s
commands), this episode bridges the idea of protagonists questioning guide figures’ authority to
the concept of humans/readers questioning divine authority, through the mere fact that in this
case, the guides in question are explicitly angels serving god.
Dennys’ argument here also displays an evolution in his character’s relationship toward
biblical authority and rigidity. Earlier in the novel, he and Sandy used the biblical text (i.e. what
they could remember of it) as an authoritative guide, or reference point, for understanding the
world around them (i.e. the Noah story)—they looked towards the biblical text, toward what was
or wasn’t written, for direction (Waters 168). Now, however, Dennys realizes that it’s not just
about following what the text delineates, about using the text as sole guidance, or about keeping
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to its limitations. Rather, Dennys realizes the importance of critiquing the text and the text’s
silences. Dennys uses this critical reading/thinking to argue for saving Yalith as well as himself
and Sandy; he argues with Alarid, “Then take her wherever it is you’re going to escape the
flood” (278). Although Alarid at first demurs, claiming “We cannot do that” (278) since the
seraphim are going to the sun, this is exactly what the seraphim end up doing—taking Yalith
alive to “walk with El” and flying her into the sun (from the twins’ perspectives, although the
understanding within the narrative is that they take her to heaven). Dennys also argues for the
seraphim helping the twins return home before the flood, with a similar logic as that of his
argument with Admael: here, Dennys says to Alarid,
“We’re not in the story, either, Sandy and I. But we’re here. And Yalith is here. [...] And if
we drown, that is, if Sandy and I drown, that’s going to change the story, isn’t it? I mean,
we’re not going to be born in our time if we get drowned now, and even if that makes only a
tiny difference, it will make a difference to our family. [...] I mean, the story would be
changed.” (Waters 279)
Alarid immediately responds, “You must go back to your own time”; although Alarid may have
thought this before Dennys argued, the implication from the juxtaposition here is that Alarid was
swayed by Dennys’ argument. Dennys has convinced Alarid that a) the twins need to return
home or else the “story” will be changed; b) since the twins were never named in the original
“story” (i.e. the bible) there is leeway to write/rewrite/add in a new or different direction, since
arguably that direction always “existed” within the biblical silences and we just never knew it
(i.e. as long as it does not directly contradict what is already written in the bible, there is space
for it); c) if that applies to the twins because they’re omitted from the biblical narrative, it should
apply to Yalith too. Interestingly, this logic could apply to “laws” of time travel (if one assumes
a fixed nature of time) devoid of religious implications, or to spiritual philosophy (openness to
new ideas as long as they do not directly contradict doctrine) as well. In this context, though,
there is an explicit aspect here of biblical critique—albeit a “light” criticism involving reading
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between the fixed textual lines to add in one’s personal exegetical commentary.135
Dennys also gives a brief feminist critique of the bible in the course of this argument; he
follows his earlier arguments to Alarid with,
“Listen, it’s a stupid story. Only the males have names. It’s a chauvinist story. I mean,
Matred [Noah’s wife in Waters] has a name. She’s a mother. And Elisheba and Anah and
Oholibamah.136 They’re real people, with names. [...] The nephilim [...] They’re like
whoever wrote the silly ark story, seeing things only from their own point of view, using
people. They don’t give a hoot for Tiglah or Mahlah, for instance. They’re just women, so
they don’t matter. They don’t care if Yalith gets drowned. But you ought to care!” (Waters
279, emphasis in original)
In a semi-metafictional moment, Dennys problematizes the fact that the women in the flood story
are “named” and “real”, a nod here to L’Engle’s naming of them, but also a reference to the fact
that presumably these figures—if one assumes they were alive/historical—had names as well,
that are simply not recorded by the “chauvinist” recorders/scribes of the biblical text.
Dennys’ comment on the women’s names (or lack thereof) here is one of a few instances
throughout the novel when the twins comment on biblical chauvinism, a moment that acts as a
mouthpiece not only for a certain brand of feminist bible reading, but also of broader critique
regarding biblical authorship. At an earlier moment in the novel, Sandy notes that Noah’s time
period “was a very patriarchal society”; Dennys remarks,
“Meg would call it chauvinistic [...] Whoever wrote the Bible was a man. Men.”
“I thought it was supposed to be God. Wasn’t that what we were taught in Sunday
school?”
“When we were little maybe. The thing is, the Bible was set down by lots of people over
lots of years. Centuries. It’s supposed to be the Word of God, not written by God.” (Waters
168-9)
L’Engle here pithily raises the concept of multiple biblical authors—an idea accepted by some
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Oholibamah, Anah, and Elisheba are in fact biblical names, albeit not from the flood story; the names
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Exodus 6:23 (Aaron’s wife) (Koren Bible).
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orthodox religious views (and present within certain biblical passages themselves) and denied by
others as challenging the bible’s divine origin and/or literal truth—and immediately reconciles
any potential problems by defining the bible as “the Word of God” rather than “written by God.”
This debate, and L’Engle’s answer here, is relevant for a number of religious dilemmas (e.g. the
challenge to doctrine/orthodoxy of biblical criticism/authorship scholarship that assumes nondivine authors), including feminist ones. Sandy and Dennys’ pithy debate above serves as a
condensed version of the path that feminist critiques of the bible can easily lead one down. As
Orthodox-Jewish scholar and theologian Tamar Ross demonstrates, questioning the male voice
endemic to biblical texts logically leads to an undermining of divine authorship:
[....] discovery of the extent to which the biblical mind-set and its specific picture of reality is
derived from the male point of view calls its divine character into question on more general
grounds: if the Torah is from God, it should be above any human conditionality. But if the
Torah’s portrayal of the world and God so clearly reflects a quintessentially male point of
view, how are we to view the source of such a Torah? What sort of God would ignore the
voices, insights, and experiences of half the human race? Because the perspective of the
Torah is limited, can we really credit it with being divine? Is it really describing God in
words that God has revealed to us or might these words be merely the projection of our own
wishes or social systems onto the cosmos—in a religious language that is socially shaped and
culture-bound, and therefore not binding upon us? (Ross, Expanding, 141)
Ross demonstrates, here, how a feminist critique of male-biased perspectives in biblical texts can
become a slippery slope to legitimate questioning of divine authorship altogether—a concern
L’Engle nods to in the passage above by having Sandy protest, “I thought [the bible’s author]
was supposed to be God.” Sandy interprets Dennys’ statement of male (human) biblical
authorship as an automatic contradiction to the idea of divine authorship—an interpretation
which, from a more conservative Christian perspective (or an overly-simplified one, as indicated
by the Sunday school reference), might hold true for some people. Dennys’ response that the
bible was written by “lots of people over lots of years” and his distinction between the “Word of
God” and “written by God” speak to Ross’ question above, of whether the bible is in fact written

157

“in a religious language that is socially shaped and culture-bound.” Rereading the bible as
divinely inspired, but technically written by human males and thus incorporating their fallibilities
(chauvinistic perspectives, historically-bound understandings of the world, etc.) allows for a
certain school of feminist revisionist (Ross, Expanding, 140) reading of the bible that can yet
maintain an orthodox view of god. According to this school of thought, feminist problems with
the bible merely reflect feminist problems with the fallible male scribes, susceptible to their
misogynistic socio-historical contexts, rather than with the divine source itself.137
L’Engle’s portrayal of biblical critique and theodicy are hedged, in Waters, by the
delimiting factors of orthodoxy: the twins’ concern is solely for rewriting Yalith into the script;
they do not argue for stopping the flood altogether. Although the twins and seraphim pay brief
lip service to the horror of the upcoming flood and the fact that “good” people as well as “bad”
will die, there is no investment in depicting (to the reader) any good characters other than Noah’s
family. The narrative tension and focus is completely on the conundrum of Yalith being too pure
to drown in the flood, being pursued by the nephilim, and finally saved by the seraphim by
“walking with El”—brought alive to heaven. The general tone we are left with is that neither
protagonists nor readers have real emotional stakes in questioning the broader theodicy of the
flood, or of caring about hoards of people dying. If anything, the few characters we encounter
outside Noah’s family are portrayed as despicable—e.g. Tiglah and her family—and while their
actions alone do not seem to merit death (they kidnap but do not harm or kill; they flirt and
attempt to seduce), the narrative does not express any mercy for them, only for anonymous
others in the world who will die in the flood. There is a casualness to the narrative’s
condemnation of Tiglah and her family that feels somewhat shocking when one steps back and

137

For more on this, see Ross, Expanding, chapters 4-6.

158

examines much of what they are condemned for: Tiglah enjoying her sexuality? Flirting with
and trying to seduce the virgin twins? Their alliance with nephilim? Dirtiness? (much is made
of their lack of bathing and hygiene).
Given these strong conservative, moralistic notes in Waters, the twins’ engagement in
biblical and theological critique—and the seraphim’s acceptance of such critique—is perhaps
even more notable in reflecting clear tensions: tensions between feminist sensibilities and a
masculine-privileged biblical text; tensions between universalist concepts of divine
love/redemption and a rigid, binary moral code; and the basic theodicy tensions inevitable in a
retelling of the flood story. Although L’Engle’s feminist critique and attempt at a solution do not
reflect many more radical feminist biblical critiques, they demonstrate a significant break from
more conservative religious positions (Christian, Jewish, or other) that hold more rigid
approaches, such as biblical literalness, or the idea of the entire bible being dictated directly and
at once to Moses—in other words, approaches that view the entire biblical text, down to its word
choice, as directly divine rather than divinely inspired.

Le Guin
Much has been written on Le Guin’s Earthsea novels, including religio-spiritual, ethical
thematics broadly and Taoist themes specifically. Levy and Mendlesohn deem Le Guin “The
most important writer, in terms of her impact on the [children’s fantasy] field in this period, to be
influenced visibly by Tolkien”; with that influence “reactive” to “rather than in emulation” of
Tolkien (Children’s Fantasy Literature, chapter 7, “The Lord of the Rings and secondary-world
fantasy”). Levy and Mendlesohn posit that “Le Guin's rejection and reworking of Tolkien is in
part rooted in a rejection of Christianity and we can see this in parallels, resonances and shifts in
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values” (Children’s Fantasy Literature, chapter 7, “The Lord of the Rings and secondary-world
fantasy”). One prominent example to which Levy and Mendlesohn point is Le Guin’s emphasis,
particularly in the first three Earthsea novels, on “not doing” and on passive/neutral acceptance
rather than heroic action; we will discuss this theme in more detail below (Children’s Fantasy
Literature, chapter 7, “The Lord of the Rings and secondary-world fantasy”). Other religiospiritual themes we might point to in Earthsea include what might be termed an ecospiritualism—humans, magical beings, and magic itself are intrinsically connected to the health
of the land and ecosystem; nature, and the impact of one’s actions or passivity on nature, act as
moral and spiritual indicators for both characters and the readers. This is often (although not
always) articulated and thus rendered explicit by different characters in the novels.
These themes could arguably fit into any number of religio-spiritual frameworks,
including various Christian and Jewish ones. Le Guin, however, states that she consciously
rejected Judeo-Christian values in Earthsea. As Jobling notes, Le Guin herself “asserts that it is
important to be clear about the significance of Taoism in her work because ‘it’s a central theme,
period.’”138 Scholars such as Jobling, Oziewicz, and Wytenbroek,139 among others, concur with
Le Guin’s positioning of Earthsea within Taoist frameworks, reading Taoist themes in the
novels. Authorial intent aside, it is also possible to read certain strands of Earthsea—sometimes
these very same thematics—in a Judeo-Christian light (e.g. reading Ged as a character who
redeems the world through self-sacrifice, as in the resolutions of Wizard and Shore). That said, a
significant part of Earthsea’s feminist reimagining of religio-spiritual possibilities is in precisely
its eschewing of Judeo-Christian paradigms for ones less traditional in children’s fantasy, such as
Taoism and references alluding to indigenous American peoples.
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Jobling (45), quoting from Erlich (see Jobling’s footnote there).
See Wytenbroek, “Taoism in the Fantasies of Ursula K. Le Guin” (1990).
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Earthsea’s value lies in part in its richness and potential to be read in exactly these
varied, even contradictory, ways. The goal of this section is not to affirm any side of the above
debate (scholarly, authorial, or otherwise)—i.e. The goal is not to pin down any one thematic as
“Christian,” “Taoist” or “kabbalistic” (etc). Rather, the more interesting and useful question is
what work do Le Guin’s religio-spiritual thematics (however categorized nominally) perform, in
terms of the main concerns of this chapter (and dissertation as a whole): subversive critique
towards authority and feminist onto-epistemology. To answer this question, this section looks at
two aspects of the Earthsea novels: ways Earthsea subverts portal-quest tropes, particularly
those of the guide figure and hero-protagonist; and Earthsea’s deconstruction of epistemologies
both within the narrative and via metafictional techniques. Le Guin employs all of these
methods to destabilize static, objective, and singular conceptions of history and ontoepistemology. All three of these aspects of the Earthsea novels, therefore, exemplify ways
Earthsea imagines new possibilities for feminist religio-spiritualities and onto-epistemologies.

Earthsea’s Subversion of Portal-Quest Tropes
In many ways, the first three Earthsea novels display a portal-quest rhetoric, one that
echoes Lord of the Rings in many regards. Mendlesohn categorizes Lord of the Rings as a portalquest work, despite its fully-realized, and fully-separate (from our world) secondary world of
Middle Earth, due to (among other factors) Frodo’s journey from his provincial world/home of
the Shire to the larger, outside world as that of a naive protagonist touring through foreign
territory. Like most portal-quest protagonists, Frodo passively receives explanation and history
of this foreign territory (foreign to him, although part of his own world rather than a secondary
one) from the guide figure, Gandalf; Gandalf’s knowledge, authority, and morality are never
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questioned (by Frodo, text, or reader). And, of course, a quest structures the narrative
movement.
Mendlesohn’s analysis of Lord of the Rings, as well as portal-quest rhetoric more
broadly, speaks in many ways to the first three Earthsea novels. Similarly to Middle Earth,
Earthsea is a fully-realized, immersive secondary world (unlike the flat, tourist-like scenery that
Mendlesohn and Diana Wynne Jones highlight in many portal-quest stories), yet elements of
Earthsea’s narrative structure and rhetoric bear similarities to the portal-quest, rather than
immersive fantasy. This is particularly the case in the first three Earthsea novels. Ged, like
Frodo, begins the novel as a provincial ignorant of the wider Earthsea world, and learns more
about the wider world as he journeys through it. Quests are intrinsic to the plots of Wizard and
Shore, and arguably to Tombs.140 The primary concern, plot-wise, in Shore is that of a
“thinning” (in Mendlesohn’s portal-quest terms) of the land, magic, and morality.141 Finally,
throughout Wizard and Tombs the narrative voice relays plot and history in the “rolling tones,”
“poetic prophecies” and “[h]igh formality” that Mendlesohn associates with portal quest rhetoric
(Rhetorics 32). The first words we see in Wizard, immediately before the opening of chapter
one, are those of poetic legend/prophecy:
Only in silence the word,
only in dark the light,
only in dying life:
140

Different scholars read Tombs’ structure, and the question of whether/how the quest manifests itself in the novel,
differently. Nodelman points out that Tombs can be read as a feminine inversion of the traditional hero-quest, with
the hero-quest understood as male (and male only); Tenar, in this reading, is the intrinsically and inevitably passive
feminine, in the dark womb-like tombs, displaced from light and action, awaiting a male rescuer/savior (Nodelman,
“Reinventing the Past”). Such a reading could lead one to conclude that there is no quest, or that this is what Le
Guin envisioned as the female/feminine analogue to the male-hero-quest (although Nodelman does see a quest
occurring, simply of a passive/receptive nature; Nodelman is also careful to position this reading as Le Guin
exploring Jungian gender archetypes rather than claiming this is Le Guin’s vision of a female hero altogether).
Others, such as Jobling and Oziewicz, read Tombs as portraying a proactively and positive female/feminine version
of a quest, replete with female heroic action and models of heroism as interdependency; both point out that Tenar
and Ged save each other in partnership (see Jobling, chapter 3; Oziewicz, chapter 5).
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For Mendlesohn’s discussions of “thinning” as an integral part of portal-quest fantasy rhetoric, see Rhetorics
p.17, 30, 46-7.
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bright the hawk’s flight
on the empty sky.
—The Creation of Ea
Consider, too, the tone of chapter one’s opening paragraph:
The island of Gont, a single mountain that lifts its peak a mile above the storm-racked
Northeast Sea, is a land famous for wizards. From the towns in its high valleys and the ports
on its dark narrow bays many a Gontishman has gone forth to serve the Lords of the
Archipelago in their cities as wizard or mage, or, looking for adventure, to wander working
magic from isle to isle of all Earthsea. Of these some say the greatest, and surely the greatest
voyager, was the man called Sparrowhawk, who in his day became both dragonlord and
Archmage. His life is told of in the Deed of Ged and in many songs, but this is a tale of the
time before his fame, before the songs were made. (Wizard 1)
The tone here is more formal and distanced, a high-politics one, seemingly conforming to
Mendlesohn’s description of the high, prophetic style often associated with portal-quest
rhetoric—the lofty, grandiose, formal, distant/passive diction and tone (e.g. vocabulary, sentence
structure, grammar) of “high fantasy”—that concerned with high politics/events (of kings,
heroes, warriors); with destiny and myth and legend; with archaic, medieval, and/or pastoral
nostalgia; and with a certain conservatism, a static view of history, a sense of thinning of the
contemporary world (values, magic, etc) and a longing toward an idealized past. Mendlesohn
contrasts this tone (which emerges, in Lord of the Rings, when Gandalf, elves, or Aragorn speak,
or when legends are told) with the demotic one used by and about the hobbits—a jarring break
with “high politics” discourse as the mundane concerns and low vernacular voice of the hobbits
(the real, common, or every-man) intercede with the lofty tones of elves and wizards. For the
most part, the narrative tones of Wizard and Tombs—i.e. the style, diction, sentence and
paragraph structure—read like the high, prophetic, distanced tone described above (e.g. past
tense, passive sentence structure, capitalized and weighty nouns).142
This is not surprising, as Earthsea does owe a debt in some regards to Lord of the Rings,
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in the sense that Le Guin specifically reacts to it (rather than emulating it) as a model for high
fantasy.143 Yet, even in these very rhetorical devices that would seem to align Earthsea with
Lord of the Rings and other portal-quest novels, Earthsea diverges from and subverts those
tropes. Two of the main ways Earthsea upends portal-quest tropes are in its hero-protagonist’s
trajectory and the guide figure’s role.
Regarding the hero-protagonist and guide figure: Ged, like Frodo, journeys from an
insular home to the wider Earthsea world; also like Frodo, Ged does so initially in the company
of a wizard guide figure, Ogion. Unlike Frodo, however, Ged’s trajectory quickly changes as he
sheds his guide figure. Ged begins his apprenticeship to Ogion in the beginning of chapter two
(Wizard 17); nine pages later Ged, fed up with Ogion, leaves him and journeys instead to the
wizard school on Roke. Although Roke is arguably simply another form of guide (i.e. the school
and the masters), this shift is still significant. Ogion reads as the classic, stock-figure of the wise
wizard guide, and readers savvy to high-fantasy/portal-quest narratives may reasonably expect
Ged to journey and train with—and be guided by—Ogion. In fact, Ogion does remain Ged’s
guide at heart—this is clear by the end of Wizard as well as in the ensuing novels—and, like
Gandalf (and other wise wizard guides), Ogion’s wisdom, accuracy, and morality are never
questioned or problematized by Ged, text/narrator, or reader. Yet Ged decides to leave Ogion’s
guidance (it is difficult to picture Frodo, Bilbo, or the Pevensies acting similarly). Ogion does
not try to dissuade Ged, but rather respects and empowers Ged—who is a mere thirteen years
old—to make an autonomous and major life choice, one that significantly impacts Ged’s
trajectory for the rest of the book. Ogion is then absent from most of the remaining plot
(returning towards the end to receive Ged when Ged returns in hawk form).
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Although it is not impossible to imagine Gandalf or Aslan behaving thus, Ogion’s
behavior is atypical for “guides”—he does, in fact, very little guiding.144 And even when Ogion
is actively “guiding” Ged (for those scant nine pages in chapter two), he teaches Ged “nothing”:
when Ged explodes with frustration and leaves Ogion, Ged does so because, as he cries, “How
am I to know these things [evil, good, the price of one’s actions], when you teach me nothing?
Since I lived with you I have done nothing, seen nothing” (Wizard 25).
Ogion’s “nothing”—the absence of his active teaching, guidance, presence, and action in
most of the novels—is, rather than a lack or negation, a presence and active affirmation of
silence, passivity, neutrality, waiting, listening and observing. What Ged fails to understand at
first, but later learns, is that Ogion was teaching and doing—choosing to not act is still a choice;
listening and observing one’s surroundings (people, nature, events) can be an active, attentive
listening. And of course Ogion does act, when necessary—he saves Ged twice. Yet Ogion’s
most powerful lessons and impact come either from his purposeful “not doing” or from his
absence.
In this vein, Ogion occupies significant space in the later Earthsea novels as well—even
when he is not present or no longer living—due to the other characters’ frequent and weighted
referencing of him. In Shore, for instance, the text alludes to Ogion (who is still alive at this
point but absent from the action of the entire novel) when Ged specifically avoids using magic
on his and Arren’s quest:
The winds turned contrary as soon as they were away from the charmed weather of Roke, but
[Ged] did not call a magewind into their sail, as any weather-worker could have done;
instead, he spent hours teaching Arren how to manage the boat in a stiff headwind, in the
rock-fanged sea east of Issel. The second night out it rained, the rough, cold rain of March,
but he said no spell to keep it off them. On the next night, as they lay outside the entrance to
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Hort Harbor in a calm, cold, foggy darkness, Arren thought about this, and reflected that in
the short time he had known him, the Archmage had done no magic at all. (Shore, 44)
Although Ged is Archmage at this point (and middle-aged) and is one of the most powerful
wizards in the world, he refrains from using magic where non-magical means suffice. At other
points in the novel, Ged articulates why: part of his reason is that magic, and the natural balance
of the world, is already strained (due to the necromancer Ged and Arren seek to stop) (Shore
130); part of the reason, however, is Ged’s philosophy of disturbing the Balance—via action—as
little as possible (Shore 174). This sentiment directly echoes Ogion’s teaching (Wizard 18-19,
25), and Arren’s surprise that wizardry would entail so much restraint and lack of magic echoes
Ged’s initial reaction to Ogion’s tutelage (Wizard 18, 25).
In Tehanu and The Other Wind, Ged, Arren, and Tenar constantly mention Ogion as well.
In Tehanu, for example, Tenar tells Tehanu/Therru both about Ogion and retells stories and
songs from Ogion; Tenar’s monologue, which includes her descriptions of Ogion as well as the
tale he told her, spans just over seven pages—possibly the longest block of monologue-text in
the novel or series (Tehanu 9-16). Tenar quotes Ogion’s name repeatedly in the lengthy retelling
such that readers are constantly made aware of Ogion’s presence. Rather than getting lost in the
retold-tale as a tale itself, or even a tale Tenar tells Tehanu/Therru, the constant naming of Ogion
in the action of the tale makes him more of a felt presence/subject, in these pages, than either
Tenar or Tehanu/Therru. In The Other Wind, Tenar, Ged, and Arren frequently weigh their
possible courses of action against what Ogion used to say and do; as three of the most powerful
figures in Earthsea, their decisions—based on their understandings of Ogion’s ethos—shape
futures not only for themselves but for all of Earthsea. In some ways, therefore, Ogion functions
even more as a guide when he is no longer onstage.
Le Guin’s use of Ogion as a purposefully passive guide figure is notable for the purposes
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of this chapter not only because it subverts typical guide-figure tropes, but also because it
emphasizes the concept of “not doing” and of passive/neutral acceptance rather than heroic
action—themes that are, as mentioned in this section’s introduction, integral to Earthsea. As
Levy and Mendlesohn point out, “the impulse to act [in Earthsea] is not celebrated, but regarded
with unease” (Children’s Fantasy Literature, chapter 7, “The Lord of the Rings and secondaryworld fantasy”). One can read this idea of balance in Earthsea as reflecting Taoist themes, as do
Jobling and Wytenbroek: “Taoism permeates Le Guin’s work. For example, A Wizard of
Earthsea is a classic tale of imbalance, in which lack of balance in Ged’s personal being and
actions has cosmic repercussions [...] [Le Guin] also incorporates the Taoist principle of inaction
– that is to say, doing only that which is necessary: ‘The first lesson on Roke, and the last, is Do
what is needful. And no more’” (Jobling 86-8).
It is not only the guide figures (Ogion in Wizard; Ged in Shore) who promote an ethic of
“not-doing” in the name of ecological and harmonic balance: the hero-protagonist must learn to
do so as well. Where characters do engage in activity that changes things (magic, ecosystems,
societies), these are either antagonistic characters or they are positive/protagonist characters who,
although acting, are acting to restore a prior balance (e.g. Ged and Arren’s quest to restore the
prior balance of life and death upset by the necromancer; and in the later novels, characters
restoring healthy human-dragon and male-female dynamics that had been skewed in imbalanced
fashions for centuries). Wizard is perhaps the most sustained critique, within the series, of the
portal-quest hero-protagonist trajectory: most of the novel is Ged’s journey as he runs away
from, and deals with the repercussions of, his hubric action in the beginning of the novel of
releasing his shadow. Although at a surface glance, Ged’s trajectory looks like a traditional
fantasy quest, in truth it is more of a “fleeing from” than a “quest towards,” as each movement of
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the narrative is dictated more and more by Ged’s fear and position as hunted prey. The result, in
Wizard, is an upended hero-quest narrative in which the protagonist journeys (physically and
metaphysically) through a trajectory of continuous self-questioning and ever-increasing
awarenesses of the widespread ripple effect of his single, foolish action (arguably this might be
read as two related actions: first with Ogion [Wizard 24-25], second at Roke [Wizard 66-67]).
Every time Ged seems to succeed in a quest-like episode along his path, such “success” only
highlights Ged’s ongoing struggle against the shadow, which is not mitigated by any of Ged’s
might wizardly deeds. The resolution at Wizard’s end comes via Ged’s acceptance of himself
and of his shadow—it is only with this embrace that Ged’s flight may cease.
Le Guin’s emphases on ethics of balance and “not doing” thus run counter to the core
structure of much traditional “high,” “epic,” or quest-oriented fantasy (both in general and that
marketed towards children), in which the narrative trajectory is all about the hero-protagonist
acting and changing their environments, and in which guide figures actively lead protagonists
toward hidden but extant, static truths. Instead, Le Guin depicts a strong ethic of
interconnectedness—one that speaks strongly to that discussed with L’Engle earlier—and to
paradigms of silence rather than speech, observation/listening rather than action, and continuous
self-questioning and self-critique, especially regarding the potential consequences of one’s
actions on others. Such ideologies complement another dominant ethos of Earthsea: questioning
established and static-seeming onto-epistemologies in favor of multivalent, ever-evolving, truths.

Narrative and Metanarrative Epistemological Destabilizations in Earthsea
In a number of ways, Earthsea deconstructs assumed forms of knowledge and processes
of knowing—both for characters, within the narrative (e.g. women’s or dragons’ stories that offer
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different perspectives on truth) and for readers, in metanarrative ways (e.g. when Wizard’s
conclusion questions the accuracy of the story (i.e. novel) just told). This section focuses on
Earthsea’s problematizing of onto-epistemologies via, first, the gradual deconstruction of
authority figures, political institutions, and epistemologies internal to (i.e. within) Earthsea; and
second, the narrative and meta-fictional techniques that Le Guin uses to destabilize static,
objective, and singular conceptions of history and onto-epistemology.
Over the course of the Earthsea novels, we see a gradual deconstruction of authority—in
terms of those in authority (e.g. the wizard council) as well as the authority of ontoepistemologies taken for granted (by narrator, character, and/or reader) within Earthsea,
especially as presented in the first two novels. Attebery touches on this when he writes that:
Le Guin’s Earthsea series likewise undercuts attempts to read the stories for sola-like truths:
even propositions about magic and balance that underlie the first books are called into
question by the final volume. As the series develops, new voices are introduced, and the
wisdom of wizards is challenged and enriched by the perspectives of women, “barbarians,”
and dragons. (Stories, “Literalist Interlude”)
Although Attebery is right, it is important to note that most of Le Guin’s “call[ing] into question”
and introduction of “new voices” in Earthsea occurs in the final (to date) two novels, Tehanu
(1990) and The Other Wind (2001). Although we see women’s voices in Tombs, and these
voices do criticize Roke’s wizards, these voices belong to the priestesses of the tombs—they are
the antagonists of the novel, from whom Tenar must be rescued (by Ged). And although Tenar,
Kossil, and the other female characters in Tombs see themselves as civilized and the Archipelago
(Ged’s hemispheric origin) as barbaric, the narrative heavily cues readers to distrust this from the
outset through its dark tones and portrayal of actions such as human sacrifice—behavior
accepted as normal by the Kargs but presumably repulsive to readers. Tenar journeys from the
corruption and darkness (both figurative and literal, in terms of the tombs) of “barbarians” and
women to the salvation, enlightenment, and benevolence of the Archipelago—specifically, into
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Ogion’s home.145 It is not until Tehanu that we see legitimate (i.e. legitimated by the novel’s
internal/narrative authority) women’s voices providing their perspectives, as well as critiquing
the male-centric views and onto-epistemologies (especially regarding magic, laws of nature, and
ethics) of Earthsea’s common folk and people of power (Roke, the king, etc).
Similarly, while we do begin to see some marginalized voices and critiques in Shore, they
are foregrounded much more in the last two novels. In Shore, for example, Ged forces Arren
(and thus readers) to consider the perspectives of marginalized peoples such as the poor and
drug-addicted (p.52-4); peripheral (to Earthsea’s Archipelago) societies, such as the Children of
the Open Sea (p.152); and dragons, who, as Attebery mentions, do provide a crucial other
perspective than the human one. However, although we encounter the benign (i.e. benign to the
protagonists) dragons Kalessin and Orm Embar in Shore, the encounter occupies only a small
portion of the narrative; furthermore, the dragons’ voices are mostly mediated to Arren and
readers via Ged (i.e. through translation).146 The dragons Ged encounters in Wizard are depicted
as antagonistic to him and to humans at large, albeit that they are not the primary antagonists of
the novel. The critical perspective that dragons provide—directly through their own interaction
in the plot, and indirectly via the legends we hear of them—only begins appearing in sizable and
largely unmediated fashions in Tehanu and The Other Wind. Even comparing the legends of and
interactions with dragons in Wizard to those in Tehanu is instructive: in Wizard both the lore Ged
studies and his confrontation with dragons focus on dragons’ cunning, abilities to hypnotize men,
“powerful and guileful” sorcery (97), ability and inclination to twist even the “Old Speech” into
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lies and a “maze of mirrorwords [sic] each of which reflects the truth and none of which leads
anywhere” (98), and of course their fearsome physical strength that is depicted as consistently
employed in killing humans and plundering villages (Wizard, 95-100). As mentioned, the
depiction of dragons in Shore is more benign—dragons their serve as allies to Ged—albeit brief.
The strongest contrast, though, is in the depictions of dragons in Tehanu. Here, the tone shifts
one hundred and eighty degrees: legends display a soft reverence for dragons’ wisdom, age, and
natures as beings more in tune with nature, creation, and balance; the tales told by Tenar (passed
to her by Ogion) emphasize how dragons and humans used to be one and the same;147 Kalessin
saves Ged and Tenar at the novel’s climax from the novel’s antagonists, who are human men;
and of course Tehanu (the child named Therru for most of the novel) is, as the conclusion
reveals, part dragon herself. Whereas portrayals of dragons in Wizard posit them as antagonistic
towards humans and as cunning, sly, and violent, and whereas dragons in Shore are more benign
but marginal to much of the story, dragons in Tehanu are foregrounded not only in a positive
way, but in a way that specifically emphasizes the different, yet true, perspective they bring to
Earthsea epistemologies: the legends told place dragons as central protagonists rather than
humans; a half-dragon, half-human woman (Dragonfly/Irian) is the solution to Roke’s quandary
of a missing Archmage.
Additionally, in these later Earthsea texts (Tehanu, The Other Wind, and Tales From
Earthsea), Le Guin tacitly connects women and dragons as occupying similarly marginalized
places in human-male-dominated societies: when some of Roke’s masters protest Irian’s
presence on Roke (before it is known that Irian is part dragon), they (i.e. their spokesman, Master
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Windkey) say, “No witches will defile sacred ground. No dragons will threaten the Inmost Sea.
There will be order, safety, and peace” (Tales, “Dragonfly” p.242). The implication is that
women and dragons similarly disrupt the male-dominated power and gendered hierarchies—
regarding the use of magic but also politically (this wizard faction, led by Thorian, also
challenges the new king). Furthermore, the two main characters across these novels who are part
dragon and part human—Dragonfly/Irian and Tehanu/Therru—are also women, and have
specifically been victims of gender-based violence by their fathers and other men in their lives.
Irian’s story, especially, challenges many of the prior assumptions of Earthsea (for characters
and readers alike): for instance, Irian’s naming ceremony, which until now has been the
unquestioned source of people’s true names (reflecting their true selves and powers), is shown to
be ineffective or incomplete—Irian knows something is incorrect about her naming (beyond her
frustration of being named after her abusive father); it is not until the story’s conclusion, when
Irian has fully realized her dragon form as well, that Irian realizes she needs to go to “[her]
people,” dragons, to receive her “other name” that is given “[i]n fire, not water” (Tales,
“Dragonfly” p.246). The result of Irian’s disruptive presence on Roke—a positive disruption
that corrects the balance—is for Roke to “open its doors”; Irian, as woman-dragon, has shown
that the male and human-privileged exclusivity and power of Roke—unquestioned in the earlier
novels—was actually a skewing of the balance that needs to be rectified in an egalitarian manner.
All this leads to the plausible argument that the questioning of assumed truths Attebery
points to above—questioning that occurs internal to the narrative at least (e.g. via characters
actions, perspectives/thoughts, or the legends/history they relay)—changes in both quality and
quantity between the first three and last two novels. Many scholars, such as Nodelman, dwell on
this issue of changes between the two Earthsea eras—focusing mostly on Le Guin’s changed
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portrayals of women and gendered issues. 148 Le Guin herself acknowledges a shift in her
feminist consciousness from 1968 (Wizard) to 1990 (Tehanu)—an understandable shift, given
the events of those decades in North American history and feminist movements.
Another way that Le Guin challenges readers’ assumptions of truth is through her use of
specific rhetorical techniques, techniques both within the narrative and metafictional. One
instance of this comes at the conclusion of Wizard, when the entire reliability and stability of the
story we were just told is called into question. As Attebery writes:
Le Guin’s A Wizard of Earthsea ends by casting doubt on the reliability of traditions on
which the narrative itself is presumably based: the song of Ged’s great deed “has been lost,”
though “there is a tale” that may hold some of the truth; “in Iffish they say” one thing about
his journey, while “in Tok” they say another, and both are contradicted by storytellers “in
Holp”; “so of the song of the Shadow there remain only a few scraps of legend, carried like
driftwood from isle to isle over the long years” (205). The message is not that there is no
truth, but that listeners (and readers) must construct that truth for themselves; that history,
like magic, is both conditional and dynamic, changing according to the understanding and
needs of its users. (Stories About Stories, “Literalist Interlude”)
Attebery draws attention to ways the text itself is self-aware of its constructedness, calling
readers’ attentions to not only a metafictional playfulness, but also the very instability of history
and historiography themselves—both within the fictional, fantastic context of Earthsea and in
“real world” contexts as well. Here, Le Guin subverts the portal quest trope of history and
legend (via scrolls, oral retellings, or prophecies) existing unquestioned, alongside the narrative
present—the protagonist’s quest—also as an unquestioned snapshot of legend. The above
passages from Le Guin problematize both such views, of past history and present narrative as
ontologically singular, static, and fully knowable, showing instead the ever-existing multiplicity
of “truths” regarding history and even regarding the narrative readers just read.
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Pierce
Like L’Engle’s Time novels and Le Guin’s Earthsea novels, Tamora Pierce’s Song of the
Lioness quartet depicts feminist onto-epistemologies that simultaneously critique and affirm
religio-spiritual traditions. Pierce differs from L’Engle and Le Guin, however, in terms of how
she achieves this critique: Pierce’s heterogenous, rather than homogeneous, religious thematics;
her emphasis on questioning and arguing through both her immersive rhetoric and narrative
content; and her portrayals of different, yet equally valid, expressions of religio-cultural
traditions as consonant with multivalent feminisms—particularly in Pierce’s depictions of Bazhir
women. I explore each of these moves in the sections below, examining their feminist
theoretical, epistemological, and religio-spiritual/cultural ramifications. Before doing so,
however, it is useful to position Song of the Lioness within feminist scholarship and critique—
both that specifically responding to the novels and the broader frameworks I employ in this
chapter subsection.
Of the extant scholarship on Pierce’s work, much focuses on feminist politics and reading
of the texts—which makes sense, given that Pierce’s novels, especially Song of the Lioness (her
first published novels) overtly foreground feminist concerns. Song of the Lioness takes place in a
secondary-fantasy world and focuses on Alanna, a female protagonist who wants to become a
knight rather than attend a convent and learn to be a lady. Since women are not allowed to
become knights,149 Alanna, who is eleven at the opening of the first novel, switches places with
her twin brother Thom, disguising herself as a boy, and goes in Thom’s place to the palace to
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this fact.
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train as a page, squire, and then earn her shield.150 The novels follow Alanna as she proceeds
through her training, becomes a knight, and on her adventures and career afterwards.
Pierce’s depiction of a female hero-protagonist becoming a knight and warrior was
radical for its time not only because such female warriors were rare, previously in children’s and
young adult fantasy, but also due to the realist way in which Pierce depicted training for
knighthood and sword-and-sorcery adventures. Pierce’s depictions are realist in general: as with
Tolkien’s hobbits, Pierce’s characters soon realize that “adventure” and “glory” entails rainsoaked clothes, muddy roads, exhaustion, sore muscles, and all the other mundanities often
omitted from epic/heroic tales; Pierce has discussed how the lack of such realist perspectives
frustrated her, as a child, in reading fantasy.151 Pierce extends such frank, realist portrayals to
Alanna’s particular lense as a female: we see Alanna experience, and have to contend with,
issues such as menstruation, breast development (Alanna binds them flat), sexuality, and fertility.
This, at a time when even Judy Blume had to tiptoe around discussing menstruation.152 Even at a
cursory glance, therefore, the feminist work of Song of the Lioness is pretty radical considered in
the context of prior children’s fantasy, genre (i.e. adult-marketed) fantasy, and children’s realist
literature.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, much scholarship that mentions or focuses on Song of the
Lioness discusses exactly these areas of feminist themes within and work of the novels. Keeling
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and Sprague, for instance, position Alanna as a “dragon-slayer” type of heroine, rather than a
“dragon-sayer” type (“Dragon-Slayer”). “Dragon-slayers” map loosely onto first-wave
feminism: they are female heroines who follow a classically “male” heroic quest pattern: some
evil being (a dragon, monster, villain, etc.) threatens the kingdom; the hero fights it, conquers it,
and saves the kingdom. Keeling and Sprague define “dragon-slayers” as characters who fit this
heroic model, with the exception that they happen to be girls, rather than boys. Akin to Robin
McKinley’s “Girls Who Do Things,” dragon-slayers “appeal as a powerful model for many
young female readers who find it empowering to take on the role of the traditional ‘dragonslayer’ and demonstrate strength through physical power as well as mental cunning” (Keeling
and Sprague, “Dragon-Slayer”). Keeling and Sprague contrast the “dragon-slayer” model with
that of the “dragon-sayer,” which accords with second-wave-feminism: “a girl who rejects the
stereotypic masculine approach to conflict and danger (typically, overpower and conquer) and
instead substitutes traditional feminine values of nurturing and caretaking to achieve her goals.
Such girls seek to connect and form relationships” and save the kingdom by “embrac[ing]
traditional feminine roles and values” (Keeling and Sprague, “Dragon-Slayer”). Keeling and
Sprague place Alanna in the “Dragon-Slayer” category, since “Alanna switches places with her
brother so that she may be trained as a knight rather than as a sorceress” (Keeling and Sprague,
“Dragon-Slayer”). I’d argue that Alanna’s more “feminine” side—her healing, magical powers,
and her frequent nurturance and tutelage of outcast youth—places her in the “dragon-sayer”
category as well. I don’t read Alanna as falling solely into either of Keeling and Sprague’s
categories. Rather, I’d argue that Alanna is a heroine in both classically “male” and “female” (if
we subscribe to those as categories) ways.
John Stephens and Robyn McCallum offer a similar analysis in their book Retelling
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Stories, Framing Culture (1998). They point to Alanna’s magic, healing, and connection to the
Great Mother Goddess as the more typically “female” heroic qualities that develop alongside
Alanna’s “male” heroic skillset. Stephens and McCallum laud Alanna for presenting a nuanced
and empowering conception of feminism.153 However, they read the feminism of the series’
third novel, Woman, as set within a Western, Orientalist discourse.154 In my sections below, I
challenge both these readings, arguing instead for Song of the Lioness as offering a third-wave
feminist framework that anticipates Butler’s Gender Trouble (1990). I posit that the series
enacts such third-wave feminism in many different ways (e.g. via cross-dressing [Flanagan
2008]), but that by looking specifically at the ways feminist themes intersect with those of
religion, we can read Song of the Lioness not as simply first-wave feminist (as Keeling and
Sprague’s analysis implies) and not as Orientalist (Stephens and McCallum) but as postcolonial
(as Sahn argues [2016]) and as evinced in Pierce’s specific problematizing of binary, Western
paradigms in the first place.

Pierce’s Heterogeneous Religious Frameworks in the Tortall Universe
As discussed earlier in this chapter, one can easily point to largely Christian themes in
L’Engle’s books, and to Taoist themes prevalent in Le Guin’s. In Pierce’s books, however, it is
not nearly as easy—or in fact truly possible—to tease out one dominant religious strand that
correlates with a “real-world” religious tradition. Instead, Pierce’s novels display a range of
textually-dominant religions (i.e. religions that are equally validated/valorized by the narrative),
each one of which is a heterogeneous amalgam of elements from diverse “real-world” sacred
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myths and traditions. These different religious traditions (within Pierce’s narrative) at times
correlate with different national, ethnic, and racial experiences as well, portraying a religious
diversity on both macro and micro narrative levels. By doing so, Pierce problematizes the
hegemonic, and often manichean and patriarchal, epistemologies present in much children’s
fantasy.
In her Song of the Lioness series (and in its companion series that occupy the same
secondary world), Pierce depicts multiple religious traditions within multiple countries; the
various religions sometimes exist nationally and sometimes within the same country or
continent. In this, Pierce is not unique: Le Guin, for example, does a similar thing (Earthsea
contains multiple, sometimes competing, religions). With Le Guin, though, the ultimate moral
message of the series seems to correlate with Taoist concepts, even if such messages are not
presented as an institutionalized form of religion. Pierce differs from this, as well as from the
Judeo-Christian paradigms of L’Engle, in three ways: first, Tortall—Pierce’s analogue to
medieval Europe—worships a divine pantheon, rather than monotheism; second, the various
religions she depicts (within and outside Tortall) are each amalgams of various “real-world”
religious strands rather than mapping onto unitary “real-world” religions; third, all the religions
depicted in the Tortall universe are depicted as equally valid and positive. Each of these moves
allows Pierce to embed both a feminist critique and a feminist re-imagining of religion, in
different ways.
The first move outlined above, that of depicting a divine pantheon rather than
monotheism, allows Pierce to depict a religious framework that implicitly equalizes (or allows
for equal) gender dynamics. Although the Tortall universe is medieval in its political
governments, industry, and socioeconomics, and although Tortall as a country is analogous to
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medieval Europe in terms of race and culture, Tortall and its neighboring countries do not
observe monotheistic religious traditions. Rather, the pantheon depicts a mix of female, male,
and animal gods. Pierce’s connection of polytheism and gender/sexual politics was intentional.
In an interview with Malinda Lo, Pierce links Tortall’s pagan pantheon with its gender
opportunities:
[...] this is a world where the gods are very much present. There is a kind of monotheism on
the other side of the world that I cover in a couple of stories … but by and large it’s a pagan
world, and it will stay pagan because the gods are very much present and very much part of
people’s lives. So you don’t get this thing of people turning to the idea of a single masculine
god. That’s never going to happen because the real gods are going to come in and put their
feet down. We partly turned into a sex discriminatory society because the pagans decided to
concentrate the bulk of muscle power in a male god, and as many of the world’s religions
turned into monotheism, the embodiment was usually a male god. So it made it easier to say
women are second-class citizens, because if they weren’t, we would be following a female
god. (Lo, “Interview with Tamora Pierce”)
In Pierce’s pantheon, the highest divine powers and authority—those who birthed and rule the
pantheon—are equally split, gender-wise: the “First Powers,” parents of the “Great Gods” and of
(a personified) Chaos, are Father Universe and Mother Flame; the chief Great Gods are the Great
Mother Goddess and Mithros (Pierce “Tortall Glossary”). Having a pantheon rather than a
single god implicitly privileges multiple onto-epistemologies by allowing space for debate and
differing divine perspectives rather than assuming, as a baseline, a single, static ontological truth
as an endpoint for differing religious claims. Having that pantheon governed by both male and
female deities equalizes gender possibilities, as Pierce points to in the quote above.
This is not to say that such egalitarian possibilities always reflect the socio-political, or
even religious, realities of various places and times within the Tortall universe. Tortall, in true
immersive-fantastic fashion, is a fully-realized and thus constantly evolving secondary world.
Mendlesohn identifies immersive secondary worlds as ones that are fully realized, have depth to
the background cultures, histories, ecosystems, etc. in ways that are internally consistent and
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that, just as mimetic/realist fiction does, depict an evolving (as versus static) world—i.e.,
environmental, technological, political, social, economic, and other aspects to the world change
over time, rather than the flat, stage-prop two-dimensionality that often characterizes portal-quest
worlds, in which the scenery is clearly there for the benefit of the protagonist-tourist, rather than
having a life of its own (Rhetorics 13). Pierce’s world-building accords with Mendlesohn’s
criteria for immersive world-building; she depicts the Tortall world as fluid rather than static
(gender, religious, racial, and socio-economic politics change over time), and as layered rather
than flat (the fully-realized layers of imagined economies, ecologies, histories, etc. interplay in
an internally consistent way). As such, societies and individuals within the Tortall universe
world shift in their attitudes towards gender as they shift in their religious, economic, racial, and
political perspectives. Pierce makes these shifts explicit in some of her more recent novels set
within the Tortall universe, such as the Beka Cooper series, set in Tortall two centuries before
Song of the Lioness.155 The mere baseline of a multi-gender, multi-species pantheon, however,
opens the door for a re-imagining of what gender/sexual politics, socio-cultural stances, and
power could have looked like in an otherwise-medieval-European secondary-world analogue.
The second point mentioned above is that the various religions Pierce depicts in the
Tortall universe (within and outside Tortall as a country) are each amalgams of various “realworld” religio-spiritual strands rather than mapping onto unitary “real-world” religions. When
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asked, in an Atlantic interview, about creative influences regarding her deities, Pierce pointed to
Homer, Robert Graves, and James Frazer, among other influences (A. Rosenberg). She
identified Mithros and the Great Mother Goddess as “direct steal[s]” of, respectively, “Mithra [a
Zorastrian divinity]” and a goddess “worshipped in the Mediterranean” (A. Rosenberg). By
mixing multiple real-world religious sources, rather than relying on a singular religious
framework—even a polytheistic one, such as Greek mythology—Pierce further opens Tortall’s
(i.e. the entire secondary world’s) underlying religious paradigmatic possibilities beyond
conventional, recognizable, and often Western-based religious frameworks of much traditional
fantasy. Pierce does so even further by incorporating non-Western, non-European sources, such
as the Zorastrian and Mediterranean ones quoted above. While non-Western and non-European
deities and religio-spiritual beliefs are appearing increasingly frequently in contemporary
fantasy,156 at the time of Song of the Lioness (in the 1980s) this was less common, particularly
amongst children’s fantasy.157
Third, no one religion is given prominence over another within either the narrative
content (e.g. how characters view each other’s religions) or via narrative/authorial tone. For
instance, two of Tortall’s patron gods are the Great Mother Goddess and Mithros; yet Tortallan
characters are free to worship (referred within the narrative as “following”) any god from a
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plethora of options. Alanna follows the Great Mother Goddess—while she encounters and is
respectful towards a range of gods (e.g., Mithros, the Black God (god of death)), she pledges
fealty specifically to the Great Mother Goddess, although she often invokes both the Great
Mother Goddess and Mithros, such as when she tells Ralon, a squire who has been bullying her,
“Never touch me again. If you do, I swear—I swear by Mithros and the Goddess—I’ll kill you”
(Alanna 97). George, however, Alanna’s friend who becomes one of her lovers over the course
of the series (and eventual husband), follows the Trickster god, due to both his occupation (first
as King of Thieves, then as Royal Spymaster) and his personality, which is more compatible
with that of the Trickster—George displays qualities that the Trickster seeks in followers, such
as subterfuge, disregard for rules, humor, wiliness, etc. George’s following of the Trickster is
accepted as a matter of course; it is never raised as an issue, when, say, George mentions
marriage to Alanna—the protests Alanna raises have to do with either class (Hand 89) or her
concerns about losing her personal and career freedom (e.g., her concern that being married and
having babies would restrict her from traveling, adventures, or responsibilities of knighthood).
Similarly, Buri, a K’mir warrior whom Alanna befriends and who joins the central cast of
characters in this and later series, worships different gods than most Tortallans. Buri is from
Sarain, a different country than Tortall; Buri’s people, the K’mir, worship different gods. None
of the other characters find this strange or problematic.
Other examples include those of the Bazhir and the Doi tribesmen. The Bazhir are desert
tribesmen who are loose analogues to Bedouin and Muslim peoples. While the novels do not go
into much depth regarding gods specific to the Bazhir, there are a number of points in which the
text references that Bazhir do have their own specific gods (Woman 24). Additionally, the
Bazhir leader called the Voice functions as both a political and spiritual leader of all the Bazhir
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tribes. Through magic, the Voice connects mentally with every Bazhir member, every day—
passing judgment and retaining memories and history of Bazhir who are no longer living. The
power that the Voice channels is something of a cross between magic (what Alanna recognizes
as the Gift); elemental/earth-magic, similar to that invoked in other Bazhir ceremonies; and
something that is tacitly presented as more spiritual as well: e.g., the Voice receives a “small Gift
of prophecy” (Woman 57) and when the Voice ceremony (the transition from one Voice to the
next) succeeds, it is presumed to be with the gods’ approval (Woman 193). Prince Jonathan
becomes the Voice, and far from this conflicting with his own religio-spiritual beliefs towards
Mithros and the Goddess, the fusion of Jon’s Tortallan and Bazhir traditions and powers seems
to receive their tacit blessing.
The Doi tribesmen also hail from regions outside Tortall. Like the K’mir, the Doi are
racially and ethnically different than Alanna and most Tortallans, who are cued as Caucasian; the
Doi and K’mir are described as “cousins” of each other in that they are similar tribal cultures
living in highlands of Asian-cued countries (Lioness 130). Alanna and her companions
encounter a group of Doi during their (Alanna and company’s) travels in “The Roof of the
World” (Lioness 127), a range of “the highest mountains in their world” (Lioness 130) set within
a region beyond the established borders of monarchy-led countries, a region with “no single
government” (Lioness 127) and, it’s implied, less hospitable climates and habitats. The Doi
appear to have different religio-spiritual traditions than the Tortallans; for example, when Alanna
asks who one of the Doi women is, Liam explains, “A fortune-teller [...] The Doi give them as
much honor as you’d give a priest” (Lioness 141). The Doi fortune-telling, like Bazhir
ceremonial rituals, is something between magic and religion (i.e. from the perspectives of the
characters): interestingly, the exact nature or categorization of Doi fortune-telling is never pinned
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down or defined for either protagonist or reader. Instead, we receive a sequence of varying,
potentially contradictory, and ambiguous classifications by non-Doi characters: Liam claims that
Doi fortune-telling “isn’t the same [as magic]. No sparkly fire, nothing flying at you, or things
changing. A Doi looks at something real” (Lioness 141, original emphasis). Alanna, in contrast,
first thinks of Doi fortune-telling as simply a different kind of magic—a more elemental-oriented
magic: “Curious, Alanna probed [the fortune-telling] with her Gift. The fortune-teller’s magic
was like Bazhir magic; it was drawn from the land rather than from a source inside the person
who wielded it” (Lioness 142). Moments later, though, when Alanna is having her fortune read,
Alanna senses something different: “When [the Doi fortune-teller] spoke, Alanna could feel a
power in her words that was nothing like the Doi magic she’d sensed earlier. This was stronger
and untamed” (Lioness 143). Alanna thinks of this latter incident as “the other magic that had
spoken through the fortune-teller” (Lioness 143, original emphasis), a foreshadowing of that
other power as Chitral, the elemental being guarding the pass, whom Alanna battles to obtain the
Dominion Jewel. Chitral is not a god, but it is an immortal being that has deity-like
characteristics; when Alanna asks “Are you one of the gods?” Chitral responds, “No. I come
from before. Your gods are children to my brethren and me [...] I am this place, and these
mountains. I suppose you might call me an elemental” (Lioness 163, original emphasis). Pierce
never explicitly states whether the Doi worship Chitral in a religio-spiritual manner; however, all
the above points—Liam’s insistence that Doi fortune-telling is something more akin to Tortallan
religion than magic, Alanna’s association of Doi environmental magic with that of the Bazhir,
and Chitral’s presence as a drastically different kind of immortal even older than the gods—all of
these factors imply a religio-spiritual culture that is different than those dominant in the more
Western-cued countries, yet that is just as accepted and validated by those Western-cued
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characters.
These three moves—depicting a divine pantheon, rather than monotheism; depicting
secondary-world religions that mix multiple and non-Western real-world sources; and portraying
diverse religions within the secondary world that are equally validated—these are just some of
the ways Pierce problematizes hegemonic tropes of much prior and traditional fantasy. While
some of these moves are specifically feminist in putting female and/or feminist deities in
positions of power, the larger, underlying feminist ethos at play in Pierce’s theological
imaginings is in their eschewing singular, static, and monolithic conceptualizations of religious
ontology and practice. Instead, the prevailing message of Pierce’s books, morally, seem to be a
call to questioning and critique—a questioning and critique that live alongside, and often
buttress, a spiritual fealty towards various divine beings (whether gods, elementals, or more
amorphous, eco-spiritual powers such as the land itself, as seems to be the case with the Bazhir).
In this, Pierce’s message seems similar to that of Jones (in the Dalemark books and also
elsewhere), with the exception that Pierce’s gods do self-identify as gods, who both desire and
need mortal worship (as versus Jones’ gods who defy their deification by humans and who resist
worship, since worship binds and sometimes harms them). Pierce’s gods draw their power from
their mortal worshipers—both from the religious strength (e.g. faith, practices) of mortal
worshipers towards the specific god in question, and from the general state of such mortal
worshipers even in ostensibly “secular” matters (e.g. political and economic power).158 Despite
this significant difference, however, Pierce’s gods are similar to Jones’ in that over and over,
Pierce’s gods show that they approve of, rely on, and reward protagonists who challenge,
critique, and question both the gods and the human-societal status quo. In other words, Pierce
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portrays human-divine interactions that specifically subvert the submissive, authoritative,
obedient human-divine relationship depicted in much traditional portal quest fantasy (both
children’s and adult’s).
Such a human-divine relationship (i.e. one based on questioning and critique), while not
integral to every immersive fantasy, is made possible by—and particularly resonant with—
immersive rhetoric’s emphasis on questioning and critique. As Mendlesohn explains, immersive
protagonists “are antagonists within their world…[They] make their worlds by continually
arguing ‘it doesn’t have to be this way’” (Rhetorics 66-7, emphasis in original). If portal-quest
rhetoric (or even, at times, intrusive-fantastic rhetoric, such as that of Cooper’s Dark is Rising
series) invites obedient dynamics—of protagonists toward their guides (Mendlesohn, Rhetorics,
32) and, as I’d argue, toward divine figures as well—then immersive rhetoric may be said to
invite not only protagonist “arguing” with the world itself (e.g., in Mendlesohn’s examples, with
societal status quo or political leadership) but a similar “arguing” (i.e., questioning, challenging)
with divine beings—presumably pinnacle embodiments of authority—as well. This brings us to
Pierce’s second tactic: an emphasis on questioning and arguing, through both immersive rhetoric
and narrative content (e.g. protagonist arguing with gods, and gods encouraging this).

Pierce’s Immersive Rhetoric and Emphasis on Critique
At first glance, one might view the Song of the Lioness quartet as a portal quest narrative
structure. While the series takes place in a completely immersed secondary world, readers still
experience a portal-like transition as Alanna, the protagonist, journeys from a familiar world (her
home estate of Trebond) to the new world of Corus, the capital city and royal palace.
Mendlesohn describes a similar effect in Lord of the Rings, when Frodo journeys from the
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familiar world of the Shire to other parts of Middle Earth (Rhetorics, 2). Alanna’s initial
impressions of Corus have the flat, touristy quality that Mendlesohn identifies as endemic to
portal quest fantasy; because Alanna is, in essence, a tourist, she (and the reader) are
overwhelmed with a tapestry of sensory details, unable to pick out what’s important or not, and
lack a sound frame by which to organize and analyze (and thus potentially argue against)
meaning. So, too, Alanna’s narrative trajectory has a number of quest-like elements: her questlike journey to become a knight and to defeat the villain threatening the throne (books one and
two); her literal quest for the Dominion Jewel; and finally her task, upon returning home, of
securing her king to his throne and defeating the resurrected villain, Duke Roger.
However, the dominating rhetoric in the series, regarding both narrative structure and
point of view, is an immersive one. In terms of narrative structure, while Alanna’s quest to
become a knight does, in some ways, parallel the thematics of a typical portal quest fantasy,
Alanna largely remains geographically stationary during most of her “journey” to become a
knight. With the exception of a few field trips (her visit with Myles to Olau, her class’s trip to
learn about the Bazhir) and one military campaign (in Hand), most of the action takes place at
the palace training yards. Alanna’s quest for the Dominion Jewel (in Lioness) is arguably the
narrative strand that adheres the most to traditional portal-quest structure. This quest, however,
is limited in scope both in terms of textual space (occupying a total of only three and a half
chapters across the entire series) and in terms of importance to the overall narrative. Alanna’s
feat is depicted as significant in a few notable ways: it is a heroic feat of a fantastic nature (her
battle with the elemental to obtain a legendary jewel); it validates Alanna as a knight in the eyes
of political conservatives (who oppose female knights) and validates Jon’s choice of Alanna as
King’s Champion; and the jewel itself plays a role in saving the kingdom during the climactic
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battle. Despite these factors, however, Alanna’s quest for the Dominion Jewel is simply not the
overarching emphasis of the series, nor the most significant in terms of either plot or protagonist
development. Jon makes it very clear that he would have chosen Alanna as King’s Champion
regardless, and the main conflict of the series—that with Duke Roger—is unrelated to the jewel
quest.
The point of view in Song of the Lioness is also an immersive one. Alanna’s first, touristlike impressions of Corus and the palace contrast with her rapid acclimation to her environment.
Beyond this early chapter, the impression readers receive of Corus and the palace are highly
immersive ones: Alanna focuses on the particular details of her surroundings which are relevant
to her—to her emotional, mental, and physical concerns at a given moment. This is similar to
Mendlesohn’s description of immersive as focalizing not through exotic details but rather
through protagonist’s emotional emphases. Because Song of the Lioness is written in a close
third-person narrative voice, Alanna’s lens serves as focalizer for reader as well: we do not see
much beyond what Alanna sees.159 Yet it is evident that much exists beyond our narrative frame
of vision, a frame constructed by Alanna’s immediate/local thoughts and perspectives. Pierce’s
world is fully-realized, with depth, history, and internal consistency that extend beyond the pages
of the book (i.e. beyond the scope of the particular story we are reading). The narrative, rather
than focusing on a tourist-like depiction of the city, palace, governmental structures, or of this
world’s history or legends, focuses instead on Alanna’s training. Readers receive details
regarding Alanna’s training as a knight and development as a character, rather than details
regarding either the surrounding, secondary world or the fantastic elements within the story,
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which are often rendered mundane. All of this correlates with Mendlesohn’s descriptions of
immersive, rather than portal quest, rhetoric.
The ramification of such immersive rhetoric is that Alanna, as a character fully immersed
within a fully-realized world, is able to occupy an antagonistic stance toward her surroundings,
and question/critique the world around her. As Sahn argues, “The Song of the Lioness quickly
establishes itself in the immersive mode when, in the opening pages of Alanna: The First
Adventure (1983), Alanna questions her world in a way that no one else around her does” (151).
Such questioning (in Alanna’s case, questioning her society’s exclusion of girls from
knighthood) enables and encourages readers’ questionings as well: “Alanna’s questioning
produces an openness that remains even when the text itself asserts closure in its events—an
openness that remains available outside the secondary world. Even when she fails to raise
questions the reader remains in a position to argue, ‘it doesn’t have to be this way’” (Sahn 151).
In this way, then, Pierce’s novels may be compared to Jones’, and to the comics/graphic
novels discussed in chapter five, in that Pierce’s works promote a dialectical mode of critique
through both their rhetoric (immersive fantastic) and thematic content (rewarding/validating
characters’ questions/critiques). Pierce’s emphasis on, and validation of, questioning and
critique extends to numerous thematic aspects of the series: feminist critiques of patriarchal
societies and binary gender paradigms; postcolonial racial and ethnic critiques; and
socioeconomic critiques, to name just a few. Scholars such as Victoria Flanagan and Sarah F.
Sahn have addressed the gender/feminist and postcolonial critiques of Song of the Lioness, and I
build on their work when I address Pierce’s gender/feminist critiques below. First, though, I
address the ways in which Pierce emphasizes critique and questioning as a mode for the
protagonist’s relationship with divine figures and authority.
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In much children’s fantasy pre-1980s, relationships between mortal protagonists and
immortal and/or divine figures often emphasize a hierarchical, subservient, and/or obedient
dynamic (with humans subservient/obedient towards the immortal/divine figures). As we have
already seen, Jones problematizes and subverts this paradigm through, among other techniques,
inverting the power dynamics. L’Engle upholds much of this paradigmatic framework, but
carves space for questioning and critique as permissible (and sometimes integral) components of
said hierarchical relationship. L’Engle’s move is oddly inconsistent, though, as the benign
divine figures oscillate between validating and censoring protagonist critique, and the villainous
divine figures consistently encourage protagonist critique as (ostensibly) a route toward
discontent and evil.
Pierce’s approach shares some traits with both the approaches of Jones and L’Engle.
Like L’Engle, Pierce upholds a traditional, hierarchical paradigm between deities and humans in
many ways, especially in Song of the Lioness.160 This hierarchical paradigm is for the most part
positively cued, and the deities Alanna encounters are largely benign (the elemental guardian of
the Dominion Jewel is arguably an exception in its apparent neutrality regarding mortal concerns
and in its ambiguously-toned ethical/moral standpoint). Alanna shows fealty and humility in
most of her interactions with deities.161
Yet Pierce emphasizes that such fealty includes, and even demands, questioning and
critique. Unlike traditional portal-quest guide figures (divine or human) who give protagonists
directions, commands, and/or guidance, Pierce’s gods rarely do so. Rather (and in a vein similar
to Jones’ Undying), Pierce’s gods ask questions. Even when Alanna blatantly asks the Great
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Mother Goddess for guidance, as she does in the beginning of Lioness, the goddess still replies
with questions geared to empower Alanna in Alanna’s agency and autonomy:
“Where do you ride, my Daughter? [...] You have achieved all you desired, have you not?
A shield is yours, rightfully won. You have slain your greatest enemy. What do you seek
now, Alanna?”
Alanna shrugged. “I don’t know. I feel there’s something important I should be doing,
but I have no idea what it is. I’m just—drifting. That’s why I brought the map here to be
translated. Maybe it’ll point me toward—Unless you need me for something?” she asked,
hopeful.
The Goddess smiled. “I do not plan mortals’ lives for them, Alanna. You must do that
for yourself. However, if you follow the map, you will find its path interesting. But think as
you ride. [...] What will become of you? Will you drift all your days? [...] Who will you
be, Alanna?” She was gone. (Lioness 23)
Here, as in other points in Lioness, the Great Mother Goddess refuses to give direct orders;
rather, she asks questions of Alanna: “Where do you ride,” “What do you seek,” “What will
become of you?” and “Who will you be, Alanna?” Granted, the tone here is still lofty and
mysterious—the tone of a goddess asking weighty questions about choice and destiny—and the
trope of gods asking such questions and refusing to answer them has precedent in much portalquest and high fantasy. However, the Great Mother Goddess here is not only asking such
enigmatic questions regarding Alanna’s personal choice as to her own path and destiny—these
questions, and omission of direction, applies to Alanna’s quest as well. The map Alanna
references is the one that will lead her on her quest for the Dominion Jewel—arguably the most
explicit quest-like segment of Alanna’s bildungsroman across the series. Alanna’s procural of
the jewel for King Jonathan secures their victory against Duke Roger in the concluding battle—a
battle in which Roger attempts to destroy the capital city (Jonathan uses the Jewel to gain hold of
his land magically, and stabilize it). Yet despite the ultimate importance of the Dominion Jewel,
and thus of Alanna’s quest, the Goddess does not direct Alanna on her quest—she does not tell
Alanna that the map leads to the Jewel; she does not tell Alanna to seek the Jewel; she does not
even tell Alanna to simply follow the map. All the Goddess says regarding this quest—a quest
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that should be all rights be epic—is that if Alanna follows the map, she will find “its path
interesting,” and due to the Goddess’ omission, Alanna does not yet realize that there even is a
quest to be had with the map—although she is certainly, by this point, seeking an “adventure”
(Woman 284). The implication from the Goddess’ discourse and tone is that Alanna could
choose to follow the map and subsequent quest, or Alanna could not—either way, it is implied,
would be fine; it is up to Alanna. Rather, the questions the Goddess finds more important—
implied by their repetition and emphases—are questions about Alanna’s individual life, path, and
identity.
The implication here is that it is not so much any one quest that matters, or any single list
of specific directions from a goddess—rather, it is a more holistic, cumulative, and fundamental
question of the type of life Alanna will create for herself, and the type of person she will become,
that matters—and that this is something Alanna must figure out for herself. The only guidance
the Goddess gives regarding these foundational issues is to continuously ask questions that force
Alanna to think. This holds true across the novels: the Goddess has a similar interaction with
Alanna towards the climactic end of Lioness (Lioness 309-310), and even Alanna’s first
conversation with the Goddess162 is marked by this same dialogic, protagonist-centered guidance
(Hand 9-18). The Goddess does acknowledge that she is there to guide Alanna in lieu of a
mortal mother (Alanna’s mother died in childbirth), yet her guidance comes in the form of
prompting Alanna to talk through Alanna’s fears. While the Goddess’ prompts are not always
questions per se, they are clearly meant to set Alanna talking, and thinking, through Alanna’s
current obstacles—be those internal or external challenges. As in the episode quoted above, the
Goddess’ questions and prompts do not give Alanna answers—rather, they give Alanna a space
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in which to acknowledge, and talk through, her fears and challenges.
Alanna’s relationship with the Goddess as described above—a relationship founded on
questions, dialogue, and open-ended possibility rather than reductive instruction and
obedience—subverts traditional hierarchical relationships, in much children’s and genre fantasy,
between gods and mortals and between figures of authority in general (e.g. guide figures,
political authorities) and protagonists. Additionally, however, their relationship bears feminist
ramifications in its eschewing of the importance of answers altogether. In Alanna’s interactions
with the Goddess, one might expect the narrative tone to suggest that there are concrete,
objective answers to Alanna’s questions and the Goddess is simply not revealing them so that
Alanna finds the answers on her own. However, the narrative actually conveys the opposite
concept. The narrative implies, via tone and dialogue, that the Goddess—and Alanna, at this
point—does not yet know the answers, that there are multiple possible answers, and that the
importance lies in the questioning, and resulting critical thinking, in and of itself. There is no
single, neat answer as to “who will [Alanna] be”—rather, it is an ever-evolving question with an
ever-evolving response. Often throughout the series, when pivotal female characters, such as
Alanna or the Bazhir shamans Kara and Kourrem, are given binary choices, their responses are
to problematize that very binary framework in and of itself—to ask “why not both?” I address
this dynamic in more detail in the following section.

Bazhir Women
In this section, I argue that a close analysis of Bazhir women within the series, and,
specifically, the issue of Kara and Kourrem’s face veils, reveals a nuanced and radical view of
feminism—one that is progressive, yet, simultaneously, respectful toward more conservative
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cultural traditions.
The series conveys this complex feminism and cultural openness due to its depiction of
characters—both Western-analogue (Alanna) and Mideastern-analogue (Kara and Kourrem)—
working their ways through and ultimately embracing what we would now describe as thirdwave feminism. Song of the Lioness anticipates a feminist politics laid out in Butler’s Gender
Trouble (1990)—one which problematizes the very dichotomous framework and gender
paradigm within which first and second wave feminisms operated. Over the course of the four
novels, Alanna realizes that she can choose to reject an externally propagated epistemology of a
rigid dichotomy of “all woman” versus “all warrior”—she chooses not to choose, in other words.
One example of this is Alanna’s choices of dress, makeup, and jewelry: at various points in the
novels, Alanna consciously chooses to dress and perform feminine, masculine, and combinations
of the two roles via various garments—male clothes and armor (both during her disguise as a boy
and in the subsequent two novels, once her female identity is well-known), dresses and makeup,
androgynous pants-tunic-skirt combinations, and more.163 When Faithful (Alanna’s magical cat)
complains that Alanna wants “to be warrior and woman. You want to travel and serve Jonathan
[the king]. Can’t you make up your mind about what you want,” Alanna queries, “Who says I
can’t have a little bit of each?” The narrative describes: “When [Alanna] realized what she’d
said, she began to grin. ‘That’s right—why can’t I? And I’ve done pretty well, I think!’” (Lioness
308). By choosing not to choose, Alanna disrupts the existing societal gender dichotomy by
superseding it. Alanna’s success at “choosing” both exposes as fallacious the view that these
categories—“woman” and “warrior”—are mutually exclusive; yet her success is not simple or
static. Specifically because she disrupts the paradigm, she is heading into unchartered waters:

163

For further discussion of Alanna’s choice of garment and the gender and sexual politics of such choices, see
Flanagan, Into the Closet (2008).

194

she must create a new epistemological paradigm for herself, which can yield greater rewards, but
is also more intellectually complex and demanding.
So too, Kara and Kourrem face the binary—perhaps mistakenly purported by Alanna
herself—that sees a progressive, feminist belief as incompatible with a patriarchal spiritual
tradition or stricture. And, just as Alanna later does, Kourrem and Kara respond by choosing
both—tacitly rejecting the premise that the two truths are mutually exclusive. All three female
heroes disrupt the binaries with which they are presented, as well as the belief that those binaries
are mutually exclusive. More fundamentally, though, they shift the very paradigm for a
conception of what “feminism” means in the first place. Rather than defining feminism through
a specific set of criteria (no matter how nuanced), these heroines find their feminist identities
within the very act of navigating the space between such frameworks. For all these characters,
“feminism” means the very grappling with different facets of self identity, and the integrity and
courage to face that struggle in the first place: for Alanna, this occurs within the realm of martial
arts and political position (as knight and noble within a court that had outlawed female knights);
for Kara and Kourrem, this occurs within the religio-cultural and ethnic sphere of becoming the
first female Bazhir shamans. Kara and Kourrem’s trajectory—their tutelage in magic by Alanna,
and their reciprocal tutelage of Alanna regarding Bazhir culture and different ways of
conceptualizing feminism—exemplifies ways that feminist empowerment can occur specifically
through proactively choosing to continue one’s ethnic, religious, or cultural traditions—such as,
for Kara and Kourrem, wearing veils.
Kara and Kourrem first appear in the third novel of the series, Woman. By this point,
Alanna has won her shield, revealed her sex, and is living among a Bazhir desert tribe. The
Bazhir are presented as loosely-analogous to Arab and Mideastern peoples: Bazhir are nomadic

195

tribes with a deeply traditional culture—especially with regards to gender. Women wear face
veils at the onset of menstruation, weave, cook, heal, and raise children. Men train as warriors,
participate in politics, and occupy leadership positions such as headman and shaman.
Alanna’s arrival disrupts traditional Bazhir life. She becomes the tribe’s first female
warrior, and thus the first female to join the nightly fire at which tribe politics are decided.
Alanna soon becomes the tribe’s first female shaman and trains two of the tribe’s girls as her
apprentices. Coram, Alanna’s mentor, points out that the Bazhir “haven’t changed in centuries,
and ye’re forcin’ them to accept things yer own people can’t accept—not easily.” Alanna
responds, “But don’t you see? To the Bazhir, I’m a legend. They take things from me they
wouldn’t take from anyone else” (Woman 119, original emphasis). Alanna does succeed at
instigating some change. Ali Mukhtab, a Bazhir spiritual leader called the Voice, tells Alanna:
“You have done more than most Bazhir have accomplished in a lifetime. You have made girls
shamans. You have begun a school for magic that will live and grow to become the greatest
such school in existence” (Woman 138).
However, certain Bazhir customs Alanna cannot alter. Alanna is unable to convince Kara
and Kourrem, her apprentices, to remove their face veils. Mukhtab tells Alanna that Kara and
Kourrem are right to keep their veils. He explains, “They have overcome too many old ideas,
but this one they can never change. A woman without a veil is a woman of bad repute among the
tribes. Good women may not speak to her, and good men may not know her” (Woman 138).
Their conversation is interrupted; the only time the text returns to this issue is at Kara and
Kourrem’s rite of shamans, when Alanna, somewhat ambiguously, thinks “They’ll be good for
the tribe, even if they do want to keep their face veils” (Woman 176, original emphasis).
Some scholars, such as Stephens and McCallum, read Alanna’s interactions with the
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Bazhir—and particularly her attempts to persuade Kara and Kourrem to abandon their veils—as
orientalist:
…it does seem clear that in her depiction of Alanna’s education of her female
apprentices…[Pierce] is attempting to instill a female consciousness that is essentially
Western…Alanna succeeds in persuading [Kara and Kourrem] to take their places amongst
the men, but her recurrent attempts to persuade them to discard their veils raises a more
complex issue of the relationship between sign and thing. (249)
Stephens and McCallum read the veil as “presented as a contentious issue without being worked
through, and seems to end up being designated a cultural trait, a marker of a rather quaint
otherness.” The veil, therefore, “cannot escape association” with a Western discourse that the
veil epitomizes Islam’s innate oppression of women, and that Muslim societies can only progress
after discarding these practices intrinsic to Islam – thus discarding Islam itself. Stephens and
McCallum further contend that Pierce missed an opportunity to “develop a connection between
the veil as a sign and Alanna’s more personal concern with clothing as a gender marker” (24950).
I acknowledge Stephens and McCallum’s reading as one viable interpretation, especially
considering the context of their project here, which investigates Western metanarratives of the
Orient within children’s literature. However, I read the veil scenes very differently. While I
agree that the veil theme is interrupted and never explicitly developed, I would argue that the
significance of the veil is implicitly developed. My reading makes no claim regarding authorial
intention or even regarding Alanna’s perspective; rather, I argue that there is room to read the
veil, and Kara and Kourrem’s embrace of it, as actually indicative of a more nuanced, respectful,
and simultaneously radical, feminist epistemology than that presented by either McCallum and
Stephens, or by Keeling and Sprague.
My analysis of the veil focuses on three issues. First is the significance of Ali Mukhtab’s
support for Kara and Kourrem’s decision. Mukhtab is presented as a mystic, wise, and
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emotionally supportive figure to both Bazhir and Alanna—when his character speaks, readers are
triggered to trust him, even to sometimes privilege his view over Alanna’s. Alanna mentions
Kara and Kourrem’s veils in her aforementioned conversation regarding her impact on the
Bazhir; Alanna’s shock that Mukhtab foretold these changes is matched only by her indignation
that he knew and remained silent. Mukhtab replies he has learned to keep his silence about the
future, because it will come without his help. This accords with an earlier textual moment in
which Mukhtab explains the Bazhir belief in the “Great Balance,” with which Alanna also
disagrees, saying she prefers action over passivity (Woman 68-9). I read in both of Mukhtab’s
responses to Alanna a subtle lesson that so-called “passivity” is not always as passive as it
seems—rather, passivity can sometimes reflect a kind of active “keeping,” or “preserving,”
whether preserving knowledge or a tradition. The Bazhir notion of the “Great Balance,” and of
the importance of at times choosing to do “nothing” in a way that is not passive but actively
maintaining, preserving, or refraining from harm, thus accords thematically with the ethics of
“not doing” in Earthsea described in the previous section.164 Through such discussions, Mukhtab
encourages non-orientalist and non-colonial perspectives of viewing a culturally-other idea from
within that other culture’s own perspective and not only from one’s external vantage point.
The second aspect of my analysis focuses on the pragmatic implications of the veil.
Mukhtab does not justify the veils by necessarily ascribing intrinsic worth to the veil itself. He
makes no argument that women, by nature, should have their faces covered. Rather, he reminds
Alanna that, given the Bazhir cultural reality at the moment, an unveiled woman simply would
never, pragmatically, be accepted as an average citizen, much less a shaman or leader. Kara and
Kourrem break through societal strictures as it is—their entire endeavor would be worthless if
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the men and women in their tribe did not accept their leadership. It is possible to read Mukhtab’s
descriptions of the veil here as according with views of the veil as a symbol—rather than as a
sacred object/action in and of itself165—as it seems Stephens and McCallum do; if their reading
is accurate then this instance would, as they claim, display a Western bias. However, I would
argue that such a reading is premature. Mukhtab does not go into detail, in his conversation with
Alanna, as to the veil’s meaning—symbolic, performative, sacred, or other. Rather, he simply
states the fact that Kara and Kourrem would not be accepted without their veils. Stephens and
McCallum seem to interpret this as indicating Mukhtab’s purely strategic (and symbolic)
conceptualization of the veil. However, the tone of this episode does not imply that that is the
entirety or complexity of Mukhtab’s view of the matter. Indeed, most of Mukhtab’s explanations
to or conversations with Alanna are marked by purposeful silences, omissions, and the sense that
Mukhtab is giving Alanna only one piece of a much more complex picture—and constructing
that piece in a manner comprehensible and palatable to Alanna’s outsider and culturally-other
standpoint. In other words, the textual tone of Mukhtab’s explanation to Alanna here, in context
of their other interactions, implies that this pragmatic view of the veil (as symbol) is simply one
facet of a larger meaning. Certainly, Mukhtab’s view of the veil as a pragmatic symbol, to the
tribe, of the continuance of their traditions in face of a culturally-other majority and swiftly
changing modernity defies stereotypical, Western, and orientalized views of the veil as
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oppressive and/or inherently misogynistic.166 Thus, far from relegating the veil to a quaint
marker of otherness as Stephens and McCallum argue, Pierce imagines, via Mukhtab’s
statement, ways that the veil, by its very indication of conservative perpetuation, may make the
new, controversial female shaman more palatable. Ironically, Kara and Kourrem’s decision to
keep their veils may actually open more doors for girls to follow their path.
To clarify, I do not argue that Mukhtab’s character, or Pierce’s text, presents the veil as
an intrinsically undesirable, yet pragmatically necessary, custom. To do so would, indeed, be
viewing the issue from a Western hegemonic lens. What I argue, rather, is that neither
Mukhtab’s comment nor the overarching narrative address whether, from the Bazhir perspective,
the veil has intrinsic value or not. Instead, the text presents the veil as one facet of an
overarching, endangered Bazhir tradition. The Bazhir hang on a thin thread—cultural survival
relies on a carefully balanced merger with the external, dominating society. The Bazhir need to
adapt some traditions for survival’s sake (and, thus, Jonathan becomes the Voice; Alanna
becomes a shaman)—but, so too, they need to maintain some traditions, or risk losing their
cultural identity.
The third aspect to my analysis centers on Kara and Kourrem themselves, and the
significance of their choice of the veil. Contrary to Stephens and McCallum, I read Kara and
Kourrem’s choice to keep their veils as specifically alluding to Alanna’s gendered clothing
choices throughout the series. Alanna chooses to wear dresses and makeup, versus pants or
armor, versus a combination of pants, skirts, and earrings, throughout the series. Alanna’s
choice in dress represents her acceptance of different aspects of her identity: the warrior aspect
as well as the womanly aspect. By the conclusion of the series, Alanna realizes that she can be

166

For more on the history of veils within Islam, and its implications at various historical junctures regarding both
colonialism and feminism, see Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (1992), chapter 8.
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both woman and warrior (Lioness 308). I would argue that readers can view Kara and
Kourrem’s choice regarding their veils in a similar light. I read the veils as representing
traditional Bazhir culture—a culture which, despite its restrictions for women and for Kara and
Kourrem specifically (in their childhood as outcasts), is still an integral aspect of their identities,
just as much as Alanna’s womanhood is crucial to her identity. Kara and Kourrem actively
choose to adhere to this part of their cultural upbringing, despite Alanna’s protests.
This view of feminism, and the characters of Kara and Kourrem specifically, can be
enormously useful and inspiring for readers who come from more conservative religious or
cultural backgrounds. From a pedagogic perspective, Kara and Kourrem can serve as an entry
point for such readers to articulate and explore any of their own struggles regarding conflicting
ideologies or cultural norms in their lives, and to discuss what personal choices mean in different
cultural contexts. To my mind, Kara and Kourrem are particularly useful characters,
pedagogically, due to the open-ended nature of all the issues I raised in this chapter. Such
openness can allow for more space for readers—youth and adults alike—to engage creatively
with the crucial life questions Pierce raises, allowing for multifaceted dialogue of potentially
contrasting reader interpretations, reactions, and resonances.
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Chapter 4: Golems, Jinn, & Jews in Space: Emerging Jewish Speculative Fiction

Until now, this dissertation has discussed feminist re-imaginings of religio-spiritualities
in texts from the 1950s through the 1980s. Chapters four and five switch temporal gears to
consider how such feminist epistemologies and mystical-fantastic dynamics play out in twentyfirst century Jewish children’s speculative fiction. This temporal leap reflects an industry shift:
broadly speaking, the 1950s through 1980s did not see many (if any) overtly-Jewish children’s
and young adult speculative-fiction novels; most of the overtly Jewish children’s and young
adult chapter books of these decades were realist fiction (set either in contemporary or historical
periods).167 While one can point to picture books and comics from these decades that can be
termed speculative fiction as well as “Jewish” (by at least some definitions of both terms), one is
much more hard-pressed to point to “Jewish” speculative fiction in prose, chapter-book form
aimed at child and young adult readers.
The contemporary field—i.e. twenty-first century children’s and young adult speculativefiction prose—has drastically changed in this regard. Starting from at least 2008 if not earlier,
through 2017, increasing numbers of children’s and young adult speculative fiction titles can be
termed “Jewish” in that they either explicitly depict Jewish content (characters, texts, references)
and/or themes, or implicitly engage in Jewish tropes and are written by authors self-identifying
as Jewish.
This publication phenomenon, while small compared to overall speculative-fiction
publishing numbers, shows a veritable explosion of Jewish speculative fiction compared to prior
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This is my sense from my research and personal (i.e. informal) surveying thus far; I have yet to find scholarship
that conducts an exhaustive survey of all “Jewish children’s literature” titles written in English and breaks them
down by genre.
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decades. If this is not a passing publishing fad, then such numbers bespeak a new, emerging
phenomenon: perhaps a new crop of Jewish speculative-fiction writers, perhaps new audiences,
perhaps a new literary zeitgeist simply more open to speculative-fiction (and thus enabling
Jewish writers to write speculative-fiction in addition to or in place of realist fiction), perhaps all
three. It is too early yet to determine whether this is a passing or enduring trend, and, if the
latter, its exact nature and/or cause. What we can do at this point, though—and what I argue is
productive—is to examine if and how themes, rhetorics, and politics from the earlier texts (i.e.
those discussed in chapters one through three) find parallels in, and speak to, the twenty-first
century texts. I mean this not in a causal way (contemporary writers directly working off the
writers examined in chapters one through three), but if earlier books were indicative of broader
trends within children’s fantasy, we may see those trends informing the current field and may
illuminate work that the current texts are performing.
This chapter, therefore, explores four prose, children’s and young adult novels: Phoebe
North’s Starglass (2013) and Starbreak (2014), Ari Goelman’s The Path of Names (2013)
(henceforth Path), and Shana Mlawski’s Hammer of Witches (2013) (henceforth Hammer). I
chose these novels for a number of reasons. First, all explicitly portray Jewish characters,
settings, and content within speculative fiction (as versus authors such as Leah Cypess, for
example, who is Orthodox Jewish, and whose young adult fantasy lends itself to reading via a
Jewish lens, but is set in a secondary world and does not overtly engage in nominal Judaism).
Second, all three novels work within the explicit realms and genres of speculative fiction, as
versus works such as Yolen’s Briar Rose (1992) or The Devil’s Arithmetic (1988), for example,
which employ fairy tale or science-fiction tropes but operate predominantly in realist modes.168
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I decided to omit Holocaust novels, first due to a problem with scope (to do such a conversation justice would
necessitate incorporating the much broader category of Holocaust literature altogether, which exceeds the scope of
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Third, although all the novels at hand blur Mendlesohn’s rhetorical boundaries to some extent—a
point to which I return below—they can be loosely categorized as intrusive fantasy (Path),
portal-quest (Hammer), and science-fiction/immersive-science-fantasy (Starglass and
Starbreak).
Despite these fantasy-categorical differences, the novels engage in similar political work
regarding fantastic and Jewish rhetorics, and regarding the underlying ideologies of these
different rhetorics; all the novels display awareness and interrogation of not only the Jewish, but
the speculative-fiction traditions from which they emerge. These novels also speak to each other
in their complex portrayals of Jewish culture, identity, and religion, and in their engagements
with the otherworldly and monstrous. All employ common rhetorical strategies that render the
“Jewish fantastic” immersive: all incorporate Jewish texts, themes, and diction in ways that
simultaneously familiarize and defamiliarize such Jewish content to and from readers. Their
immersive and kabbalistic methodologies encourage dialectical reader-text interactions that
jointly construct meaning. North, Goelman, and Mlawski thus foreground feminist concerns in
two ways: through surface privileging of female characters and narrative voices, and through
more embedded feminist critiques of the constructedness of language, identity, and ontology.
Juxtaposed with the children’s fantasy and kabbalistic, Beat poetry of my prior chapters, these
21st century texts present ways to rethink our definitions of, and approaches to, the category

this current project); secondly due to the murky turf of determining what is “fantasy” versus realist in such works.
Scholars such as Lassner and Cohen (“Magical Transports”), and Kerman and Browning (editors of The Fantastic in
Holocaust Literature and Film, 2014), include works such as Jane Yolen’s The Devil’s Arithmetic (1988) and Briar
Rose (1992) and Spiegelman’s Maus (1986-91) among the texts discussed due to such texts’ engagements with
fantastic devices such as time travel (The Devil’s Arithmetic) or animal heads on human figures (Maus). While their
conversations are important ones, especially in The Fantastic in Holocaust Literature and Film (including a
foreword by Yolen), it seems to me that such texts do not operate in similar enough fantastic modes as the texts I
discuss here—at least, not without significant reframing of the underlying, driving inquiry. It also does not seem
self-evident to me that minimal use of certain fantastic devices, such as time travel, automatically designate such a
novel as “fantasy” (as Lassner and Cohen seem to imply) when the core of the story is historical realism.
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“Jewish literature.”
Goelman and Mlawski both depict magic via intrusive rhetoric (magic intruding in an
otherwise “realist” world); in terms of their other narrative elements, however, Goelman depicts
an ostensibly intrusive framework (the stationary, domestic setting of summer camp), while
Hammer operates in more of a portal-quest arc (the protagonist leaves on a quest and journeys to
new, alien lands). North’s works can be classified as science fiction, dystopia, immersive, or
perhaps science fantasy. North is immersive both because of her science-fiction framework and
because she renders the Jewish content immersive: as background, world-building culture,
always explicit and normalized, and often unexplained (in true immersive fashion). Goelman
and Mlawski, however, offer more explanation of Jewish content as it arises in their novels,
which accords with intrusive-fantastic rhetoric; i.e. their novels take place in the “real world” and
magic intrudes, hence it is explained to or by protagonists, and for readers.169 However, even
though Path and Hammer do not operate within immersive-rhetorical modes regarding their
depictions of the fantastic or regarding protagonist viewpoints (both protagonists are in new
settings for most of the narratives), both novels emphasize critical reading as empowerment, and
as necessary methodologies/strategies for protagonists to navigate their worlds—and, by
extension, for readers to navigate the text. By so doing, these novels, despite their ostensive
intrusive or portal-quest narrative trajectories, parallel much of immersive rhetoric’s ideological
and political implications and potentialities. Additionally, Goelman and Mlawski’s takes on
themes such as the Jewish monstrous, Jewish fantastic, and kabbalistic content are particularly
illuminating when placed in conversation with the poets of chapter one; despite the lack of
awareness or overt connection between these writers (i.e. Goelman and Mlawski on the one hand
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and Meltzer and Drachler on the other), their uses of kabbalah, fantasy, and talmudic/midrashic
rhetoric/methodologies show striking parallels—as do some of the political/ideological
ramifications of such rhetoric.

Kabbalah and Critical Reading in Path and Hammer
The specific kabbalistic and midrashic hermeneutics and themes invoked in Path and
Hammer all connect with themes of critical reading: i.e., of characters learning to read both
themselves and their surroundings (whether texts, other people, world and events around them)
in critical, skeptical, and analytic ways—reading both for accuracy (e.g., readjusting their own
misconceptions, deconstructing ontologies) and for ethics (i.e., critically interpreting not only
what is accurate versus false, but the ethical and moral implications of different actions and
choices). Simultaneously, a related theme is recognition of multiple truths and perspectives. In
both novels, this is portrayed as part of the critical reading process—e.g., characters’ resulting
awarenesses of multiple truths, or the necessity of employing multiple perspectives to understand
the given “text” (whether the text in question is one’s surroundings, people, or a literal text)—
and as important ethically in its own right. Goelman and Mlawski take existing genre tropes of
child protagonists learning these lessons via the development of magical powers and self-agency
(e.g., in much fantasy by Jones, Pierce, Le Guin, Diane Duane) and, in Path and Hammer, either
use kabbalah instead of magic (Path) or infuse magic with kabbalistic and midrashic rhetoric
(Hammer).
Goelman’s title, The Path of Names, is taken directly from the kabbalistic method of
Abraham Abulafia bearing the same title (Scholem, Major Trends, Fourth Lecture, section 7). It
is no surprise, therefore, that kabbalistic themes—especially those concerning letters, numbers,
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and their creative powers—form the central focus of the novel, both plot-wise and thematically
(i.e. these topics are foci of Abulafia’s text as well). Specifically, Goelman highlights the
concepts of gematria (alphabetical numerology) and hokhma hatseruf (science of combination of
letters). As he does so, he pokes fun at contemporary “pop-kabbalah” trends that embrace a
surface, ill-informed version of kabbalah that indiscriminatorily fuses Jewish kabbalah with
Buddhism and various eastern mystical traditions.
Goelman introduces kabbalistic concepts to readers by having his protagonist, Dahlia,
learn about them for the first time. Readers previously unfamiliar with kabbalah can learn about
it alongside Dahlia. Dahlia learns about kabbalah through a few venues: “Club Kabbala” in
camp, a book in the camp library called The Path of Names, and through the memories of David
Schank, the spirit possessing her. The first two methods listed here—the kabbalah club and
library book—present information to Dahlia in seemingly frontal fashions: Peter, the kabbalah
club leader, and the library book seemingly provide “infodumps” (Mendlesohn, Diana Wynne
Jones, chapter 5, “The Technique of Immersion”). At first glance, this may seem, rhetorically,
similar to the way protagonists receive crucial information in portal-quest fantasies: the oral
tradition conveyed verbally by an authoritative figure, “campfire” or “club discourse” style,170
and the ancient, esoteric, mysterious, obscure scroll or text suddenly discovered by the
protagonists and/or authority figure (Mendlesohn, Rhetorics, 13, 17). However, such portalquest “infodumps” usually come unquestioned—i.e. the information itself and the source are
usually accurate, and unquestioned by either protagonist or reader in this accuracy (something
both Jones and Mendlesohn mock: “There is, for some reason, no such thing as a lying,
mistaken, or inaccurate Scroll” [Jones, Tough Guide, 169]).
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Here, quite literally a club—kabbalah club!
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Goelman, however, subverts this slightly, most notably by humorously depicting Peter as
a “pop-kabbalah” enthusiast—in other words, someone who actually knows very little about
Jewish kabbalah. When Dahlia unenthusiastically joins the kabbalah club (because she had not
signed up for any club and was assigned to this one), Peter greets her by giving a glib, reductive
definition of kabbalah: “Kabbala is just the Hebrew word for Jewish mysticism. Jewish
meditation. Jewish magic” (68, original emphasis). The narrative immediately pokes fun at
Peter: “He lowered his voice and grinned when he said ‘magic.’ Dahlia wondered if it was too
late to switch clubs” (68). Peter’s reference books are Kabbala for Dummies, Zen and the Art of
Motorcycle Maintenance, and The Tao of Pooh. As Dahlia points out, “These books aren’t even
Jewish!” (73) To Peter “kabbalah” means meditating (although “meditating” seems to just mean
closing one’s eyes and sitting), saying “om,” and giving massages. Peter, the would-be
knowledgeable authority figure transferring oral traditions (in portal-quest rhetoric terms) in fact
knows nothing, and seems uninterested in learning anything substantive about the topic at hand.
As Dahlia’s older brother (and counselor) Tom says to Dahlia later in the novel, “Look, Dahl,
Peter’s a nice guy, but you can’t take him too seriously” (261). Dahlia responds, “‘Peter? You
think I’m learning this from Peter? He didn’t...he didn’t—’ She was laughing too hard to even
finish her sentence for a few seconds. ‘He didn’t want to do anything in his club except chant om
and do massages’” (261-2, emphasis in original). Peter’s disinterest in actually learning about
kabbalah is the real target of Goelman’s humor and critique, rather than the mere comparisons of
kabbalah to magic, Buddhism, or other areas. For instance, when Rafe (a fellow camper) later
enthusiastically compares kabbalah to a “Jewish-themed RPG” the tone is positive, not mocking
(as it was with Peter)—because Rafe actually reads the book and is interested in learning
(Goelman 102). Goelman’s critique spears, instead, those who simply embrace current hip(ster)
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fads and/or want to “zen out” and simply slap the label “kabbalah” onto it without any real
engagement or interest in authenticity, accuracy, or even basic curiosity regarding what any of it
means.
Goelman further ruptures the would-be club-narrative dynamic (i.e. the potentially closed
space of characters convening, uninterrupted, for a “fireside” lesson/tale) by having Dahlia and
Rafe continuously interrupt and question Peter. Such interruptions happen from the very
beginning of their very first session, when Peter begins:
“Today we’re going to talk about the tenth sefira of kabbala—Malchut. ‘Kingdom’ in
English. Then we’re going to meditate on—”
“What’s a sefira?” Rafe interrupted. (69)
Immediately we have a break in the closed/club discourse, a break caused by interruption and
questioning; the child/recipient of legend/information is not silent and passively absorbing, but
rather active, vocal, and questioning. This questioning—Rafe’s sincere attempt at
understanding—reveals not only the complicated nature of the esoteric information Peter tries to
dumb down, but reveals as well Peter’s lack of knowledge in precisely what he purports to teach:
Peter glanced back at his notes. “The simplest translation is number. Um. You can also
think of the sefira as gates from the divine to the rest of the world.”
“What?” Rafe narrowed his eyes. “What does that mean? If they’re numbers, how are
they gates? And you just said Malchut means ‘kingdom’—that’s not a number.” (69)
Peter’s floundering does more than reveal his lack of knowledge—it spurs further questioning
and critique by the child characters. While Peter’s glib answers attempt to shut down
conversation—e.g. “Let’s not sweat the details. I want to lead us in a chant” (69)—Rafe and,
shortly, Dahlia’s questions expand and energize the conversation, opening new points and new
questions. The back and forth questioning and hectic-feeling conversation builds for five pages;
what starts out feeling vapid and amusing evolves into an actually interesting and substantive
discussion—albeit a fragmented, unmoderated and chaotic one that neither Peter nor the campers
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really seem to care about. The chaotic, fragmented nature of the conversation means that
accurate and useful bits of information (whether coming inadvertently from Peter or from
Dahlia) are mixed haphazardly with inaccurate and irrelevant bits. In contrast to the portal-quest
infodump, information/legend here is not neatly packaged as such for either Dahlia or readers—
to piece together anything like a useful picture of kabbalah, both Dahlia and readers have to sift
through and work to draw meaning and connections on their own.
Dahlia and Rafe—and readers—thus actually learn more about kabbalah from their
interruptions and questions than from Peter himself, although Peter does supply some entry
terminology. Even when he does, though, he is unable to explain what such terminology means;
Dahlia and Rafe need to read the book themselves to figure it out. In this way, Goelman
emphasises original research, inquiry, and self-empowered learning. In the conversation
between Tom and Dahlia referenced above, Tom, puzzled, asks where Dahlia “where’s all this
stuff coming from”—i.e. where she learned about kabbalah. Tom assumes that Dahlia learned
the complex information she references (e.g. the seventy-second name of god, being able to write
in Hebrew) either from Peter or Rafe. Dahlia, however, responds, “This is coming from me [...]
And a book Peter found in the camp’s library” (262).
The book is slightly more of a reliable information source, written (according to the
narrative) by (the fictional characters) Reb Velvel and translated by David Schank. Yet even this
source is limited in its usefulness, as only half of it is translated: Schank’s translations soon start
tapering off, replaced increasingly with sketches and drawings of mazes, and cease entirely by
the fifth chapter (of the book Schank is translating). These sketches prove meaningful to Dahlia,
as the drawings accord with her dream/memories and the maze is crucial to the novel’s
kabbalistic themes and plot. From a utilitarian perspective, the book’s incompleteness may
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resemble tropes of fragmented scrolls in portal-quest fantasies. Tonally, however, Goelman
treats it more flippantly. Unlike the often somber, weighty import of lost, partially-burned, or
otherwise fragmented scrolls in portal-quests, here the entire text exists (simply in Hebrew) and
the translations simply stop. Even this cessation of translation—which might, in other fantasy
tropes, stem from ominous reasons or impart a sense of mystery—is depicted, here, in banal and
humorous tones: the narrative reads, “After the first few chapters, the translator seemed to lose
interest in translating”; Rafe notes, “Huh [...] Seems like buddy got bored with translating” (75).
We later learn the fatal import of Schank’s “boredom” as a futile means of suppressing the
seventy-second name of god and hiding from his would-be murderers, and that the mazes he
draws, rather than doodles, are in fact kabbalistic encapsulations of that divine name (which later
result in the hedge maze Schank unwittingly forms, which the antagonist uses to drain children’s
life-forces). At this moment in the narrative, though, the truncated translation and sketches come
across as wry bathos, reminiscent of a bored student’s notebook doodles.
Through her questions at the kabbalah club, scant information from the book, and
information from Schank’s ibburic possession of Dahlia, Dahlia does piece together some
kabbalistic concepts. Dahlia’s inquiry is always driven by immediate need: she seeks
information regarding ghosts after seeing the ghosts, and seeks information about possession
once she starts to suspect Schank is possessing her. Her piecing together kabbalistic concepts,
therefore, comes not in a clear, linear fashion but disjointedly. Dahlia discusses gematria quite a
bit in the novel’s start, for instance, at the kabbalah club; however, Dahlia loses interest and does
not think about gematria for most of the novel (focusing instead on immediate concerns such as
ibburim and ghosts) until the novel’s climax, when it becomes critical to her survival.
In this way, the kabbalistic concepts presented to readers in Path are heavily focalized
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through Dahlia’s close third-person lens. Thus, when Peter first explains gematria, Dahlia reacts
“with disgust,” asking, “That’s it? [...] A basic alphanumeric code?” (72). But Peter protests,
“No, no, it gets much more complicated […] The idea is that words with equivalent numbers are
the same on some higher, metaphysical level” (72-73). Although Dahlia at first attempts to
dismiss this, too, as uninteresting, this is one of the points that becomes central to the narrative.
Dahlia realizes that the alpha-numerical value for the Hebrew words for life, nothingness, and
maze are all the same, sixty-eight. In kabbalistic terms, and as the novel emphasizes explicitly,
this means that these words (words with equivalent alpha-numerical sums) are, on some
symbolic or metaphysical level, equivalent. Even when connected as seeming opposites (e.g.
“life” and “nothingness”), they are the flipsides of each other—opposites that contour each
other’s boundaries and meaning.
This idea is central to how Dahlia ends up defeating McMasters in the novel’s climax.
This climactic showdown between Dahlia and McMasters occurs at the heart of the maze.
Dahlia, McMasters, the campers (Chelsea, Jaden, and Mitchell), and the ghosts are all trapped
inside the spiritual plane of the maze, i.e. the plane of reality in which the maze embodies
different levels of proximity to divinity/immortality (ostensibly god). All the characters have
reached the heart of the maze—the “courtyard in the shape of a six-pointed star” (321);
“courtyard” references kabbalistic terms for god’s dwelling place/presence.171 The reference
here is a subversive one: god never appears, and Dahlia finds the courtyard “anticlimactic [...]
After all that way, it just ended like this: a courtyard in the shape of a six-pointed star, carpeted
with long grass and empty except for a sprinkling of yellow wildflowers. No magical glow of
light, no monsters or angels or gods—just an empty courtyard” (321). That said, Dahlia and
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(Scholem translates hekhaloth as halls or palaces [Major Trends, Second Lecture, section 2, Kindle edition]).
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McMasters recognize the courtyard (i.e. the center of the maze) as the source of the maze’s
power—whether one defines that power in religious terms, as David Schank/Hassidim do, in
magic/supernatural terms as McMasters/Illuminated Ones do, or in loosely scientific terms
(using words such as “electric”, “energy”, and “force”) as Dahlia does.
Dahlia realizes that in this place—i.e. using the power of the maze plus the power of the
seventy-second name of god—written words have literal, creative power: to look at or
conceptualize (i.e. to comprehend) certain letters or words is to make them happen.172 Thus,
when Dahlia writes the Hebrew words for life (chayim) and nothingness (chalal) on separate
stones, merely looking at one of those words—or even thinking about it too much, letting it
solidify in one’s mind—automatically makes the viewer/thinker into that word, either alive (and
free of the maze) or nothing (distinguished, in the text, from death, which is presented as merely
another realm of existence; hence when the ghosts look at “life” they are freed from the maze to
rest peacefully in death; looking at “nothing” would have excised them from existence
altogether). McMasters wants Dahlia to write “life” so that he can look at that word and return
to a physical, immortal, existence; he holds the children hostage as his bargaining chip. Dahlia
tricks him, instead, into viewing the word “nothingness.” Dahlia tricks him in part through her
magic-trick skills: sleight of hand, verbal patter as misdirection, etc. However, she is only able
to trick him through the fact that the two words have equal numerical values (of sixty-eight) and
thus, within her closed hands, emit the same level or kind of power, rendering them
indistinguishable until gazed upon.
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In a similar way as does Jones’ portrayals of magic operating by “performative utterance”—i.e. by declaration of
words making those words reality, rather than simply a verbal statement—as discussed by Gascoyne (“‘Why don’t
you be a tiger?’: The Performative, Transformative, and Creative Power of the Word in the Universes of Diana
Wynne Jones”). See also Kaplan, “Diana Wynne Jones and the World-Shaping Power of Language” in Diana
Wynne Jones, eds. Rosenberg et al.
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Thematically, this parallels a concept with which Meltzer, Drachler, Jones and Le Guin
all deeply engage: the concept of letters and words as having creative power, i.e. the literal
creative power to create or change the material world around you if used the right way. This
concept connects to the more subtle themes in The Path of Names of “performative speech” and
“performative magic”—themes prevalent across fantasy literature, implicit in The Path of
Names, and explicit in much of Jones’ and Le Guin’s work.173 Performative speech and/or
magic conveys the idea that the words we say and write—the narratives we tell of our
experiences—have psychological and spiritual power for both ourselves and others, and can be
empowering.174 Dahlia learns this throughout the novel, and this is the main thrust of the
narrative—this, along with an emphasis on critical reading, interpretation, and thinking of not
just words/texts, but of events and onto-epistemological narratives as well.
A central theme in Path, therefore, is that of self-actualization, empowerment to write
one’s own narrative/fate, and the incumbent responsibility of such empowerment (i.e. one being
responsible for one’s words, actions, power). This theme, as expressed through the power of
words, writing, and magic, parallels and converges with broader themes of coming-of-age
common in middle grade and young adult novels.175 Goelman makes this connection explicit:
when Dahlia returns to the maze to save the other campers trapped inside, Barry tries to stop her,
protesting “You stupid? [...] It’s not safe for you in there.” Despite her fear, Dahlia says, “I
know [...] So what? [David] told you to keep children out of the maze. I’m not a child. Let me
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See, for example, Jones’ use of “Performative Speech” in The Pinhoe Egg (2006), p. 415; and Le Guin’s
descriptions of Segoy creating the world through words.
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For a discussion of this concept as regards Jones’ novels, see Rudd, “Building Castles in the Air”; Fleischbein,
“New Hero”; Kaplan, “Diana Wynne Jones and the World-Shaping Power of Language”; and Hixon, “Whose
Woods These Are” in Telling Children’s Stories, ed. Mike Cadden. All of these discussions, albeit in a context of
Jones’ work, apply to the conversation here regarding child protagonists writing their own life narratives (in the
literal-magical sense and in the metafictional, thematic sense) as empowerment.
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In fact scholars such as Nikolajeva explicitly tie these two, although through metaphoric and constricted readings
that add less to this conversation than the analyses of others cited in this chapter.
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go.” Barry replies, “Awright [...] About time someone started cleaning up their own mess”
(310). Maturity and the threshold between child and adult (or, more technically, teenager or
young adult) here mean taking responsibility for one’s actions, “cleaning up [one’s] own mess,”
in Barry’s words; Dahlia is responsible for Chelsea’s entrance and thus entrapment in the maze,
and Dahlia thus shoulders the burden of at least trying to rescue her.
Maturity here also means facing your fears and doing what’s right despite those fears.
Dahlia fears lightning generally and McMasters specifically; unlike some children’s/young adult
novels’ trajectories, Dahlia does not need to overcome or mitigate these fears—these particular
fears are rational and justified (McMasters is frank about his plans to murder them all to gain
power from their life-forces, and lightning is one of his weapons of choice). Rather, Dahlia acts
heroically and “cleans up her messes” despite her fears. Dahlia is successful in saving Chelsea,
Jaden, and Mitchell, but it is not her success that is emphasized, by the narrative, as the moment
signifying her crossing childhood’s threshold—rather, the significant moment morally is
Dahlia’s decision to risk her own life trying regardless of the outcome, even when authority
figures (her counselors, Barry) tell her not to in attempts to protect her.
Dahlia’s next moment of moral testing and development come when she first enters the
maze, finds Chelsea near the entrance, and faces McMasters. Chelsea is exhausted and weak; the
maze path is difficult to walk: “At first, it was like walking against a gentle summer breeze, but
slowly the wind they were walking into grew stronger. After a minute or two, it felt like they
were pushing against a gale. Each step was a struggle, and they still didn’t seem to be getting
anywhere” (314-315). Dahlia thinks, “There had to be some trick to get through the maze,” but
without Schank’s possession and guidance of her, she doesn’t know any easy trick. McMasters
then appears and tries convincing both girls to give up:
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Chelsea slowly lowered herself to sit on the grassy path. “I’m so tired,” she said. Her face
was alarmingly pale.
Dahlia leaned down to help her up. “Come on. Get up.”
“Why bother?” McMasters said.
Chelsea nodded. “Why bother?” (316)
At this point, McMasters sends a generally-nihilistic or fatalistic challenge (verbally, but also
psychologically and magically). But when Dahlia cries, “Leave her alone!” McMasters
responds: “‘What’s it to you?’ McMasters looked at Dahlia. He seemed honestly curious. ‘This
girl’s done nothing but mock you. Just because you’re interested. Just because you want to figure
out how the world works. Why do you care what happens to her?’” (Goelman 316).
Here, McMasters builds his psychological and magical attack from broad ennui/fatalism
to a specific type of misanthropy and solipsism, one geared toward exploiting Dahlia’s past
social tensions with Chelsea as well as certain personality tendencies or potentialities Dahlia
exhibited throughout the novel until this point. When McMasters says “Just because you’re
interested. Just because you want to figure out how the world works,” what he means—phrased
the way Chelsea does throughout the novel—is “just because you’re a dork/nerd.” Dahlia is
intellectually curious, bookish, academically inclined, and particularly loves math and magic
tricks: in other words, she is a homing beacon for casual torment by her thirteen-year-olds peers
(and even by some counselors), especially in a camp (read: largely unsupervised) environment,
and especially by the cool/popular kids, of which Chelsea is a ringleader. Indeed, throughout the
book Chelsea and her cronies casually taunt Dahlia in minor ways; minor in that they don’t go
out of their way to mock her because largely they ignore her, and because from their perspectives
their comments are minor, but from Dahlia’s (and the reader’s) they are hurtful and
embarrassing. Chelsea and her friends are not depicted as reductively mean; at one point, when
Chelsea groans “God! Do you have to try to be such a nerd?” Dahlia snaps back, “God! Do you
have to try to be so nasty?” Dahlia is then “surprise[d]” when Chelsea giggles, “Not so much. It
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sort of comes naturally” and the tension breaks (200). This, plus the fact that Dahlia and Chelsea
are thrown together in the adventure since Chelsea can hear the ghosts that Dahlia sees (and
Dahlia thus needs Chelsea’s help solving the mystery) probably help Dahlia reach the point
where she can respond to McMasters by challenging, rather than conceding, his point. Dahlia
persists in trying to save Chelsea, rather than giving in to the bitterness and revenge McMasters
advocates.176
Although Goelman gives Chelsea a three-dimensional realism and likeability as a
character, when McMasters asks Dahlia, honestly, why Dahlia cares:
Despite everything, Dahlia hesitated. Why did she care? It wasn’t that she liked Chelsea
so much. It was just … “What else is there?” she said. “I mean, really? If other people don’t
matter, what does? What’s the point of knowing secrets that you never tell anyone?” She
tried again to help Chelsea to her feet. She couldn’t even get Chelsea to look at her.
“What’s the point?” McMasters repeated incredulously. “Knowledge is the point.”
“Not if you don’t tell anyone.” [sic] Dahlia said. “If you don’t tell anyone, then
knowledge isn’t anything.” (316-317)
Here Dahlia finally faces, straight-on, what has been implied throughout the novel but never,
until now, addressed forthrightly: the potential for Dahlia’s antisocial (in the colloquial as
opposed to the clinical sense) tendencies to develop into misanthropism and solipsism. Dahlia
herself is not there yet—her thoughts, reactions to the people around her, and general attitudes
are better classified as “revenge of the nerd.” Dahlia is a kid who, as a nerd, feels marginalized
in her social peer groups (camp and, it’s implied, school). Dahlia expresses underlying,
unexamined assumptions that a) she is different from the other kids around her (in that she is
“nerdy” and they are not; in that she is intellectually curious and they are not) and that b) she is
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Incidentally, Goelman’s presentation of Chelsea—in this example and others—also lends Chelsea a threedimensional realism and likeability as a character, as well as portrays a nuanced and acute understanding of bullying
and/or the social realities, tensions, and challenges of thirteen-year-olds (even when not as clear-cut as bullying);
Goelman’s adroit handling of this topic contrasts with reductive or trite tropes commonly seen in more clumsy
attempts, within children’s and young adult literature (e.g., arguably L’Engle’s flat portrayals of bully characters in
Wrinkle and Planet), to address the “nerd kid getting bullied” theme, and thus may feel more realistic and useful
(and less forcefully pedantic or sympathetic) to young readers.
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smarter than the other kids around her (which does not necessarily have to go hand in hand with
“nerd” or curiosity). Before coming to camp, Dahlia’s main social outlets (as evidenced by her
reflections on the way to camp and at points throughout camp) were online magician forums (i.e.
magic-trick, realist magician), magic camp, and math camp. Despite these venues we never see
Dahlia (or her family) mention any friends of hers. Whether or not this omission is meant to
imply that Dahlia has none or simply that it didn’t come up (i.e. in a narrative rigorously and
successfully committed to a close-third-person lens with true immersive, mimetic realism, as
Goelman’s is, Dahlia may simply not think about friends outside camp and thus it may not come
up)—either way, the omission is noticeable specifically because of its presence in the climactic
chapters. While McMasters does not explicitly call her out on not having friends, he does tell
Dahlia that she is like him: smarter than everyone else, “special,” “guts[y],” and above other
people who, like Chelsea, “mock” Dahlia’s thirst for knowledge.
With McMasters, these characteristics—and his particular interpretation/framing of
them—directly justify his means to an end: murder as means to “knowledge,” which he equates
with power (in this case, his own personal immortality). Of course McMasters, here, is trying to
flatter and woo Dahlia, as well as, on a deeper level (since he’s smart enough to understand at
this point that she will defy him), to misdirect/distract her into doing exactly what she is already
doing: attempting to rescue the campers and thus entering into the heart of the maze (McMasters
wants to lure her there and knows she would be suspicious if he did not look like he was trying to
thwart her). His statements, obviously, should be taken with a grain of salt in terms of how
much they can tell us about either his own motivations or Dahlia’s personality. What’s
fascinating, though, is that all the characteristics McMasters lists above—special, somehow set
apart from everyone else (by guts or brains), uniquely worthy of magic/power—could, cast in
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another light, describe the traditional fantasy hero, especially in children’s and young adult
literature. Yet McMasters plays on this trope, taking it down a more solipsistic, misanthropic,
and clinically-antisocial path; in so doing, Goelman exposes the potential ugly underside to
fantastic-heroic “chosenness,” as well as to “revenge of the nerd” type
disdain/bitterness/antisocialness. The precocious, gutsy child hero can also be a smarmy, cocky
loner isolated from and disdainful of others who are different (in much the same way we often
assume the “cool” kids—in a narrative or in reality—are disdainful of the “nerdy” kid who is
different).
Goelman does not shy away from exposing these potentialities within Dahlia (although,
since we see everything filtered through her perspective, he does so very subtly and beautifully).
Goelman’s treatment of this issue here again parallels and complements similar awarenesses and
depictions by authors such as Jones (e.g. Duck in Dalemark or Grundo in The Merlin Conspiracy
[2003]) or Coville (e.g. Peter in the My Teacher is an Alien series [1989-1992]), and, in the
realist-literature realm, E. L. Konigsburg—among others. It is noticeably a different approach
from, say, L’Engle, who depicts Charles Wallace’s achilles heel as hubris, but in a more
spiritual/religious as versus interpersonal way, and really only invests in the perspectives of
“chosen”/elitist characters.
Goelman’s foregrounding of this issue, as well as his subtle way of addressing it, matters
because it touches on two key aspects of Dahlia’s growth (and broader themes of the novel):
first, advocating a critical, skeptical, and argumentative perspective that one uses as an
epistemological framework—even and perhaps especially toward oneself, i.e. toward our
blindspots. Second, Dahlia realizes there is a foundational humanism lying at the core of any
other ontological pursuit or claim—i.e. that this ethos is (i.e. should be) the ultimate goal (and
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thus guiding rubric) underlying other ostensible ideologies, be they scientific, religious, or other.
Regarding this first point, as mentioned before, Dahlia originally expresses underlying,
unexamined assumptions that a) she is different from the other kids around her in camp (in that
she is “nerdy” and they are not; in that she is intellectually curious and they are not), b) that, as a
different/weird/nerd, she can’t truly connect to the other kids, and that c) she is smarter than the
other kids around her, specifically the “cool/popular” kids who ignore or taunt her. All of these
assumptions prove false. Rafe, at least, is a self-identified and unapologetic nerd (although he
does not use that term), yet he is also social and friendly. Additionally, Dahlia eventually
connects on some levels with her female peers who are neither nerdy nor particularly bright, but
are kind.
Finally, and most significantly for plot purposes: the cool/popular campers (Chelsea,
Lisa, and Michal) are not, as Dahlia assumes, dumb. Chelsea, especially, is quite smart—
something Dahlia learns and does acknowledge—and Chelsea shares Dahlia’s ability to perceive
and communicate with the ghosts (Dahlia can see the ghosts but not hear them; Chelsea can hear
but not see them). Dahlia needs Chelsea’s talents in order to solve the mystery and Chelsea later
needs Dahlia to rescue her; the two girls must learn to work with and appreciate (to some degree)
each other as the novel continues—a progression we see focalized more through Dahlia but that
is implied enough via Chelsea’s behavior to be mutual. Goelman wisely shows that this does not
mean the two need to become friends—or even shift that much from their core personalities.
Rather, he stays true to the two characters, showing instead how two polar opposite thirteenyear-old girls can, while staying realistically true to their own personalities and social positions,
move from antagonistic teasing/loathing to more of an annoyed and semi-polite tolerance.
Overall, therefore, Dahlia’s moral/ethical development as a protagonist-hero depends on
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her critical thinking skills: on skeptically and critically evaluating information and choices
offered her by the antagonist/villain, but also on Dahlia’s ability to critically evaluate her own
biases towards herself and those around her. It is only once Dahlia has strengthened those
critical reading/interpretive skills that she can employ the magic/kabbalah/power (depending on
each character’s understanding of it) to her desired purpose (i.e. saving her friends and herself).
Crucially, the mechanisms with which Dahlia achieves this in the novel’s climax are, quite
literally, writing (inscribing Hebrew letters/words), kabbalah/magic (mentally invoking her
desired meaning/pronunciation of the letters/words), and her dork-prowess in both magic-tricks
(sleight of hand, patter, misdirection) and mathematics.
Although Mlawski’s Hammer of Witches does not foreground kabbalah the same way
that The Path of Names does, the kabbalistic theme of the magical and literal-creative powers of
words is central, as well, to Hammer. Mlawski’s historical fantasy takes place in Spain, in 1492.
The prologue opens with Baltasar (hereafter “Bal”), protagonist and first-person narrator, telling
readers:
My uncle Diego always said there was magic in a story. Of course, I never really believed
him when he said it. My uncle was an old man to me for as long as I can remember, and a
bookmaker, too, so his head was always full of one story or another. [...] Now I know my
uncle was right. There is magic in a story. Real magic. (Mlawski 1)
Baltasar (and his uncle) are magicians, called “lukmani” by Inquisitors and self-titled as
“Storytellers,” a name Diego says means roughly the same thing (57). As Jinniyah (a half-genie,
half-human character) explains, Storytellers “take the stories and make them real” and the term
“lukmani” references the “sage Luqman” who “was so wise, he was able to speak with anyone
and anything — even the flowers and the trees and the earth” (117). Similarly, Jinniyah
explains, Bal and other Storytellers have magical—and instinctive—fluency in all human
languages; after all, in order to make the stories real, “first you have to read the stories. It only
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makes sense that you’d be able to understand other languages” (117). Magic in Hammer works
via letters, words, and language, on multiple levels of resonance.
On the first, surface level, Bal and other Storytellers literally make stories come true, or
come to life, through magically invoking the letters of the story or creature in question. Thus, for
instance, Bal brings the story of the golem to life by mentally projecting the Hebrew letters
spelling “golem” into the air (they appear as fiery letters) and a golem appears. Similarly, Bal
brings other creatures to life—such as Titivillus177 and the Leviathan—by mentally focusing on
and projecting the letters spelling their names, in whatever language is appropriate. Bal uses this
same procedure to conjure not only creatures, but also characters (e.g. “El Cid, the everhonorable Castilian hero” [Malwski 150]), story tropes or elements (e.g. the “sleeping / trapped
princess” trope, or the thorny vines from that tale), or settings (e.g. Bal conjures the Garden of
Eden; his father conjures the desert).
Even on this first level, though, the way Storytelling magic works is not simply by
focusing on or visually projecting the letters/names in question. Storytellers also have to focus
on the—or rather one possible—meaning of the story. Bal learns that different interpretations of
the same story (story as in creature, figure, setting, or complete tale), or even focusing on
different aspects of the same story, can cause the same creature, setting, or character to manifest
in wildly different ways. Thus, for Bal, the “sleeping beauty” tale manifests as innocent romance
due to Bal’s optimistic interpretation of it: Bal thinks the story conveys “you’re not even awake
if you haven’t found your true love” (191). Bal’s interpretation impacts reality:
To my surprise a warm pink light formed between us, and the salty ocean air grew
flowery in my nostrils. The words SLEEPING PRINCESS bloomed pink in French before
us, and a summoned prince and princess glowed up over the sand. A red, red rose formed
between them.
177

Titivillus is a demon who causes manuscript errors, referenced by Christian monks (see upcoming section for
more details).
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“I release you,” I said, shocked by what I’d done. (191-192)
For Catalina, however, the tale is sinister. She calls Bal’s interpretation, “A boy’s way of
looking at it”; Catalina interprets the story as that of a trapped princess, who goes from being
trapped by a witch to being trapped by the prince, and never claims agency, freedom, or
autonomy. As she speaks,
the summoned princess reappeared in front of us, but now she appeared haggard and drawn.
Another rose grew in front of her, but as it grew its stem desiccated and coiled around itself,
and its petals wilted to black. Thorny vines grew from the tip of the rose’s stem and snaked
around the princess’s wrists and over her mouth, tight like ropes. Her phantom eyes darted
back and forth with terror. (192)
Catalina’s lesson on Storytelling (in the magical sense) is thus also an explicit lesson in critical
reading; Mlawski thus foregrounds, for readers, how one can read the same story (e.g. Sleeping
Beauty) differently through different lenses—in this case, differing gendered lenses. Catalina
overtly identifies Bal’s reading as male-gendered and male-privileged; overtly critiques such a
reading through, among other points, her personal escape from an unwanted marriage; and
overtly offers a feminist reading to replace Bal’s interpretation.
In Hammer, therefore, magic works when the Storyteller reads, or rereads, stories and
then retells those stories focalized through a specific, and often personal, interpretative lens. The
more one emotionally invests in, or believes, in the (interpreted version of the) story at hand, the
more physically the conjured story-elements manifest. Similarly, the way to break more
complex spells178 is, as Catalina instructs, to “figure out why you don’t belong” in the story—in
other words, to deconstruct the story (286).
There’s a clear parallel, here, to writing—one Mlawski does not try to hide, but rather
alludes to in almost campy tones. In addition to obvious titular flags like “Storytellers,” and in
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To break simple spells, such as Bal’s conjuring of the golem, Bal simply says “I release you from my service”
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addition to the literary-analytical reading and writing processes described above, Catalina tutors
Bal in Storytelling strategies, helping him recognize his own amatuer moves, such as telling flat,
cliched stories or over-relying on personal experience. Regarding the latter, Catalina tells Bal,
“Linking stories to your own life...I’ll admit that’s how I started out, too, when I was young. But
what happens if a story doesn’t remind you of anyone you know? What if you wanted to
summon a siren, for example? I find it doubtful you know any women who have fishtails” (204).
Catalina’s point here, while germane to its plot context (Catalina teaching Bal how to summon
creatures) also sounds like a writer sharing writing advice; it also reads like a writer’s—
especially a fantasy writer’s—response to the “write what you know” adage that likely frustrates
many a speculative-fiction writer if understood literally. Catalina explains that she summoned
sirens, earlier in the novel, “by thinking more abstractly” and excavating underlying themes in
the siren story that are relatable to her: e.g., “men’s fears of women and the sea” (204-205). The
tone here is simultaneously that of characters learning how their newfound magical powers work
(in itself a speculative-fiction trope) and that of real-world writers sharing critique and advice.
The parallel between magic and writing, however, resonates on a deeper level as well.
Hammer posits that stories and narratives—in other words, our framing and interpretation of the
life, reality, and experiences surrounding us—wield power for both ourselves and others. This is
true in both magical and mundane senses. From the magical end, when Catalina gives her
feminist interpretation of Sleeping Beauty (quoted above) she gets increasingly angry,
reprimanding Bal for the misogynistic stories he used to tell for the crew’s entertainment (back
when Bal thought Catalina was also a boy, due to her “Jeanne d’Arc spell” [189]). Catalina
points out that “Dirty Mary,” the despairing prostitute of Bal’s stories, is not the funny/erotic
character Bal and the sailors think her, but rather just as trapped and objectified as the princess
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from Sleeping Beauty. As Catalina gets angrier, the rose vines she has conjured twist around
Bal, starting to suffocate him (194). The juxtaposition here between Catalina’s lesson in critical
reading and multiple interpretations, on the one hand, and tangible effects of those interpretations
on the other, underscores the “performative speech/magic” aspect to both magic and storytelling
more mundanely: the way we interpret things matters. The stories we tell matter. Bal’s earlier
tales, to the sailors, of “Dirty Mary: the girl who sold herself along with her flowers” were not
Storytelling in the magical sense, yet they have just as much impact by perpetuating misogynistic
perspectives and dehumanizing and objectifying women. Bal is horrified when the sailors later
rape Taino women. Although neither he nor his story is responsible for the sailors’ actions, there
is an implicit connection between this incident and the way Bal is literally bound and pierced by
the thorns of his own unexamined, male-privileged version of the “Sleeping Beauty” spell.
Mlawski emphasises this connection by having Bal think, upon hearing news of the rapes, “I
couldn’t believe it [...] On the ship we’d shared dirty jokes, lewd stories about women for fun.
No matter what Catalina said, I knew in my heart they were good people. Not—I couldn’t even
think the word” (281). Hammer demonstrates that just as Storytelling magic brings specific
narratives to tangible life, so does mundane story-telling—i.e. the narratives we tell about
ourselves and others—just in a less immediate and less obviously-causal manner.
Mlawski’s treatment of magic-as-storytelling/writing, and writing/storytelling-as-magic
parallels treatments by Goelman discussed above, and by Jones discussed above and in chapter
two. Similarly to both Goelman and Jones, Mlawski shows that there are multiple possible
interpretations, meanings, and implications of both words individually and narratives/stories as
wholes. In other words, the interpretative powers of words/stories, and the literal, immediate,
causal power (in Hammer) of stories/words to affect reality, are not objective, singular, or static.
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Rather, there always lie multiple possible meanings, interpretations, and directions for such
power to develop.
While this concept is by no means unique to midrashic and kabbalistic hermeneutics, it
strongly resonates with Jewish kabbalistic and midrashic interpretive methodologies. Mlawski
herself has noted that one can term Hammer “talmudic.”179 Certain cues within the novel’s
rhetoric allude to Jewish cultural speech and argumentation patterns more overtly: Diego, for
instance, talks in a cadence that sounds reminiscent of the quintessential “old Jewish man” (from
the Lower East Side, Brooklyn, or Eastern Europe).180 Additionally, though, there is a manner of
talmudic and argumentative rhetoric at the core of Mlawski’s treatment of Storytelling as a
magic that works via literary and logical deconstruction that perhaps offers, to us, one reply to
Mendlesohn’s inquiry as to what a “truly Jewish fantasy—with all the argument endemic to
[Judaism]—might look like” (Rhetorics 16, original emphasis). This quote of Mendlesohn’s is
salient here not only because it nods toward a possible Jewish-fantastic rhetoric of
argumentation, but because Mendlesohn is discussing here portal-quest fantasies’ “fixed” and
“recursive” natures of knowledge (Rhetorics 16). Hammer, fascinatingly, is a portal-quest
fantasy that specifically, and explicitly, defies those (characters or readers) who would
conceptualize knowledge, meaning, or reality as fixed, recursive, or, I would add, singular.
Hammer insists instead on a multifaceted, multiple, ever-fluid, and ever-destabilizing
conceptualization of not only knowledge and ontology, but of the very epistemological
frameworks via which we perceive truth/reality (hence Catalina’s devastating critique of Bal’s
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Mlawski “The Big Idea: Shana Mlawski.” Big Idea column, Whatever (site), proprietor John Scalzi,
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See, for instance, the speech patterns present when Diego tells Bal stories in the beginning of the novel (p. 33), or
when Diego reveals Bal’s true, secret identity (p. 51, 53; here, see also Bal’s aunt’s speech patterns—toward Bal as
well as toward the Malleus Maleficarum [p.59]).
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male privileged perspective and elucidation of differing female and feminist experiences that
offer different ways to approach interpretation in the first place).

The Jewish Monstrous in Goelman and Mlawski
Both Goelman and Mlawski depict a plethora of supernatural beings within their novels;
within this plethora, both authors explore the specifically-Jewish monstrous. As I touched upon
in chapter one, my proposed terminology of a “Jewish fantastic” or “Jewish monstrous” seeks to
articulate overlays between the fantastic/monstrous and explicitly-Jewish texts, tropes, or
contexts (contexts such as cultural traditions, folk tales, contemporary or historical Jewishcommunal norms). Goelman and Mlawski differ in their approaches to and imaginings of a
Jewish monstrous in a number of ways.
First, Goelman’s renderings of the Jewish monstrous repeatedly subvert protagonist and
reader expectations regarding conventional speculative-genre tropes of the supernatural and
monstrous, particularly by subverting conceptualizations of the monstrous as threatening,
powerful, unnatural, and aberrational. This is a broader trend of Goelman’s depictions of the
monstrous, beyond specifically Jewish monsters in the novel—it includes, for instance,
Goelman’s bathos-toned, mundane depiction of the (non-Jewish) girl ghosts. Yet it includes
specifically-Jewish creatures, and speaks to a recurring thread among classic Jewish folklore,
folk tales, and fairy tales in which monstrous beings are depicted not as antagonistic, scary, or
inhuman but rather in a humanized, relatable, sympathetic, and even occasionally humorous
light.181 Unlike Goelman, Mlawski’s monsters do not subvert conventional speculative-fiction
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See Schwartz, “Introduction,” Elijah’s Violin; for example, Schwartz notes that demons in Jewish fairy tales are
often depicted as leading parallel lives “to that of a devout Jew of the Middle Ages. This is not intended as mockery,
for the Yenne Velt, the world in which demons and other spirits live, was believed to be a mirror image, somewhat
distorted, of the world in which we live.” Asmodeus, for example, king of the demons, “is a characteristically Jewish
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tropes of the monstrous: Mlawski’s monsters—largely the creatures Bal summons via
Storytelling magic—are for the most part large, physically-powerful, unintelligent beasts who
wreak physical havoc (e.g. the leviathan, behemoth).
Second, Goelman explores the Jewish monstrous by depicting and exploring monsters or
other beings stemming, specifically, from Jewish traditions, folklore, and texts—namely the
golem and ibbur, with references to dybbuks. Mlawski, in contrast, invokes some specificallyJewish monsters such as the golem and behemoth (spelled “Bahamut” in the novel and portrayed
here as a giant reptile with the face of a lion). However, the “Jewish monstrous”—i.e.,
specifically-Jewish embedded magical beings—is by no means dominant among the novel’s
monsters. Rather, Mlawski portrays obscure Jewish monsters alongside a plethora of
multicultural, religious, and ethnic supernatural beings, such as: Titivillus, the “imp” who spoils
monks/scribes’ manuscripts (and thus of Christian origins); ifritah, Muslim fire demons / genies
(the specific ifritah in the novel, Jinniyah, is a practicing Muslim, and explains that “God made
[ifritah] out of subtle flame and smokeless fire” [80]); ghuls (“Arabian desert demons” [84]); the
“karkadann,” a unicorn of Persian and Indian tales (Hammer 140), and Baba Yaga (of Russian
tales). While some of Mlawski’s creatures are likely well known to readers (unicorns, mermaids,
perhaps Baba Yaga and the leviathan), others such as Titivillus and the behemoth are more
esoteric, and are not commonly seen in contemporary North American children’s fantasy.
Mlawski’s placement of the Jewish monstrous as specifically, and inextricably, located among
and intertwined with these multicultural and interfaith beings (and such beings’ origins and
sources, in terms of folk and fairy tales, myths, and legends)—such a positioning implicitly
posits a “Jewish monstrous” that is, by its very nature, intertextual and interactive with other

demon [...] Spending part of his time in Paradise, where he studies in the Heavenly Academy, Asmodeus does not fit
the mold of the typical demon of fairy tales” (Schwartz 10, original emphasis).
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religio-ethnic monsters.
Goelman, too, references a number of magical beings, yet most of them (with the
exception of the ghosts) are specifically Jewish-kabbalistic supernatural beings. Goelman
focuses, however, on two main beings: the golem (Barry, the camp groundskeeper) and the ibbur
(David Schank, who comes back from the dead to possess Dahlia). The golem, as discussed in
chapter one, is a being made out of clay/mud, brought to life through someone (traditionally, a
rabbi) writing the word “emet” (truth) on the golem’s forehead and invoking (verbally or
mentally) a divine name of power that creates/brings life. The golem is traditionally depicted as
created for the sake of assisting the rabbi: in earlier talmudic literature, the golem helps his
rabbinic creator/master with tasks; in later legends, starting with early modern times, the golem
serves as protector of the Jewish community from external threat. If and when the rabbi/creator
needs to return the golem back to lifeless mud, the rabbi/creator simply erases the first letter on
the golem’s forehead: “emet” (truth) is spelled with the letters aleph, mem, and taf; if one erases
the aleph, what remains is mem-taf, spelling “met” (dead). The magic underlying the golem fits
within larger kabbalistic themes of letters and words/names (specifically, Hebrew and divine
ones) making things be: when one names/calls/writes the golem as “dead” it automatically is so.
An ibbur (pl. ibburim) is, simply put, a spirit from one who is deceased that comes back
to possess a living person/body; the word ibbur is “a masculine noun, literally meaning
‘conception’; v. le-hit’abber, to become pregnant; n. ubar, fetus” (Chajes 14, original emphasis).
Beyond this, though, there are different definitions of and traditions regarding the ibbur. Chajes
points to the word’s first appearance “in Jewish mystical sources as a general term for
reincarnation [...] ibbur appears to have been imbued with a distinct meaning of its own for the
first time in Ramban’s [Nahmanides’] commentary on Ecclesiastes” (Chajes 15, original
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emphasis). Chajes then goes on to explain that “[n]ot all kabbalists shared a common
understanding of the term ibbur, nor did they agree on the conditions and extent of reincarnation
in general.
By the end of the thirteenth century, however, Spanish Kabbalists had taken the term
ibbur to denote the temporary introduction of a foreign soul into a living body some time after
birth” (Chajes 15, original emphasis).182 An ibbur remembered its “former life and regarded the
new bodily home as temporary. Its customary resident, or ‘host,’ was generally unaware of the
presence, let alone personality, of the ibburic guest” (Chajes 15, original emphasis). An “ibburic
guest” might become known, however, “through [its] speech or other action, as a concomitant
occupant of a person’s body” (Chajes 16, original emphasis). Chajes emphasises, though, that in
“early kabbalistic literature” such as the Zohar, ibburim are benign, rather than malicious,
presences, “impregnat[ing] a host’s body when both the transmigrating soul and the soul of its
temporary host stood to benefit from the association” (Chajes 16). In fact, “unlike gilgul, which
was thought to rectify sins, ibbur was regarded by the Spanish kabbalists as a phenomenon that
applied primarily to the righteous, in this world and the next” (Chajes 16, original emphasis).
However, at some point ibbur expanded to include negative reincarnations as well as positive
ones. Chajes cites Rabbi Moses Cordovero (1522-70), a Safed kabbalist, as introducing the term
“evil ibbur,” although as Chajes points out, R. Cordovero’s description (in his commentary on
the prayer book) shows that he views ibburim not as “evil souls of the more malicious variety,
whom we will meet in later accounts of dybbuk possession” but rather as “quotidian” or
“routine” threats. R. Cordovero specifies that one recites morning blessings as a way to literally
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As distinct from gilgul, which “was then taken to refer specifically to reincarnation coincident with conception or
birth”; Chajes delineates these two phenomena as having different “psychospiritual ramifications” in that “one who
returned to the world by means of gilgul” was thought to “not recall any former identity” whereas an ibbur did
(Chajes 15, original emphasis).
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exorcise any ibburim of “idolators,” “slave[s]” or “a woman” that might have hitched a ride with
one’s own soul when returning to the body in the morning (Chajes 16-18).183 Yet, while there
were practices designed to ward off evil ibburim, there were also practices designed to
specifically “bind” one’s soul “to the souls of the dead and to rouse [the righteous dead] to action
on [the living’s] behalf” (Chajes 19).
While Mlawski does not include an ibbur or dybbuk in Hammer, she does include a
golem, making a cross-comparison of golems across the two novels possible. Mlawski and
Goelman’s different yet complementary approaches to the Jewish monstrous are particularly
apparent in their respective treatments of the golem figure. Goelman’s depiction of the golem
focuses more on the golem’s lowly (and literal mud) origins and internal/psychological themes
of what it means to be humanized or dehumanized; Mlawski’s focuses more on the machismostrength-fantasy of the disenfranchised Jew. Goelman’s depiction of the golem also connects to
prior golem literature—and particularly, to Drachler’s golem discussed in chapter one—through
its emphasis on the golem as servitor/slave and as object and its problematizing that. Goelman’s
emphasis not only of these conditions themselves, but of the golem’s awareness of and bitterness
towards these conditions, speaks particularly to Drachler’s depictions of the golem as
marginalized and liminal semi-Jew and semi-human.
Mlawski’s golem appears early in Hammer, within the context of a story told to Bal by
his uncle:
“‘What is a golem?’ you might ask. One of my favorite stories. It’s a wonder I didn’t tell
you about him sooner. The golem is a giant beast made out of clay. But the best part of the
golem — to an old bookmaker, anyway — is that he comes to life through the power of the
written word. Must have been an invention of bookmakers. They’re creative fellows, you
know. Philosopher kings, if they wanted the power —”
“But moving on,” I grumbled.
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As Chajes explains, “As the soul was thought to depart the body during the night—sleep being one-sixtieth of
death—its return to the body could naturally be expected to meet with the occasional complication” (Chajes 18).
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“Now, to give a golem life, you write the word truth, which is ameth, like this.” With a
finger, my uncle traced out some invisible runes on my quilt. “You write it on a tablet and
put it into the creature’s mouth. And to stop the golem, simple enough. You erase the first
letter.” My uncle covered the first invisible symbol with a veiny hand. “Now it says meth,
which means death, and voilà — the golem stops.”
“Please, Uncle. No more stories.”
“But I haven’t even gotten to the point of it yet. You see, Bali, the golem is a protector.
Brute strength, pure loyalty. In fact, he is the Jewish people’s greatest protector” (33)
At the time of hearing this story, Bal thinks the story is fictional; he does not realize that golems
are real (within the context of the novel) and that his uncle has personally made golems before.
When Bal is captured by the “Malleus Maleficarum,” however, he recalls his uncle’s tale of the
golem. “Malleus Maleficarum,” (Latin for “Hammer of Witches,” as Uncle Diego explains to
Bali) is, within the novel, an inquisitory branch targeting witches that parallels the religious
Inquisition targeting Jews and Muslims. When he is captured and interrogated by them, Bal
thinks:
Oh, if only I had a golem now! It occurred to me that I really was a child, and that my uncle,
eccentric as he was, had always been my protector, my golem. At this moment, the last
moment, I yearned to be back home, safe in bed, protected by Diego and his stories. Stories
that, like a golem, came to life with a single word. (Mlawski 47-48)
Shortly after the above-quoted passage, Bal creates a golem to save him from the torture about to
commence; Hammer’s golem, thus, is quite literally saving a Jewish (or so Bal thinks he is at the
time) human from Christian oppressors, as does the golem in the classic Prague tale. This
contrasts with Goelman’s depiction of the golem’s context: in Path, a Jewish rabbi creates a
golem in order to save two non-Jewish (ostensibly Christian but that is left ambiguous) girls
from an antagonist who, while potentially loosely associated with Christianity (in the sense that
his organization is called the Illuminati), is by no means overtly so or religious in any way.
The manner of golem creation in both novels differs as well. In Path, Schank creates a
golem through physically inscribing the letters aleph, mem, and taf (spelling “emet,” or “truth”)
into the golem’s mud forehead, as is described in traditional golem texts and literature. In
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Hammer, however, Bal creates his golem out of mental focusing on the relevant letters:
It’s hard for me to explain what happened next. The closest I can get is to say I felt like
some deep part of myself, somewhere beyond the backs of my eyes, was reaching toward
another. As if the words “Diego,” “golem,” “protect,” and “word” unlocked something
within me I didn’t understand. In front of my closed eyelids something was glimmering, and
my eyes flicked beneath them like I was watching a dream. I felt warmth caressing my
cheeks and fingers, warmth like a fire embracing you on a stormy day. And somehow, for an
instant, I felt safe.
I opened my eyes.
A series of fiery letters in an unknown language flared before me. Though I had never
seen those symbols before, the word ameth escaped my lips, and I knew they stood for truth.
Several inches tall, the letters browned the atmosphere around them as if the world were
nothing more than paper that could burn away to nothing. (Mlawski 48)
The fiery letters then bring the golem into existence—the narrative elides exactly how, but Bali
next sees “a ten-foot-tall earthen beast. Its coal eyes blazed red as it barged through the exploded
doorway. With a howl it shoved away the cloaked man and the soldier as if they were nothing
more than toys” (Mlawski 49). Mlawski’s golem is a “rocky monster” who “let[s] loose another
primal roar” (49). The imagery here is that of a physically-oriented monster: huge, earthen,
strong, roaring (never speaking) and using brute force. This is a sharp contrast to Goelman’s
introductory description of the golem:
[David] hovered above his corpse, watching as the golem he had summoned rose from the
earth. In seconds, it expanded from the little figure he’d traced into the mud to become taller
than David. Stockier too. The holy name glowed like fire on its forehead, and there was a soft
hiss as the rain pattered against the fiery letters.
The golem stood there frowning for a moment before heavily walking a few paces to
where the lightning had thrown David’s body. He crouched and placed his thick fingers on
David’s neck. [...]
The golem slowly turned back to McMasters. For a moment, he simply stared at him. The
eyes were the most human part of the golem, large and brown, strangely naked, with no
eyelashes or eyebrows to conceal them. [...]
The golem moved so fast, David barely registered his movement: One moment the golem
was staring at McMasters, the next he was clutching the man’s neck with his right hand. He
lifted McMasters off the ground and held him at arm’s length.
“I was summoned,” the golem said slowly, “to protect children.” (Goelman 282-283)
In contrast to Mlawski’s golem, Goelman’s is described almost gently, especially in the
beginning—a “little figure [...] traced into the mud” that grows, the “soft hiss” of rain on the
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letters of his forehead. The golem’s first act is a gentle one of checking David’s pulse. His
lowly origins—of mud—and his human-esque qualities come across in both his bearing and his
physical features: his eyes are the “most human part” of him (note they are the “most” human
part—not the only human part). Goelman’s description of the golem’s eyes as “large and brown,
strangely naked” lend a tone of vulnerability to the golem. The golem speaks—again unlike
Mlawski’s—and displays very human-like cognitive skills: all David had had time to command
the golem, before dying, was to protect children. When the golem forms, McMasters tries to
take command of it (in the excised sections from the quotation above), invoking god’s seventysecond name and ordering the golem to obey him. McMasters asks if the golem understands,
and the golem nods. McMasters then commands the golem to move David’s body, and to then
find two boys and bring them to the maze. The golem has enough autonomous, critical thinking
skills to realize that what McMasters is ordering him to do—bring two boys to the maze—goes
directly against his original instructions from David (to protect children). The golem thus kills
McMasters. He then says, to David’s corpse, “And you, [...] Idiot. Building your cursed maze,
then summoning me when it’s too late to keep the girls out of it” (Goelman 283). Despite the
fact that Goelman’s golem lacks the soul/spirit necessary to hear the dead (in the golem’s own
estimation) he speaks, comprehends, and is capable of independent, critical thought.
In contrast, Mlawski’s golem seems more bestial and less human. Although Uncle Diego
complements the golem on its intelligence in bringing Bali home, saying, “Quite a smart one you
made there. I’d always thought they were all fools with heads full of clay and dirt,” it is
portrayed more in the way a smart dog or horse might track back home (and this, Uncle Diego
says, is smart for golems) (Mlawski 52). This is not a positive or negative thing; rather, it simply
focuses on different elements of the golem myth—Goelman focusing more on the lowly/mud
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origins and internalized, human themes; Mlawski focusing more on the machismo-strengthfantasy of the disenfranchised Jew.
Goelman’s depiction of the golem connects to prior golem literature by emphasizing the
golem’s servitude and objectification, as a being created only to serve (and enslaved by creator’s
wishes), and by exploring the problems of that—problems both technical and ideological. From
the practical level, Goelman critiques the pragmatic ramifications of the golem as monster/hero
by playing out the golem’s “rules” or limitations to their full implications. Schank, the rabbi
who created Barry and commanded him to protect children from the maze and McMasters, died
immediately after this creation/command; Schank is therefore unable to further communicate
with or help Barry. Schank only discovers belatedly (in death, moments after his creation of
Barry) that Barry’s very golem nature—being made of mud, and, as Barry says, “I’m no mystic”
(284)—prevents Barry from both hearing Schank’s spirit and fulfilling Schank’s command, as
Barry cannot access the spiritual planes of the maze, where the girls are trapped, nor can Barry
hear Schank’s ghost. Barry can and does kill McMasters, and tries via physical means to stop
generations of children from entering the maze. But Barry is unable to do more—he cannot even
destroy the maze. Any significant power, within the narrative, to either fight evil or protect the
innocent requires “spiritual,” rather than physical, aptitude—and spiritual is portrayed, in the
novel, as any aspect of human creativity, intelligence, soul, personality, etc. (i.e. it is not meant
religiously, but depicted more as innate qualities/potential within mortal, living beings). Barry’s
very physical nature (being made from mud) and physical prowess, which are exactly the
qualities that aid most golems, limit and constrain him.
With this double constraint—that of the golem’s natural law of obedience and that of the
golem’s nature as a mud being—Goelman presents the conundrum of a golem who is bound and
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forced to try to achieve/obey its creator’s commands, but inherently, by the golem’s very nature,
unable to do so. Goelman critiques this logistically: such absurd limitations and rules render the
golem almost powerless within the novel’s plot; resolution stems instead from human characters
taking responsibility and action into their own hands. Whereas prior golem depictions cast the
golem as either savior or tragic power-run-amok,184 Goelman deflates this with an injection of
immersive realism, implying that golems, as plot devices, are as limited as the rules that bind
them; realistically they probably would be the quietly marginalized, weird, mostly ineffective
caretaker that Barry is. Instead, Goelman places power—for both good and evil—in the hands of
his human characters, in moral and non-physical forms (power comes from knowledge, courage,
connectedness, etc) accessible via mundane means (McMasters studies, Dahlia practices magic
tricks, etc.). Such human-golem power dynamics contrast with many traditional renditions of the
golem tale, in which the whole purpose of the golem is to physically fight on behalf of
disenfranchised Jews. In Goelman’s story, the Jewish characters must act for themselves—not
because the golem goes horribly wrong or becomes too powerful in a Frankenstein-esque trope,
as seen in some golem stories, but out of a mundane, pragmatic playing out of the limitations that
an enslaved golem would have, and out of an a priori ethics of taking responsibility upon oneself
(this is a golem tale very much of twentieth and twenty-first century American Jewry; it is
difficult to imagine such a message operating in an early-modern, European Jewish context).
Goelman also critiques the golem figure thematically: Barry’s frustration can be read as a
broader frustration with the slavery and objectification of the golem, and with the lack of the
golem’s autonomy as its own being. The paradox of strength/power yet disempowerment
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See, for example, the golem picture books discussed by Sonheim (“Picture Books About the Golem”); see also
Eichler-Levine’s discussion of overlapping golem picture books and particularly motifs of the golem as child, and
the child as sufferer (Suffer, chapter five).

236

parallels classic golem themes, including both Meltzer and Drachler’s depictions. Goelman’s
emphasis on the golem’s self-awareness, however—awareness of itself as slave/object,
awareness of its sole reason for existence as being to fulfill another’s needs, awareness of the
male rabbinic authority responsible for this leash—Goelman’s emphasis not only of these
conditions themselves, but of the golem’s awareness of and bitterness towards these conditions,
differs from much prior golem literature that focused on the human (rabbinic, Jewish layperson,
and non-Jewish) experiences or thematic embodiments of the golem. Instead, Goelman’s
perspective parallels, thematically, Drachler’s poetic treatment of the golem. Like Drachler’s
golem, Barry displays enormous resentment—for the above-mentioned conditions or limitations
of its existence as a golem, as well as general resentment towards rabbis and Judaism.
Like Drachler’s golem, too, Barry is portrayed as a liminal figure—regarding his liminal
status of being alive or not, as well as his liminal status of being Jewish or not. Technically, of
course, Barry is not “Jewish” since he is not “human” (or possibly, debatably, “alive”). He also
identifies—or at least, performs his identity outwardly—as non-Jewish; indeed, before readers
discover Barry is a golem, the narrative presentation of Barry is as a non-Jewish person
employed by the Jewish camp as caretaker. Yet, due to Barry’s nature of being constructed by a
rabbi, via a specifically-Jewish, kabbalistic process, to complete specifically Jewish tasks
(keeping children out of a kabbalistic maze), Barry cannot help being informed about and aware
of esoteric Jewish law and philosophy—it governs his existence as surely as his role as caretaker
in a Jewish summer camp governs his day to day experience. In both, however (the camp and
broader Judaism) Barry exists on the fringes—literally (he lives on the campgrounds’ border)
and thematically (he is not technically part of the Jewish community, but is by default more
knowledgeable about some aspects of Judaism than are most of the Jewish camp attendees or
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employees). This resonates with themes of the golem as marginal specifically to the Jewish
community—as fundamentally “unformed” or only “partially formed,” not fully human and not
fully Jewish—within halakhic/talmudic literature (discussed in chapter one) and alluded to in
Drachler’s poem.
Barry’s liminality (and the liminality of the golem as a being) is also evident in his
rhetorical ambiguity regarding his position as a supernatural/horror figure and his moral stance
within the novel (i.e. is he good or bad, antagonist or protagonist). At various points in the
novel, Barry is portrayed in seemingly conflicting ways: although he is ultimately revealed as a
good and even heroic figure, his depictions throughout the novel until this reveal are sinister and
ominous-feeling. We eventually discover that Barry’s whole purpose (for his creation/existence)
is to protect children; this is similar in theme to legends of golems protecting Jews, albeit Barry
protects all children, not just Jewish ones. Yet for most of the book, before we know that Barry
is a golem, Barry is depicted in negatively-cued tones: he appears threatening and ominous. Part
of this is for plot purposes of misdirection (and misdirection is also an explicit trope throughout
the novel)—we’re meant to think Barry is the villain when the villain is actually McMasters and
Barry is good. Interestingly, all the negatively-cued depictions of Barry throughout the novel
cease immediately once we know he’s a golem—then Barry is depicted in only positive-cued
tones, albeit still uncanny, strange, and unearthly ones.
This tonal shift and blend has Barry oscillating between signifying a threatening
presence/power and a protective, benign presence/power—an oscillation that echoes,
thematically, golem legends (especially Prague/Loew ones) and literature such as the poetry and
comics discussed in chapters one and five respectively, and the picture books referenced in both.
Unlike in those other texts (legends, poetry, comics, and picture books), Goelman’s golem is not
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the central focus of this novel, nor is his physical power of particular note. Goelman implies that
Barry is physically strong (Barry picks McMasters into the air with one hand and quickly,
efficiently strangles him) but there is little textual showcasing of, astonishment toward, or
dwelling on Barry’s physical strength (in contrast to the other literature referenced above).
Rather, the terror Barry evokes before his reveal as a golem stems more from his weird and/or
hostile demeanor. Whereas the literary/folkloric golems referenced above are easily, obviously
recognized by the characters around them as huge, powerful monsters, Barry is misrecognized
throughout most of the novel as human. It is precisely this misrecognition that provides the
platform for, and force of, the other characters’ terrified reactions to him. Since the human
characters assume Barry is also human, they expect him to behave like other humans; any
behaviors or qualities that deviate from typical human ones thus appear strange or scary. These
deviations, more so than Barry’s hostile interactive demeanor, cause human characters to feel
that Barry is weird or scary; after all, other human characters (e.g. Natan, the chef) also act
hostilely to campers, but only Barry feels off and uncanny to the characters. Once Barry is
revealed to certain characters as a golem, however, the weirdness evaporates, because what is
weird for a human is normal for a golem. The human characters’ uncanny and horror-esque
reactions, therefore, stem largely from either not being able to recognize/categorize an other (is
Barry human? other?) or from misrecognition and thus a perception that the other is acting
aberrantly.
The driving tension, here, is thus one of liminality or ambiguity, rather than horror
regarding the supernatural itself. As soon as characters properly recognize, categorize, and thus
understand the strange other, that other ceases being “strange” in the observing character’s
eyes—even when the reality of the correct categorization is or should be objectively strange.
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When Dahlia behaves strangely due to seeing ghosts and being possessed, Chelsea and Rafe
classify her as weird, scary, and/or crazy. As soon as Chelsea or Rafe understand the
supernatural circumstances, however, they visibly alter their attitudes toward Dahlia. When
Chelsea realizes Dahlia is acting as she does because Dahlia can see the ghosts, Chelsea softens
towards her; although Chelsea continues to treat Dahlia like a nerd (and thus does not befriend
her and occasionally still makes snippy comments) she stops mocking Dahlia for being weird or
socially inept (options that Chelsea either disdains or—it’s implied—perhaps fears) and even
gives Dahlia an apologetic look when Chelsea’s cronies continue to mock Dahlia. Chelsea
seems to find sanity relieving, and mental instability scarier than the supernatural/fantastic. Rafe
reacts similarly, saying to Dahlia “I hope that you’re possessed [after Dahlia tells him Schank is
possessing her]. Because otherwise, I’d be seriously freaked out by how weird you are” (252).
Recognizing the strange/fantastic other for what it is—be it ghosts, magic, or monsters—implies
a level of knowing, understanding (and perhaps potential for control) that, through its very
categorization (and ability to fit into categorizations), render it less terrifying (and thus more
mundane and familiar) than the unknown, uncategorizable, and unpredictable, such as—for
Chelsea and Rafe, at least—mental instability.
This issue of recognition, and of moral and rhetorical ambiguity (is the monster good or
bad; is the monster horrific or mundane) occur, as well, in Goelman’s presentation of Schank as
ibbur. Demon/spirit possession is usually depicted (in literature and film) as horrific and/or
malevolent; here, however, Schank’s possession of Dahlia is categorized as one of the “boring
kind of do-gooder spirits” (105)—an ibbur, a spirit who returns from the dead to help by
imparting knowledge, experience, or guidance. The narrative’s descriptions of this possession—
especially Dahlia’s realization of it and initial horror/resistance—definitely do borrow from
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horror rhetoric and tropes. Overall, however, it is portrayed as benign in purpose, advantageous
due to Schank’s knowledge, and ultimately banal/mundane and rather ambiguous.
All of Goelman’s depictions discussed here contain a recurring theme of the Jewish
monstrous subverting protagonist and reader expectations regarding speculative-genre
tropes/conventions of the supernatural/monstrous, as well as conceptualizations of the monstrous
as threatening, powerful, unnatural, and aberrational. As the novel progresses, what seems
malevolent, abnormal, or unnatural is actually benign, whereas what seems benign, normal, or
natural is actually malevolent. Barry shifts, in the eyes of characters (Dahlia and Tom) and
readers, from a menacing, monstrous-seeming human to a benign, human-like monster—humanlike in his emotions (which we only see after the reveal that he is a golem) and humane in his
desire to protect the children. Barry’s trajectory opposes and thematically complements that of
McMaster, who seems at first to be harmless and normal/natural—a handsome, folksy,
uncomplicated and friendly farmer, and the paradigmatic “American” (as Schank thinks)—but
turns out to be a fantastical arch-villain. Ghosts, usually categorized (by characters and readers)
as unnatural or supernatural, are here depicted as part of nature and even as mundane (e.g.
Chelsea and Michal’s reactions to the ghosts).
Overall, Goelman’s explorations of the Jewish monstrous continually render the fantastic
mundane, and the mundane fantastic—on both rhetoric and thematic levels. Such normalizing of
the strange is a move normally present in immersive or liminal, rather than intrusive, fantastic
rhetoric. While Mlawski does not employ this strategy in her monstrous rhetoric, specifically,
she does employ it rhetorically throughout other aspects of her novel—specifically regarding
characters’ reactions to magic and to the worlds around them—as does Goelman. The methods
(e.g. bathos, irony, humor) and dialogical, argumentative rhetorical strategies both authors
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employ are strikingly similar, despite their novels’ differing contexts and overall narrative
trajectories. Both Goelman and Mlawski render the magical mundane and vice versa; the ways
in which they do so—and the subversive implications of such moves—is the subject of the next
section.

Normalizing the Strange: Fantastic Rhetoric in Goelman and Mlawski
Both Path and Hammer employ intrusive rhetoric, rather than immersive, with regard to
magic’s place within the novels’ purportedly-realist settings; Hammer can be read as portal-quest
as well in its narrative arc.185 True to intrusive rhetorics as discussed by Mendlesohn, both
novels include explanations of the fantastic (to or by the protagonist for whom magic is a break
from “reality”, and therefore for the reader); both also employ horror-genre rhetoric in describing
and ratcheting up the intrusion of the fantastic.186 Unlike typical intrusive fantasy rhetoric,
however, both of these novels also make an odd move: after introducing a new, horror-rhetoricinfused (i.e. dramatically, suspensefully described) element, the narrative almost immediately
deflates it, switching (sometimes jarringly) to a tone that renders the magical mundane.
The rhetorical move of making the magical mundane is one Mendlesohn aligns with
immersive and liminal fantasy—not usually intrusive. Granted, some instances of this, in Path
and Hammer, achieve comedic effects, such as when readers expect pathos yet encounter sudden
bathos, or when the juxtaposition of the “strange” and “normal” serves as comedic in its own
right. However, there is more at play here than comedy. By juxtaposing heightened rhetoric
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Bal is explicitly on a quest (although his interpretation of and position within the quest changes throughout the
novel). While Bal stays within his world, and thus there is no literal portal, similarly to Frodo he leaves his familiar
home and country to journey to unfamiliar lands; Mendlesohn’s categorization of Lord of the Rings as a portal-quest
in this regard applies to Hammer as well (Rhetorics 2).
186
See Mendlesohn’s chapter on intrusion fantasy, Rhetorics p. 114-181.
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(horror/intrusive) with immediate deflation (comedic or otherwise), Goelman and Mlawski play
with different ways of normalizing the strange—and of undermining both readers’ and
protagonists’ genre expectations (often in a metafictional or intertextual way for protagonists
who are often think of their adventures as “stories” and are aware of their own “genre”
expectations). In doing so, Goelman and Mlawski bring a bit of immersive rhetoric’s ideology—
protagonists who question/argue with their surroundings; the epistemological subversions
resulting from rendering the magical mundane (i.e. allowing readers to question what is “real” or
“status quo”)—into otherwise intrusive-rhetoric novels. Goelman and Mlawski could be said to
be arguing, themselves, with many prior traditions/assumptions of intrusive fantasies—in
essence asking, why can’t one have an intrusive fantasy where the magic is mundane, or where
the protagonists argue with their worlds—in a way that hearkens back to authors such as Nesbitt.
Goelman and Mlawski accomplish this in few ways.
First, the rhetorical shifts and juxtaposition mentioned above: for Goelman, at least, there
are many moments in which the text introduces the magical, supernatural, or uncanny in a
seemingly-typical “intrusive” (Mendlesohn) way—i.e. rhetorics from horror genre—only to
immediately deflates it with some bathos/mundane reaction from other character. For instance,
when Dahlia arrives at Camp Arava she sees two little girls walk “[s]traight through the cabin’s
wall” (Goelman 5). This is described in dramatic tones:
The older of the two girls seemed to notice Dahlia looking at them, and she grabbed the
other girl’s hand. She took a step away from Dahlia, toward the cabin, dragging the smaller
girl with her. Then another step. Then another.
Straight through the cabin’s wall. (Goelman 5)
The emphasis on the girl’s noticing Dahlia’s attention, and suddenly leaving, lends suspenseful
and mysterious tones to the episode—is the girl avoiding Dahlia? Why? Why her urgency and
forcefulness? The short, staccato-like sentences (“Then another step. Then another.”) further
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build suspense and readerly anticipation. The paragraph break spotlights the punchline: walking
through walls. Clearly, something extraordinary just occurred—and this is clear to (and clearly
meant to be felt by) the reader.
Yet Dahlia reacts to this by interpreting it in a non-magical, mundane way, thinking to
herself: “What a great magic trick. How had they done it?” (Goelman 6). Such a reaction is
believable to the reader only because we already know Dahlia’s fetish for magic tricks (the
realist kind); she spends all her free time practicing magic tricks, connecting with online
magician communities, and wants to be at magic camp rather than Camp Arava. In the
paragraph right after Dahlia’s reaction, she examines the bunk to try to figure out how the girls
did it. While the reader may understand that the disappearance was supernatural, Dahlia assumes
a natural explanation, and her reaction is mundane and monotonous enough to both convince the
reader and defuse the suspense. When Dahlia searches for the “magic trick” mechanism, she
does not find anything to explain the disappearance—yet, rather than this ramping up the
mystery through dramatic tones, the narrative deflates it through both the meticulous, dense
description of Dahlia’s inquiry and through the transformation of what should have been an
exciting, suspenseful mystery into a source of embarrassment for Dahlia. The popular girls see
her examining the bunk in odd ways, ask her what she’s doing, find her answer (that she’s
searching for little girls) both weird and boring, and then casually mock her for it; Dahlia/the
narrative then responds wryly, “Great. She’d been in camp for two minutes and already given the
mean girls a reason to make fun of her” (Goelman 9). The narrative immediately moves on to
other, unrelated action.
These strategies: of (temporarily) rendering the fantastic liminal by putting it (in the
protagonist’s mind at least) in question as to whether it is natural or supernatural; of moving
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from a brief note of the dramatic uncanny to immediate mundane, boring (not actually boring,
but described in a more bored-sounding tone) barrage of detail; of distracting the protagonist
from the supernatural via embarrassment and/or unrelated action, and thus also distracting the
reader with sleight-of-hand—such strategies parallel those used by authors such as Diana Wynne
Jones in both immersive and liminal texts. While Goelman’s tactics may be more apparent to
readers than Jones’ (i.e. we may not be as unsure whether what happened was magical or not
here as we would be in, say, Archer’s Goon [1984] or Fire and Hemlock [1985]) that is not the
point here (or, I’d guess, Goelman’s agenda)—rather, it is noteworthy here as a break with
typical intrusive rhetoric (again, given some exceptions such as Nesbit or Eager) that instead
ratchets up the suspense.
In fact, if readers are aware of the dissonance between what is actually happening
(supernatural events) and Dahlia’s comprehension of those events (or lack thereof) the result can
be a narrative irony at work, in a way similar to that described by Nikolajeva187 that engages
readers in a certain type of critical thinking/reading. In Nesbit/Eager, this can be source of
humor (e.g., in Half Magic [1954], the mom’s mundane/natural interpretation of obviouslyfantastic occurrence is clearly meant to be ironic in a humorous way); here though seems more
about subverting assumptions of how characters might react—subverting genre assumptions—by
bringing in a protagonist who responds to the magical in both realist/mimetic ways and via
skeptical/argumentative lens.
And it is not only the protagonist who does so—other characters react in these ways as
well. Chelsea, for instance, one of the popular/mean girls, turns out to be able to hear the ghosts
(Dahlia can see them but cannot hear them). When Dahlia asks her why she comes back to camp
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if she can hear ghosts, Chelsea “shrug[s]. ‘What’s the big deal? I usually hear them two, maybe
three, times a summer. This summer it’s more, but so what? This is where my friends go. What,
am I going to go to Camp Bimah and spend all summer praying?” Dahlia responds, “But you
said it depresses you when they cry”; Chelsea replies, “Sure. And it depresses me when it rains,
or when I pass a homeless person on the street. But it’s not like I’m going to stay in my bedroom
and sob all the time” (198). Chelsea’s reaction to the ghosts is banal, pragmatic, and lightly
ironic/funny (depressing ghosts are preferable to religious summer camp), rather than the mix of
horror, shock, and scientific fascination that Dahlia feels and expects in return. The ensuing
conversation proceeds in tongue-in-cheek fashion to deflate any expectations Dahlia, or readers,
might have following Chelsea’s revelation: when Chelsea says that the ghosts have been saying
“Malkoot” but that she doesn’t know if that’s even Hebrew, and Dahlia says, “Malchut is the
tenth sefira [...] I should show you the kabbala book,” Chelsea replies, “No. You really
shouldn’t” (199); when Dahlia suggests collaborating to understand the ghosts Chelsea initially
refuses—not out of fear, but out of profound disinterest. When Dahlia presses Chelsea “But
don’t you want to know?” (200, original emphasis) Chelsea replies:
“My first year at camp I spent days with Lori Nelson, this other girl who could hear the
ghosts. We’d sit around the steps of the cabin, trying to figure out what they were saying.
What it all meant.”
“What happened to her?” Dahlia asked in a low voice.
Chelsea rolled her eyes. “Nothing. She stopped coming to camp. She had no friends
except me. And it turned out I didn’t want to spend all my time hanging out with a girl who
scratched her scabs until they bled and wore the same T-shirt every day for three weeks”
(200)
Bathos, humor, and mimetic realism continuously deflate the appearance and expectation of
horror or melodrama. This occurs throughout the novel: when Rafe describes the kabbalah book
as “pretty cool” and “like a Jewish-themed RPG” Benjy says it sounds like “one of those crappy
games they make you play in Hebrew school” (Goelman 102); when Rafe enthuses that the
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kabbalah book describes “like, seven different kinds of dead people” Benjy replies, “That sounds
like my grandmother’s old-age home” (Goelman 102-103). At the novel’s resolution, Dahlia’s
intense rescue of herself, Chelsea, and two other campers—the entire novel’s climax, depicted in
suspenseful, dramatic tones since their lives are on the line—is deflated by Chelsea’s reaction,
“What a dorky way to be rescued. Math and letters. It was like some crappy movie they’d show
at Hebrew school” (331). Some of these reactions might be ways of humorously engaging a
specific cadre of potential readers—middle schoolers skeptical of religious Jewish education in
general (who can thus relate to the above sentiments), and perhaps skeptical, as well, of Path
itself (in which case Path can subtly reflect these jokes back upon itself, as a novel that also
entertains via Jewish content, or deflect such criticisms from itself via characters who roll their
eyes at this such obvious didactically-minded entertainment). These reactions also, however,
serve to inject realism and realism’s resulting pragmatic critiques into the otherwise
horror/intrusive rhetoric and mystical tones of the story.
Second, in general, Goelman presents camp as a place where “weird” is normal. He does
this throughout the novel in different ways, but the most explicit example is in the novel’s
conclusion. Leading up to the climax, more and more campers disappear (into the maze, but no
one knows this); counselors have been frantically searching, campers are crying and scared, and
camp is about to be closed and everyone sent home early. Dahlia then goes back into the maze,
confronts the antagonist, and rescues everyone. As the campers return to the frantic camp, they
tell a pretty weak lie: “They had gotten lost in the woods, it had rained, the counselors had found
them” yet, “[t]he amazing thing was that everyone seemed to believe them” despite the
implausibility of every aspect of the cover story (333). Despite the clearly inexplicable, dramatic
events—and in defiance of expectations Dahlia and readers might have regarding dramatic

247

recognition, by the rest of the characters, of the dangers the protagonists faced and of Dahlia’s
heroism—despite all this, instead of surprise and acknowledgement, “[n]one of it surprised
anyone. The only thing that did seem to amaze everyone was the panic that had swept the camp.
In hindsight, everyone knew all along that it was no big deal” (333-4). The biggest surprise we
see is the next day, when Benjy and Rafe see Barry talk to Dahlia: “Benjy was thunderstruck.
‘Did Barry just—just—talk to you?’ [...] Rafe shook his head. ‘That was the weirdest thing I’ve
ever seen at camp’” (336). Benjy’s shock at the surly caretaker speaking nicely to Dahlia
contrasts with his (and everyone’s) complete lack of shock about—or indeed recognition of—
actual supernatural events; Rafe, who knows about the supernatural events, still says that Barry’s
friendliness is the weirdest thing Rafe has seen at camp. This spurs Dahlia to think, “It was
weird what people noticed [...] People hadn’t so much forgotten about the campers getting lost
the day before as lost interest. A bunch of girls were crying at breakfast, but that was just
because the first-session people were leaving” (336). Some of the general camp reaction taps
into the trope, within children’s fantasy, of surrounding characters (often parents or passersby)
failing to recognize the fantastic even when it occurs right under their noses. However, Goelman
also portrays camp as a place where reality is inverted, or at least slightly askew: what should be
strange is normal; what should taste horrible (e.g. camp food) is—not precisely good, but
campers don’t notice until they’ve wolfed it down; the surly caretaker is more fearsome than
ghosts or evil magicians; and first-session people leaving is sadder than the trauma of thinking
four campers were lost or dead.
Overall, the effect of Goelman’s rhetorical manipulation—whether through bathetic
reactions and juxtapositions, or the use of summer-camp as a space with different operative
norms and assumptions than the surrounding world—is to deflate what should be epic, and
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normalize the strange. In some ways, camp itself is a microcosmic immersive/secondary-worldesque environment, in which the regular, realist/mimetic “rules” regarding what is “normal” or
“possible” (in other words, regular/realist onto-epistemologies) are upended, reversed, or simply
different—in much the same way as they are in a secondary world. It also allows Dahlia, an
otherwise intrusive-fantasy protagonist, to occupy a similar rhetorical stance as immersivefantasy protagonists: because Path’s sleep-away camp is a setting in which the strange is normal
and the fantastic (magic, the supernatural and uncanny, monsters) mundane, camp functions
almost as a microcosmic secondary, immersive world of its own—a world governed by different
rules and expectations of reality and normalcy than the outside world.
Goelman’s injection of bathos and deflation into what should be (and at times in the
novel, still is) uncanny and marvelous thus allows Dahlia to question and argue her surroundings
in a similar manner to immersive-fantasy protagonists. It also encourages reader awareness of
and skepticism towards the underlying fantastical mechanics and tropes that Goelman
simultaneously employs and critiques. Overall, for Goelman, all of these rhetorical shifts subvert
“genre” expectations of the reader and/or protagonist, in ways that encourage or necessitate
critical reading/thinking (again, of protagonist and/or reader).
Mlawski also makes use of bathos, humor, and other techniques to render the magical
mundane—despite the novel’s predominantly intrusive and portal-quest framework—and,
similarly to Path, the effect in Hammer is to open space for both Bal and readers to critique and
argue their worlds. When Catalina inadvertently summons thorny vines that strangle Bal, for
instance (in the scene quoted above in the first subsection of this chapter), Catalina blinks, comes
out of her rage, and releases the vines; when she apologizes to Bal, however, he enthuses, “Are
you kidding? I didn’t know you could summon things to strangle people! That was amazing!”
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(194, original emphasis). Humor in Hammer often serves to inject a note of mimetic realism into
an otherwise epic-toned fantasy novel—a way in which the narrative wryly and tacitly posits the
question of, “How would these characters actually react, if they were real people?” Similarly to
Path, though, it is through humor and bathos as well that characters make space for questioning
prior assumptions and envisioning new possibilities—whether regarding assumptions of how
magic and natural laws work, as with the example above, or regarding assumptions regarding the
societal dynamics surrounding them. For instance, for much of the novel Bal has sensed hostility
from “Pedro,” who is really Catalina in disguise; Bal assumes the hostility stems from Catalina’s
suspicions that Bal is Jewish. When Bal and Catalina discover their mutual identities as
Storytellers, Bal realizes the behavior he had interpreted as hostility was actually avoidance—
Catalina, like Bal, fears anyone discovering her magical powers. When Bal expresses this to
Catalina, she rolls her eyes, “Why should I hate Jews? Half the men at court are conversos”
(189). Much of the novel’s prior tension—Bal’s efforts to keep his Jewish identity secret, the
ratched-up hostility between Pedro/Catalina and Bal, and the narrative misdirection of “Pedro”
as the secret antagonist—all of this is casually deflated with Catalina’s eye-roll. Simultaneously,
Mlawski debunks overly reductive stereotypes of Jewish-Christian relations in medieval Spain
(as she does elsewhere in the novel and in the afterword).
A third way that the novels render the fantastic mundane, and draw reader attention to the
very literary conventions the stories employ, is through metafictive critiques of the narrative
structure itself. This is most evident in Hammer, when Bal realizes that he is not, in the end, the
hero of our story—in fact, he is not, and never was, even a main player. The prophecy that has
been dominating the narrative for both Bal and reader—Baba Yaga’s prophecy that sets Bal on
much of his quest—stated that: “A great power approaches in the West: a power that will
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destroy the world as we know it” (352, original emphasis). Bal, Jinniyah, Catalina, Bal’s
father—all the major characters in the novel have been assuming the prophecy refers to Bal and
his father: as Bal thinks, “My father thought I was that dreadful power; at times, I thought it was
him. And that misunderstanding almost led to father and son dying at the hands of the other, for
no reason”—i.e., that misunderstanding of the prophecy led to the entire impetus, climax, and
resolution of Bal’s quest (352). Yet Bal realizes: “what if the Baba Yaga wasn’t talking about
either of us? What if, after all that, she was talking about Colon [Columbus] and his men? What
if the battle between Spaniard and Taino was the first of many, the start of a war that would
change the course of history?” This leads Bal to reflect, “And here I thought I was the main
character [...] Maybe I wasn’t even part of the story” (352).
Of course, Bal is still the protagonist of our story—of the novel we’re reading. But Bal
has been conceptualizing his story—i.e. the plot of the novel—as a typical portal-quest, epic,
fantasy adventure. Everything that occurs to Bal, from the revelation of Bal’s secret, magical
identity, and important lineage to his persecution by the Malleus Maleficarum to his forced exile
to Baba Yaga’s prophecy—all of this is interpreted by Bal and, likely, by readers as implying
that Bal is the expected hero-protagonist along a hero-protagonist’s bildungsroman and quest.
And, in some ways, it is; Bal is correct in assuming that the person behind many of the magical
attacks against him is his father, and in true hero-quest form we see Bal find his father, duel
magically, and then resolve their misunderstandings. By the end of the novel, Bal has indeed
completed his bildungsroman trajectory—resolving not only his personal challenge, but
redeeming his father as well, and thus ending the curse of the Hamah and (it is implied) restoring
their family’s lineage. One would expect the novel to end here; there is a bit of an ambiguoustoned next few pages as the novel continues following Bal and his companions—even when the
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“story” seems to be over. Very shortly, however, we see why: the true narrative climax—the
battle between the Taino and Spaniards—has begun.
It is at this point that Bal, and readers, realize that everything that has transpired until
now regarding Bal and his father—the Malleus Maleficarum, Bal’s secret identity and forced
flight, Bal’s adventure/quest to find his father, the magical challenges Bal faces along the way,
the climactic duel and resolution—all of this has nothing to do with the prophecy, or even with
the “main story” really going on all this time—that of European colonization. Looking back
over the novel, this becomes clear—what readers might have previously taken as fun side
features (e.g., the fact that Bal happens to escape on Columbus’s ship of all ships) or historicalfiction grounding contextual details (e.g. depictions of Columbus and his captains, and of Taino
leaders such as Caonabo and Anacaona) were actually the main story occurring this whole time,
right under Bal’s and reader’s noses. It is this story—that of European conquest—to which the
prophecy refers; although Bal and his father’s relationship is moving, it is not the “power that
will destroy the world as we know it”—European colonialism is. And even aside from the
fictive prophecy, contemporary readers are well aware that it is this story—of colonialism and a
clash of civilizations—that impacts world history far more than any individual bildungsroman
would, even were it realist-fiction or factual.
By doing this, Mlawski deflates and subverts the epic, fantastic tones present until now
from the novel’s fantastic elements: although Columbus is warily aware of magic, he is
portrayed as utterly mundane and non-magical—as are the other captains, almost all the crew,
and most of the Taino. The utter devastation and global change prophesied occur quietly and
mundanely, alongside and unheeding of the magical battles foregrounded in Bal’s narrative focal
point. Additionally, though, Mlawski explicitly problematizes the conventions we (and Bal as
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well) have come to associate with much genre fantasy (for Bal, of course, this would be legends,
fairy tales, etc): the idea of a single (often child) hero as savior of the world, the idea of easilydemarcated and magically-fueled cataclysmic battles between good and evil, and the unexamined
assumption, in much portal-quest fantasy, of the tourist (be it protagonist or reader) as central to
the story in the first place.188 Much as Jones does in her short story “The True State of Affairs,”
Mlawski concludes with a protagonist realizing he was never actually the protagonist at all.
Rather, the indigenous people to whom he has traveled are, and always were, the true
protagonists. Similarly, the true antagonists were not those opposed to Bal (e.g. his father or
Rodrigo) but were those coming to conquer and colonize the Taino—which makes sense if one’s
frame shifts from considering Bal as the protagonist to recognizing the Taino as central to the
story. Although the Spaniards assist Bal, and are thus cued through most of the novel as typical
helpful-side-characters (i.e. we think their relevance is in their assistance for Bal), in truth they
have been the true antagonists all along.
Through their rendering the fantastic mundane and creating rhetoric space for
protagonists to “argue the world into being” (Sahn 151)—in other words, by utilizing
mechanisms of immersive rhetoric in otherwise intrusive and portal-quest narrative structures—
Goelman and Mlawski subvert conventional tropes of heroic, epic, and much fantasy literature,
especially portal-quest fantasy. In doing so, they also perform similar political and ideological
work to much immersive fantasy: they depict characters who begin with unexamined
assumptions of themselves and their surrounding worlds—assumptions tacitly reinforced by the
narrative—and gradually learn to critically and skeptically examine both themselves and their
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worlds. This re-examination is not a simple replacement of prior singular, static ontological
assumptions with new singular, static ontological realities (e.g., what seems to happen in Uncle
Diego’s initial revelation/info-dump to Bal about Bal’s identity). Rather, Goelman and Mlawski
depict the plethora of potential, contradictory, yet simultaneously present, truths and perspectives
that unfold the more that characters (and readers) employ these very skeptical, analytic, literarydeconstructive, and midrashic-kabbalistic methodologies to interpret the “stories”—the
ontological narratives—surrounding them. In the following section, we will examine how North
employs a similar rhetoric and promotes similar ideologies within science fiction—and science
fiction that is groundbreaking in its use of Judaism as a taproot, world-building culture.

Rabbinic Judaism as Immersive Science Fiction in Phoebe North’s Starglass
While Mlawski and Goelman render the fantastic Jewish in a number of ways (e.g., the
Jewish monstrous; taking intrusive and portal-quest rhetoric and yet still having protagonists
argue their worlds; normalizing the strange and making magic mundane within these intrusive
and portal-quest rhetorics), North, in her science fiction novels, renders Judaism immersive in
both her world-building and rhetoric. Judaism lies at the core of Hammer’s and Path’s plots in a
way it does not in Starglass and Starbreak (whose plots centralize, instead, stories of a
generation ship and first contact on an alien planet). However, in Starglass and Starbreak
Judaism functions as the background culture of North’s immersive, science-fiction world, and
thus permeates the novels in a way rare for children’s and young adult science fiction and
dystopian literature.
In Starglass, North makes Jewish content and themes embedded, explicit, and integral to
the story; yet North does so in a way that normalizes, rather than exoticizes, this content that is
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likely unfamiliar to most readers. In this chapter section, I argue for reading Starglass’ rhetoric
as immersive—not the speculative (here, scifi and dystopian) rhetoric, but rather the rhetorical
strategies North employs in conveying and using the novel’s Jewish content and themes. These
rhetorical approaches enable the Jewish content to make a double-edged move: the Jewish
diction and thematics simultaneously estrange and draw in the reader. Such rhetoric allows for
subversive reading on the part of the reader—a mode of critical reading that can then also be
applied back to the very Jewish concepts North references, and their related contemporary
Jewish-communal politics.
In some ways Phoebe North’s Starglass is unequivocally “Jewish” yet in others, it is
“mainstream” science fiction, young adult literature. From its external aesthetics, Starglass
looks like a typical, mainstream young adult science fiction novel; nothing on its cover, or even
the inside jacket-flap summary, hints at Jewish content. From its first page of narrative text,
however, Starglass foregrounds its overtly Jewish content. The plot follows Terra Fineberg, a
Jewish female protagonist, who lives aboard a Jewish spaceship called the Asherah. The Ashera
was created by the JPS—the “Post-Terrestrial Jewish Preservation Society”—as a means to
preserve Jewish culture, religion, and languages after Earth’s impending destruction-by-asteroid
(Starglass 164). Starglass’ diction is saturated with Hebrew and Yiddish terminology, its
characters are overtly Jewish, and its culture is a fascinating blend of secular and rabbinic
Judaism.
North imagines a world in which Judaism develops, in complete isolation, for five
hundred years—basically a shtetl in space. The result is a richly layered world with an
authentic-feeling culture. Many science fiction and fantasy readers enter speculative texts—
especially secondary world ones—expecting to face just such unfamiliar, yet clearly rich and
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authentic-feeling, cultures. North acknowledges specifically tapping into her own Jewish
cultural experiences—largely from her childhood—to bring that authentic, layered depth to her
world-building in Starglass (Ryland, “Starglass Blog Tour”). Much of Starglass and Starbreak
are written in immersive rhetoric in general, including the science fiction elements of the story
unconnected to Judaism.189 This is purposeful with North, as she has discussed in interviews.
North says that she uses “a method Jo Walton terms ‘incluing’ [sic] to incorporate all of this
science into the novel. When a writer utilizes incluing, he or she will scatter worldbuilding
throughout via word choice and setting details. This reduces the need for tiresome infodumps,
but it necessitates putting a lot of trust in your readership. The best science fiction feels, in some
ways, like a mystery, where the reader has to put together the clues of the world as he or she goes
along” (Ryland, “Starglass Blog Tour” jenryland.blogspot.com).190 Additionally, however,
North’s immersive rhetoric—and hence the dialogic, critical-reading mode that accompanies it—
extends to the Jewish content as well. Thus, in Starglass North renders Jewish—rather than
fantastic—content immersive. She does so in a few ways.
The most obvious way in which Starglass does this is with its diction: the plethora of
unexplained, unmediated Hebrew and Yiddish vocabulary throughout the text. North’s
rendering Judaism immersive happens most overtly, and most continuously, through the Hebrew
and Yiddish diction throughout the text. In contrast to Goelman and Mlawski, who largely
explain the esoteric Jewish content (e.g. vocabulary, concepts) they reference, North demands
that readers piece together meanings for themselves. For instance, on the first page of chapter

189

Mendlesohn actually uses the term “immersive rhetoric” in the context of fantasy, rather than science fiction;
however, Mendlesohn notes that immersive fantasy is closest to science fiction in its rhetorical mechanisms and
reader-text dynamic (Rhetorics xx).
190
Additionally, it is worth noting that North studied children’s writing with Kenneth Kidd (see Ryland, “Starglass
Blog Tour,” jenryland.blogspot.com).

256

one, North writes: “Rebbe Davison had told us [...]” (Starglass 3) without explaining overtly that
“Rebbe” means teacher; a few sentences later North describes that Rebbe Davison “looked
across the classroom at me” (Starglass 4); readers can then infer that Rebbe Davison is a teacher
in a classroom (although there would be no reason for a reader unfamiliar with the term “Rebbe”
to assume that it is a title/honorific as versus a first name, until later in the novel). Similarly,
Terra refers to her father as “abba,” the Hebrew term for father: “I thought that maybe my abba
would draw me into his arms, comfort me like Momma would have done” (Starglass 4). North
does not explain that “abba” means father, but the meaning is clear from the word’s context.
Other examples of minimally-mediated Hebrew and Yiddish diction include: “kugels,” (13)
“gelt,” (21) “tikkun olam,” (24) and “talmid” (41) as well as other honorifics such as “Giveret”
(Hebrew for “Mrs.”). These are just a few examples; many more permeate the text. Some terms,
such as “bar mitzvah” (8) or “Mazel tov” (25) might be more generally-known to North
American readers and thus less unfamiliar/alien. It is notable, though, that these terms are
presented in just as minimally or unmediated ways as the terms/words listed above.
None of the above terms are italicized or footnoted within the text—they appear visually
similar to their surrounding words. Many of these terms/words191 are likely unfamiliar to most
readers; Terra, however, as a fully-immersed character in her world (which is alien to us) mostly
does not pontificate on the meanings of what, to her, are obvious words or concepts. Readers,
thus, encounter unfamiliar words/terms with little to no explanation or contextual clues. Such
dissonance between the protagonist and reader comprehension is heightened by North’s use of
first-person narrative, in both Terra’s main-text narration and her ancestor’s diary entries that
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sporadically appear between chapters. The first person narration allows North to even further
delimit readers’ perspectives when gazing upon and trying to interpret this foreign world. While
such techniques are common in science fiction rhetoric, it is less common for some of the
“secondary world” words/terms, cultures, etc. to utilize real-world analogues in such a direct
manner. Readers used to science fiction or immersive fantasy, therefore, who might be
comfortable with unmediated, unfamiliar content—readers who might be used to interpreting
such content via contextual clues—could easily interpret these terms/words as purely fictional
and miss the fact that they are actually “real” Hebrew/Yiddish terms (whereas such a mistake is
less likely to occur in a realist-fiction novel, where readers would most likely interpret unfamiliar
content as culturally other).
Even when North does include explanation (e.g. the word/term “mitzvoth”), North is
careful to render such explanation organic to the narrative context as versus via an “infodump”
(Mendlesohn, Diana Wynne Jones, chapter 5, “The Technique of Immersion”). For example,
North introduces the word/term “mitzvah” (pl. “mitzvoth”) organically within Terra’s memory of
her mother’s funeral:
On the day of my mother’s funeral, we all wore white. My father said that dressing ourselves
in the stiff, pale cloth would be a mitzvah. [...] Rebbe Davison had told us about mitzvot only
a few days before—how every good deed we did for the other citizens of the ship would
benefit us, too. (Starglass 3)
Since, at the time of this memory, Terra is also a newcomer to the word/term “mitzvah,” it is
natural for her to reflect on learning its definition a few days prior; North thus defines the word
for readers to whom the term is otherwise unfamiliar. Interestingly, though, North’s translation
is not a straightforward use of the word/term mitzvah as it is used in the contemporary (real)
world. “Mitzvah” in the Hebrew-language sense of the word translates as “commandment”;
conceptually, “mitzvah” refers, in contemporary Judaism, to a specific religious or ethical
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obligation (sometimes seen as divine commandment, sometimes as humanistic/ethical
imperative, depending on one’s religious and denominational affiliations).
Within Starglass, however, “mitzvah” refers to both a “good deed” in the colloquial
sense—as quoted above (“good deed[s]” done “for the other citizens of the ship”)—and a “good
deed” in a uniquely-Asherati way. First, there is the subtle addition, in the above-quoted
definition of mitzvah, of self-interest: how every good deed done for others “would benefit us,
too”—a concept not inherent to all real-world/contemporary uses of the term “mitzvah.” More
obviously, though, Terra continues to reflect on Rebbe Davison’s explanation that “mitzvah”
also includes behaviors conforming to specific “Asherati” customs and laws, such as “watching
babies get born in the hatchery” (3-4) or “doing well in school” (3). Interestingly, Rebbe
Davison’s third example—“paying tribute at funerals” (4)—is in fact a mitzvah in the real-world
Jewish sense: caring for the dead (before and during funerals and burials) and comforting
mourners (both at funerals and for the shiva week after) are considered mitzvoth in OrthodoxJewish communities. Doing well in school, and watching births (however those births occur),
however, are not.
North integrates Hebrew and Yiddish diction into the narrative text via varying levels of
mediation, ranging from words/terms that are completely unmediated yet contextualized (e.g.
“abba,” “Rebbe”) to words/terms with overt explanations. In the latter cases, however, those
explanations may be incomplete, ambiguous, or may fuse real-world and fictional uses or
definitions. Such explanations, therefore, still demand critical reading for a thorough and
accurate comprehension of both the word/term and the narrative implication. The explanation of
“mitzvah,” for instance, stops short of frontal, straightforward rhetoric in its juxtaposition of
familiar and unfamiliar examples: readers will likely recognize examples such as doing well in
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school and attending funerals, but “watching babies get born in the hatchery” (3-4) is listed
between those examples, implying that it is as just as mundane an activity.
North thus disrupts an otherwise straightforward rhetoric (of perceived frontal
explanation, and of reader familiarity with that explanation’s terms) by normalizing the
strange/science-fictional. Most readers will realize that hatchery-births are a science-fictional
premise and thus figure out that “mitzvah” refers, within the narrative context, to good deeds or
expected behaviors aboard the Asherah. North also never explicitly states (even within the overt
explanation above) that “mitzvah” is a specifically-Jewish/Hebrew term. Readers who are not
previously familiar with the word/term may not connect “mitzvah” to its Jewish/Hebrew context
(e.g., one could assume that “mitzvah” is a fictional term for “good deed” in the science-fiction
Asherati society). Readers familiar with “mitzvah”’s connection to Judaism/Hebrew still need to
engage in the critical reading referenced above, of teasing apart fictional and nonfictional uses of
“mitzvah” and its implications within the narrative. Such critical reading opens the possibility of
engaging with a further explicatory level of Starglass’ text: the way that Rebbe Davison’s
phrasing (in the quote above) sheds light on Asherati values, cultural norms, and possibly laws.
The quote above comes early in the novel—readers know nothing, yet, of Asherati laws—but the
fact that Rebbe Davison conflates conforming behaviors (doing well in school, watching babies
get born) with the term “good deed”—and specifically with “mitzvah”—connotes a more
conforming, possibly conservative society (i.e. the emphasis on reproduction), with authority
figures (the teacher) infusing legal or social-norm requirements with religious and/or ethical
weight. For those aware of “mitzvah”’s Jewish/Hebrew origins as religious/legalcommandment, this connotation is even stronger.
Both North’s choice of Hebrew/Yiddish diction and her various modes of integrating that
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diction within the narrative, therefore, operate via immersive rhetoric. There is an initial
distancing and defamiliarizing that occurs between reader and text when readers first encounter
such words/terms (assuming lack of prior familiarity), in a way that accords with the rhetorical
moves of immersive fantasy. Such dynamics are typical of science fiction. Mendlesohn
discusses the extent to which science fiction plunges reader into completely new and foreign
contexts (new beings, worlds, languages, ontological premises, etc.). Such new contexts are
often described in unfamiliar (i.e. fictional) words, terms, and languages, without any
explanation. Mendlesohn further asserts that many science fiction readers are accustomed to
such rhetorical moves and specifically enjoy the process of puzzling it out. Such rhetoric is part
of the tacit reader-text contract. In fact, North herself acknowledges this, stating that “there’s
less handholding in world-building in scifi. You trust readers more to put it together” (Rock,
“Interview with Starglass Author, Phoebe North”). North has commented about the importance
(to her) of creating realistically-complex and “accurate” worlds in science fiction, even directly
using the term “immersive” to describe such a process (The Book Lantern, “Past the Final
Fronteer” [sic]).
In Starglass, Judaism functions as the background culture for North’s science-fiction
world-building. In discussing this choice, North makes this connection (of specifically using
Jewish culture as the base of a secondary-world when world-building) when she explains that
Starglass originally did not have Jewish elements at all:
In the beginning, the spaceship featured in Starglass was not at all “Jewish.” The names and
terminology were generic, even bland. But I realized the book needed something more. Just
as the science fiction tropes were necessary, so, too, was a shadow of my own cultural
heritage. Little bits of Yiddish began slipping out. I changed my main character’s last name
to Fineberg, which was my mother’s maiden name. I began to explore what Judaism would
look like in the final frontier of diaspora, and in doing so, ended up exploring my own faith,
as well. (North, “Science Fiction, Judaism, and the Hidden Self”)
Here, North positions her use of Jewish culture as a personally-authentic taproot culture from
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which to create a complex, realistic, and immersive secondary world—much as other science
fiction or fantasy writers world-build from fictional or other real-world-analogue cultures.
Elsewhere, North has elaborated on the deeper resonances, for her, between Jewish culture and
Starglass’ generation-ship premise: “On deeper inspection, I realized that a generation ship is
nothing if not a society in diaspora, and I realized that I could give the novel deeper metaphorical
resonance by exploring notions of the promised land, of exile, and of wandering” (Duyvis,
“Gettin’ Lucky”). North describes her religious upbringing as follows:
My own religious background is mixed; my father was a broadly spiritual Christian, while
my mother was raised Orthodox Jewish. We grew up with both a Christmas tree and a
menorah! While I consider myself agnostic, I still find myself enacting the cultural rituals of
either religion, decorating our house with string lights every winter and saying prayers over
shabbos candles on Friday nights. I've always been fascinated by the way that religious
traditions can permeate a culture even when most members of that culture aren't devout, for
example in the way the debates about gay marriage and abortion have played out in
contemporary America. And my interest in Judaism, specifically, has been long-lived. I feel
more culturally Jewish than I do Christian—though maybe some of this comes from my own
awareness of the matrilineal nature of Judaism. But I know that my own Jewish heritage is
largely invisible to others, due to my last name, my tattoos, my fair coloring, or the fact that I
never had a Bat Mitzvah. Though I've always been fascinated by these tensions, I didn't
consciously set out to write a Jewish science fiction story when I began Starglass. (Ryland
2013)
North has also commented that she “researched a ton about [...] Jewish traditions” alongside
researching the novels’ science content (Seeing Double in Neverland, “Interview with Phoebe
North” 2016).192
In addition to Hebrew/Yiddish diction, Starglass also immerses readers in a rhetoric of
Jewish thematics: specifically, a complex portrayal of rabbinic Jewish practices/traditions,
implicit and explicit references to canonical Jewish texts, and depictions of societal behaviors
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Interestingly, in addition to North’s personal background and research regarding Judaism, North’s editor at
Simon and Schuster was an Orthodox Jewish woman, Navah Wolfe; Wolfe also happens to be a member of the
facebook group Orthodox Ladies United in Fandom, which I reference in some citations of this dissertation (The
Book Lantern, “Past the Final Fronteer” [sic]).
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and concepts unique to modern Jewish (often Orthodox Jewish) communities (e.g. the concept of
“bashert”). I examine each of these three categories below.
First, Starglass depicts a rich and complex portrayal of rabbinic Jewish
practices/traditions. Although characters appear “secular” in their lack of theology and
institutionally-religious affiliations, Asherati culture is peppered with rabbinic/traditional Jewish
practice—such as funeral/mourner’s laws, liturgy, Shabbat and holiday rituals, heteronormative
marriage laws, and “mitzvoth” more broadly speaking. For example, at funerals characters “sing
the kaddish” (11). The Asherati version of kaddish differs from the contemporary AshkenaziOrthodox-Jewish kaddish liturgy in the former’s opening “On our hallowed ship or on Zehava”
and in the description of its being sung (“Now let us sing the kaddish” [11])—most AshkenaziOrthodox-Jewish services in the United States use the term “recite” or “say” kaddish, although
practices vary between stating the kaddish in a tuneless chant and “saying” it in a musical, singsong chant. The remainder of the kaddish liturgy used in Starglass, however, is almost a direct
translation from the real-world, contemporary kaddish of Ashkenazi Orthodox-Jewish liturgy:
“May there come abundant peace, grace, loving kindness, compassion….” (11).193
Second, North references—both explicitly and implicitly—core Jewish texts such as the
Torah and Talmud. The Torah (Hebrew bible) makes explicit appearances in the narrative and is
central to the political developments in Starbreak. Although the Asherah is a ship of people selfidentifying as Jewish, with a culture infused with Jewish traditions and Hebrew/Yiddish
language, as described above, the Jewish culture of the Asherah is almost entirely secular. Thus,
the Torah exists as a dusty, largely unknown library tome. The Torah also functions as
something of a subversive book within Starglass: Koen, one of the secret rebels (as is Terra)
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See, for example, the Artscroll siddur’s translation of kaddish derabanan, the Rabbis’ Kaddish, The Expanded
ArtScroll Siddur: Wasserman Edition, Mesorah Publications, 2010, p.53-4.
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gives the book to Rachel, Terra’s best friend. While Koen may view the Torah in a more
subversive manner (e.g., as a competing authority to the ship’s Council), Rachel reads and
internalizes the Torah in a more conservative, proscriptive manner. Rachel tells Terra, “It’s
called the Torah [...] It’s an ancient history of these people on Earth who live in a desert and
stuff. Anyway, it talks a lot about how you’re supposed to act. And it says if someone asks for
forgiveness three times, then you’re supposed to forgive them” (Starglass 408-9). Rachel
continues to reference the Torah in both Starglass and its sequel, Starbreak; Rachel explicitly
views the Torah in a religio-spiritual light. When Terra asks Rachel why she is so fascinated by
the Torah, Rachel replies, “It makes me feel good to think that there’s a plan behind it all. A
force driving us, just like the engines once drove us. Someone watching down over us, you
know?” (Starglass 414). Rachel’s explanation here places the Torah as a text conveying
spiritually-comforting beliefs that tacitly allude to god (“Someone watching down over us”).
North also implicitly alludes to biblical stories and tropes through her the narrative
framing and arc of her series. Starglass is a story about a Jewish collective that escapes
environmental cataclysm into the “exile” or “diaspora” wilderness of space—and they
specifically escaped and began their wanders in order to reach a “Promised Land” of the planet
Zahava (gold). During this journey, there is dissonance between the masses and their leaders;
cycles of futile rebellions, marked by the nation’s “grumbling,” recur. All of this, thus far,
evokes the narrative arcs, tropes, and imagery of the stories of Exodus and Numbers: escape
from Egypt, desert wandering to the Promised Land (with its incumbent dissent, rebellions, etc.).
Asheratis have a “contract” which their forefathers signed—they, themselves, did not sign it, but
are still bound legally to it; this contract is authoritarian in nature (i.e. they have no choice but to
be considered, by the High Council, at least, as inevitably bound to the contract, regardless of
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what they themselves feel or wish). This parallels, and alludes to, the two biblical covenants:
brit bein habetarim—the Abrahamic covenant—and receiving the Torah at Mount Sinai—the
Mosaic covenant. Like the Israelites in the bible (and throughout history), Asherati are bound to
an ancestral covenant.
In addition to Hebrew-biblical allusions, North alludes to talmudic and rabbinic
Judaism—both ancient and contemporary. For instance, the Asherati contract mentioned above
has not, within North’s narrative, remained static: over the generations, the contract expanded as
successive “High Council authorities” amended, interpreted, qualified, and expanded the
contract, mostly in restrictive way. Only this selective group of the High Council has access to
read and interpret the contract—the rest of the Asherati do not. This image of an elite group of
authorities interpreting and adapting an ancient contract that still determines normative law
centuries later—particularly laws regarding rituals, life-cycle events, sexuality, marriage, and
procreation—all of this resonates with talmudic and other rabbinic interpretive and authoritative
responsa (e.g., interpreting biblical and talmudic law) that have governed both historic and
contemporary Jewish communities and practices. The non-High Council Asherati’s lack of
access to the contract parallels the lack of access most Jews (i.e. non-scholars) had to rabbiniclegal texts (e.g., halakhic codifications, responsa) until the twentieth century; as with their realworld Jewish counterparts, most Asherati thus learn ritual and law mimetically, with all the
misunderstandings and misapplications endemic to mimetic ritual development.
North’s treatment of these issues holds feminist ramifications. For instance, Terra and
the other rebels’ demands include a call for more egalitarian and democratic access to the ship’s
contract and political structure, including legal decision-making. This parallels Orthodox Jewish
traditions of halakhic development, in which women prior to the twentieth century were largely
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barred access to the texts making up the corpus of halakha (and the yeshivot in which to study
these texts), and in which women are still largely barred from holding positions of rabbinic
authority, although this trend is slowly changing in some modern and centrist Orthodox Jewish
communities. Although North’s fictional disenfranchisement is a class/bloodline one and not a
gendered one (the two primary captains of the novels are both women), the egalitarian critique
translates aptly to contemporary gendered disenfranchisement within halakhic processes among
Orthodox Jewish communities.
North also shows how rituals and laws that seem straightforward (to Terra or any other
people immersed in a given culture) can in fact bear multiple, unstable meanings. Over the
course of Starglass, Terra gradually deconstructs the terms, concepts, and laws with which she
has grown up and whose meanings Terra has taken for granted. Terra comes to realize that
different people interpret and utilize the same laws and terms for different purposes, and
discovers insidious motivations behind rituals she has taken for granted (e.g. “bar mitzvah”
sterilizations of males aboard the ship, minus males within High Council families, who are
trusted to reproduce naturally).
There are ramifications here of subversive feminist epistemologies—in general, but also
regarding specifically rabbinic/traditional Jewish cultures, laws, and traditions. North’s fictional
depiction of these issues within the novels is more delineated and extreme than the parallel issues
in actual Jewish communities. Such an extreme deception as the bar mitzvah sterilizations, thus,
does not map neatly onto real-world debates within contemporary Jewish communities.
However, there is a strong thematic resonance and allusion here that applies to, and thus informs,
contemporary Jewish critiques. One might think here of issues such as corruption and lack of
transparency between Orthodox Jewish rabbinate bodies (e.g., Israeli Rabbanut; Batei Dinim of
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North America) and their respective laypeople and/or citizens on issues as salient as conversions,
determinations of who is considered Jewish by various halakhic or Israeli authorities, or issues of
marriage and divorce, just to name a few. North herself has remarked in interviews that
Starglass touches on themes and contemporary realities of Judaism, such as “the tensions
between Judaism as a cultural heritage and a religious one” (Duyvis, “Gettin’ Lucky”).
Readers are presented with these depictions (i.e. all of above depictions of rabbinic
Jewish culture/traditions) without much explanation—since these behaviors form an
unquestioned, natural part of Asherati lifestyle, Terra—our first-person narrator—doesn’t
question them, and thus doesn’t “think” to explain them to herself in her head (i.e. to readers).
Terra’s narrative, however, is framed—and interrupted—by diary excerpts from her ancestor
Frances, a first generation “Asherati” (passenger of the Asherah). Frances comes from a
different world than Terra—Frances is native to Earth, Terra to the Asherah—and Francis lived
five hundred years earlier, when the starship Asherah departed Earth. Frances’ first-person
narratives complicate those of Terra in that Frances is not familiar with, or accepting of,
“Asherati” culture and law—which, in Frances’ time, are new. Practices that are normative and
described obliquely from Terra’s vantage point are thus historically contextualized and
interrogated by Frances in her journal, making Terra (and possibly readers) rethink and
interrogate them as well. In some ways the diary entries move away from immersive rhetoric,
hearkening more toward the “found document” (e.g. maps, scrolls) common in portal-quest
rhetoric, which are unquestioningly accepted by characters/readers as authoritative and accurate,
and thus engage in a more frontal/closed transferal of information (Rhetorics 14). However,
Frances’ diary allows Terra to do what immersive characters typically do: argue (with) their
worlds. Additionally, the diary entries engage in their own form of internally-immersive
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rhetoric. When Frances interviews to join the Asherah, her interviewer says:
“So you call yourself Jewish.”
I shrugged. “My mother was. But I’m not observant. Will that be a problem?”
“The Asherah is owned by the Post-terrestrial Jewish Preservation Society.”
“A religious group?” I asked, surprised. […]
“No. Secular Jews. Mostly American. A few Israelis. A few European Jews.
Committed to the continuation of Jewish culture even after Earth –” she hesitated, unable
to say it. […] (164)
When Frances jokes that Asherah’s Jewish lifestyle “would have made my grandmother
proud…She could hardly ever get me to go to synagogue with her,” the interviewer is “not
amused,” and responds: “[Asherah’s] contract specifies that the governing council is committed
to two missions: the first, to ensure the survival and unity of the passengers of the Asherah at all
costs. The second, the survival of Jewish tradition and culture even in the diaspora of space”
(165). The dialogue here foregrounds a hugely complex set of questions regarding Jewish
identity—who is considered a “Jew,” the unthinking categories of “Jew” delineated in semantic
labels, and the tensions endemic to Jewish self-identification in one’s negotiations with “Jewish”
culture, genealogy, practice, belief, or lack thereof for any of those factors. Yet none of the
background to this fraught subtext is fully explained. Readers stemming from or familiar with
North American Jewish cultures or communities may note and understand this subtext, and if so
it can inform their readings. Readers unfamiliar with this real-world conversation, however,
must piece together referential meaning from context, tone, and implication.
In some ways, Starglass subverts traditional Jewish religio-cultural norms—especially
regarding the feminist critiques regarding the council/legal traditions. Simultaneously, however,
North reaffirms traditional Jewish religio-spiritual concepts, values, and themes. For instance,
Rachel—Terra’s best friend—and Rachel’s mother display traditional, and traditionallygendered, Jewish behavior such as lighting Shabbat candles and hosting Shabbat dinners. Rachel
is also the character who discovers the Torah, and repositions it as a central, religious force—on
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a personal level in Starglass and then on a massive political scale, for all Asherati, in Starbreak.
North’s depiction of this is mixed in tone. In some ways, Rachel’s recuperation of the
Torah in Starglass is portrayed as positive and subversive: unlike the current Asherah leadership
that invokes traditional texts and values as an unsubtle way to maintain their authoritarian—and
ostensibly secular (i.e. atheistic)—control of the masses, Rachel reads inspiring messages from
the Torah that, to her, endorse a limited degree of questioning the status quo, particularly
regarding the Council’s socio-economic restrictions (Starbreak 296). North also, however,
depicts Rachel as naive and an uncritical thinker—in general, and also regarding Rachel’s
infatuation with the Torah and reviving an ancient religio-spirituality.
This comes across minutely in Starglass and more extensively in Starbreak, when Rachel
uses her religio-spiritual clout and convictions to commandeer both Silvan (now her husband)
and the rebel faction they both lead. When Rachel and Silvan achieve control of the ship, by the
novel’s conclusion, the narrative tone is deliciously ambiguous: although Rachel and Silvan are
depicted as more ethical and sincere (as individuals and in their leadership roles) than those they
replace (e.g. Captain Wolff, who is portrayed as flatly ambitious and cruel), their central
platform—orchestrated by Rachel—is to re-integrate the Torah as not only a central religiospiritual and religio-cultural text, but as Asherah’s central legal and socio-philosophical rubric.
The novel leaves the details of this development open-ended: readers’ final glimpse of the
Asherah, now commanded by Rachel and Silvan, is right before it leaves the planet Zahava.
Starbreak’s focus always was—and returns to—Terra and the other Asherati who choose to stay
on Zahava and live as immigrants in the already-existing non-human societies indigenous to
Zahava. Our last glimpse of the Asherah, though, is the farewell Shabbat dinner Rachel and
Silvan (but mostly Rachel) host to say goodbye to Terra and others who chose to stay on Zahava.
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The Shabbat dinner is described in detail—not only the ritual practices associated with rabbinicJewish Shabbat observance (e.g. reciting kiddush and blessings over the challah) but also the
social and interpersonal dynamics of the Shabbat table that resonate with contemporary Jewish
norms/realities (e.g. the wifely “ballabusta”). Later, Terra implores Rachel to allow her citizens,
going forward, to love whomever they choose—as versus the Council’s previous
heteronormative matchmaking process, and as versus Rachel’s understanding of Torah law as
prohibiting homosexuality. Rachel replies she will; however Terra’s request comes in response
to Rachel’s own request that Terra allow her people (the Asherati who choose to stay on Zahava)
to worship according to Jewish beliefs if they wish (Starbreak 412). The tone, then, regarding
returns to “traditional” Jewish values, theology, and law, is left ambiguous—Rachel and Silvan
might use such traditional texts and ideas to promote more egalitarian, democratic, and socially
just policies; they might also turn Asherah into a restrictive theocracy.
What’s fascinating, however, is North’s treatment of the Starglass equivalent of halakhic
development. North portrays much of the Jewishly-themed Asherati law (e.g. funeral customs,
marital laws, etc.) as unstable in their meanings: Terra thinks she understands what specific
terms and practices mean, but her understanding is repeatedly undercut as various characters,
coming from differing vantage points, present numerous possible “true” definitions, all of which
reflect contrasting epistemologies and agendas. To give just one example: Terra discovers that
“bar mitzvah” sterilizations have as much to do with political power and socio-economic
hierarchies in place as they do with the presented rationale of population control on a finite
starship. As Terra discovers the unreliability of her comprehension regarding custom and law, so
too does she gradually learn to be skeptical of the different political “truth narratives” she is told,
whether by her parents/teachers, peers, the government, the rebels, or even her own mentor.
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While unreliability is sometimes presented in a heavy-handed context of direct manipulation
(e.g. the aforementioned bar mitzvah example, or rebel polemic), it is often presented as a
confluence of factors: limited or incorrect information, logical but incorrect hypotheses, earnest
miscommunications, etc. Terra only gradually learns how to critically/skeptically read the world
around her: at one point she and other rebels examine the original Contract manuscripts; at
another point she explicitly decides to stop trusting others’ interpretations of current political
events and to only rely on her own observations and analyses.
While this may sound like a typical young adult literature thematics of “children growing
into adulthood by learning self-reliance and accurate world-navigation,” North’s subtle treatment
of it renders it more nuanced, and subversive, than that. Most of the “truths” Terra
interrogates—be they explanations of rituals or ethics—remain unresolved and seem inherently
unstable. Key examples are “mitzvah” and “tikkun olam,” terms that form the backbone of
Asherati ethics. Although these terms are initially presented uncritically, with an implied but
inexplicit meaning known to Terra and deduced by readers, Terra starts to recognize the
ambiguity and instability of these terms as different “guide” figures behave in ways that
demonstrate contradictory, flawed understandings of these terms and their resultant ideologies.
The subversive nature of these thematics is buttressed by the subversive rhetorical work
described earlier, with the Hebrew/Yiddish diction. In both cases, it is specifically the Jewish
content that is immersive in rhetoric, and forces the reader to do the critical thinking work of
piecing together meaning for herself. Thus, themes of subversion in Starglass’s plot are echoed
in the subversion of its open-ended rhetorics, which remain fundamentally ambiguous and
unresolved.
Overall, the rhetoric of Starglass and Starbreak allows for subversive reading on the part
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of the reader—a mode of critical reading that can then also be applied back to the very Jewish
concepts, and related contemporary Jewish-communal politics, themselves. This is significant
for a number of reasons. First, from a Jewish literature perspective, North’s novels reflect and
critique real-world Jewish culture, traditions, and conversations—while simultaneously offering
a new voice in the broader conversation of Jewish literature itself. While Jewish-themed science
fiction predates North’s work, the extent to which Judaism permeates the novels, and the
paradoxical effect of Judaism underpinning the world-building while remaining peripheral to the
central narrative arcs (in the sense that the plots focus mostly on the generation ship issues,
political governance and rebellion crises, and on the alien civilization and its interactions with
the humans) creates a fascinating example of what “Jewish literature” might look like if Judaism
were just as obvious a religio-cultural world-building source as, say, Christianity in Western
speculative fiction. Aside from queering aesthetic and religio-cultural norms in the speculative
fiction field, these novels also queer tropes that one has come to expect of contemporary “Jewish
literature”—for instance, by having characters whose Judaism is so taken for granted, so entirely
secular, and so fused with the characters’ broader political and societal structures (e.g., there are
few, if any, non-Jews on the Asherah; they refer to themselves as “Asherati” rather than “Jews”),
that these characters are able to be Jewish while focused on things entirely separate from Jewish
history, philosophy, or angst.
Second, it is significant that the subversive nature of North’s immersive rhetoric lies
specifically in its Jewish content (e.g., diction, thematics). While such an immersive Jewish
environment may exist in realist Jewish literature, it is unusual in speculative fiction, especially
children’s and young adult speculative fiction. For readers not already familiar with the Jewish,
Hebrew, and Yiddish content in the narrative, North’s rhetoric fosters critical reading, a dialogic
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reader-text dynamic in which readers and text dialectically construct meaning. For readers
already familiar with the Jewish references, such critical reading and dialogic dynamics still
exist—particularly as North undercuts and plays with traditional definitions to terms such as
“bashert,” “mitzvah,” and “tikkun olam.” Additionally, though, Starglass and Starbreak offer
such readers—especially affiliated and observant Jewish readers—a rare instance of textual
portrayal in mainstream children’s and young adult fiction (mainstream in that it is not published
specifically through a Jewish publisher, for Jewish audiences) to which they can potentially
relate.
Finally, the immersive rhetoric of the Jewish content here not only forces readers to
become critical thinkers of the text before them, as they read—it also encourages them to apply
that critical framework to Judaism in their own lives or in the surrounding world. This is
especially true given that the terms and concepts North uses are actual terms, concepts, and
practices employed in contemporary Jewish communities, and the specific ways that North
interrogates Jewish content reflect real tensions and critiques, as discussed above. Yet North
engages in such critique without necessitating a rejection of Jewish tradition: she depicts
characters rejecting it entirely, affirming it entirely in a conservative manner, and those who, like
Terra, interweave aspects of tradition with new cultural beliefs, language, and customs (e.g.,
those of the indigenous, non-human beings on the planet). Rather, what North’s rhetoric
advocates is a critical engagement with that very instability of meaning—which models a more
subversive and open way of critical thinking that readers can apply to their own lives.
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Chapter 5: Mirka, Ms. Marvel & Mendy: Graphic Spaces for Orthodox Religious
Superheroes
In 2010 and 2014, two female superheroes emerged on the scene of children’s and YA
graphic novels:194 Mirka and Kamala. Mirka made her debut in a series called Hereville by
Barry Deutsch, consisting of three graphic novels: How Mirka Got Her Sword (Hereville book
one [2010] hereafter referred to as Sword); How Mirka Met a Meteorite (Hereville book two
[2012] hereafter referred to as Meteorite); and How Mirka Caught a Fish (Hereville book three
[2015] hereafter referred to as Fish). Kamala made her debut as Ms. Marvel in the Marvel
comics series of that name (2014-2015).
Numerous scholars have discussed the male-driven focus of not only mainstream comics
but of comics criticism as well (Oksman 4), as well as the industry’s “history of framing women
within hegemonic ideologies” (Kent 523). In this context, Hereville and Ms. Marvel subvert
traditional genre expectations by depicting female protagonists—and, in Ms. Marvel’s case, a
Muslim woman of color—through feminist lenses. However, Kamala and Mirka are exciting in
the world of speculative graphic novels and comics not only because they are girls, but also
because they are religious girls. Kamala is a Pakistani-American Muslim from Jersey City. Ms.
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Throughout this chapter, I use the terms “graphic novel” and “comics” interchangeably. There are important
distinctions between these terms, as Cheryl Alexander Malcolm notes (“Witness, Trauma, and Remembrance,” 145),
such as multiple writers (for comics) versus a single writer (for graphic novels), or changed character origins across
various comics issues. The three texts I discuss in this chapter, however (Hereville, Ms. Marvel, and Mendy), are all
single author texts, with consistent character origins and cohesive narrative arcs. Ms. Marvel is also distributed in a
similar format to graphic novels: although it may have been released, initially, issue by issue, it is currently divided
into volumes, each of which collates a number of issues to present a complete narrative arc; each volume reads
similarly to each book of the Hereville series in that each Ms. Marvel volume displays a self-contained narrative, yet
the volumes build on each other for an over-arching narrative as well. For the purposes of this chapter, which
examines narrative rhetoric and prevailing themes across these graphic texts, I therefore use the terms “comics” and
“graphic novels” interchangeably when referring to the objects (i.e. the primary texts) themselves; when speaking
about the medium in general, I use “comics” to refer to this form of art (as versus cartoons, visual art, or prose),
following McCloud’s explanation and definition (5).
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Marvel was created by Sana Amanat and G. Willow Wilson, two Muslim-American women, and
much of Kamala’s life is drawn from Amanat’s own experiences growing up as a PakistaniAmerican Muslim girl. Mirka is an ultra-Orthodox Jewish girl growing up in the fictional town
of Hereville. The byline on the cover of the first Hereville book, How Mirka Got Her Sword
(2010), reads, “Yet Another Troll-Fighting 11-Year-Old Orthodox Jewish Girl.” This byline, in
its ironic humor, emphasizes not only the dearth of Orthodox-Jewish female protagonists in
comics—but the more general scarcity of female religious superheroes, as a whole.
Mirka and Kamala both break that trend. As religious girls hailing from minority
communities, Kamala and Mirka subvert mainstream genre expectations regarding what the
“superhero” looks like. Similarly, these characters’ portrayals—particularly amidst their
immersive, religious environments—force readers to question, and rethink, labels such as “ultraOrthodox Jewish,” or “Pakistani-American Muslim.”
Many readers, critics, and even the creators themselves have commented on the fact that
Kamala and Mirka break barriers simply by being here: Kamala is the first Muslim-American
girl to get her own Marvel series, and Mirka is the first ultra-Orthodox Jewish-American girl to
get her own fantasy graphic novel series. Marvel has featured prior Muslim characters, such as
Dust (one of the X-Men) or Muslim villains/terrorists. However, as Jehanzeb Dar and Miriam
Kent note, these prior Muslim characters are depicted in stereotyped, Orientalized and objectified
ways—even Dust, who is intended as a positive character.195 Kamala breaks such stereotypes
due to the authentic, nuanced, and localized depictions of her experience. Kent describes Ms.
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See Miriam Kent, “Unveiling Marvels: Ms. Marvel and the Reception of the New Muslim Superheroine,”
Feminist Media Studies (May 2012) and Jehanzeb Dar, “Holy Islamophobia, Batman! Demonization of Muslims
and Arabs in Mainstream American Comic Books in Teaching Against Islamophobia,” in Teaching Against
Islamophobia, edited by Joe L. Kincheloe, Shirley R. Steinberg and Christopher Darius Stonebanks, 99–110, Peter
Lang,. 2010.
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Marvel as “somewhat of a beacon for intersectionality and minority representation, with the
potential to become a powerful feminist text” (Kent 523). The same might be said for Hereville.
While Jewish figures have appeared in prior superhero comics—most notably Magneto,196
Thing, and Kitty Pride—none have been ultra-Orthodox like Mirka is, and none of these prior
stories have foregrounded Jewish religious observance the way Hereville does.197 Mirka, like
Kamala, negotiates intersectional experiences: the Hassidic-Jewish world of Hereville versus the
modern, secular world—and magical creatures—just outside Hereville’s borders.
Mirka may be the first ultra-Orthodox Jewish female protagonist in speculative children’s
comics, but another ultra-Orthodox Jewish comics protagonist predates her: Mendy Klein,
protagonist of the series Mendy and the Golem (1981-6). Mendy and the Golem was not
mainstream—it was originally published through “Mendy Enterprises,” a Lubavitch-affiliated
outlet.198 The purpose was overtly pedagogical, meant as outreach to Jewish child audiences.
Mendy and the Golem mimicked the style and narrative content of mainstream superhero comics:
each storyline features a villain who threatens the protagonists or the wider Jewish community,
and the protagonists (the Klein family and Shalom the Golem) need to stop the villain. Thus, the
narrative arcs and antagonists resemble mainstream superhero comics, especially those aimed at
child readers. Additionally, the comic often humorously alludes to secular pop-culture,
including references to Star Wars (the robot “Oy Vayder” [Vol. 2, no. 1]) and other pop culture.
196

While Magneto’s character in the X-Men movies is overtly Jewish, his ethnicity and religious affiliation in the
comics is more ambiguous: “When first introduced, Magneto’s history as an Auschwitz survivor had not been
established. Whether he is actually Jewish or was in the camp because he was a Gypsy or for some other reason is
the subject of fierce debate in fandom as well as among comics professionals” (Fingeroth 117).
197
For more on Jewish superheroes in comics, and Magneto specifically, see Fingeroth Disguised as Clark Kent:
Jews, Comics, and the Creation of the Superhero, Continuum, 2008; Malcolm, “Witness, Trauma, and
Remembrance: Holocaust Representation and X-Men Comics” in The Jewish Graphic Novel: Critical Approaches,
ed. Samantha Baskind and Ranen Omer-Sherman, 144-160, Rutgers U. Press, 2010.
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Lubavitcher Rebbe approved each issue before print. See Ingall, “The First Kosher Comic Book Blazed a Trail for
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276

Finally, unlike much other Jewish children’s literature of the 1980s, which tended towards
realism, Mendy and the Golem displays elements of the fantastic. The main fantastical element
is the golem himself,199 although science fiction tropes also make appearances, such as when
“Dr. Hardheart” forces Shalom to battle his giant robot (Vol. 2, no. 1), or when “Moshe the
Mayven” invents a time machine and the characters travel back in time (Vol. 1, no. 6).
Unlike Hereville and Ms. Marvel, Mendy and the Golem does not break gender or racial
barriers by having a female, or female of color, protagonist; nor does it display much subversive
content, overall, regarding gender. However, Mendy does break some cultural barriers by
portraying an ultra-Orthodox protagonist in an authentic Orthodox Jewish setting, and by doing
so within a speculative (however lightly speculative) fictional narrative. Many of Mendy’s
readers would have been unfamiliar with the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jewish lifestyle
depicted in the comic. Even readers who hailed from Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox Jewish
backgrounds expressed surprise and delight in seeing themselves portrayed—and, if such readers
were more modern in their pop-culture exposure, in seeing themselves portrayed alongside
humorous nods to secular speculative fiction.200 Mendy, therefore, performs similar work to that
of Hereville and Ms. Marvel regarding issues of diversity, and representation of marginal
communities within children’s literature and comics—and can thus have similar impacts on
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It is important to note here that the term “fantastic,” as applied to the golem—particularly with regard to a
Lubavitch-affiliated comic/magazine—is tenuous. Some Lubavitch hassidim do not regard the golem as “fantasy”
but as reality (e.g. my Lubavitch cousins, in conversation with me regarding this dissertation, were surprised at and
disagreed with my categorization of golems as fantasy since, they argued, the golem is a real, factual possibility and
the story with Rabbi Loew’s creation of the golem in Prague is not fictional legend but true history). Here, thus, it is
useful to bear in mind Attebery’s approach when addressing similar matters (e.g. his conversation re angels) in
Stories, chapter 6 (Kindle edition).
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See Ingall’s descriptions of her and her classmates’ reactions to Mendy, as well as to Estrin’s comments (quoted
in Ingall) regarding readership response across both affiliated and unaffiliated Jewish readers (Ingall, “The First
Kosher Comic Book”).
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readers who identify with characters portraying their specific religious, ethnic, or cultural
experiences.
As noted previously, Kamala and Mirka do break barriers simply through their presence
and through their authentic, nuanced portrayals. Mendy, similarly, breaks barriers by his
presence as an ultra-Orthodox Jewish protagonist in children’s comic books (especially in the
1980s). However, in this chapter I explore other ways that these comics perform subversive
politics: for Hereville and Ms. Marvel, through their shared narrative rhetoric and thematics of
critique; for Hereville and Mendy, through their rendering the fantastic Jewish. My discussions
of Hereville and Ms. Marvel connect to, and build on, my discussions of immersive rhetoric and
subversive, feminist religio-spiritualities emphasizing critique in chapters two and three; my
discussions of Hereville and Mendy connect back to chapters one and four, which discussed
ways such feminist religio-spiritual critiques are explored via the Jewish fantastic.
This chapter first discusses the broader immersive potential of comics as a medium. It
then moves to examine immersive rhetoric within Hereville and Ms. Marvel specifically; I
propose that Hereville and Ms. Marvel employ an immersive rhetorical style to depict religious
and ethnic cultural experiences, rather than the fantastic per se. The third chapter section
expands on this by examining themes (rather than rhetoric) of religio-cultural critique within
Hereville and Ms. Marvel—these thematics of critical thinking mirror the cognitive work readers
perform with the immersive rhetoric discussed in section two. The final chapter section explores
what happens to such themes and rhetoric when they are rendered specifically Jewish, by
examining the Jewish fantastic within Hereville and Mendy.
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Immersive Potential of the Comic/Graphic Medium
Here, I apply Mendlesohn’s discussion of immersive rhetoric within fantasy prose to
comics. Comics as a medium contains innate potential for such “immersive” rhetoric and
dialectical reader-text interactions. Numerous comics critics and theorists (e.g. Eisner, McCloud,
Groensteen) discuss the potential, within the very structure of the comics form, for dialectical
and dialogic reader-text constructions of meaning—which I will expand on shortly. Some, such
as Iser,201 have compared the hermeneutical reading process of comics to that of prose literature.
Few, however, have yet discussed this in relation to the concept of immersive fantasy (prose)
rhetoric. In order to demonstrate what the two rhetorical discussions—that of comics rhetoric
and that of immersive-fantastic prose rhetoric—have in common, I will first address the
dialectical/dialogic possibilities of comics, specifically, as a medium. The very structure of
comics demands dialogic involvement of the reader in creating meaning; the reader is often
forced to engage in active, critical hermeneutics of the presented text (whether pictures and/or
words) in order to construct meaning(s). This dynamic parallels the critical-reading and dialogic
readerly engagement demanded by immersive-fantasy prose rhetoric.
In this section, I first explore what this dynamic is—how does the form, structure, and
medium of comics foster, or even demand, such hermeneutical, dialectical readings? Many
scholars have discussed this question regarding the basic language and reading process of
comics; I summarize a few elements that are particularly relevant. As I do so, I add to this
existing scholarship by positing ways these dynamics in comics parallel the dynamics of
immersive-fantasy prose. I end this section by pointing towards additional ways that “immersive
fantasy rhetoric” can apply in comics, beyond the hermeneutical dialectics innate to the comics
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form and within, instead, narrative elements and thematics. Immersive-fantasy prose rhetoric
normalizes the strange by depicting fully-realized, complex worlds or settings, and presenting
such worlds from the perspective of familiar/indigenous protagonists. I propose that comics can
create such immersive dynamics as well—but the way in which they do so employs both pictures
and words, and builds on the specific hermeneutics endemic to comics as a form. I develop this
idea more fully in the following section by looking at how it plays out within Hereville and Ms.
Marvel.
Before examining ways that comics as a medium encourages critical reading, I should
note that many of these dynamics arguably overlap with those of picture books. Scholars differ
regarding the relationship between comics and picture books. Nodelman, in his article “Picture
Book Guy Looks at Comics,” notes both similarities and differences in the word-image dynamic
(and reading experience) in picture books and in comics. One difference, for example, is
quantity: picture books usually display fewer words and pictures, per page, than do comics;
picture books usually separate (in some way) words from pictures, whereas comics intermingle
them (437). Yet, as Philip Nel notes: “Picture books and comics are kin [...] Comics and picture
books differ in degree, rather than in kind” (“Same Genus,” 445).
Clearly, the question of where and how picture books fit into this chapter’s discussion is a
complex one. As mentioned in my dissertation introduction, while there are many picture books
that relate thematically to this project, to do such topic justice exceeds the scope of this current
study. So too, discussion of the potential critical reading and immersive rhetoric inherent to
picture book media and formats must await future projects. What is salient here is the fact that
many of the dynamics I examine in this chapter are arguably not unique to comics, but rather
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may extend to picture books as well. With that acknowledgement, I will now outline some basic
ways that comics as a medium demands critical reading and dialogic engagement of the reader.
One clear example—and one often discussed by critics and theorists—is the gutter. The
term “gutter” refers to the “space between the panels” (McCloud 66). In Eisner’s and
McCloud’s discussions of the work performed by the gutter, they point out that readers must do
the work of substituting/inserting the transitional meaning between panels—e.g. chronological
transitions, spatial/geographic transitions—in order to understand the relationship between two
(or more) panels. McCloud positions this work of transitioning and interpreting across the gutter
as one form of “closure,” which he defines as the “phenomenon of observing the parts but
perceiving the whole” (63, emphasis in original). We can perform closure even while reading a
single panel: McCloud gives the example of a panel box depicting just his head and waist—we
assume that his legs are there, hidden behind the boundary of the panel box (61). Yet we
perform closure especially when reading across the gutter. As McCloud puts it, “Comics panels
fracture both time and space, offering a jagged, staccato rhythm of unconnected moments. But
closure allows us to connect these moments and mentally construct a continuous, unified
reality” (67, emphasis in original).
For example, a sequence of panels depicting first a young man and then an old man may
signify a huge chronological jump as we view the same character at different points in his life, or
it may signify a move from depicting one character to depicting a different character in the same
moment (e.g. two men on a train); or it may signify emotional information (e.g. a young man
who feels old); etc. The exact transitional relationship between the two panels can be heavily
implied by contextual cues such as image details, the surrounding narrative/story-line, dialogue
bubbles, narrator text, etc. Regardless, the reader still needs to engage in an act of critical
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thinking—whether such act takes place instinctively, within a fraction of a second or takes place
more consciously, over a prolonged struggle to interpret meaning (all of which clearly depends
on both the text and reader in question).
Groensteen explicitly connects such cognitive work performed in the gutter with readers’
constructions of meaning. He describes the gutter as “the site of a semantic articulation, a logical
conversion, that of a series of utterables (the panels) in a statement that is unique and coherent
(the story)” (System 114). The reader’s “conversion” of disparate panels into a unified narrative,
Groensteen explains, sometimes occurs in stages: readers may construct one narrative “from a
dialogue between two or three juxtaposed panels” but then need to revise, reinterpret, or
reconstruct that narrative based on further panels—thus engaging in a “progressive construction
of meaning” (System 114). This progressive construction of meaning that occurs in (and across)
the gutter is a dialectical one: “Between the polysemic images, the polysyntactic gutter is the site
of a reciprocal determination, and it is in this dialectic interaction that meaning is constructed,
not without the active participation of the reader” (System 115). Groensteen acknowledges that
this dialectical dynamic is not unique to comics; in fact, he explicitly connects it to
hermeneutical reading in general:
Clearly, this progressive construction of meaning is not exclusive to comics. Rather, as
Wolfgang Iser has notably demonstrated, it is analogous to the process that structures the
reading of a literary text. The ‘wandering viewpoint’ constitutes, he says, ‘the basic
hermeneutic structure of reading.’ In a sequence of sentences, new correlations frequently
‘lead not so much to the fulfillment of expectations as to their continual
modification...Each individual sentence correlate prefigures a particular horizon, but this
is immediately transformed into the background for the next correlate and must therefore
necessarily by modified.’ (System 114)
Groensteen describes a process of hermeneutical reading—the fluid, dialogic construction
between reader and text of ever-evolving meaning(s)—that is endemic to comics but comparable
to hermeneutical reading processes across literary genres. I would add to this that this
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hermeneutical process also—and specifically—parallels the dynamic of immersive-fantasy prose
rhetoric.
The kind of critical reading that readers perform in the gutter also occurs with the page as
a whole. The comics layout—the frequent positioning of multiple images and words on one
page—demands certain cognitive interpretation to navigate. Readers must decide, for instance,
in what order to read panels—i.e. in what direction to proceed around the page in order to follow
the flow of the narrative. Sometimes the direction is simple and obvious—to experienced
readers, at least; even the “simple” reading direction of left-to-right, top-to-bottom panel zigzag
of North American comics is a learned language, and readers who are encountering comics for
the first time may not instinctively read this way. Many times, however—including during the
comics discussed in this chapter—the direction is rendered much more ambiguous and complex,
with multiple panel orders bearing different reading experiences.
One example of this occurs in Sword, when Mirka asks her stepmother Fruma whether
Mirka’s deceased mother might be a dybbuk (94).202 On this page, the dialogue bubbles proceed
left to right on the top row, but then rather than starting again on the left in the second row, they
move diagonally downward from the right to the left (from both row 1-2 and row 2-3). The
panels must be read, then, in the exact opposite order we are used to with North American
comics—for half of the page. Half of the panels remain in the expected left-to-right order. The
other half zigzag, disorienting the reader. Although, in this case, there is only one possible
direction of reading that coheres, the correct direction is only evident after reading the content of
numerous dialogue bubbles; Mirka’s staccato-like comments clearly build on each other in one
specific order. From the bubbles alone—i.e. from their delineation and juxtapositions on the
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page—the direction is not intuitively, or immediately, clear. Rather than the typical bubble(s)per-panel model, the bubbles here link and drape across the panels and page, disrupting the
angular panel boundaries with fluid, curving lines (94). Additionally, if readers had not already
read the incident to which Mirka refers—if, say, they skipped pages and read this out of
context—the bubbles could ostensibly be read in the opposite direction (although this would not
cohere with the rest of the page, once readers moved to the third panel row). Despite the fact
that the bubble direction is ultimately concretized in only one possible direction, the unorthodox
dialogue layout and directional shift can disorient the reader (mirroring the disorientation Mirka
experiences in this scene), and necessitate critical interpretation of the bubble content in order to
construct the correct reading order.
Similarly, reader recognition that a page is showing a series of separate, but related,
pictures in the first place—as versus interpreting the page as one static image of multiple
pictures—depends on a learned comics language, one based on prior experience and shared
cultural norms/expectations—or what Groensteen terms the “diachronic point of view, that is to
say before the eyes of a reader deciphering the page according to a predetermined protocol (an
order)” (Comics, 34). This language acquisition shares some features with that described by
Nodelman regarding interpretation of images in picture books.203
Yet another form of critical reading in comics can occur through the process of
integrating the pictorial and linguistic texts presented on the page. McCloud lists seven
categories of word-image combinations: 1) word specific (words convey the story and pictures
merely illustrate); 2) picture specific (pictures convey the story; words add soundtrack); 3) duospecific (words and pictures send the same message); 4) additive (“words amplify or elaborate
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on an image or vice versa”); 5) parallel (“words and pictures seem to follow very different
courses”); 6) montage (“words are treated as integral parts of the picture”); and 7)
interdependent (“words and pictures go hand in hand to convey an idea that neither could convey
alone” (153-5, emphases in original). This complements Nodelman’s discussion, in Words
About Pictures, of different possible word-image relationships in picture books. Nodelman
explains that rather than merely illustrating the content conveyed by words, pictures and words
communicate different types of information that, together, give readers a different story than
either could convey alone—a description that sounds akin to McCloud’s “interdependent”
category (Words About Pictures 205-6). Regarding the relationship between words and pictures,
specifically, Nel argues that
[i]nterdependency is unique to neither picture books nor comics: both rely upon an
interdependent relationship between pictures and words, in which text and image together
convey a meaning that neither could communicate on its own. Both modes imply a reader
willing to navigate the friction between [...] the continuous, ungraduated picture and the
disjunct, graduated word - the picture offering a less guided reading experience, the word
a more directed one (“Same Genus,” 447).
I would question Nel’s statement here that pictures offer a less guided reading experience, and
words a more guided one - after all, pictures can offer a wealth of detail, perspective,
information, and other narrative guidance through concrete depictions, which words—
specifically first-person, ironic, unreliable, or immersive narration—have the freedom to skirt
around or omit entirely. That critique aside, Nel’s point here—that both comics and picture
books demand a reader “willing to navigate” between visual and verbal, guided and less-guided,
textual and reading modes—emphasizes the critical, cognitive work readers perform in reading
either medium.
Comics, as a form, also contains the innate possibility for multiple readings and
meanings. Charles Hatfield explains that “[f]rom a reader’s point of view, comics would seem to
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be radically fragmented and unstable [...] this is their great strength: comic art is composed of
several kinds of tension, in which various ways of reading - various interpretive options and
potentialities - must be played against each other” (quoted in Nodelman, “Picture Book Guy,”
440). Nodelman expands on this idea, writing of the graphic novel Red: “[...] the extreme
fragmentation and instability of the sequence seems revelatory of a deliberately unsettled world
view inherently full of new possibilities - and therefore, it seems, well suited for depiction in
comic form, an exaggerated manifestation of that form’s inherent uncertainty” (440-1).
All the elements discussed thus far show ways that the innate structure of comics
facilitates critical, dialectical reading processes. Such reading dynamics connect, generally, to
immersive prose rhetoric in that immersive rhetoric encourages a dialectical reader engagement
and construction of meaning. Comics also, however, hold the potential to engage in even further
“immersive” dynamics. For example, some of the main immersive features Mendlesohn
describes include indigenous, and thus familiar, narrative points of view and fully-developed
worlds that exist beyond protagonist (and reader) trajectories or perspectives.204 Comics, too,
can utilize familiar points of view and fully-developed worlds, to similar effect—yet, when done
in comics, such dynamics involve both the images and words. Hereville and Ms. Marvel employ
these, and other, features to create immersive reader dynamics—but in order to see how they do
so, we must analyze both the use of pictures and linguistic text. My main proposition throughout
the upcoming section is that we can find similar rhetorical dynamics, and ramifications, to
“immersive” prose rhetoric within comics—yet while the end results are comparable, the way to
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identify immersive comics rhetoric—i.e. what immersive “looks like” in comics—will differ
slightly from prose.
Immersive Rhetoric in Hereville and Ms. Marvel
Despite the natural inclination of comics towards “immersive” dynamics discussed in the
prior section, comics can still tell their stories in more frontal, “portal-quest” ways—such as
when the narrator or characters explain background, context, or interior monologue in overly
heavy-handed ways. For example, in a panel from The X-Men no. 1, the narrator says, “At that
very moment, just such a mutant prepares to strike...in a secret laboratory near Cape Citadel!”
(brought in Malcolm 151; emphasis in original). The picture is that of Magneto’s face and
clenched fists; Magneto says, “The moment is at hand! All my months of preparation and
planning shall now pay off!” (Malcolm 151). The narrator here gives overt plot information—
even more information than the picture or dialogue gives in this particular panel.
What’s notable about Hereville and Ms. Marvel is that they largely avoid such frontal
devices—rather, their narrative rhetorics are largely “immersive.” In each series, the narrative
itself (both pictorial and linguistic) presents immersive dynamics—separately from, and in
addition to, the structurally-immersive potential of comics media in general discussed in the
previous section. In this way, Hereville and Ms. Marvel enact very similar critical
reading/cognitive work (set up similar dialogic dynamics) to those of the prose works discussed
in chapters two and three. Yet, like the texts discussed in chapter four, in Hereville and Ms.
Marvel, it is religion and culture—rather than the fantastic—that is rendered immersive. This is
not to say there is no immersive fantasy in these texts—there arguably is, but there is just as
much (if not more) intrusive and portal-quest rhetorics in these texts as well. In fact, Hereville
and Ms. Marvel may serve as fascinating case studies of the fault lines in Mendlesohn’s
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taxonomy—fault lines she acknowledges in her “Irregulars” category. However, the focus going
forward in this section is the way that protagonists’ religious and ethno-cultural identities and
communities are depicted via immersive rhetoric—and the resulting reader-text dynamic this
rhetoric fosters.
In each series of texts, there is no overt introduction or explanation, in the beginning of
the story, to the protagonist’s religious background or context—rather, the story jumps right in,
assuming reader familiarity. The result is the same simultaneous, paradoxical, familiardefamiliarization that readers experience with immersive-fantasy prose.
For instance, the first linguistic text we see on the opening page of Sword is, actually,
narrator text (1). This might lead us to expect some form of introduction to Mirka’s world.
Instead, however, the narrator opens the story by telling us: “Mirka liked her stepmother, Fruma,
well enough. Fruma had the longest nose of anyone in Hereville, but her odd looks hadn’t taken
Mirka long to get used to” (1). While this texts gives us some level of introduction (Fruma is
Mirka’s stepmother, they have a positive relationship) it does not, for example, explain what
Hereville is in the first place, or that Mirka and Fruma are ultra-Orthodox Jews. The opening
pages are peppered with details that are likely unfamiliar to anyone not already versed in the
cultural norms of ultra-Orthodox Jewry: clothing, for example. Fruma covers her hair; the girls
and women wear long skirts and long sleeves; and Mirka’s brother, Zindel, wears a black hat,
peyos (forelocks), a vest, and tzitzit (1, 3).
In addition to the clothes, Hebrew and Yiddish terms are integrated, pervasively,
throughout the dialogue bubbles. Although Deutsch provides translations of the Hebrew and
Yiddish terms, he does not say that the language is Hebrew or Yiddish—he simply translates the
word at the bottom of the page. The first time there is any acknowledgment, within the text, that
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this language is Yiddish is at the very end of the novel, when Mirka meets the troll. The troll
says, “Oh, you speak Yiddish! Very well: I’ll speak Yiddish too” (Sword 120). The troll and
Mirka then proceed to continue talking in (what looks to the reader like) English. The
implication is that even though most of the dialogue, throughout the book, appears to us as
English with frequent Yiddish words thrown in—in truth the characters are actually speaking
Yiddish all the time. Despite the troll’s acknowledgment of this fact, Deutsch’s move here is
still very subtle—if you pay attention to the troll’s statement here, and follow this inference, then
you understand this point—but not all readers may infer this,205 and it is not made explicit until
the third book. Given that these books are marketed to eight-twelve year olds, it is notable that
text and/or author assumes readers are mastering this complexity. Deutsch’s choice, as well, to
include Yiddish and Hebrew words in the dialogue in the first place—even with accompanying
translations—is similarly notable, given the expected reader age of the reader.
The immersive dynamic of the opening narrator text is similar in most of the other
narrator texts/blocks throughout the series. The narrator explains some aspects of the immediate
scene, but avoids explaining the wider, overt contexts. For instance, while the narrator may
explain specific details that arise organically in the story—such as gender segregation and dress
code at the Hereville school, prohibitions on eating pork, or prohibitions on reading non-Jewish
books— there is no definitive moment when the narrator explains that Hereville is a town of
ultra-Orthodox (and hassidic and/or Lubavitch-esque) Jews. Rather, it is assumed that the reader
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Yiddish/Hebrew with most of it presented as English for readers, excepting occasional words “kept” in transliterated
Yiddish/Hebrew.
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knows that general context, and the narrator moves straight to explaining more specific content
(e.g. Yiddish/Hebrew words, gender norms, dietary or Shabbat laws).
The first of these narrator explanations occurs when the characters encounter a pig, and
Mirka, terrified, thinks the pig is some sort of fantastic beast. The narrator explains why Mirka
does not recognize pigs: “Eating pigs is strictly forbidden in Hereville, so no one keeps them.
Only Rochel [Mirka’s stepsister], who hadn’t lived there her whole life, recognized the creature”
(Sword 20). Crucially, the fantastic has already been introduced into the narrative before this
incident. Mirka debates the ethics of dragon-slaying with Fruma (Sword 3-4) and, in a separate
incident, sees a woman floating in mid-air (Sword 14). Mirka’s first debate with Fruma, taken
out of context, may seem to be simply “our-world” or “real-world” characters arguing about a
fictional, fantastic concept (dragon-slaying). Yet Fruma takes the conversation seriously,
debating the different ethical angles with Mirka and comparing dragons—and the discourse—to
serious, real-world topics: when Mirka argues that dragons eat humans, Fruma challenges that
Mirka eats animals; she argues points such as:
If dragons are man-eating monsters, didn’t Hashem create them that way…? Rivers can
overflow and drown people. Are rivers evil? Evil rivers! Ridiculous! Isn’t killing a
dragon attacking a symptom while ignoring root ecological causes? And if you’re not
dealing with the root, are you solving anything?...” (Sword 4, emphasis in original)
The main point of the conversation is to depict Fruma’s valuation of debate, and her
encouragement of and engagement with Mirka in debating, questioning, and thinking through
ideas from different, even opposing, angles. Yet it’s not clear to the reader, initially, whether the
topic under debate—dragons—are fictional or real to Mirka and Fruma. Mirka’s observation of
a floating woman soon after this reinforces the presence of the fantastic—and further raises the
question of whether Hereville takes place in “our” world or in a secondary, fantastical world.
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The effect of this—i.e. of the lack of overt explanation regarding the nature of Hereville
or of characters’ apparel and language—is to render the story setting unclear and unstable for the
reader. Are we dealing with our world? A secondary fantastic world? Something else?206 This
is compounded by the fact that magical elements precede the first narrator explanation (regarding
dietary laws, quoted above). This explanation seems rooted in the “real world”—yet still,
interestingly, omits the word “Jews,” saying merely that Hereville residents do not eat pigs. In
fact, the word “Jew” has not appeared at all by this point (i.e. page 20). For all readers know
(excepting the cover byline), the entire story thus far could be taking place in a secondary world
where characters dress strangely, speak a fictional language, and do not eat pigs.
These questions of setting (our world? Fantasy world?) and of character (reality-based?
fantastical?) are addressed only in snippets, and through clues readers need to piece together.
For instance, our first clue that Hereville may take place in the “real” world, with the fantastic as
an unexpected intrusion, is Mirka’s reaction to seeing the woman floating in mid-air. Mirka is
shocked—depicted by her gaping mouth—and the immediate next dialogue we see, a
scene/panel later, is Mirka’s sister Gittel saying, “Mirka, this is crazy. You did not see a woman
float on air” (Sword 14-15). The fact that the fantastic is unexpected and out of place cues
readers that this is an otherwise rational, “real” world setting—what Mendlesohn terms intrusive
fantasy.207 The allusion to Charlotte’s Web (Sword 21) and the narrator’s first mention of Jews:
“In Hereville, kids aren’t allowed to have non-Jewish books” (Sword 29) further give readers the
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This question is never explicitly resolved within the books. Contextual cues indicate that the stories take place in
“our” world—i.e. the real world—and that the magic is an unexpected intrusion. Yet from the texts alone, Hereville
could arguably exist within a parallel universe similar to ours but slightly different (i.e. regarding the presence of
magic). The fact that the town of Hereville is an insular world within the larger story world only adds to the
setting’s ambiguous and liminal tone.
207
See Mendlesohn’s definition of intrusive fantasy (Rhetorics, chapter 3)
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sense that the story takes place in our “real,” recognizable world (although the possibility that the
story takes place in a parallel world, similar to our own, is never ruled out).
Yet in this very moment of apparent realism—of the narrator’s explanation that, “In
Hereville, kids aren’t allowed to have non-Jewish books. So Mirka kept hers hidden”—Mirka
takes out her “Big Book of Monsters” to search for the pig, which she thinks is a fantastic
monster. This is distinctly unlike the “real world” of most readers. Most readers likely
recognize pigs, even if they don’t eat pig. The depiction of a girl who not only doesn’t eat pig
(as with Kamala) but doesn’t even know what a pig is—and assumes pigs are magical
monsters—is likely foreign to most readers. And understandably so, for Deutsch’s depiction is
an exaggeration. Even within insular Hasidic and Haredi communities, most eleven-year-old
children know what pigs look like.208 Mirka’s assumption, for the next forty-nine panels, that the
pig is some unknown, fantastical monster—and her interpretation that this is her first heroic
battle—frames the incident with an overall liminal, unstable tone. Is this an actual battle? Is the
pig perhaps really a magical monster? On one hand, we see Rochel’s calm reaction at the
beginning of the episode, as she tells the other siblings—after Mirka has run off with the pig
chasing her—that “it’s only a pig” (21). On the other hand, we see an unusually-determined, and
unusually angry and intelligent-looking pig chasing Mirka, and Mirka’s own classification of it
as a “monster” and herself as a “hero” who needs to battle it (23). Such mixed messages, and
liminality of the fantastic (i.e. the setting has not yet been clarified—is this a secondary world?
Ours? Is anything magical currently occurring with the pig or not?), render even the overt
narrator-explanation (“Eating pigs is strictly forbidden in Hereville, so no one keeps them”)
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Despite the custom in some hassidic communities, such as Lubavitch ones, to avoid toys depicting non-kosher
animals, my sense is that by age eleven (Mirka’s age) most children recognize non-kosher animals, simply due to
the inevitable amounts of exposure to the outside world, however small.

292

unclear—is the narrator telling us this in order to ground the story in our recognizable/real world
(although perhaps only for readers who know Jewish dietary law), or is the narrator simply
explaining why Mirka didn’t recognize the pig, but not establishing a realistic or fantastic
context?
Later, Mirka’s stepsister Rochel explains to Mirka: “That thing wasn’t a monster, you
goose! It’s a pig! The farm animal? Gentiles eat them? Oink oink?” and laughs at Mirka’s
mistake (Sword 30, emphasis in original). Mirka grumbles, “How was I supposed to know what
a pig looks like?” (Sword 30) This exchange—particularly Mirka’s response—points to the
epistemological game fantasy plays: we interpret information based on our prior experiences and
received knowledge. Fantasy often asks us to turn those frames of reference—experience and
received knowledge—on their head, and to instead interpret the narrative’s information from a
completely different onto-epistemological starting point, a completely different set of “rules” of
reality, truth, possibility, and meaning. The above episode of Mirka’s misinterpretation of the
pig as monster is not “fantastic”—but it performs similar upheavals of onto-epistemological
expectations: within the narrative, Mirka’s upheaval of labeling the creature as a monster but
learning it is actually a pig; for readers, the upheaval of tacit assumptions that “real-world”
characters would recognize pigs. Such upheavals can occur because the narrative depicts an
unfamiliar and marginal (to many) world within “our” “real” world. The narrative then delivers
a further upheaval when Mirka realizes the pig can talk, and that it has, indeed, been
purposefully revenging itself on her for stealing a grape from its garden (49). Suddenly, just as
Mirka and readers have categorized the pig as “real” versus “fantastic,” the pig shifts status—
what we thought was non-magical turns out to be magical. The shifting statuses of mundane or
fantastic evoke liminal-fantasy rhetoric, and characters’ surprise towards magic evokes intrusive
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rhetoric. However, the fact that the larger background and context are never overtly spelled out
for readers—or for the protagonist—but rather are taken for granted speaks to an immersive
rhetoric. So too, the text seems immersive given the fact that when the narrator does explain
content, such explanations provide only a partial view of the wider context—and that such
framed viewpoints can sometimes actually render the larger contextual questions even more
ambiguous (as with the pig episode).
The elements described above—the plethora of Hebrew and Yiddish, ultra-Orthodox
Jewish garb, and a fully-realized depiction of the details of ultra-Orthodox Jewish lifestyle and
religious observance—are immersive in that they are rendered normative (i.e. these elements are
depicted as normal). While much of this lifestyle may be foreign to non-ultra-Orthodox-Jewish
readers, this is normal, everyday life for Mirka, and it is presented as such. Because Mirka is our
protagonist, and we see things (loosely) through her eyes, it is largely presented as “normal,
everyday life” to readers as well. What immersive rhetoric normally does to and with the
fantastic, Hereville’s immersive rhetoric does to and with Jewish religio-cultural tropes and
diction (similarly to Starglass, as discussed in chapter four). Editorial or narrator explanations
and translations do break this rhetoric slightly; my guess would be that their main impetus is to
make the text accessible to the average reader, who is likely unfamiliar with the ultra-Orthodox
Jewish world and/or not fluent in Yiddish or Hebrew—especially given that the book is geared
towards eight to twelve year olds (whereas Ms. Marvel and Starglass presumably have slightly
older target audiences). Even when such moves are necessary, though, Deutsch uses a number of
techniques (such as the partial explanation and blinkered viewpoint discussed above) to embed
them organically within the narrative so to maintain—and sometimes even heighten—the
immersive tone.

294

One exception is the presentation of Shabbat in Hereville. Around the middle of each of
the three Hereville novels, the religious customs of Shabbat (spelled “Shabbos” in the novels) are
explained overtly, and represent a significant break in the otherwise immersive rhetoric. One
reason for this may be purely tactical: in each of the three novels, Shabbat plays a crucial role
thematically. In Meteorite and Fish, Shabbat is also a major turning point in the plot. Given the
central significance of Shabbat in each novel, Deutsch may have made a choice to foreground
and explain Shabbat rituals more overtly than other practices (such as those discussed above) so
that readers were better able to understand the significance of Shabbat thematically and plotwise. In this view, the pages overtly explaining Shabbat function similarly to the editorial
translations and explanations described above, and are simply more drawn out.
Another way of viewing the three depictions of Shabbat, though, is that the reader is
presented with information about Shabbat in accordance with the details relevant to the
protagonist and plot at that moment in the narrative. Sword has the most expanded explanation
of Shabbat, spanning eight and a half pages. The narrator explains the pre-Shabbat preparations,
rituals and customs during Shabbat itself, and the concluding ceremony by walking us through
Mirka’s experience of that particular Shabbat, as it falls chronologically in the plot. Mirka and
Zindel had been bargaining with the witch (Sword 71-5), but although Mirka wants to follow the
witch’s directions to find the troll immediately, Zindel pulls her back, saying, “Mirka, it’s sixth
day [Friday]! We should have been home ages ago!” (Sword 75, emphasis in original). The next
narrator text—alongside an image of Mirka and Zindel running home to help prepare for
Shabbat—reads, “In Hereville, the most important holiday of the year, Shabbos, takes place
every single week” (Sword 76, emphasis in original). For the next eight and a half pages, the
narrator walks us through Shabbat—alongside the characters’ experiences of it in “real time” to
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the story. One of the central themes in Sword is Mirka’s negotiation between her religious,
Hereville lifestyle and her pull towards “goyish” (secular/non-Jewish) things, such as monsterfighting and magic. The way Shabbat is depicted in Sword emphasizes this theme: rather than
immediately seeking the troll (and the sword of her dreams), Mirka instead races back to prepare
for Shabbat. The juxtaposition highlights the tension Mirka experiences between these two
worlds. Mirka’s unquestioned choice of delaying her adventure for Shabbat emphasizes not only
Mirka’s priorities, but one of the ways she balances such dual worlds/pulls: the text implies
Mirka’s instinctive compartmentalization of religious and “secular” activities (troll-fighting can
be delayed; Shabbat, as it is time-bound, cannot).
This compartmentalization is further emphasized by the narrator text describing Mirka’s
mindset at the onset of Shabbat:
Ever since the witch said Mirka should talk to Fruma, Mirka had been dying to
interrogate her stepmother about troll-killing, but hadn’t had a chance to. But the moment
the Shabbos candles were lit, all thoughts of questioning Fruma left Mirka’s mind
completely! It’s not that Mirka was an especially chassidishe (religiously observant) girl,
by Hereville standards. But being raised in Hereville had given Mirka an instinctive
knowledge of which things belonged to Shabbos and which were uvdin d’chol (weekday
things). Troll-killing, Mirka understood, was not a Shabbos thing. Once the candles were
lit, she would no more have asked about it than she would have deliberately sneezed on
the khale (bread). (Sword 80, emphasis in original)
The narrator emphasizes Mirka’s instinctive compartmentalization, and shows how such
compartmentalization is both a religious and cultural, socially-ingrained value (“she would no
more have asked about it than she would have deliberately sneezed on the khale”). The text also
walks readers through Shabbat via Mirka’s emotions about Shabbat. Pre-Shabbat preparations
are depicted as laborious, but necessary (and often humorously hectic) chores (Sword 76-8); the
smell of the baking khale (bread) is depicted as a tantalizing distraction from said chores (78);
the hush and holiness of lighting the Shabbat candles to begin the holiday is depicted visually
through darkened colors, increased use of cross-hatching, fewer words and dialogue, and Mirka’s
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somber face (79); and Shabbat is depicted as containing joyous singing, food, family time,
blessings, prayers, naps, youth groups, and feasting (80-2). Aside from the quote brought above,
the narrator refrains from saying directly that the emotions or opinions described are Mirka’s,
instead phrasing them as statements, such as, “Shabbos is different from other days” (Sword 81).
Yet there is a subtle emphasis on Mirka, both in the images (Mirka appears in most panels,
engaged in the activities described by the narrator) and narrator tone (e.g. “With so much to do
on Shabbos, time slips by quickly” [Sword 82], which sounds like a reflection of Mirka’s
thoughts). Such moves imply that the opinions expressed by the narrator reflect those of Mirka,
particularly, in a tacit close-third-person point of view. This idea is confirmed in Meteorite,
when Mirka overtly affirms how special Shabbat is to her. Since a main theme in Sword is
Mirka’s exploration of the fantastic, and attempts to reconcile that aspect of her life with her
religious and cultural life, it makes sense for the narrative to demonstrate just what that tension
and negotiation look like for Mirka.
The depiction of Shabbat in books two and three are even more tailored to their
respective themes and plotlines. In Meteorite, Shabbat receives a much briefer explanation of
four pages (interspersed as the narrative progresses, rather than grouped together), and most of
the depiction focuses specifically on the fact that Metty (Mirka’s antagonist, the meteoriteturned-human who looks like Mirka) “steals” Shabbat from Mirka by usurping Mirka’s place in
her home. Although Mirka and Rochel go to Rochel’s sister for Shabbat, and thus Mirka does
not miss Shabbat entirely, Metty does in fact succeed in “taking” Shabbat away from Mirka, as
Rochel points out: “Mirka, Shabbos is supposed to be spiritual! Did you think about anything but
Metty and food during Shabbos?” (Meteorite 67). In Meteorite, Shabbat represents one core part
of Mirka’s identity—it is something she loves, something meaningful to her. A significant
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theme in Meteorite is Mirka’s acceptance of herself. In the beginning of the novel, Mirka
obsesses with the idea of becoming a hero, which to her mind equals dragon-slaying, physical
prowess, and fame (Meteorite 8). At first Mirka welcomes Metty’s arrival, thinking that by
“splitting” her life and identity with Metty, Mirka will have “half the chores to do” as well as the
advantage of Metty’s superior strength for sports and adventures (Meteorite 45). Over the course
of the novel, Mirka slowly realizes the downsides to this plan; the more Metty enjoys aspects of
Mirka’s life, the more Mirka misses them, realizes what she loves about her life and personality,
and sees how much she took those aspects for granted. Shabbat, in this plot and thematic
trajectory, is the straw that breaks the camel’s back as Mirka decides to take her life back from
Metty.
Shabbat in Fish operates similarly. In Fish, Layele (Mirka’s half sister) is captured by a
magical wishing fish, who is the book’s antagonist. In addition to kidnapping Layele, the fish
almost kills Mirka. Rather than stay to continue fighting the fish and rescue Layele, Fruma
brings Mirka home to observe Shabbat. When Mirka yells, “WHY should I get changed? Why
should I do ANYTHING when Layele—” Fruma interrupts her, shouting, “First, because
celebrating Shabbos wouldn’t mean anything if we only did it when it’s EASY. Second, Layele
NEEDS us to celebrate Shabbos and pray to Hashem. That’s how we can help her right now”
(Fish 91, emphasis in original). The main themes emphasized here—that commitment to
religious and ethical values extends even to difficult circumstances and choices, and the healing
power of Shabbat—are pivotal themes to the novel as a whole and its resolution specifically, as
will be discussed in more depth in the upcoming section. The brief depiction of Shabbat (a
single-panel, two-page spread plus three more pages) focuses entirely on Mirka and Fruma
healing over Shabbat, gathering strength and tools to resume the battle after Shabbat. Mirka and
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Fruma also bond, on Shabbat, over their similar magical experiences—developing the theme of
their stepmother-stepdaughter relationship that, too, is pivotal throughout the novel and in the
conflict resolution. Last, Mirka finds out after Shabbat that observance of Shabbat had been
protecting her and Fruma from the fish’s curse, which takes effect once Shabbat concludes.
In all three depictions of Shabbat (in the three novels), although there is a slight break in
narrative rhetoric due to increased editorial and narrator explanations, such overt explanation
lessens as the series progresses (presumably, the assumption is that readers have already read the
explanations in the prior Hereville novels). More importantly, however, the presentation of
Shabbat performs two significant functions: first, it reflects the mindset and “real time”
experiences of the protagonist within the immediate narrative context. Second, it emphasizes the
pivotal themes of each novel, serving (in Meteorite and Fish particularly) as crucial turning
points in the plot, as Mirka reflects on the issues and challenges at hand. Mirka’s revelations and
emotional growth during Shabbat of Meteorite and Fish, especially, are what allow her to face
her antagonists and move towards the conflict resolution.
Ms. Marvel shows a similar “immersive” rhetoric to Hereville: readers are plunged
directly into Kamala’s world, from the first page that shows her eyeing forbidden bacon, but
does not explain why it’s forbidden. Like Hereville, Ms. Marvel makes it very clear that Kamala
is Muslim—but without saying so overtly. Rather, readers are shown details of Kamala’s life
without much (or any) editorial or narrator explanation.
For example, on the first page of Ms. Marvel vol. 1: No Normal, we see Kamala smelling
bacon sandwiches in the Circle Q mart, saying, “I just want to smell it. Delicious, delicious,
infidel meat…” (emphasis in original). Readers are never overtly told that Kamala can’t eat the
bacon sandwich she eyes due to her adherence to Islamic dietary laws; readers are not yet even
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told that Kamala is Muslim. Kamala clearly craves the bacon; her body language communicates
this: her body bent towards the bacon, braced arms spread to encompass the display; her wide,
intent eyes gazing at the bacon; her lips pursed in determination. Kamala’s body language
contrasts sharply with those of her friends around her—Bruno and Nakia both stand casually,
with nonchalant, amused expressions. Kamala, and her desire, are foregrounded; Bruno and
Nakia are slightly receded and smaller. The effect emphasizes Kamala’s desire for bacon,
making palpable the tantalizing meat, Kamala’s craving, and the thin glass barrier of the casing
(symbolizing, perhaps, that thin barrier of self-will and the choice to adhere to her religious
laws). As Kamala stands mesmerized, Nakia says, “Seriously, Kamala, I don’t understand why
you do this to yourself” (emphasis in original). In the next panel, Bruno says, “Either eat the
bacon or stick to your principles” (emphasis in original), and Nakia adds, “There’s fakon. I’ve
had it. It’s not that terrible.” All of these conversational cues strongly imply Kamala’s Muslim
identity—but only for readers who already know that Islam prohibits eating pig. As Kent points
out, many readers may be unfamiliar with this principle—but “[f]or Kamala, however, this is
everyday life and the scene clearly presents it as such” (524).
While Kamala’s dark hair and skin are foregrounded on this opening page, signifying her
Pakistani roots, nothing about Kamala’s appearance on this first page—or the text’s language—
directly shows that she is Muslim. She wears a “Ms. Marvel” sweater with jeans, and does not
cover her hair/head. The choice to depict Kamala without a head covering was a conscious one;
as Wilson explained in an interview, “[W]e were going for authenticity. For example: We [sic]
very early on decided she was not going to cover her hair—simply because the majority of
American Muslim women don’t cover their hair” (Riesman). Rather, Kamala’s Muslim identity
is implied through a number of cues. These cues include Kamala’s reference to bacon as “infidel
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meat,” and the depiction of Nakia, Kamala’s best friend, right next to Kamala in the page’s
center, and largest, panel. Nakia is a Turkish-American Muslim, and wears a hijab. Even
though it is Nakia, rather than Kamala, who wears the hijab, its central presence on the page,
right next to Kamala’s head, cues readers to think of Islam.
Another way that Ms. Marvel’s rhetoric functions as immersive is through its use of nonEnglish language. Similarly to Hereville, Ms. Marvel integrates non-English words and texts—
here, Urdu and Arabic—throughout the dialogue, without identifying these languages as Urdu
and Arabic. Ms. Marvel goes a step further than Hereville by not providing translations much of
the time. Some terms or texts are translated—for example, when Kamala dresses for her
cousin’s mehndi (“pre-wedding party,” as the editor translates), the panel depicts Kamala
wearing what looks like formal Pakistani clothing, with a large arrow pointed at the clothes,
reading “*Shalwar Kameez! (A.K.A. Pakistani Clothing!)” (Vol 1, “All-New Marvel Now Point
One #1”). Kamala herself does not translate the term; she simply says, “Superhero costume: +5
to dexterity. Shalwar Kameez*: +5 to bling” (emphasis in original). The asterisk next to
“Shalwar Kameez” brings us to the editorial note quoted above. Not only does the editorial text
here translate for readers, but the text itself, in its large, arrow shape, dominates just as much of
the space as does the dialogue.
Many of the non-English words in Ms. Marvel, though, are not translated—such as
Kamala’s terms for her parents (“Ammi” for her mother; “Abu” for her father) or theirs for her
(“beti”). Similarly, her brother’s prayers at the dinner table are not translated (Vol 1, issue 1). In
yet another example, Kamala’s superhero-transformation scene depicts white, secular/Christian,
American superheroes Carol Danvers, Captain America, and Iron Man reciting Sufi poetry to
Kamala. Danvers speaks in (transliterated) Urdu and the two men speak in English—yet the
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poem language, context, title, or other information is omitted (Vol 1, issue 1). In all these cases,
many readers may not recognize certain languages, terms, or ideas expressed on the page. Ms.
Marvel omits, however, frontal explanations—and at times even translations. Instead, readers
are expected to engage in active, critical reading of the text, figuring out what terms mean either
through contextual clues or through looking it up outside of the text.
In this way, the immersive rhetoric of Ms. Marvel and Hereville facilitates—perhaps even
necessitates—audience engagement in critical reading modes. This rhetoric complements the
narrative content (plots) and thematics of both series as well: both series emphasize the
importance of critical thinking and questioning as Kamala and Mirka negotiate their
intersectional identities, which will be discussed in depth in the upcoming section.
In addition to the thematics of critical reading, though, the immersive rhetoric of
Hereville and Ms. Marvel performs feminist political work of presenting specific, authentic, and
localized diverse experiences—and specifically presenting them in a normalized way. For
example, when asked whether she began work at Marvel with a goal of creating a “list” of
diverse characters who emerged under Amanat’s aegis (e.g. a black Latino Spiderman, female
Thor, Kamala Khan, Korean-American Hulk), Amanat corrected the host: “There was no list.
Because I think if there’s a list, you’re checking boxes, right? You have to be able to find a way
to tell stories [...] that impact lives and are really telling the story of the world outside your
window” (MAKERS Team). In her speech introducing President Obama at the White House for
Women’s History Month, Amanat clarified further:
[Kamala’s] story has challenged misperceptions about minorities, about women, about
anyone who has been marginalized for their differences [...] being “normal” isn’t one race,
one gender, one point of view - being “normal” is being different - and being different is
being American. [...] we seek to share stories of heroes that showcase what the world actually
looks like because diversity is not a trend - it is simply life. (FOX 10 Phoenix)
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Amanat’s point that diversity is simply an accurate reflection of the America “outside your
window”—that diversity is normal, and the norm is in fact diverse—comes through in the
comics via Kamala’s authentic, personal, and local/specific experiences that are depicted in a
normalized manner. Both Kamala and Mirka’s experiences are not overtly introduced and
explained because they should not have to be: they are just as “normal” and “American” as the
experiences of a white, male, secular protagonist.
This particular mode of normalizing unfamiliar content (if/when it is, in fact, unfamiliar
to readers—as versus readers who are already familiar with the protagonist’s religio-cultural
experiences) occurs through the paradoxical reader-text dynamic unique to immersive rhetoric:
that simultaneous drawing in, yet distancing, of the reader. Because the reader encounters
rhetorical intimacy—the narrative speaks to her as if she’s “already in the know,” already
familiar with the protagonists’ unique experiences—the reader is drawn in. Yet it is specifically
because of this fact that the text does not overtly explain its world—because someone “already in
the know” would not need explanation, just as the protagonist does not. The religio-cultural,
ethnic, and racial experiences depicted are not rendered exotic; rather, they are Kamala’s and
Mirka’s “everyday life,” and presented as such (Kent 524).
This paradoxical dynamic allows readers to experience simultaneous comfort and
discomfort, simultaneous connection to and estrangement from these protagonists, as we’re made
aware of our own lack of knowledge, experiences, and interpretive contexts when confronting
characters whose intersectional backgrounds differ from our own. On the other side, for readers
who do share common intersectional experiences with the protagonists, this immersive move can
be truly exciting and empowering: seeing your particular religio-cultural experiences not only
represented, but represented as “normal.” Both sides of this dynamic encourage critique-based,
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dialectical reader-text dynamics—and both subvert traditional reader expectations of what
“normal” comics or superheroes look like, and—simultaneously—of what “normal” ultraOrthodox Jews and Pakistani-American Muslims look like as well, which I will discuss in depth
in the next section.

Religious Critique in Hereville and Ms. Marvel
The previous section examined ways the immersive rhetoric of Ms. Marvel and Hereville
facilitates—perhaps even necessitates—audience engagement in critical reading modes. The
focus of this section is on the ways that such immersive rhetoric complements thematics of
religio-cultural critique in these comics/graphic novels. Both series emphasize the importance of
critical thinking and questioning as Kamala and Mirka negotiate their intersectional identities.
Both series depict ways their protagonists simultaneously love and critique their religious and
cultural traditions—and how such critique can lead not to rejection or assimilation into a
majority (and other) culture, but rather to empowered affirmation of their religious/cultural
identities as multifaceted, and as a self-construction ever in flux.
Both Mirka and Kamala identify as religious and observe their respective religious
customs, and in both texts, this religious faith and observance is depicted in a positive light.
Simultaneously, however, both narratives emphasize questioning and critique—in general, and
specifically towards authority figures such as parents and religious leaders. In doing so, these
works demonstrate that critique itself can be “religious”—that the very process of questioning
truth and morality can complement religious tenets.209 Ethics and morality, in these books, are
not binary or easily discernible, nor do they easily map onto the religious laws, teachings, and
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“scientific/rational” and external-to-religion vantage point) see Asad et al, Is Critique Secular.
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beliefs that permeate Mirka’s and Kamala’s worlds. Rather, ethics and morality are depicted as
nuanced and complex. Kamala and Mirka need to employ their independent critical functions
and moral compasses—drawn from both their religious and secular210 frameworks and
experiences—to determine what they think is the “right” choice in different situations.
Both protagonists draw on religious teachings where relevant and helpful; religious
beliefs incorporate part of Mirka and Kamala’s critical moral compasses. As such, Hereville and
Ms. Marvel demonstrate ways that traditional beliefs and practices—deemed “old-fashioned” or
conservative by many contemporary views—are still useful and relevant in “modern” contexts.
The texts do not shy, though, from questioning limitations and/or relevances of certain religious
laws/beliefs in this same modern context. The result is a religious dynamic (in the texts) that is
neither dogmatic nor antinomian—rather, it depicts an ever-fluid middle ground, a space where
truth is shifting and religion can act as a guide alongside “secular” philosophies and conceptual
sources, as long as one is constantly critical and questioning. To demonstrate what I mean here,
let’s take a closer look at some examples.
Kamala is presented first and foremost as a character loyal to her family, culture, and
religion. She observes Islamic dietary laws (as discussed in the previous section, regarding her
abstention from bacon) and attends mosque. Kamala is depicted, in the beginning of the first
issue, as wanting to “fit in” with the “normal”—aka white secular/Christian211—teens around her
in Jersey City, and rebelling against her culture and family: she sneaks out at night to attend a
party, and grumbles to herself: “Why am I the only one who gets signed out of health class?
Why do I have to bring pakoras to school for lunch? Why am I stuck with the weird holidays?
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Everybody else gets to be normal” (Vol 1, issue 1, emphasis in original). Yet this initial
resistance, and desire to be “normal,” is almost immediately refuted by the reception Kamala
receives at the party. Zoe, the white girl who had invited Kamala, only did so as a joke; when
Kamala arrives, Zoe mocks both Kamala and Kamala’s culture when she exclaims, “I thought
you weren’t allowed to hang out with us heathens on the weekends! I thought you were, like,
locked up! [...] Ugh, Kamala — no offense, but you smell like curry. I’m gonna stand
somewhere else” (Vol 1, issue 1, emphasis in original). Kamala’s reaction to this shortly
afterward, in her conversation/vision with the Avengers during her exposure to the Terrigen
gas,212 is telling. Captain America tells her, “You thought that if you disobeyed your parents —
your culture, your religion — your classmates would accept you. What happened instead?”
Kamala replies, “They — they laughed at me. Zoe thought that because I snuck out, it was okay
for her to make fun of my family. Like, Kamala’s finally seen the light and kicked the dumb
inferior brown people and their rules to the curb. But that’s not why I snuck out! It’s not that I
think Ammi and Abu are dumb, it’s just — I grew up here! I’m from Jersey City, not Karachi!”
(Vol 1, issue 1, emphasis in original).
Kamala’s response here illuminates a few points. First, her rebellion against her
parents/culture does not stem from a rejection or devaluing of that family and culture; Kamala
demonstrates clear affection for and embrace of her family and culture overall (here and
elsewhere throughout the comics). Rather, as Kamala articulates, her rule-breaking and
frustration stems from two main causes: her desire to be accepted by her classmates and her
struggle to balance tradition (Islam, familial culture, Karachi) and modernity (Jersey City, her
non-Muslim friends, etc). The first cause, that of peer pressure and her desire for “normalcy,” is
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It is implied, in the immediate context of this scene, that this is merely a hallucinogenic vision and not an actual
conversation; however readers do not know this for certain until later issues.`
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one that is addressed relatively quickly in the narrative. Kamala articulates, in the conversation
above, that resisting elements of her familial, ethnic, and religious cultures does not change how
peers like Zoe view or treat her. This is not to say resisting such elements holds no benefit for
Kamala. We will discuss shortly ways that resistance through critique can be crucial for Kamala.
Rather, my point here is that Kamala’s use of such rebellion as a strategy for fitting in
backfires—which she realizes and accepts quickly.213 In fact, Kamala eventually realizes that
the opposite approach works: the more she embraces her cultural, religious, and familial identity,
and the more she accepts herself for who she is (rather than judging herself by another standard),
the more those around her accept her as well—including even Zoe, in the final issue, who reveals
that her treatment of Kamala stemmed from Zoe’s jealousy of Kamala’s loving relationships
with her friends and family.
Kamala’s second cause for resistance—her struggle to balance her tradition with her
“modern” life and values—is a more ongoing and complex struggle throughout the issues. The
Ms. Marvel series depicts Kamala as having a dialectical relationship with her faith—critiquing
yet affirming—and this dynamic evolves over the course of the issues.
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Her subconscious takes slightly longer to accept this; Kamala first shape-shifts into Carol Danvers (white, nonMuslim), and although she knows she can shape-shift to other forms and/or remain in her own form and simply
stretch or shrink her body, Kamala chooses to appear as Carol Danvers for her first two rescue attempts. It is only
after Bruno discovers her superpowers, and asks her why she wants to hide, that Kamala admits it’s because she
expects—and thinks others expect—that “real” superheroes have “perfect hair and big boots” (and are, presumably,
white). It is only after Bruno replies, “Who cares what people expect? [...] what we need is you,” and after Kamala
realizes that her healing powers only work when she is in her true form, that Kamala embraces her physical looks
and wears her Ms. Marvel garb on her true body. (She still wears a mask, though, to hide her secret identity—mostly
because she’s afraid of her family’s reaction.) A lot of this (i.e. her initial appearance as a Carol-Danvers-lookalike
as versus her eventual appearance in the Ms Marvel costume as herself) also engages in a separate, but overlapping,
issue: that of the Muslim superhero (or, in the metasense, comics protagonist). Kamala’s statement above highlights
that most comic-book superhero depictions portrays white, secular/Christian characters—and that neither readers nor
characters internal to the story—not even Kamala herself, initially—expect to see a Muslim superhero. The whole
point, of course, is to subvert this status quo: immediately after this conversation, Kamala appears consistently in her
true form (with mask) and never goes back.

307

Ms. Marvel contains numerous moments of critique regarding traditional Islamic law,
especially with regards to gender. Kamala critiques the gender segregation at her mosque during
Sheikh Abdullah’s youth lecture. When Kamala and Nakia murmur to each other during the
lecture, Sheikh Abdullah calls across the divide (the women are separated from the men by an
opaque barrier) to shush them. Kamala responds, “It’s really hard to concentrate when we can’t
even see you” (Vol 1, issue 3, emphasis in original). Here Kamala makes a pragmatic critique: if
Sheikh Abdullah’s goal is to engage teens, separating the young women behind a barrier makes it
less likely they’ll be enthralled in the lecture—as, in fact, we do see in the drawings of not only
Kamala and Nakia, but of the other young women around them, most of whom seem to be
sleeping, staring at their phones, or unfocused (e.g. the girl on the left, looking down and fiddling
with the carpet or her feet). These girls are, for the most part, unengaged by the lecture - and the
girls’ experience learning behind a visual partition sharply contrasts with their educational
experiences in venues such as their public schools. Kamala then asks, “didn’t you tell us there
was no partition at the Prophet’s mosque in Medina? That men and women went through the
same door and sat in the same room?” (Vol 1, issue 3, emphasis in original). Crucially, Kamala
not only critiques the gender segregation from a pragmatic or “modern” perspective, but also
from within Islamic tradition itself: Kamala’s question asks whether gender-segregated mosques
are inherent and integral to Islam, or whether Islam itself may allow gender-mingling at the
mosque (implying, perhaps, a question of whether the current practice of gender-segregation
stems from external, historical/sociological roots rather than from purely-religious roots).
In addition to questioning Islamic religious practice viz a viz gender, Kamala critiques
her parents’ cultural expectations for her as their daughter: “You and Baba want me to be a
perfect little Muslim girl — straight A’s, med school, no boys, no booze, then some hand-picked
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rich husband from Karachi and a billion babies [...] Your definition of success is pretty narrow”
(Vol 1, “All-New Marvel Now! Point One #1,” emphasis in original). When Kamala’s father
refuses to let her go to the party mentioned above, he does so because “it’s not safe for a young
girl to be out late at night with strange boys, drinking God knows what and thinking God knows
what” (Vol 1, issue 1, emphasis in original). Kamala retorts, “If I was a boy, you’d let me go to
the party.” Although she’s sulking, Kamala does have a point—she experiences different
restrictions than her brother does. Such protective/restrictive impulses from her parents may not
stem only from cultural/religious origins. They may also stem from general concern that parents
would have for a teenage daughter going out partying with boys, or being out at night in the
city—yet Kamala’s gendered critique still applies.
Despite these critiques, however, the comics depict Kamala’s relationship toward both
her Muslim and Pakistani-American identities as overwhelmingly positive. Kamala bases her
first, and formative, decision to use her new superpowers to save Zoe’s life on an Islamic
teaching: “There’s this Ayah from the Quran214 that my dad always quotes when he sees
something bad on tv. A fire or a flood or a bombing. ‘Whoever kills one person, it is as if he has
killed all of mankind — and whoever saves one person, it is as if he has saved all of mankind”
(Vol 1, issue 2, emphasis in original). Immediately after thinking this, Kamala “embiggen[s],”
and saves Zoe from drowning. As she does so—the images broken up panel by panel in a slowmotion rendering of her running, and then reaching out, to Zoe—she continues thinking: “When
I was a little kid, that always made me feel better. Because no matter how bad things get...there
are always people who rush in to help. And according to my dad...they are blessed” (Vol 1, issue
2, emphasis in original). Kamala’s thoughts in this second quote are broken up, panel by panel,
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in a slow motion that parallels that of her arm reaching out for Zoe, culminating in the words
“...they are blessed” right before her “embiggened” hand scoops Zoe out of the water.
By quoting the Quran, the text here demonstrates that Kamala’s inspiration and
motivation to save Zoe are rooted in Islamic beliefs. Such depiction performs a dual
reinforcement: it emphasizes Kamala’s connection to, and affirmation of, her religious traditions,
and simultaneously emphasizes Islam’s peaceful and humanistic values. Additionally, Kamala
does not simply quote the Quran; she quotes her dad quoting the Quran, along with her dad’s
assessment that “people who rush in to help [...] are blessed.” This affirms not only Kamala’s
relationship to the Quran and Islam, but to her familial culture as well. Here, Kamala shows that
despite her rebellions against her parents (e.g. breaking curfew, sneaking to forbidden parties), at
her core she views her parents as role models—both in how they understand and live by the
Quran, and in how they relate ethically to the world around them more broadly. The choice here
to show not only Kamala quoting the Quran, but quoting her dad’s quoting of the Quran,
reinforces a sense of traditions and values being passed down, parent to child, through the
generations—and of the persisting relevance of such teachings/values, even in modern-day
situations.
In addition to referencing the Quran, Kamala references an amalgam of sayings/teachings
from various South Asian and Middle Eastern figures/sources, throughout her adventures, as
inspiration for her heroic choices—and as motivation when such choices are scary. When she
prepares to rescue Bruno’s brother, Kamala addresses her fears, and bolsters her determination,
by telling herself, “I’m exactly where I was meant to be. It’s like that Persian guy Rumi said.
‘Wherever you are...was circled on a map for you” (Vol 1, issue 5). Kamala’s references serve
to ground her convictions and to help guide her in making ethical decisions in the moment. The
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texts and adages Kamala references also serve to guide both Kamala and readers in moral
interpretation of their surroundings. For instance, when she finds the Inventor’s secret hideout
and it looks like a wasteland/dump, she says, “Gross. Abu would say this is exactly the sort of
place that evil jinn would hang out” (Vol 2, issue 8). This reference serves two main purposes
for both Kamala and readers. First, it shows Kamala invoking—and guiding herself by—her
father’s sayings [i.e. phrasings] and opinions, as well as the folklore/myth of not only her father,
but a more deeply entrenched tradition. Her casual reference (and, presumably, her father’s
similar causal references in the past) to “the sort of place that evil jinn would hang out,” without
further elaboration, implies a level of fluency/familiarity with jinn stories and, likely, their
cultural contexts. Second, Kamala’s reference here—in its quick, instinctive evocation—shows
readers that when she encounters new and challenging situations, she instinctively interprets such
situations through the plethora of ontologies at her disposal: be they folklore from her childhood,
religious adages, or pop-culture references. Increasingly as the narrative develops, Kamala
develops her own critical lens through which to examine, and assess, her surroundings and
herself; this critical lens incorporates teachings and values from her religious, ethnic, and cultural
heritages.
In addition to showing that Kamala’s heroic actions are inspired and guided by the Quran
and other religious texts, Ms. Marvel affirms Islam (and Kamala’s relationship to Islam) by
depicting religious Muslim authority figures within Kamala’s life in positive lights. After she’s
grounded, Kamala decides to break her parents’ trust and sneak out in order to rescue Bruno’s
brother. Her rationale is: “Ammi and Abu taught me to always think about the greater good. To
defend people who can’t defend themselves, even if it means putting yourself at risk” (Vol 1,
issue 1, emphasis in original). Here, Kamala may not be obeying the letter of the law (listening
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to her parents, staying at home vs. sneaking out) but she believes she adheres to more underlying
Islamic (and cultural/familial) principles of defending the defenseless and working towards the
greater good. As she tells Sheikh Abdullah, “I don’t mean to disobey Abu and Ammi. It’s just
that sometimes I have to in order to do the right thing” (Vol 2, Issue 6, emphasis in original).
Surprisingly (to Kamala, and perhaps to readers), Sheikh Abdullah does not tell Kamala to stop
her activities/excursions and to “be a good girl, focus on [her] studies, and do istaghfar
[repentance]” as Kamala expects. Rather, he suggests she find a teacher, and tells her to “do
what you are doing with as much honor and skill as you can” (Vol 2, Issue 6, emphasis in
original). Kamala says, “I can’t believe it. I thought you were going to warn me about Satan
and boys.” Sheikh Abdullah replies, “I’ve been giving youth lectures at this mosque for ten
years. If I still have to warn you about Satan and boys, I should lose my job. I am asking you
for something more difficult. If you insist on pursuing this thing you will not tell me about, do it
with the qualities befitting an upright young woman: courage, strength, honesty, compassion and
self-respect” (Vol 2, Issue 6, emphasis in original).
This dialogue depicts a number of points. First, rather than solely critiquing/resisting
Islamic traditions and beliefs, Kamala in fact uses certain Islamic principles—such as “doing the
right thing” (e.g. defending the helpless, saving lives)—to guide her actions. Second, the
conversation demonstrates that religious principles sometimes conflict with one another (here,
parental obedience vs. defending the helpless). Sheikh Abdullah recognizes this conflict as well,
and responds by advising Kamala that if she insists on disobeying her parents in the name of
greater good, she at least pursue that greater good according to other religious values: “courage,
strength, honesty, compassion and self-respect.” Just as Kamala uses religion to critique religion
(i.e. weighing a religious principle of saving lives against a religious principle of obeying
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parents, and finding, in this case, that saving lives trumps obeying parents) so too Sheikh
Abdulla uses religion to qualify religion, in asking her to save lives in a courageous, honest,
compassionate, and self-respecting way. Sheikh Abdullah says this is harder than avoiding
“Satan and boys,” and he’s right. It is exactly these values that Sheikh Abdullah identifies
here—courage, strength, honesty, compassion, and self-respect—that rise, frequently, as murky
areas that Kamala needs to address as she fights villains.
In the Generation Why storyline, for example, Kamala’s biggest challenge is not the
villainous Inventor (antagonist character who is a clone of Thomas Edison mixed with a bird) or
his robots, but rather convincing the Inventor’s teenage recruits that they (the teenagers) have
worth as human beings. Kamala thinks at first that the teens were kidnapped and are being held
hostage, so she barges in to rescue them, battling robots along the way. When she finally frees
the teens, though, they tell her, “You got it all wrong [...] We’re here by choice” (Vol 2, p.98,
original emphasis). The teenagers volunteered to be used as (literal) human batteries for the
Inventor’s robots because, as they explain to a dumbfounded Kamala: “If we could harness that
energy, [human-generated body heat and electrical fields] we wouldn’t need to kill each other
over oil and fry the planet and melt the ice caps and stuff” (Vol 2, p.103, original emphasis).
The recruits view themselves and Millennials as “parasites,” and volunteer themselves as human
batteries to “give our lives to something good” (Vol 2, p.103). When Kamala accuses the
Inventor of brainwashing the teenagers, he replies that he never told the teenagers their lives are
worthless, rather: “They’ve been told their lives are cheap since the moment they were born”
(Vol 2, p.107, original emphasis). Kamala’s main battle is to connect with these teenagers in an
empathic way (rather than simply telling them they were “brainwashed,” which is not received
well), and help them develop a sense of self-worth. Simply beating up the robots or physically
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freeing the teenagers is not enough. Kamala can only help the teenagers shift their mindsets by
getting to know them better (e.g., asking them about their interests and hobbies) and
brainstorming ways they could contribute to society via their personal interests and quirks,
idiosyncrasies and all. As the teens share their interests with Kamala, it is easy to see why adults
may have written them off. One made a program to bypass parental internet locks, another
makes “stuff out of junk,” and Vick (Bruno’s brother), likes “doing the jobs nobody else wants
because they’re dangerous and stupid” (Vol 2, p.114-115). Kamala, however, with her
characteristic humor, creativity, and ability to see potential in anything and anyone, fires back at
them “Future cyber-security expert,” “Future engineer,” and for Vick, “Future president” (Vol 2,
p.114-115). The dialogue and artistic rendering of the teenagers (who visually look like punks,
nerds, and other social outcasts) emphasize these characters’ self-perceived societal marginality.
Kamala, as a self-proclaimed nerd, is on the social fringes herself; this, plus the compassion that
Sheikh Abdullah emphasized and which marks Kamala’s character215 make Kamala wellequipped to both save the teenagers—by befriending them—and defeat the villain, which she can
only do with the teenagers’ help.
At the story’s conclusion—after the Inventor’s defeat—Kamala’s parting words are
atypical in their bathos and mundanity. In response to the teens’ enthusiastic, “Let’s do it all
again!” Kamala asks, “shouldn’t you guys be at school or at work or something? You know,
back to your real lives?” When they reply that “[r]eal life is overrated” Kamala gives an
impassioned speech about the importance of real life and of staying involved in the world; while
she does so, she thinks, “Man. I sound like my dad. ‘Stay involved. Work hard. Have goals.’ But
you know what? Abu is right sometimes” (Vol 2, p.144-145). Through Kamala’s referencing her
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dad here, and through her conversations with Muslim figures of authority such as that with
Sheikh Abdullah, Ms. Marvel demonstrates ways that one’s relationship to one’s religion—here,
Kamala’s relationship to Islam—can be a nuanced, multifaceted relationship rather than an
overly-simplified binary one. Such a portrayal is especially noteworthy in that it subverts
stereotypical representation, within American/Western media, of Islamic observance as extreme,
rigid, and binary.216
Kamala’s conversation with Sheikh Abdullah subverts stereotypical depictions of Islam
in another crucial way: by portraying a religious, male leader who not only listens to and
supports Kamala’s needs, but who affirms her very act of questioning and critiquing Islam with
regard to her own experiences and challenges. Nor is he the only Muslim authority figure in the
comics to do so. When Kamala finally reveals her super-identity to her mother in issue 19, her
mother’s response affirms Kamala’s choices as ones that align with Islam: “If the worst thing
you do is sneak out to help suffering people — then I thank God for having raised a righteous
child” (Vol 4, Issue 19). Just as Kamala’s heroic inspiration from the Quran reinforces Islam’s
peaceful and humanistic values, so too the emotional support and intellectual validation from the
religious-Muslim figures in Kamala’s life (Sheikh Abdullah and her mother) reinforces
portrayals of Muslim authority figures as open-minded, intellectually sophisticated, and
emotionally supportive.
This emphasis on critique applies beyond the religious aspects, to more general themes of
authority and epistemology. When Queen Medusa learns of Kamala’s existence (Kamala is an
Inhuman, although she does not, at this point in the story, know this), she initially suggests
bringing Kamala to the Inhuman headquarters, Attilan, because Kamala will “need protection,
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training.” Captain America, however, says that Kamala is “determined to figure things out on
her own. Apparently she’s almost as stubborn as [Wolverine] is” (Vol 2, Issue 7). This
stubbornness, and determination to “figure things out on her own,” is depicted as positive—
Captain America and Queen Medusa say it in admiring tones, and qualify Kamala as “special”
because of this trait. This move also subverts, slightly, the typical portal-quest type move in
which the hero/protagonist hears his origin story—and receives training and instructions—from
the guide figure. The rhetorical subversion is minimal and temporary, as Kamala is soon brought
to Queen Medusa, who does tell Kamala her origin story (in an infodump) and trains her; this
doesn’t happen right away (it happens in Issue 9), but it does eventually happen. Yet even when
it does, it is somewhat unusual: as soon as Kamala is told her true identity/origins, she is also
told to stop her pursuit of the Inventor because she is “too young and too important,” yet she
immediately disobeys this, cuts the infodump short, and leaves on her own to fight the villains
(Vol 2, issue 9).
Similarly to Ms. Marvel, Hereville emphasizes themes of religious critique and
affirmation. A repeating theme throughout all three books is the importance of questioning and
debating. In the first scene of the first book, Fruma debates free will (regarding knitting chores)
and the ethics of dragon-slaying with Mirka. Although Mirka may not realize it at first, Fruma is
instructing Mirka in how to debate—and it is just these debating skills that enable Mirka to
survive in her climactic encounter with the troll. In fact, the scene in which Mirka defeats the
troll through argument visually parallels the first scene of Fruma debating dragon-slaying ethics
with Mirka. There is a direct mirroring between Fruma’s and Mirka’s positionings within the
frame/page, facial expressions, and body languages as they develop their arguments, and of their
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respective opponents in the side panels to the left on both pages (Sword 4, 131 for Fruma and
Mirka respectively).
Numerous other instances of debate occur in the books, and are central to the plot—and,
significantly, are presented as positive. When Fruma finds out that Mirka skipped school, she
uses debate as an educational tactic. Instead of reprimanding Mirka, Fruma plays devil’s
advocate in a reverse-psychology move. Fruma tells Mirka:
Your principal thought I should punish you. You know what I said? I said,
Mirka is a bright girl who knows the best use of her own time. You know your life better
than the principal does! Right?
They say girls must learn so they can teach their own children. Nonsense!
Just because I was forced to go to school, I should force you, so someday you’ll
force your own children? Ridiculous! When does the cycle end?
Tomorrow I’ll tell your little sisters they can do whatever they want, with no
supervision.
Don’t say it’s a bad idea - who are you to say five-year-olds need supervision?
What gives you that right, just being older and wiser? I’m older than you, and we’ve
already agreed that I shouldn’t tell you what to do, right? (Sword 89, emphasis in
original)
Fruma advances a number of arguments here (visually, each argument is separated by a
paragraph/bubble, signified in the above quotation by paragraph breaks)—arguments that build
upon each other. Fruma’s argumentative style here is talmudic—she takes a theoretical, logical
possibility (however absurd or impractical seeming) and draws it out to its internally-logical
conclusions—even to an extreme. Such argumentation methods are more than common in
talmudic literature—they are the backbone of talmudic rhetoric, and of the concurrent religiouslegal (halakhic) process depicted and developed through such argumentative rhetoric. As such,
this style of arguing—finding the opposite (or a different) angle to the issue at hand, even if it’s a
non-intuitive angle, and pursuing it to its own logical extreme (however impractical)—is not
only endemic, but highly prized in both the talmudic literature itself and in traditional study of
such literature.
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Fruma’s initial argument here employs reverse psychology, taking Mirka by surprise by
arguing in support of Mirka skipping school: “I said, Mirka is a bright girl who knows the best
use of her own time. You know your life better than the principal does! Right?” The emphatic
statement is qualified by the short, subtle “Right?” at the end—a question inviting and
necessitating Mirka’s complicity in (rhetorically/hypothetically) supporting this argument, yet
also implying just the teeniest tinge of doubt—or leaving an opening for such doubt/rebuttal.
While Mirka may have (theoretically) agreed with this idea (that she knows her own life/use of
time better than the principal does), the arguments steadily progress to ideas with which Mirka
cannot possibly agree, forcing Mirka to argue the other side.
Fruma’s second argument, “They say girls must learn so they can teach their own
children. Nonsense!” points, in a reverse-psychological way, to one actual value of school—
people learning so that they can eventually teach others. This argument is loaded with
background context: many texts and traditions in Judaism forbid female Torah/talmud education,
and the debate came to the forefront of Orthodox communities in the early twentieth century
when Sarah Schenirer opened the first female Jewish school (Bais Yaakov). One of the rabbinic
rationales for permitting formalized Jewish (i.e. biblical and rabbinic) education for women was
so that girls could learn enough to follow halakha themselves and establish observant homes as
adults—i.e., so that they could eventually teach their own children (this was a growing concern
as increasing numbers of Orthodox Jewish women received secular educations). Famously, one
of the foremost Orthodox rabbinic supporters of female education in the twentieth century was
Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the seventh Lubavitcher Rebbe. While previous rabbinic
leaders had only granted permission for women to learn Torah (Hebrew Bible) and limited
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commentary (e.g. Rashi), Rabbi Schneerson permitted women’s learning of talmud as well.217
Fruma’s argument that “girls must learn so they can teach their own children,” when considered
in light of this history, is progressive and feminist in its support of female education, and female
empowerment to teach/pass on traditions to their children, even if by 2016 such schools are
viewed as mainstream from within the communities and conservative from outside the
communities (the terms “progressive” and “feminist,” though, would likely not be used by
members internal to ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities themselves).
How much of this background Deutsch is aware of and/or consciously inserted into the
text is unknown. Regardless, the point remains that Fruma’s second argument points to an actual
imperative for education—one specific to female education and different than the typical
arguments made in favor of secular education (e.g. better life/opportunities for oneself in the
future). Fruma develops this theme of teaching one’s children (arguing against it in devil’s
advocate style) in her third argument: “Just because I was forced to go to school, I should force
you, so someday you’ll force your own children? Ridiculous! When does the cycle end?” At
first this may seem like an empty point and pure hyperbolic rhetoric, but her next argument
builds directly on this idea of “not forcing” children to attend school, by saying, “Tomorrow I’ll
tell your little sisters they can do whatever they want, with no supervision.” Instinctively,
readers (and Mirka, presumably) understand this is a bad idea. Fruma’s emphasis of on “little
sisters” and “no supervision” reminds Mirka and readers that school isn’t just about learning—
it’s also about supervision and safety, especially for young children. Fruma concludes by
anticipating this argument, “Don’t say it’s a bad idea - who are you to say five-year-olds need
supervision? What gives you that right, just being older and wiser? I’m older than you, and
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we’ve already agreed that I shouldn’t tell you what to do, right?” Fruma thus effectively traps
Mirka in Mirka’s own (hypothetical/rhetorical) support of Fruma’s very first argument: if you
hold x (in this case, that children can supervise themselves better than adults) then you have to
follow x to its logical conclusion (that this applies not only to Mirka but to her five-year-old
sisters, because Mirka has no more right to dictate to them than the principal/Fruma have to
dictate to Mirka). Again, this accords with talmudic methodology described above—along with
the talmudic manner of phrasing an argument in the form of a rhetorical question.
Mirka immediately bursts out, “But society will break down if no one learns! Children
need to go to school!” Fruma says, “Really? You think so?” in an uncertain voice (emphasized
visually by the waviness of the letters in “really”) and with an uncertain/perturbed facial
expression and hand-to-cheek gesture. Mirka retorts, “I completely know what you’re up to
here” (89), but that does not prevent Fruma’s tactics—and her logical points—from persuading
Mirka, who immediately apologizes. This is unusual—throughout the books, Mirka is a fiery,
stubborn character who rarely backs down, and can be somewhat self-centered and bratty (in a
believable, and normal-seeming, eleven-year-old way). There are plenty of times she does not
concede others’ points or her own mistakes. The fact that she does concede here, and so quickly
and (seemingly) sincerely, speaks to Fruma’s tactics, and the power of logical argument on
Mirka—but it also demonstrates that Mirka learns and thrives when she is forced to argue against
herself—i.e. when she is forced to argue against her natural inclinations, and argue for
unexpected and/or unfamiliar viewpoints (as she does with the troll). Mirka, like Kamala, needs
to learn things for herself, argue points for herself, and make mistakes herself before she is
convinced - and, also like Kamala, she will not commit to anything that she does not strongly
desire or in which she does not believe. This is not always altruistic—again, she is depicted as a
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normal (non-idealized) eleven-year-old—but it does demonstrate Mirka’s strong, independent,
challenging and critiquing personality and mind.
Much can be said about Fruma’s methods here from an educational perspective,
separately from the Jewish themes/context of the story. Her emphasis on argument, specifically,
implicitly conveys to her children that their perspectives matter. She listens to them, and their
perspectives/arguments can actually impact outcomes such as parental decisions and the
children’s experiences. There’s what to discuss here from a general educational point of view,
but there is also a specific, endemic Jewish quality to, and thematics within, the trope of arguing
in the books—beyond simply the educational, progressive, and feminist themes of it.
Arguing and debate—the triumph of the intellect over physical strength—is emphasized
throughout Jewish texts, traditions, and culture. As Fruma explains when Mirka asks her how to
fight trolls: “In the stories I’ve read, trolls are too strong to be defeated [...] physically. But
they’re usually quite stupid, so heroes can outsmart them. It’s a metaphor, really: intellect
overcomes brute force, like Jacob tricking Esau into giving up his birthright for stew. It teaches
us to value our minds” (Sword, 90-1, emphasis in original). Just like Jacob (and like Bilbo)
Mirka survives her encounter with the troll by tricking him into arguing through sunrise.
Although Mirka’s troll is clever (unlike the stupid trolls of Fruma’s explanation and the text to
which she alludes, The Hobbit), and although he does not fight through brute force (favoring a
knitting contest instead), Mirka still bests him by two things: argument and trickery. She argues
in the same ad-absurdum—and talmudic—way Fruma does, taking any possible other side that
might point logically (however impractically) toward her sweater being “superior.” The
arguments Mirka makes—that her sweater’s extra sleeves are perfect for the troll’s multiple
arms; that closed sleeves will keep hands warmer; that her sweater is more innovative and
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artistic; that multiple holes give people a choice of neck-hole—all subvert our initial evaluation
of the sweater. In a style echoing both Fruma (overtly, clearly Mirka’s intent and the
visual/verbal association) and talmudic rhetoric (more covertly), Mirka argues unlikely, but
logically plausible, points from other sides of the issue, and follows these points to their logical
conclusions.
Her rhetorical style here also echoes Fruma’s in its backing-people-into-corners
technique—rather than simply state her points directly, she frames her points through rhetorical
questions that automatically put the troll on the defensive. Mirka’s first rallying cry, after the
troll declares himself the winner, is, “So you’re going to CHEAT?!?” (Sword 130, emphasis in
original). The troll, startled, replies, “What? No! We agreed that -” Mirka yells back,
“DREYKOP [cheater]! We AGREED that the better sweater wins! And MINE is the better
sweater!” (Sword, 130, emphasis in original). Mirka’s huge, terrified eyes, shaking stance
(depicted through white shaking-squiggly lines surrounding her body), and the uncertain,
squiggly line of her speech bubble in her latter statement, all indicate that Mirka has no idea yet
what possible arguments she can make. Mirka is aware of the absurdity of what she is arguing
(her sweater’s a mess and his is perfect—how can hers be better?), and that she has no earthly
clue what her arguments will be, but she is playing for time. Yet her choice of opening with her
question cleverly puts the troll on the defensive, and disorients him long enough for her to gain
mental footing. This strategy echoes Fruma’s tactics—rather than simply stating your point, take
it as a given and force your opponent into the defensive through rhetorical questions. Mirka asks
“So you’re going to CHEAT?!?” forcing the troll into a defensive position of explaining why
he’s not a cheater. She says, “I notice all your sleeves have openings at the ends,” and asks, “Do
you WANT people wearing your sweater to have their hands freeze and fall off?” (Sword 131)
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and, “Just look at that pattern-following rag you knitted! Where’s the joy? Where’s the
spontaneity? YOUR sweater has only one spot for a neck to go! Why not give people a
choice?” (Sword 131, emphasis in original). This type of rhetorical-question as argument echoes
not only Fruma and talmudic debate, but tropes of Jewish conversational styles more broadly.
The rhythmic cadence of the italicized/emphasized words also feel “Jewish” in conversational
tone—evoking both Jewish-mother diatribes and talmudic discourse, which, in traditional
yeshivot (seminaries/schools) has a sing-song like cadence to the questions, answers, and
emphases on specific words.
In her fight with the troll, Mirka argues by deconstructing the word “better” from their
contest contract—who made the “better” sweater? Why, it depends how you define “better”!
Such semantical hairsplitting and deconstruction is endemic to talmudic literature, where the
different possible meanings and implications of minute words from the bible and Jewish law are
picked apart and debated, because such different interpretations, even of a single word, can have
drastic legal ramifications (not unlike U.S. constitutional law, but unlike constitutional law,
talmudic law sounds, stylistically and rhetorically, much more akin to Mirka’s debate with the
troll). Mirka’s use of legalistic/contractual loopholes (the fact that the contract left the definition
of “better” open to interpretation) is also classically talmudic in nature. Deutsch further
emphasizes this point by having Mirka find a literal loophole—when the sun rises, the troll turns
into his true nature—yarn (still alive, just composed of yarn)—and Mirka finds a loose,
“unfinished” end (Sword 132). Grabbing it, she threatens to unravel the whole troll unless he
agrees that her sweater is better and concedes the contest. The talmudic debator’s triumph by
finding a loophole through which to hook his argument, or an intellectual “loose end” with which
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he can unravel his opponent’s argument (or “yarn”) is rendered literal in Mirka’s defeat of the
troll.
In Meteorite, the conflict resolution hinges, similarly, on the deconstruction of a
contractual term: Mirka and Metty (the meteorite who looks identical to Mirka) agree to three
contests of Mirka’s choosing; the “better Mirka” wins and gets to stay in Hereville, while the
loser must leave. At first the contestants, and readers, think that proving oneself the “better
Mirka” means winning the individual contests—sword-fighting, monster-fighting, and math.
Metty wins these contests, and both she and Mirka think Metty has won. The judges, however—
Mirka’s brother Zindel and step-sister Rochel—declare Mirka the winner: they argue that the
contract says “whoever is the better Mirka wins”—emphasis on the word “Mirka,” not “better.”
As Rochel argues, “Mirka can’t win a sword fight in one move. Mirka can’t beat up a dozen
monsters at once. Mirka can’t do high school math in her head. Every time you were so much
better than Mirka, you just proved that you’re not as good at being Mirka as Mirka is” (Meteorite
102-3, emphasis in original). Similarly to the Mirka’s debate with the troll, success hinges on a
talmudic-like deconstruction of a specific word, arguing for your interpretation of that word, and
then pointing out the logical consequences of that interpretation.
Until now, the points discussed have shown ways in which tropes of arguing are
prevalent in Mirka, and bear talmudic (and other culturally-Jewish) intonations. While these
examples do not function, within the narrative, as critiques of Judaism itself, they do emphasize
the value placed on argument and critical thinking for its own sake, and ways in which authority
figures—such as Fruma—encourage disagreement and critique within certain frameworks. In
Hereville, Mirka does not critique or rebel against her Jewish/familial culture in quite the same
way that Kamala critiques and rebels against elements of her Muslim/familial culture; yet subtle
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moments of critique (and Mirka rebelling) do permeate the pages if one looks closely. The tone
and approach is drastically different than that of Ms. Marvel, for a few prominent reasons.
First, Kamala lives in a “modern” or “secular” external society/community, but also
within other, overlapping enclaves of her family, other Muslims, and other Pakistani-Americans.
As such, she experiences what some have termed “dual identities”—she is American, PakistaniAmerican, Muslim, and female (and, of course, Inhuman), and these identities/affiliations may at
times align and at times conflict. Kamala therefore is actively engaged in navigating her
identities, in grappling with how these multiple pulls, values, and lifestyles fit together. Because
of Kamala’s geographic setting in Jersey City, her way of life, despite an active local Muslim
community, is not the majority culture that she sees around her—that majority culture is white
American Christianity/secularism (or so it seems to her, at least, as portrayed by the media and
her classmates).
Mirka, in contrast, lives in the homogenous society of Hereville, which is thoroughly
ultra-Orthodox Jewish. The modern/secular world does exist around them, but Mirka has no
firsthand experience with it save for her Book of Monsters and, eventually, the bits of exposure
she receives through her adventures, such as meeting the witch and troll, who are not Jewish, and
seeing snippets of Fruma’s secular/modern childhood via time-travel. Mirka, therefore, does not
actively wish to look or be different than she currently is—she does not wish to be “normal” the
way Kamala does in the beginning of Ms. Marvel. Mirka doesn’t know any other way to be, and
even when she discovers other lifestyles (the non-Jewish one of the witch and the “modernish”
one of Fruma’s childhood) she never seems tempted to leave the Hereville way of life—she
loves Shabbos, thinks that the witch’s dress (tank top and shorts) is “immodest,” and never
seems to even think of the possibility of not living an ultra-Orthodox lifestyle. Mirka’s critique
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and rebellion, therefore, is naturally going to be appear very differently in the narrative than
Kamala’s. It’s worth mentioning that another potential reason for different approaches and tones
might be the insider/outsider status of the authors. With Ms. Marvel, the writer, G. Willow
Wilson, is a white female Muslim and the editor, Sana Amanat, is a Pakistani-American, female,
Muslim. With Hereville, Deutsch is a Reform Jew218 viewing ultra-Orthodox Jewish culture
from an external vantage point, which may afford less space for critique; rather, Hereville reads
more as a celebration and depiction of that lifestyle.
Such celebration, however, does not negate critique—even if the critique depicted in
Hereville is of a different nature than that of Ms. Marvel. Mirka is clearly a character with a
headstrong, rebellious personality. Despite her complete immersion in, and love of, Hereville
and Judaism, there are certain ways Mirka resists aspects of Hereville’s culture, if not Jewish law
specifically. From the beginning of book one, Mirka is depicted as a tomboy—she hates
“womanly arts” like knitting (although this changes after her knitting battle with the troll); she
picks fights with bullies and seems to enjoy physical fighting in general; she dreams of owning a
sword and slaying beasts; and she likes nothing better than climbing trees, exploring the forest,
her attic, or basement, and discovering bugs or monsters. While she complies with her school
dress code, she wears her clothes, as Rochel notes, in a tomboy manner: hair messy, slouching,
shirt untucked, skirt wrinkled, and hiking shoes (Meteorite 55). Over the course of the books, as
Mirka’s exposure to and knowledge of the outside world grow, we see her become more
acclimated to non-Jewish and secular-Jewish norms—even if she expresses no desire for those
norms herself. For instance, in book two (Meteorite) we see Mirka’s confusion and scorn
regarding the witch’s dress: “That woman is so WEIRD. Why was she DRESSED like that? [in
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t-shirt and shorts] Hasn’t she heard of modesty? And what was on her ARM? [tattoo]”
(Meteorite 38, emphasis in original). Yet by book three (Fish), Mirka is so familiar with and
used to modern culture that when Layele reacts with similar confusion during their time-travel
observation of young-Fruma wearing tank-top and shorts, and later a bathing suit, Mirka
responds with annoyance, “THAT’S how modern girls dress” (Fish 25, emphasis in original)
and, “GROSS, Layele! It wasn’t underwear. That’s what modern girls wear to go swimming”
(Fish 37, emphasis in original). By showing Mirka’s acculturation to the secular/modern world,
as well as her resistance towards certain (often gendered) cultural norms of the Hereville
community described above, the text offers implicit critiques of these norms and of rigid,
intolerant mindsets. While Hereville in general is presented positively, ignorant attitudes—such
as Mirka’s original reaction to the witch’s clothing and tattoo—are implicitly critiqued here.
One ideal seems to be Fruma, who appreciates both worlds, actively chose Hereville life, and yet
remains tolerant of those who live other lifestyles. Fruma—as well as Mirka’s own growth and
change in attitudes—demonstrates that it is possible to simultaneously affirm one’s religion and
culture while still approaching it with a critical and open-minded eye.
In addition to this type of critique, another kind arises in the books—and it is, again,
connected to the thematics of debate. Earlier, I discussed ways that arguing, debate, and
semantic critique in Hereville assumes a particularly Jewish nature, and how the narrative
endorses argument/critique for argument/critique’s own sake. The emphasis on arguing, though,
also extends to the area of ethics. At key points in the series—particularly in the climax of book
three (Fish)—the narrative conveys that this talmudic-like debate and critique, while at times
purely semantic and lighthearted (e.g. Fruma’s and Mirka’s argument regarding dragon slaying),
is in fact a crucial and critical mindset when characters face moral dilemmas. When Mirka
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complains to Fruma, “how come I always have to do things your way?” Fruma responds, “If you
ever win an argument, then we can do things your way” (Fish, 15, emphasis in original).
Although at first this may seem simply rhetorical (Fruma implying Mirka will not win an
argument against her), or simply something to end the discussion (in the scene, Fruma is rushing
before Shabbos and does not have time for Mirka’s protests), the novel’s climax upholds exactly
this, when Mirka wins the argument regarding the magic fish’s fate and Fruma agrees, despite
her reservations, to do things Mirka’s way. Crucially, this debate (their debate regarding the
fish) is the most serious debate, and issue, of all three books—both the most serious regarding its
pragmatic ramifications (the fish has already attempted to murder them—attempts in which he
almost succeeded—and he shows clear intent to continue those attempts) and regarding the
ethical (Jewish and general) ramifications of whatever action Fruma, Mirka, and Layele choose
to take.
In Fish the entire plot centers on questions of defining “justice” and ethics. The book
opens with Layele, Mirka’s younger, half-sister, burying pictures of Mirka’s dead mother in the
backyard. When Fruma asks Layele why she did this, Layele responds that a girl in class told
her the angel of death would get confused by the pictures and accidentally come for Fruma.
Mirka, fuming at the attempted burial of her mother’s pictures, asks, “So what’s her
punishment?” (Fish 8, emphasis in original). Fruma, however, responds, “Punishment isn’t
always the answer.” (9, emphasis in original). After telling Mirka a parable about Rabbi Hillel,
Fruma explains, “Hillel showed you can get further with kindness. Without kindness, justice isn’t
justice” (11, emphasis in original).
Mirka uses exactly this logic back against Fruma when, at the end of the novel, Fruma
wants to bury the fish alive so that it won’t ever harm Layele or Mirka again. Mirka, though,
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argues for kindness—to exact a contractual promise from the fish not to harm them (which it
would need to uphold due to the nature of its magic), and then let it go. Fruma is still unwilling
to do this, because, as she bursts out to Mirka, “You don’t KNOW what it’s like to have a child
in danger!...And I don’t want you to know” (134, emphasis in original). Mirka replies, among
other things, that “you taught me Hashem [god] wants us to be kind all the time. It wouldn’t
MEAN anything if we were only kind when it’s easy” (135, emphasis in original). Here, Mirka
references not only the Hillel story from the beginning of the book, but also Fruma’s statement
that “celebrating Shabbos wouldn’t mean anything if we only did it when it’s EASY” (Fish 91,
emphasis in original). Fruma says this when Layele is captured by the fish—Mirka is aghast that
Fruma is planning to make Shabbos when Layele has just been captured, and Fruma yells back
that, first, it wouldn’t mean anything if they only did it when it was easy, and second that
“Layele NEEDS us to celebrate Shabbos and pray to Hashem. That’s how we can help her right
now” (91, emphasis in original)—and they do.
The emotional resonance of Fruma’s argument in the Shabbat scene, and her clear
turmoil and fear for her child, all parallel that of the climactic scene deciding the fish’s fate—a
fate which, again, may impact the lives of Fruma, Layele, and Mirka. In using Fruma’s own
arguments against her, Mirka shows Fruma just how much she has internalized the Jewish values
Fruma taught her, as well as the talmudic-esque debate and critical mindset, which are what
allow Mirka to think of a creative solution to the fish problem (a contractual solution—again,
very talmudic).
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Rendering the Fantastic Jewish: Mirka and Mendy
In addition to its immersive rhetoric and thematics of critique, Hereville is notable for its
portrayal of what I term a “Jewish fantastic.” Hereville depicts monsters and magic in ways that
specifically resonate with Jewish cultural tropes and textual traditions. In this, Hereville
connects directly to the novels discussed in chapter four, as well as to the poets from chapter one.
The final section of this chapter, therefore, examines the “Jewish monstrous” and “Jewish
fantastic” tropes and images of Hereville, alongside those of the Mendy and the Golem comics
series. Although Mendy and the Golem displays very different narrative rhetoric and gender
dynamics than Hereville does, it is notable as one of the first comics depicting ultra-Orthodox
Jewish characters in fantastic, superheroic settings.
Both Hereville and Mendy and the Golem feature specifically-Jewish monsters. Mendy
and the Golem, as its title suggests, features a golem; the first issue opens with Mendy (one of
the child protagonists) discovering a baby golem in the synagogue basement. At his urging, his
family adopts the orphaned golem. Mendy names the golem Shalom because, “[golems] used to
bring peace to the Jewish people” (vol 1, issue 2). The text gives a brief explanation of golems
when Mendy’s father, Rabbi Klein, explains: “A golem was like a statue made of clay. Many
years ago, golems were used to protect the Jewish community in times of trouble!” (vol 1, issue
2). Rabbi Klein’s explanation here refers to the Loew version of the golem legend. As I
discussed in chapter one, according to the legend, Rabbi Loew created the golem out of clay and
gave it life by inscribing the word “emet” (truth) in Hebrew on the golem’s forehead.219
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Although the golem is the main Jewish monster active in Mendy’s narrative, other monsters and
miracles from Jewish lore are mentioned more marginally, either in offhand dialogue or in the
separate bible stories that accompany each issue. For instance, Mendy mentions the giant Og
(Vol 1, issue 1), who features in midrashic and medieval biblical commentary. Mendy thus
showcases magical beings/monsters that are specifically Jewish: creatures that are pivotal in
rabbinic Jewish texts and traditions, and whose stories (in their original texts, as in Mendy)
emphasize core Jewish beliefs and historical experiences. By featuring specifically—and
overtly—Jewish monsters within an ostensibly “superhero” comic form, Mendy renders the
fantastic Jewish.
In contrast to Mendy, Hereville’s monsters and magical beings are ostensibly secular: the
witch, troll, meteorite, and fish are all generic and secular creatures.220 Additionally, all these
characters self-identify as external to Judaism, although occasionally somewhat familiar with
Jewish culture (e.g. the troll and witch speak Yiddish; the troll is aware of the insular nature of
Hereville; the witch is aware of Shabbat). That said, Hereville’s depictions of the fantastic
employ specific Jewish tropes. This is true regarding depictions of both the primary antagonists
(the witch, troll, meteorite, and fish) and of more subtly introduced magical beings and concepts.
One example of the latter category is the ongoing theme of dybbuks, Jewish ghosts that
can possess bodies of the living (Chajes 14). In Sword, Mirka chases the pig underwater and
almost drowns; when she is close to death, Mirka sees her dead mother, who holds and comforts
her. Later in the book, Mirka mentions the incident to Fruma, saying:

in Two Israeli Graphic Novels,” both in The Jewish Graphic Novel, eds. Samantha Baskind and Ranen OmerSherman.
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specifically-Jewish origin the way golems are.
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Ma was there. She held me and...I felt safe. It was nice. She felt so real. It was weird. I
mean...Her chest was moving. I could feel it as she breathed. I thought maybe...The, when I
went to bed, I couldn’t sleep. I thought about all the stories about dybbuks...No one is ever a
dybbuk for a good reason...No one’s ever happy to be a dybbuk. My mother shouldn’t be a
dybbuk! She doesn’t deserve...She belongs with God! (Sword, 94, emphasis in original)
Rather than dismissing dybbuks as unreal, Fruma takes Mirka’s concerns seriously, and, hugging
Mirka, replies, “I don’t think your mother’s a dybbuk. I live in the family your mother made,
surrounded by her children and under her roof. I think I’d know if she were still here” (Sword
96, emphasis in original). Although Fruma goes on to tell Mirka that “[p]eople can see all sorts
of things when they’re oxygen-deprived” (96 emphasis in original), this seems to explain why
Mirka might have seen her mother, given Fruma’s conviction that Mirka’s mother is not a
dybbuk—it does not serve to negate the possibility of dybbuks more broadly.
Fruma’s casual acceptance here of the concept of dybbuks accords with her seeming
acceptance—in the immediate conversation, and throughout the book—with the fantastic (e.g.
her discussions with Mirka about dragons and trolls, and her clear familiarity with the witch).
Overall, this foreshadows for readers what is confirmed in Fish, that Fruma has had her own
encounters with magic. Additionally, though, Fruma’s casual acceptance of the possibility of
dybbuks—as well as Mirka’s assumption, in the first place, that her mom must be a dybbuk—
may speak to a communal reality in which the dybbuk (like the golem) is depicted as an
accepted, real creature in traditional texts (both folkloric and legal texts), and occupies an
ambiguous place in modern religious consciousnesses.
Interestingly, thematics of the dybbuk pop up in the other Hereville books as well. In
Fish, Mirka again almost drowns, and she again sees a dead mother: Fruma’s dead mother.
Mirka does not mention this to Fruma, and the question of whether she really encountered some
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dead version of Fruma’s mother, or whether Mirka was hallucinating, remains unresolved.221
The text strongly implies, however, that this is more than simply a hallucination, for Fruma’s
mother communicates information to Mirka that Mirka would have no other way of knowing
(assuming, again, that such information is true), such as the fact that Fruma used to be called
“Fran” and details of Fruma and her mother’s fraught relationship (Fish 82-3). Similarly, when
Mirka has a near-death experience in Meteorite—again, one of oxygen deprivation—Mirka sees
and hears her great-great-grandmother, who speaks words of encouragement (Meteorite 119).
Like in Mirka’s conversation with Fruma’s mother, her great-great-grandmother mentions details
Mirka wouldn’t have otherwise known, implying that she is a ghost rather than a hallucination.
This example contrasts with an earlier moment in Meteorite, when Mirka thinks of her greatgreat-grandmother to give herself courage before battling Metty—it is implied from the context
there that this is just an image/vision in Mirka’s mind, projected visually: i.e. the great-great
grandmother appears briefly and only repeats what Fruma already told Mirka, providing no new
information beyond what Mirka already knows (Meteorite 88)—both of which contrast with her
depiction in the outer-space incident. While these incidents are not directly connected to
dybbuks, they do emphasize a theme of deceased Jewish figures showing up as spirits or ghosts
in dire times, to give encouragement and advice—a phenomenon that, while not unique to
Judaism, has textual and folkloric roots dating back to medieval Jewish sources.222
Another example of a dybbuk allusion is that of the magical wishing fish from book
three, who is that story’s antagonist. The fish cannot speak on its own, so it possesses Layele’s
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body, using her throat to speak and using her physical body to perform its own will, such as
when it forces Layele to chop off her hair. Interestingly, Hereville’s earlier reference to the
dybbuk—Mirka’s vision of her mother’s spirit—portrays a dybbuk (or, Mirka and Fruma’s
concept of a dybbuk) as a ghost-like manifestation. This contrasts with the traditional
conception of the dybbuk or ibbur as a disembodied (and invisible) soul/spirit possessing a living
body, and speaking or acting through that live body-host, e.g. David Shank’s possession of
Dahlia in Path (discussed in chapter four above). The antagonist fish from Fish, however,
alludes specifically to the spirit-possessing trope, albeit not labeled dybbuk or ibbur, and albeit
the fact that the fish—the possessor—is alive rather than dead. Unlike Shank in Path, the fish in
Hereville is an overtly sinister possessor of Layele’s body, forcing her to harm herself and her
family. Whereas Path’s depiction of benign possession explicitly references older kabbalistic
understandings of ibburim, Hereville’s depiction of evil possession implicitly nods to later
conceptualizations of dybbukim and ibburim as evil, as well as to secular traditions of evil
possession (in general) that abound in contemporary media, e.g., Ginny in Harry Potter and the
Chamber of Secrets (1998).
The main antagonists, as well, depict certain Jewish thematics. Visually, both the witch
and troll portray traits that are stereotypically “Jewish”: both display prominent noses (the
witch’s nose markedly resembling Fruma’s); the troll’s face in general looks like a caricature of
an old Jewish man (see figure below). The troll, rather than dueling Mirka with swords,
challenges her to a knitting battle, and knits her a homey sweater. When he presents her with the
sweater, saying, “I’ve created a lovely sweater in your size,” he is the exact picture of the
stereotypical grandmother, holding up a modestly-necked sweater with primly-rowed flowers
(Sword 129). His face, as he holds up the sweater, looks absurdly anxious (eyes slanted and
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brow furrowed in concern, mouth turned down)—absurd, because in holding up his perfect
sweater he should instead be wearing a triumphant expression, at winning the duel. Instead,
readers are reminded, visually, of the elderly (Jewish, but not exclusively Jewish) relative who
brings homemade sweaters on visits. The fact that this “elderly relative”-esque monster is about
to eat Mirka further brings to mind Maurice Sendak’s wild things and his well-known comment
that they were based on his Jewish relatives, who threatened to “eat him up” when he was a child
(Eichler-Levine, Suffer 132). If one contrasts the image of the troll with the earlier, draft
versions (in the Sword appendix “Sketchbook”), the troll’s “Jewish” look stands out even more
against the earlier versions that—while monstrous—do not specifically evoke Jewish visual
tropes.
Both Mendy and Hereville subvert traditional tropes in their depictions of monsters:
Mendy’s golem is a literal baby, who cries, is not yet able to speak language, and is adopted into
the family because he needs to be looked after. The golem’s huge size contrasts starkly with his
infantile state of development, turning what would be a fearsome creature and narrative moment
of terror into comedy.223 For instance, when the protagonists first discover Shalom, their initial
fear of him evaporates when he begins crying gargantuan tears that pool waist-deep around the
humans, prompting Rabbi Klein to recognize that Shalom is merely a “BABY golem” who
“needs someone to watch over him” (Vol. 1, no. 1, original emphasis). Even as he grows up
slightly over the course of the issues, Shalom the Golem is depicted as, overall, easily scared,
ignorant and unskilled in fighting, and disinterested in fighting unless it is in defense of himself
or loved ones. The comics’ various plotlines center on Shalom as the victim, and the
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children/adults needing to rescue him, as often as the reverse. Even when Shalom and/or the
humans are triumphant, the text always overtly emphasizes that their success came not from
Shalom’s strength or the humans’ cunning, but from god. Such emphasis clearly stems from the
comics’ religious pedagogical agenda; however it still de-emphasizes the golem’s monstrous
strength, complementing the depiction of his personality as specifically un-monstrous, but rather
as one of the family.224
Hereville, too, depicts monsters in more ambiguous and vulnerable tones. The troll’s
emphasis on knitting, feminized/emasculated mannerisms, and avuncular attitude towards Layele
in particular (one which seems sincere), make him seem more like a cantankerous relative than
an evil creature. The witch, troll, meteorite, and fish all emphasize intellectual prowess rather
than physical, and the crises that arise—the challenges Mirka faces—are, at core, emotional and
psychological challenges (both internal and external) rather than physical ones (contrast this with
the plethora of superhero-comics narratives emphasizing physical battles, crises, and prowess).
All of the antagonists in the series—excepting, perhaps, the fish—are humanized, shown to be
multifaceted, and even help the protagonists at times, albeit when it serves the antagonist’s
interests. Still, none of the antagonists are depicted as purely villainous: each is shown to have a
rationale and life beyond the direct focus of the protagonist’s quest (i.e. subverting the traditional
“antagonist is here to thwart the protagonist/quest” motif), and each complicates the traditional
Manichean villains of much children’s fantasy. (This is distinct from the villains in Mendy, who
do fall into such traditional Manichean frameworks, and are almost purposefully, and comically,
flat.)
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Both Hereville and Mendy render monsters more ambiguous than the traditional, simple
"evil" monsters in much children's fantasy. Rather, Hereville and Mendy depict monsters as
vulnerable and emasculated in different ways: infantile, relative-like, emphasizing intellect rather
than physical prowess.
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Conclusion

All of the texts discussed in this dissertation offer new, feminist reimaginings of religiospiritualities that embrace an approach of affirmation-through-critique—of advocating for
critique and questioning as an integral part of religio-spiritual expression. All also depict ontoepistemologies that embrace multiple, fluid notions of “truth” and “reality” rather than static,
singular ones.
My hope is that this dissertation raises more questions than it answers, and opens many
more doors for future scholarship in different directions. There are so many writers whose works
fit perfectly within the scope of this dissertation, yet whose work I had to exclude merely for
sake of time and actually getting the project done. These writers include, for example, Virginia
Hamilton, Joan Aiken, Diane Duane, David Almond, Bruce Coville, Lois Lowry, Susan Cooper,
Ellen Kushner, and Jane Yolen, just to give some examples of twentieth-century authors. As I
mentioned in the introduction and throughout the dissertation, even more authors are due
inclusion if we expand the scope to include picture books, books published prior to 1960,
“adult”-marketed speculative fiction, pulp magazines, and literature from countries other than the
United States and England and/or in languages other than English. And this is simply if we
expand the author/text dataset but maintain the same driving inquiries of this dissertation—when
of course the latter can be expanded and changed as well.
One aim of my dissertation was to open, or further open, conversations about different
areas of literature that are marginalized in current English academia. My goal was not to be
exhaustive, but to provide a few key examples and to point the way as to where more work could
follow. Thus, for instance, the poetry discussed in chapter one. Much, much more work needs
to be done on kabbalistic poetry of the early and mid-twentieth century, particularly of the
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“Abulafian circles,” of which chapter one only skims the surface. This dissertation also opens
the door for a project that moves away from religious questions entirely, toward instead the
question of feminist children’s fantasy writers—particularly of the 1960s to 1990s, but perhaps
stretching further back to writers such as Nesbit and Weilerstein as well. There’s a story waiting
to be told about the lines of connection between writers such as Jones, McKinley, Wrede,
Kushner, Pierce, and others—about direct and indirect relationships, and about the “sudden
flowering of heroines,” in Levy and Mendlesohn’s words (Children’s Fantasy Literature,
chapter 7)—the sudden slew of feminist children’s fantasy.
Clearly, one of my main arguments throughout this dissertation has been to expand the
category of “Jewish literature,” and I hope that some of the doors this dissertation opens can do
exactly that, in numerous ways. More scholarship is needed on Jewish children’s literature, on
Jewish speculative fiction, on Jewish graphic novels and comics. I happened to choose Jewishfantastical, and Jewish-children’s-fantastical, literature as my subject matter here—partly
because of personal preference and partly to make this argument for categorical expansion in its
most “extreme” form. My informal, personal sense is that the vanguards of “Jewish (/American)
Literature” are still fairly tightly and conservatively drawn: with privileging of Ashkenazic
perspectives, of “adult”-marketed literature, and, within prose, of the topical trinity that confer
unquestioned “Jewish” status upon their literary vessels: the Holocaust, immigration, and Israel.
I think that, subconsciously at first, I set to disrupt that as emphatically as possible with my
choice of primary texts in this dissertation. It’s one thing to argue that “classic” (a.k.a. realist)
children’s fiction that has explicit Jewish content should be part of the Jewish literary canon—
such as the works of Sydney Taylor, Judy Blume, or E. L. Konigsburg. It’s another to argue for
Starglass or Hammer, or to consider how Jones’ work might, in some ways, explore a Jewish or
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kabbalistic/midrashic fantastic. If the juxtapositions and cross-comparisons within this
dissertation are at all compelling, then hopefully it will give momentum to other inquiries that
expand the boundaries of “Jewish” literature and interdisciplinary studies.
Overlapping, but distinct, is the concept of a “Jewish fantastic”; I can envision scholarly
inquiries exploring this idea within literature as well as other areas, such as Jewish history,
sociology, religion, cultural studies, and film, drama, and other areas of art. Similarly, the
question of religion and fantasy in literature—beyond simply a Jewish fantastic—is one that
begins before this dissertation and will continue after it. I hope that this dissertation offers some
new ways to conceptualize such future projects. I found fantasy-theoretical lenses exceedingly
fruitful even in unexpected applications, such as kabbalistic, Beat poetry; perhaps similar crosspollination can continue to highlight religio-spiritual, ethnic, and cultural processes at play in
literary texts. Given the emphases among the theories I’ve employed here on ontoepistemological subversion/critique, postcolonial, queer, and indigenous literatures would be
logical areas to include (both regarding literary/primary texts and theoretical frameworks) in
future endeavors building on this conversation.
These questions, and more, can have implications not only for literary studies, but for
gender/sexuality studies, religion studies (particularly studies of religion and feminism),
childhood studies, and sociological and cultural-studies scholarship as well.
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